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My title refers primarily to the following passage in Collingwood’s Autobiography: 
 
But of course it was no longer a ‘closed’ subject. It was no longer a body of 
facts which a very, very learned man might know, or a very, very big book 
enumerate, in their completeness. It was an ‘open’ subject, an inexhaustible 
fountain of problems, old problems re-opened and new problems formulated 
that had not been formulated until now. Above all, it was a constant warfare 
against the dogmas, often positively erroneous, and always vicious in so far as 
they were dogmatic, of that putrefying corpse of historical thought, the 
‘information’ to be found in text-books.1 
 
It refers also to an earlier passage from Collingwood’s essay ‘Croce’s Philosophy of History’: 
 
In the past the Oxford “Greats” school has stood for this ideal of the cross-
fertilisation of history and philosophy, even when the coordination of the two 
sides has been worst, and the undergraduate has seemed to be merely reading 
two different schools at once, under tutors who regarded each other as rivals for 
his attention; but in the future the whole question will be reopened, and 
philosophy may either contract a new alliance with the natural sciences, or retire 
into single blessedness as an independent subject like Forestry or Geography, or 
force herself into the company of Modern History, disguised perhaps under the 
inoffensive name of Political Theory.2 
 
It refers also to a passage in An Essay on Metaphysics: “It represented the typical nineteenth-
century conviction that all questions about fundamentals had been settled and must on no 
account be reopened”.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 A, p. 75 
2 Essays in the Philosophy of History, William Debbins (ed.) (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1965), p. 5 
3 EM, p. 96 
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Conventions 
 
It is greatly to the liberty of the author that doctoral theses may be written without the 
obligations and limitations of a house style guide. I have eschewed certain stylistic conventions of 
contemporary writing here for the sake of what I hope will be easy reading. The third person 
singular is given throughout as ‘he’, and the reader referred to as ‘he’, without any intended 
gender-political message. By using ‘he’ I do not intend to deny that women exist, that they read, 
or that they make equally wonderful academics; and I do not think that this traditional usage 
retards the legitimate causes of truly liberal feminism. 
I have left contracted forms – can’t, couldn’t, shouldn’t, etc. – as they are in the spoken 
language of the world’s native English speakers, and as they are to be found in the written works 
of Thomas Hardy, Thomas Hobbes, and William Shakespeare. I have also not made a rule of it, 
but have allowed context, emphasis, and tone to inform the decision to use ‘have not’ rather than 
‘haven’t, or vice versa. 
I have eschewed as far as possible the jargon that is to be encountered at least 
somewhere in all of philosophy’s subfields. If ‘jargon’ is technical language misliked, ‘technical 
language’ is too often jargon legitimized by would-be technocratic experts. I hope that this means 
the reader will never have to ask himself ‘What does he mean?’, and that he will enjoy the benefit 
of seeing any errors of reasoning in the plain light of day, rather than suffer the need to decode 
my prose in order to discover them. There are, in Collingwood scholarship, debates over whether 
(and if so how) Collingwood should be referred to as an ‘idealist’, an ‘Hegelian’, a ‘Kantian’, or 
whether (and if so how) his philosophy is to be read as ‘historicist’, ‘dialectical’, and so on. I have 
not entered these debates here, and this is part of the reason why I have avoided these contested 
terms as far as I have been able to. For the philosophically-trained they can be misleading unless 
used with sometimes extensive qualification, and for the philosophically-untrained reader they are 
discouraging. Collingwood’s philosophy can be explicated without such terms – as his own 
writings demonstrate. 
The full titles of most of Collingwood’s published books begin with the word ‘The’ or 
‘An’: The Idea of History, The Principles of History, An Autobiography. Much of the time I have taken 
the liberty of dropping the article for the sake of normal English usage. So I have sometimes 
referred to ‘Collingwood’s Autobiography’, ‘his Autobiography’, ‘the Autobiography’, and so on. 
Likewise I have sometimes referred to ‘his Essay on Philosophical Method’, though the full title is An 
Essay on Philosophical Method. I have preferred this small modification to the awkward formulation 
‘Collingwood’s An Essay on Philosophical Method’. The convention of other Collingwood 
commentators is to retain the full title with article, though there have also been some who, I 
think unwisely, crop The Idea of History at the wrong end, resulting in The Idea. (Compared with 
such usages I doubt the reader will find my omission of articles very confusing.) 
Double quotation marks are reserved throughout for direct quotation, and single 
quotation marks for everything else including ‘scare quoting’.1 In quotation I have left all 
punctuation marks as they appear in the original. I have silently changed upper-case letters into 
lower-case where the beginning of a sentence is being incorporated into a running sentence of 
my own, unless I’ve thought meaning to be affected, in which case I’ve simply retained original 
capitalization even in the middle of sentences. I’ve used scare quotes for ‘question and answer’ in 
order to hold it together as a kind of concept, and where I have omitted them it’s because I’ve 
used the term in full as ‘the logic of question and answer’ or ‘the theory of question and answer’. 
And I have hyphenated it (as question-and-answer, usually without quotation marks) according to 
the norms of compound adjectives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 An example of this working nicely is A. P. Martinich, Hobbes: A Biography [1999] (Cambridge University 
Press, 2007) 
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So it is necessary, as I have said, that men who live together in any sort of 
institution regularly take stock of themselves, either as a result of external 
shocks or of internal factors… and my claim is that those changes are healthy 
that bring them back to their founding principles. 
 
– Niccolò Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy (ca. 1517)1 
 
 
 
 
 
So his exposition of this work not seldom betrays a tone of resentment against 
the persons who ought to be doing it: a resentment due to the fact that their 
neglect of their own work has forced him to do something for which he feels 
that he is not qualified and in which he accordingly fears that he is making a 
fool of himself. 
 
– R. G. Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics (1939)2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Machiavelli, Discourses Book III, ch. 1. David Wootton (ed. and trans.), Selected Political Writings 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), pp. 190-1, 189 
2 EM, p. 87 
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Part I 
 
Introductions 
 
 
 
Each autumn, in universities from Cardiff to Sydney, young men and women in 
their late teens or early twenties find themselves in seminar rooms invited to discuss the 
writings of long-dead European males (mostly males) concerning events and situations 
that are no longer happening. But these young people are not history students. They are 
not literature students either, necessarily. They are politics undergraduates. Many of them 
are already political activists of some shade and some of them, when all this is over, will 
want to ‘go out’ into the world and make changes to it. They have come to get equipped 
for the dangers of real-life political action1; to get a politics degree which might make 
them attractive candidates for civil service positions or for an assistantship at party HQ. 
They are equipping for the future, they want to know about the future, and they want to be 
prepared for the currents in which they will soon have to swim: the networks, hierarchies 
and channels of influence in conjunction with which they will have to operate – present 
networks, today’s hierarchies and perhaps even tomorrow’s. Yet here they are, engaging 
not only with today’s political problems, but with yesterday’s, or with those of several 
centuries past; with Plato’s Republic, Hobbes’s Leviathan, and with a whole cast of authors 
whose works and words belong, as they soon realise, to the problems of their own time, 
and seem to offer very little for the solution of today’s. Even on the level of ideology, the 
challenges of Hobbes, of Rousseau, or of Burke to current thinking are weakened by 
attendant contexts that are no longer happening, by their ill-suitedness to popular revival, 
and by their undemocratic obsolescence. 
This is not new, of course. We’ve been doing this to undergraduates for 
generations. And whether they realise it or not, they are being initiated into the outer 
circle of a very old society. It is called the ‘History of Political Thought’, or the ‘History 
of Political Theory’, or the ‘History of Ideas’, ‘Great Texts’, ‘Greats’, or some variant 
thereof. Its outer circle is a teaching space where familiarity with the canon is cultivated, 
some sense of ideological heritage insinuated, and where some of the rudimentary 
techniques of the brotherhood are tenderly bequeathed. But this is really only the surface. 
                                                 
1 NL, 2.52-3; 28.1 
 - 12 -
Deeper within there are initiates who ‘stayed behind’, who continue to read, 
analyse and pursue understanding of the canon (eventually they even dispense with the 
idea of the canon), and they stay up late, arguing with each other across the centuries, 
crossing analyses and challenging the legitimacy of each other’s genealogies. There are 
also those who, as well as all this, discuss the very techniques they use in their vocation, 
attempt to sort out who is doing it well, and who is doing it badly; try to formulate 
clarifications of what it means to do it well, and why doing it that way rather than this 
way perverts the whole endeavour. It is inevitable that there should be this subgroup of 
meta-operators: as history produces questions about not only the past but also about 
itself, so this apparent sub-discipline, the history of ideas, does the same. Questions arise 
about not only past ways of thinking, but also about, (1) how we should or should not be 
carrying out our studies of those thinkers, and (2) why we should be doing so at all. 
These are two questions which seem to me to arise out of any engagement with this 
discipline inevitably, however qualified and however fleeting or otherwise that contact 
might be. Certainly those undergraduates ask themselves and each other why they are 
being led around this museum of curiosities, how they should navigate it, and why the 
museum exists at all – though the outer circle is not considered an appropriate place for 
that kind of discussion. 
The present study is an attempt to make sense of some of what has been heard in 
these ‘inner-circle’ arguments in the history of political thought, carried out by one who 
has only relatively recently been able to progress from the outer circle, but who still 
regularly returns there on pedagogical duties. 
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i 
Questions 
 
The two questions we open with are, then: 
 
1. How ought the history of ideas to be done? and 
2. Why ought the history of ideas to be done? 
 
Because the history of ideas concerns itself overwhelmingly with the study of the 
written word, recent decades have seen certain of these questions (but mostly the first 
one, concerning how exactly we should be doing it) answered by recruiting the 
sophisticated and often technical kind of philosophy of language that arose following the 
Second World War. What historians of political thought are doing, one might for 
instance answer, is actually revealing or illustrating linguistic paradigms and the story of 
them. They should be analysing changes in political ‘languages’. 
But the second question, which concerns the purpose or value of the history of 
ideas, is just as important. Why should there be historians of political thought? And why 
should politics undergraduates, whose parents and society at large think of them as 
preparing for the future, be at all interested in old debates that no longer seem relevant, 
or be made to ‘engage’ with the past at all? 
This seems to me to be at the present time quite a pressing question. Most 
parochially, patterns of resource distribution have changed quite noticeably in Western 
universities, particularly in the UK, as society thinks its needs are evolving, and there’s a 
common feeling that the humanities are not profiting from these developments. There is 
a general sense that, as university education becomes more vocational, a focus on ‘soft’ 
subjects like history, philosophy, and other ‘theoretical’ disciplines puts a graduate 
seeking immediate employment at a disadvantage beside candidates boasting a 
background in ‘hard’ sciences, or in engineering, or in mathematics – applied or 
otherwise. ‘Soft’ subjects don’t teach you how to make anything, or how to sell anything. 
They are, so popular thinking seems to assume, luxury subjects. 
It is no longer much of a surprise that the value of certain academic subjects 
should suffer regular reassessment, or that the humanities disciplines in particular are 
never far from the very top of the reappraisal hit-list. Many of my colleagues consider 
this to be a regrettable inevitability in a philistine society where those who set the political 
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agenda are predominantly ‘practical people’, vocational people, and where people are in 
the unconscious utilitarian habit of asking what everything is ‘for’. Most of my 
colleagues, however delicately they might put it, think this practical thinking is out of 
place with regard to disciplines like the history of political thought. They think of it as a 
low-brow category error, and would rather there were certain disciplines that were 
respected and transferred unquestioned, while continuing to enjoy generous public 
funding wherever else it were reduced or cut, even if those practices do not fit 
comfortably with the language of ends, means, and purposive action. 
I think my colleagues are wrong to think that there are some academic disciplines 
that shouldn’t have their value and purpose questioned, and I think their arguments for 
the protection of important disciplines can be more convincing than they usually are. The 
history of political thought has a great weapon in its versatility. We have already seen that 
it can change its name. It can also reposition itself among the quasi-systematic 
organisation of ‘fields’ that comprises academia. If philosophy falls, the history of 
political thought stays standing, not as philosophy, but as history. And if history comes 
under attack next, history of political thought can be repositioned as an essential part of 
political education, and politics is not really ‘soft’. (There is, after all, such a thing as 
political science.) But it is entirely healthy that a society reappraise the actions and 
behaviours that go on within it, and in its name. It is entirely normal for a community to 
prioritize its activities when the option of maintaining all is no longer available, and it is 
democratically healthy that discussions of this nature, within a community, be held 
openly, frankly, and responsibly. We don’t need democratic government to survive, or 
even to be happy; but if for whatever reason we are attached to it, we should realise that 
that difficult system depends on people thinking beyond their own interest group and 
discussing the public good properly, and acting according to good reason – rather than 
simply making pleas for their interest group and acting according to appetite.1 
This second question, ‘Why ought the history of ideas to be done?’, is, then, 
typically answered in different sorts of discussion from those in which historians and 
philosophers answer questions of historical method. Thus these ‘methodological debates’ 
in the history of ideas, asking what historians are (not) doing, and what they ought (not) 
to be doing, are in state of rude academic health. But the question of why the discipline 
should be maintained at all is mostly left aside for magazine articles and so on. And even 
                                                 
1 See NL, 21.2-23 
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if a good answer to that question is given, it will not typically be clear how it relates to 
those ‘methodological’ discussions. 
I have found during the present study that this disconnection of the ‘why’ 
question from the ‘how’ question is not a necessary one, and that ideas concerning ‘how’ 
history is done can be bound, and bound profitably, to ideas about why it is done in the 
first place. Indeed, it is common sense that you don’t know the right way to do 
something until you know what you’re doing it for. If the aims of an endeavour change, 
then the best means for achieving them should surely change as well. 
I have started dozens of hares already, and a study of this length cannot hope to 
catch all of them for good by the close. It is anyway not my intention to do so. I want 
rather to direct the reader’s attention to one past contributor to this warren of 
questioning who is generally considered to be of some importance to the ways in which 
subsequent answers have been offered and arranged during the last sixty years. 
 
 
ii 
Why study Collingwood? 
 
The Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy (1935-41) and historian (and 
archaeologist and amateur yachtsman), R. G. Collingwood (1889-1943) is at once a late 
figure of ‘British idealism’, though he accepted the label only reluctantly,1 and an early 
figure in these twentieth-century ‘methodological debates’ in the history of ideas.2 His 
writings in the philosophy of history have a lasting appeal, not only because his thinking 
so obviously springs from the everyday experience of a working historian with earth 
under his fingernails, but also because, despite the air of straightforwardness and 
philosophical freedom with which he writes, Collingwood aspires to formulate a 
philosophy of history grounded ‘in its own past’.3 It is towards this end that he draws on 
                                                 
1 A, pp. 56-7. The best response to debates over Collingwood’s ‘idealism’ is probably to be offered by 
quoting in full NL, 5.2-39 
2 Or at least, he is cited as an influence or inspiration by some later contributors. See for example Quentin 
Skinner, ‘Some Problems in the Analysis of Political Thought and Action,’ Political Theory, vol. 2, no. 3 
(Aug., 1974), pp. 283-4. See also Richard Tuck, ‘The Contribution of History’, in Robert E. Goodin & 
Philip Pettit (eds) A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford, 1993) pp. 72-89 
3 Fred Inglis describes Collingwood’s “exasperation” at the “routine professional error, which was to argue 
with past thinkers as though they all – Plato, Leibniz, Spinoza, Kant, and company – were there together in 
Oxford in 1912”. And adds that it became Collingwood’s life’s work “to archaeologise the foundations of 
belief, and to do so by excavating the strata of belief-formation as these were made visible in the 
morphology of differing, adjacent, and interpenetrating disciplines of the mind”. See Fred Inglis, History 
Man: The Life of R. G. Collingwood (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2011), pp. 74, 91 
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his broad and detailed knowledge of the history of the philosophy of history. And if we 
cannot share his breadth and depth of knowledge, we can at least take inspiration from 
the approach. 
It was because of the breadth of Collingwood’s knowledge of other thinkers that 
I, unlike most Collingwood scholars, first came to him in his capacity as a secondary 
author. I was interested in what The Idea of History, which I had come across more or less 
by chance, had to tell me about German philosophy of history from Hegel onwards. But 
it was what I found in Part V of The Idea of History – the ‘Epilegomena’ containing 
Collingwood’s own philosophy – that caught my attention and quickly superseded in my 
interest what I had until then been looking for. Surveying from the present the history of 
the philosophy of history, one’s attention is held rather longer by what Collingwood 
offers: intriguing claims – sometimes bold, sometimes suggestive; a refreshingly direct, 
frank and personal style; and a backstory to these works which reveals an unceasingly 
active man digging with the local archaeology society, yachting on the Mediterranean, and 
working on his books in decidedly ‘holiday’ settings – under the plane trees on the 
terrace of a French country house; on the deck of a cruise ship bound for the Dutch East 
Indies; or in a sweltering hotel room in Surabaya. There is an undeniable romance about 
Collingwood’s story to which even his most focused and analytic commentators find it 
hard to remain immune.1 
Past romances, of course, don’t carry the urgency of present realities. But it is not 
on romantic grounds that I’m returning to Collingwood. It is because he is now generally 
recognised as a founding figure of the twentieth-century English-language tradition of 
the philosophical problems thrown up by historical interpretation. It is probably not 
surprising that his voice is echoed in today’s debates about how history and historical 
interpretation are to be done. Today’s contributors working in English are almost always 
familiar with Collingwood, many still cite him explicitly, and some even identify him as 
the author who ignited their interest in problems of this kind in the first place.2 The 
common ground of today’s ‘intentionalists’3 with Collingwood, if not their debt to him, is 
probably the most obvious: understanding an action, for Collingwood, means 
                                                 
1 See W. J. van der Dussen, History as a Science: The Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1981), pp. 61, 128. See also Inglis, History Man, p. 138, and Tomlin, R. G. Collingwood (London: Longmans, 
Green & Co., 1953), p. 37 
2 Dussen provides a brief overview of Collingwood’s reception between the publication of The Idea of 
History and his own time of writing (1981). See Dussen, History as a Science, p. 2 
3 See for example (and for my understanding of the meaning of the term ‘intentionalist’) Mark Bevir, ‘How 
to Be an Intentionalist’, History and Theory vol. 41, no. 2 (May, 2002), pp. 209-17 
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understanding the agent’s intention, what he was trying to do – or, for understanding a 
text, what he was trying to say. The common ground of the school known commonly as 
the ‘Cambridge School’ or, a little more technically, as ‘linguistic contextualists’ – such as 
J. G. A. Pocock, and especially Quentin Skinner – is perhaps less obvious, despite their 
own claims. Each of these schools has brought considerations to the study of historical 
texts that are not to be found in Collingwood. But from what follows I think it should be 
obvious to the reader that the big foundational claims of some of today’s writers are 
(also) Collingwood’s. 
Among scholars of British Idealism Collingwood is today very extensively, very 
regularly and, I think, very skilfully discussed. It was once normal to describe 
Collingwood as a neglected thinker. It then became merely possible to say this. It would 
now be quite untrue. There is an ever-growing body of literature focused on 
Collingwood, and I think of an unusually high average standard for that focused on a 
single thinker.1 So now Collingwood’s exact meaning when he says such-and-such is the 
subject of innumerable articles; the precise nature of his relationship with, or influence 
by, whomsoever-you-please is the cause of much dispute, and his thinking on history 
specifically is the focus of a handful of brilliant works that could, or even should, be 
considered masterpieces of philosophy in their own right. (I have in mind particularly 
Alan Donagan’s The Later Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood.) But most Collingwood scholars 
are primarily interested in the ideas of the man himself, and not as much with what the 
implications might be of Collingwood’s ideas for those still writing on recognisably 
continuous problems.2 So another reason for selecting Collingwood for an extended 
study of this kind is that both of these fields – which are perhaps less well-acquainted 
than would be to their mutual benefit – might have something to gain, in however small 
a way, from their co-involvement in the same inquiry. That is, at least, the hope. 
Some of the arguments Collingwood offers support positions that are now very 
much in retreat. The main one of interest to us here is that history is, or can be, a science. 
What is at stake in such a claim makes it worth revisiting. Jan van der Dussen has 
recently written that “in the present postmodern era a claim such as this is completely 
                                                 
1 This is due largely to the research community of the Collingwood and British Idealism Centre based since 
2000 at Cardiff University, which publishes the Collingwood and British Idealism Studies journal (Incorporating 
Bradley Studies) and in 2004 produced a fine series of books on Collingwood by James Connelly, Marnie 
Hughes-Warrington, and Stein Helgeby. (See bibliography) 
2 There are of course plenty of exceptions to this rule. Gary Browning, for instance, devotes fifteen pages 
of his Rethinking R. G. Collingwood to comparing/applying Collingwood’s arguments to those of Rawls, 
Lyotard, and MacIntyre. See Gary K. Browning, Rethinking R. G. Collingwood: Philosophy, Politics and the Unity 
of Theory and Practice (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp.154-69 
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disregarded and even ridiculed on the grounds that history is a branch of literature 
without any scientific pretensions. It is remarkable”, he adds, “that Collingwood scholars 
themselves have hardly paid attention to this claim”.1 Here I have paid nearly exclusive 
attention to what Collingwood says about history as a science, a form of systematic 
inquiry – or what Dussen calls “historical reasoning”. In relation to present debates 
about the history of ideas, the importance of this is further underlined by Dussen – albeit 
a little dramatically: 
 
It is conspicuous… that in the present theoretical studies on history the 
relevance of historical reasoning is hardly noticed. This has an obvious reason, 
of course. For because of the notorious ‘linguistic turn’ in historical theory, the 
interest in historical reasoning and inquiry has almost vanished, history being 
reduced to story-telling without any claim to truth or relevance.2 
 
According to Collingwood, “a philosophy which ignores its own history is a 
philosophy which spends its labour only to rediscover errors long dead”.3 It is with this in 
mind that I’m returning us to the writings of this dead European male to ask, first, how 
he answered those questions and, secondly, once those answers have been disentangled, 
whether they were (and are) good and right answers. 
We must establish first that those questions are the same. Collingwood’s ‘Lectures 
on the Philosophy of History’ of 1926 are set out explicitly with our present questions in 
mind.4 Collingwood outlines his questions as follows. (The present study is concerned 
with only the first two.) The reader will see instantly the correspondences and differences 
between what he wanted to answer in 1926 regarding history and what I want him to 
answer now regarding the history of ideas: 
 
The fundamental question is, what are we doing when we study history? and 
this raises three allied questions: (1) What are we doing it for? in other words, 
how does this study fit into our general view of the aims and purposes of 
human life? (2) What is the best way of doing it? in other words, what are the 
principles of method by which historical study is or ought to be guided? (3) 
                                                 
1 Jan van der Dussen, ‘Collingwood’s Claim that History is a Science’, Collingwood and British Idealism Studies 
vol. 13, no. 2 (2007), pp. 7-8 
2 Dussen, ‘Collingwood’s Claim’, p. 30 
3 EPH, p. 4 
4 In IH, pp. 359-425. The questions are, though, retained in the introduction to The Idea of History. See IH, 
pp. 9-10 
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What are we doing it to? in other words, what is the true nature of the thing 
which we call the past, which historical thought takes as its object?1 
 
Now, where Collingwood’s questions concern history in general, our questions 
concern the history of ideas specifically. But Collingwood is especially useful to our 
inquiry because, for him, all history is the history of thought.2 Historical knowledge of 
ideas is to be found not only in historical texts as expressions of theories and doctrines, 
but also in the ground, through artefacts, and in anything that was evidence of human 
action. The effect of this is that anything Collingwood says about history is to be taken as 
pertaining directly to the history of ideas, and therefore to our questions about it. 
But I don’t only want to know what Collingwood said. I want to know whether 
what he said was right. There is a certain disobedience to this, as there is to all 
Collingwood scholarship, because in his Autobiography Collingwood expressly instructed 
that “if there are any who think my work good, let them show their approval of it by 
attending to their own”.3 All Collingwood scholars have, in one way or another, ignored 
their orders. Alan Donagan opens his classic study of 1962, The Later Philosophy of R. G. 
Collingwood, by saying so quite explicitly, “because it seemed to me that I could not 
economically proceed with my own work until I had taken stock of his”.4 I cannot 
pretend to have taken stock as comprehensively or as masterfully as Donagan has – or as 
W. J. (Jan) van der Dussen has, or as W. (William) H. Dray has, or as has been achieved 
by Louis O. Mink, or by any of a cast of Collingwood scholars whose works, even after 
my years spent referring to them repeatedly, remain impressive and intriguing to me, as 
well as to an embarrassing extent in places beyond my grasp. The ever-growing variety of 
books and articles written about Collingwood offer a further, albeit ‘academic’ reason,5 to 
revisit him. The field is rich, but not unmanageably saturated. It is also not free of error, 
and the present study contains explanations of what I think is the general character of 
some of those errors. Sometimes these explanations prove to be worth expanding on. 
My priority however has been to focus in on those questions broached by 
Collingwood that already interested me, and which I think are important. I have then 
gone as far in my thinking on them and how Collingwood dealt with them as time, 
energy, and intellect would allow. The result, I think, breaks Collingwood’s instruction in 
                                                 
1 L26, published in IH, p. 359 
2 A, p. 110 
3 A, pp. 118-19 
4 Alan Donagan, The Later Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), p. vii 
5 See NL, 2.5-55, 26.22 
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subject matter, but aspires to obey it in the ethic of autonomous practice1 – which is the 
usual method, I suppose, of apprenticeship. 
As such, what follows here is an instance of the overlap of two categories of 
Collingwood scholarship that have been described as “pure” and “applied”.2 The ‘pure’ 
parts concern what Collingwood means, and what sense of it has been made by other 
commentators. The ‘applied’ interrogates his conclusions and those of others. 
My expectation was that the ‘pure’ part, understanding and describing 
Collingwood’s arguments, would be reasonably easy. His works, on first reading, give the 
impression of philosophical simplicity bordering on the simplistic. But on further 
investigation this impression evaporates. Louis Mink is right to say that “the essays 
collected as “Epilegomena” in The Idea of History are in fact very difficult to understand 
and elucidate, although the full extent of their difficulty is concealed by the grace of their 
style and the often compelling qualities of the obiter dicta so often quoted from them”.3 It 
probably demands very little supporting argument to say that it is inherently right to 
establish what an important thinker really meant by what he said. There will probably 
always be a need to do this with Collingwood, since his writings really invite different 
understandings among his readers. Those writings are lucid, inviting, and graceful – but, 
as William H. Dray observes, they are “not always careful. They do not exhibit that love 
of exact language which analytic philosophers have since made de rigueur.”4 Collingwood 
generally avoids technical language out of his preference for communicating meaning 
through context, (in accordance with the norms of literature5); and when he does use 
technical language it can be even more misleading.6 “It thus sometimes requires a certain 
amount of patience”, Dray writes, “and even of goodwill, to elicit a sensible and coherent 
doctrine from what Collingwood actually has to say”.7 A lot of what Collingwood says in 
answer to our opening questions, for example, and a lot of what is ‘methodological’ 
                                                 
1 This is also the approach taken by Donagan. According to Collingwood’s own principle (IH, p. 301), 
Donagan says, “in presenting what I believe to have been Collingwood’s thought, I have tried to be critical; 
and on all major questions to which I think his answer was wrong I give my reasons for thinking so”. 
Donagan, Later Philosophy, pp. 21-2 
2 See David Boucher’s editorial introduction to EPP, p. 1. Boucher’s description is neat: “Without wishing 
to be flippant, or to suggest the mutual exclusiveness of categories… the former [is] concerned to 
understand, in all its complexity, what Collingwood means… while the latter interrogates Collingwood’s 
conclusions, modifies and develops them, and applies them to concrete philosophical problems.” He adds 
in a footnote “The concerns are complementary, and neither is illegitimate, nor takes priority over the 
other.” 
3 Louis O. Mink, Mind, History, and Dialectic: The Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood (Bloomington/London: 
Indiana University Press, 1969), p. 157 
4 Dray, History as Re-enactment [1995] (Oxford: Clarendon, 2001), p. 27 
5 EPM, pp. 201-208 
6 For examples see Dray, History as Re-enactment, p. 27 
7 Dray, History as Re-enactment, p. 31 
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about it, is covered by his phrase ‘historical thinking’. It is a non-technical term which 
sometimes contains, is sometimes contained in, and is sometimes synonymous with, 
other terms including ‘scientific history’, ‘history as a science’, ‘thinking historically’, 
‘historical thought’, ‘historical knowledge’, and ‘understanding’. I have offered in the 
present study an explanation of what Collingwood means by such terms and when he 
means this (whatever it is) rather than that. 
The ‘applied’ part has obliged me to press some of Collingwood’s claims rather 
harder than would be normal in ‘pure’ scholarship. This is despite the temptation to 
extend more sympathy to an author’s arguments than that argument perhaps deserves, 
when one sympathises with other of his contentions.1 There is an attendant temptation to 
assume that, if a great author seems to be wrong about something, one must have 
misunderstood him.2 In such a case the endeavour to reach a point of understanding 
where full agreement is reached can turn out to be never-ending. There is also the more 
malignant temptation to accuse those who criticise one’s author of employing the wrong 
kind of thinking.3 This is partly what sustains the perceived rift between contemporary 
‘analytic’ and ‘continental’ philosophy. This study is not carried out with either an 
‘analytic’ or a ‘continental’ approach in mind. The reader is being offered everyday 
reasoning4 with no special pleading for the exclusive appropriateness of any particular 
tradition. 
I have made the decision not to arrange the ‘pure’ and the ‘applied’ separately. 
Instead I have described and assessed Collingwood’s arguments more or less 
simultaneously. By ‘arguments’ I mean his answers to the questions I’ve opened with and 
the reasoning he offers to support them. My initial plan was to describe those answers in 
the first part of the study, and then to return to them in the second with a fresh 
‘evaluative’ attitude. The arguments about ‘what he thought’, which are essentially 
historical arguments, could then be tidily separated from the ‘was he right?’ arguments. 
I’ve decided, in the end, that this expects the reader to carry too much detail in his 
                                                 
1 Marnie Hughes-Warrington is particularly sympathetic about Collingwood’s tenuous connexion of history 
to civilization via dutiful action. See Marnie Hughes-Warrington, ‘How Good an Historian Shall I Be?’ R.G. 
Collingwood, the Historical Imagination and Education (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2003), pp. 168-69, 178 
2 W. H. Dray is to be commended as an example of a commentator who is not afraid to say when he thinks 
Collingwood is wrong about something. See for example Dray, History as Re-enactment, pp. 72-80 
3 Marnie Hughes-Warrington, for example, writes that “Problematic too are the views of concepts that are 
commonly coupled with the analytic approach, which are not sufficiently expansive and dynamic to match 
Collingwood’s contribution to philosophical thought”. Hughes-Warrington, p. 8 
4 By ‘reason’ I follow Collingwood in meaning plainly “thinking one thing, x, because you think another 
thing, y; where y is your ‘reason’ or, as it is sometimes called, your ‘ground’ for thinking x”. (NL, 14. 1) To 
Collingwood’s own basic definition of ‘reason’, a distinction between ‘continental’ and ‘analytic’ reasoning 
does not pertain. All that is important, in either ‘style’, is whether thinking y is a good reason for thinking x. 
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memory from one half of the study to the other, and thereby expects the reader to do 
much of the organizational work that really ought to have been mine. Dussen’s History as 
a Science exhibits this division and, although it works perfectly well there, I found myself 
constantly flicking back to Dussen’s descriptive sections when I was really trying to grasp 
his own arguments on the same point much later in the book. So the organizational 
principle here is to keep what is being discussed together in one place, rather than to 
disperse points across the study in order to unite the descriptive attitude in one place and 
the evaluative in another. It is anyway easy enough for the reader to realise that when I 
say something like ‘Collingwood’s mistake is presupposing x’, I am simultaneously 
claiming that he thinks x (the description), and that thinking x was a mistake (the 
evaluation). 
 
 
iii 
Conception and design of the study 
 
It is quite common practice today to ‘offer a reading’ of an author, or of a 
particular school of thought or argument. If this were my intention then I would 
introduce my ‘reading’ here by claiming that ‘question and answer’ is the key concept, 
and that everything should be ‘read through’ the theory of question and answer. I might 
add that the study was an ‘attempt’ (they are often ‘attempts’) to take the theory of 
question and answer seriously. 
I have avoided the language of ‘offering a reading’ here because of 
dissatisfactions with what often results from that kind of task. A ‘reading’ can be made 
very easily to operate as an academic smokescreen behind which things can be said 
without the usual requirements of evidence which would not have been permitted 
without the cover a ‘reading’ affords. A commentator can say that he is offering a 
‘reading’, for example, when he really wants to suggest that this (whatever it is) is what 
his author meant. But because it is only a ‘reading’ of the author’s texts, and not a full 
historical claim about his intentions, the commentator is not required to offer much in 
the way of evidence to demonstrate that this is what the author did in fact mean. 
Providing a ‘reading’, in short, can be used as cover for perpetuating what Mink has 
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called a ‘fictional’ version of a thinker.1 Meanwhile the ‘reading’ being offered can 
function as a more substantive philosophical argument which demands that a certain set 
of conclusions be ‘taken seriously’. But, because it is only the commentator’s ‘reading’ of 
what an author is saying, or what ‘light’ he throws on the issue, and not necessarily that 
commentator’s own argument, he can offer it without any new reasons for thinking that 
conclusion sound. Of course the language of a ‘reading’ can be used, and has been used, 
to refer quite explicitly to an historical claim, or a philosophical claim that is the author’s 
own, and excellent scholarship can result. But it is because I am aware of these 
ambiguities permitted by offering ‘readings’ that I have chosen to avoid saying that that is 
what I’m doing. 
I have instead tried to do the exact opposite. I have argued that Collingwood’s 
conclusions are philosophically strong, but that the arguments which, as a matter of 
historical assertion, he tried and succeeded in offering, are not as strong as they could 
have been in view of his own logic of question and answer. Collingwood is at the height 
of his philosophical powers when he argues by reference to ‘question and answer’, so 
where he failed to do so I have said so, and have then shown how arguing by recourse to 
the logic of question and answer can demonstrate the sense of Collingwood’s answer 
anyway. 
‘Question and answer’ is, then, the central ‘thread’ from which the ensuing 
arguments and discussions presented here have been hung. Because ‘question and 
answer’ figures so centrally, I have devoted Part II to explaining what it is, what 
Collingwood says about it, and what is additionally valuable about it. 
With Part II out of the way and the theory of question and answer explained and 
discussed, we return in Part III to Collingwood’s particular arguments about history. I 
have not sought to discuss every argument and every point made in Collingwood’s 
writings about history, since the attempt to do so in a work of this length would be 
suffocating for reader and author alike. I have instead selected those arguments which are 
important (a) because they have a significant presence in Collingwood scholarship and 
there are, or have been, debates about them which I think I can help to resolve; (b) 
because they offer something to contemporary debates about the history of ideas as they 
are still being carried out; or (c) because they are correct and valuable points, even 
                                                 
1 Mink explains: “By ‘fictional’, of course, I mean the sense in which Shakespeare’s or Shaw’s Julius Caesar 
is fictional, not that in which Mr. Pickwick is fictional. The fictional Collingwood is not an invention but an 
interpretation”. Louis O. Mink, ‘Collingwood’s Historicism: A Dialectic of Process’, in Michael Krausz 
(ed.), Critical Essays on the Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972),  p. 155 
 - 24 -
though nobody seems to be talking about them anymore. Of course some of 
Collingwood’s arguments about history fall into more than one of these categories. I’ve 
also given a short summary of what some other Collingwood commentators have said 
about ‘question and answer’ in relation to Collingwood’s philosophy of history. The 
priority of the present study is to understand and evaluate what Collingwood says, so my 
general rule has been to discuss other commentators only in so far as doing so helps to 
give the reader some sense of the significance in Collingwood scholarship of what is 
being said here.1 
The arguments of Collingwood’s that I’ve selected for my own discussion divide 
into two classes. The first class, which forms the subject matter of Part III, comprises 
those arguments of Collingwood’s about history ‘generically’;2 while the second class, 
which forms the subject matter of Part V, comprises those arguments of Collingwood’s 
about the history of ideas/history of philosophy/history of political thought specifically. 
I’ve already said that Collingwood considers all history to be the history of thought. The 
division between history ‘generically’ and the history of ideas specifically is therefore one 
I am imposing artificially for my own purposes, and if the reader doesn’t like it he can at 
least take comfort from seeing that I have been quite explicit about the fact. I’ve mapped 
what today’s historians of ideas mean by the subject-matter of their discipline onto what 
Collingwood means when he discusses the history of philosophy, or the history of 
political theory.3 It seems to me that, from the point of view of the history of political 
thought, Collingwood’s arguments about history generically are interestingly also those 
that are presupposed by historians of ideas, rather than discussed by them. Conversely 
those arguments I have sorted into the second category, pertaining more specifically to 
the history of ideas, are those that are more contentious among professionals, and which 
they are mostly still arguing over in print. 
The actual points dealt with in Part III are (i-xiii) history as a distinct science; (xv) 
the so-called ‘what-why paradox’; and (xvi) the debate over Collingwood’s 
‘constructionism’. In each case I have sought to show how the logic of question and 
answer rescues Collingwood’s conclusions from his own sometimes-misleading 
arguments. In relation to the first I have shown the weaknesses of Collingwood’s 
                                                 
1 Explaining the ‘significance’ of a scholarly contribution sometimes involves pointing to another 
commentator’s mistakes. When I do this I mean to do so, as Collingwood writes in his preface to his 
Autobiography, “honoris causa”, as “a way of thanking him for what I owe to… his teaching, or [to] his 
example”. A, p. vii 
2 See NL, ch. XXXIV 
3 See A, p. 61 
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attempts to explain what is so distinct about history by recourse to history’s distinct 
concepts, objects (or subject-matter) and methods. What follows from his own logic of 
question and answer, though he neglects it, is that sciences are of a distinct kind when 
the questions to which they pursue answers are of a distinct kind themselves. In relation 
to the second I have argued that Collingwood’s claim – that in history knowing what 
happened means knowing why it happened – only makes sense in relation to historians 
posing properly ‘historical’ questions. The third point refers to an on-going debate in 
Collingwood scholarship, rather than to a question systematically answered by 
Collingwood; and that debate concerns whether or not Collingwood is an historical 
‘constructionist’ or a ‘realist’.1 I have argued that the apparent dispute is actually 
dissolved by referring to what Collingwood says about how historical facts are 
established by working historians systematically constructing answers to particular 
questions. 
In Part V I have discussed what Collingwood’s logic of question and answer 
offers to today’s philosophical debates about the history of ideas. I could have chosen 
any of a number of current debates for this, but I have thought it best to focus on one 
‘big debate’ and one smaller debate where I think there is actually more at stake. The first 
is the debate around the role of historical context to understanding past texts (iv-vi). The 
second concerns whether historians of ideas ought to ask whether what their authors said 
was true (vii-x). 
Despite what Collingwood seems to say about the irrelevance of knowing a 
person’s context, the logic of question and answer actually lends support to the 
arguments being made in our own time by Quentin Skinner. I could have referred to 
other authors as well as Skinner, or instead of him, but I thought it best to focus on 
Skinner alone. This is not because I assume he is the most representative of the 
contemporary field, or because I think he is the best around at the moment, or simply 
because I have any dramatic vengeance against him or what he says. I have chosen him 
because, firstly, what he has said has produced much dispute. No-one in this field has 
given over as much of his time defending his own claims against attack as Skinner – and 
to his often obvious frustration. Secondly, I’ve picked out Skinner because I think it is 
                                                 
1 The term ‘realist’ is used by Collingwood (always with single quotation marks) to indicate the self-
identification of John Cook Wilson, H. A. Pritchard, H. W. B. Joseph, and Collingwood’s own tutor E. F. 
Carritt. See A, pp. 18-22. He also refers to “the parallel and more or less allied school at Cambridge” of G. 
E. Moore. See A, p. 22 
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mostly in the disputes provoked by him that Collingwood still has some valuable 
considerations to offer. 
The second debate, concerning whether historians of ideas can ask whether their 
authors’ arguments were true, is less widely discussed nowadays, though I think for 
obvious reasons it remains important – and not only because Collingwood thought of a 
rapprochement between history and philosophy as one of the main achievements of his 
philosophical career.1 Again there has been some discussion of the ‘was he right?’ 
question between Skinner and his critics – though not of Collingwood’s rapprochement 
itself. It seems to me that the real justification for Collingwood’s rapprochement between 
history and philosophy – that is, the reason why historians of philosophy should ask ‘was 
he right?’ – lies in a deeper rapprochement between theory and practice. That is to say that it 
is because of what history is for – socially and politically – that historians must ask ‘was he 
right?’ 
Between Parts III and V I have devoted a whole chapter to Collingwood’s so-
called ‘doctrine of re-enactment’. This has been a major point of discussion among those 
who have taken scholarly interest in Collingwood’s writings during the last seventy years, 
and I found in time that I had rather a lot to say about both the doctrine, and what has 
been said about it. I have shown in Part IV that, even as Collingwood explains it, the 
doctrine is still vulnerable to certain criticisms. I’ve then explored some of the ways in 
which commentators sympathetic to it have tried to rescue it, before showing that some 
of the criticisms still stand – even when commentators have been able to demonstrate 
deep affinities and connexions with other areas of Collingwood’s philosophy. I’ve then 
explained how I think the logic of question and answer makes more sense of the doctrine 
of re-enactment than Collingwood’s philosophy of mind does, even though Collingwood 
does not argue in that way himself and probably never intended to. 
In Part VI I turn to the question of what the history of ideas is for. Here I have 
reunited what I have distinguished earlier in the study. I take Collingwood’s arguments 
about what history ‘generically’ is for to include what the history of political thought, the 
history of ideas, or the history of philosophy, are for – or is for, if you take them to be 
the same discipline. The two claims I’ve discussed are (iii-iv) that history is for self-
knowledge; and (vi-xi) that history is necessary for freedom, duty, civilization, and 
progress. With regard to the first argument, Collingwood, I think, fails to deliver – at 
least by any normal sense of what ‘self-knowledge’ means. It is the second argument that 
                                                 
1 A, p. 77 
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is much more suggestive. Collingwood’s arguments concerning the relationship between 
history and freedom and history and duty, are, however, unsuccessful – though this has 
not stopped some commentators from celebrating them. It is rather in conjunction with 
civilization and progress that Collingwood makes better headway in explaining what 
history is for. 
Finally I’ve collected some conclusions together in a ‘Conclusions’ section – 
partly to follow academic norms, and partly for the sake of what contemporary cognitive 
therapists call ‘closure’. 
 
 
iv 
Warnings regarding method 
 
In his introduction to Action as History: The Historical Thought of R. G. Collingwood 
(2004), Stein Helgeby gives the following concise overview of the trends in Collingwood 
scholarship over the last few decades: 
 
Until at least the late 1950s, interest in Collingwood’s thought tended to focus 
on specific or isolated doctrines within the philosophy of history. In the 1960s 
and early 1970s several writers attempted to provide broader and more 
systematic accounts of his philosophy. By the 1980s and 1990s there were 
renewed efforts to reinterpret Collingwood broadly, particularly utilising 
unpublished material not available to earlier commentators.1 
 
It is an effect of the questions in view of which I came to Collingwood in the 
first place that the present study is inadvertently, in the context of Collingwood 
scholarship, a return to the 1950s – in its conception, anyway. But although it is perhaps 
a little retro, it is not meant to be reactionary. The sort of approaches Helgeby says are 
typical of the ’60s and ’70s, ’80s and ’90s have produced, and continue to produce, 
scholarship of the highest order. But I want to know whether certain of Collingwood’s 
claims are right. Those claims are made, usually along with their supporting arguments, 
not in unpublished material, but in Collingwood’s best-known published works, above all 
in The Idea of History and An Autobiography. Indeed Collingwood’s ‘big claims’ are 
                                                 
1 Stein Helgeby, Action as History: The Historical Thought of R.G. Collingwood (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004), 
pp. 18-19 
 - 28 -
notorious and long fought-over only because they were published.1 I have also left my 
discussions of the philosophical background of Collingwood’s arguments quite lean – or 
at least leaner than I have found to be common in Collingwood scholarship. One of the 
claims discussed here is that an historian must reconstruct, as far as evidence allows, the 
question to which an author offers his argument as a solution. Much has already been 
written to (re-)contextualize Collingwood’s various claims. I could of course have pasted 
much of that work into the present study, having first assumed that the reader would 
find Collingwood’s claims hard to understand properly without it. I have chosen instead 
to follow Collingwood’s principle of avoiding scissors-and-paste history, because I have 
no good reason to break it. I have no new considerations to offer about the contexts of 
Collingwood’s arguments, and there is no reason to assume that without further 
background knowledge the reader will misunderstand Collingwood’s questions, 
reasoning, and solutions. Collingwood’s questions and answers are (still) very accessible 
to the general reader. Where others’ work has shown that in view of contextual 
considerations Collingwood’s arguments are not what they seem, I have provided the 
reader with references to that other work and built my own discussion on others’ 
interpretive advice. 
The reader might be surprised that I mention so seldom what could be called 
Collingwood’s ‘intellectual inheritance’, in particular what David Boucher has called ‘the 
Italian connexion’.2 Among what is to be understood by this is Collingwood’s discovery 
of Giambattista Vico, his translation of Benedetto Croce, his shared interest with (and 
eventual loss of philosophical respect for) the ‘philosopher of Fascism’ Giovanni Gentile, 
and his fruitful exchanges with his friend Guido de Ruggiero. Much high-quality work 
has already been done to elucidate this network of influences, inspirations, and 
friendships, and in different aspects, so there is no need to divert the reader with hints of 
what he might find elsewhere in a better form.3 Again I would rather see those true 
                                                 
1 It would be untrue to say that I have found unhelpful Collingwood’s unpublished manuscripts, which are 
safely housed in the Bodleian Library, and it would be a downright lie to say that reading them hasn’t been 
rewarding and occasionally frustrating. (The most fruitless episode of my study was to find evidence to 
clarify whether Collingwood’s misrepresentation of Wilhelm Dilthey in The Idea of History was deliberate 
simplification, or accidental interpretive error. My conclusion, in view of lost material, is that we’ll probably 
never know.) However I have chosen to discuss here contentions and arguments of Collingwood’s that are 
available to the reader without his having to go to Oxford. Thus, although I have referred in passing to 
unpublished versions of arguments, and have very occasionally quoted from them, my policy has been to 
use unpublished material to make sure that I have not misunderstood or misrepresented what I’ve actually 
focused on, which are published arguments, and to discuss them in their published and best-known form. 
2 See David Boucher, The Social and Political Thought of R. G. Collingwood (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989), pp. 15-21. See also pp.43-45 
3 See particularly James Connelly, ‘Art Thou the Man: Croce, Gentile or de Ruggiero?’; H. S. Harris, ‘Croce 
and Gentile in Collingwood’s New Leviathan’; B. A. Haddock, ‘Vico, Collingwood and the Character of a 
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works of history read than whatever summary I might have ‘scissor and paste’d into the 
present work.1 
Most studies of what an author said or thought on a given topic face the question 
of deciding ‘when’ the relevant point or period for analysis was. This is the case with 
Collingwood, who has been subjected to specific studies of his ‘early’, ‘middle’, and ‘late’ 
thought, and has been judged more favourably for one than for the other by some, and 
conversely by others. It is clear, as it is with any author who publishes his ideas 
prolifically over more than twenty years, that there is development and change in 
Collingwood’s thinking. There are also competing periodizations to negotiate, competing 
claims about what that ‘change’ consists in, and competing suggestions about what 
caused or drove that change.2 Because I’m approaching Collingwood with particular 
questions already in mind, I’ve been able to deal with this a little more pragmatically. I 
have not tried to paint a portrait of our subject’s mind at a specific point in the 
development of his thinking – a portrait ostensibly free from the corrupting influences of 
hindsight. The present study is carried out in hindsight. For us this means that, although 
we want the strongest ideas and arguments of the man at the height of his powers, we are 
by no means obliged to disregard arguments that he did not himself follow up, or which 
are contradicted by other or later arguments – so long as that kind of contradiction is not 
exploited for criticism. My interest is in certain arguments that were made at the time 
they were made, and not only in those which their creator remained committed to during 
some personal golden age. 
                                                                                                                                            
Historical Philosophy’; and Rik Peters, ‘Croce, Gentile and Collingwood on the Relation between History 
and Philosophy’; all in David Boucher, James Connelly, & Tariq Modood (eds), Philosophy, History and 
Civilization: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on R. G. Collingwood (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1995), totalling 
pp. 92-167. Beyond the Italian heritage there is also the German. Gary Browning and Giuseppina D’Oro 
continue to debate Collingwood’s allegiances with Hegelianism/Kantianism. See Browning, Rethinking R. 
G. Collingwood, pp. vii, 26, 78-80, and Giuseppina D’Oro, Collingwood and the Metaphysics of Experience 
(London: Routledge, 2002) 
1 Marnie Hughes-Warrington has criticised much Collingwood scholarship for being insufficiently 
‘historical’ in its approach to Collingwood. “Few writers offer anything more than a brief survey of 
antecedent thinkers, variations in Collingwood’s view and or a history of the reception of Collingwood’s 
idea”. She picks out Nielsen and Saari for particular censure. Meanwhile her own work, How Good an 
Historian Shall I Be?, offers whole chapters of chronologically-arranged descriptive ‘conceptual history’, but 
nothing explicit about what of all this she thinks Collingwood assumes, what he knows, what he doesn’t, 
what he is responding to, or what he is ignoring. This ‘historical perspective’, it seems to me, turns out not 
to be a perspective on Collingwood at all. See Hughes-Warrington, pp. 99-127 
2 Dussen has provided a reliable overview of the development of Collingwood’s philosophy of history in 
his introduction to the 1993 edition of The Idea of History (see IH, pp. xxix-xlii). This is followed by an 
introduction to the Lectures of 1926 and 1928 which, in view of the starting point I’ve already discussed, 
the reader might find helpful (see IH, pp. xlii-xlviii). More recently Gary Browning has provided a really 
excellent account of competing interpretations and periodizations of Collingwood’s philosophy from Knox 
to Collingwood scholars of today like Giuseppina D’Oro and Rex Martin. See Browning, Rethinking R. G. 
Collingwood, pp. 4-12 
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For what it’s worth, the period of Collingwood’s writing that will happen to fall 
into focus here is that following the publication of Speculum Mentis in 1924 and continuing 
until and including the publication of The New Leviathan in 1942. This is not so much a 
‘period’ as it is a career. It is not because my own interest excludes earlier works, and 
much less is it because I think Speculum Mentis a work that it is advisable to disregard. It is 
rather because after 1925, as Dussen has well documented, “Collingwood changed his 
views concerning the epistemology of history”.1 What Dussen seems to mean by this is, 
though, different from what I mean by it. What Dussen says is that “until that date 
Collingwood had a realist view of history, while after it he developed an explicitly idealist 
theory of the past”.2 It is my view that what is significant about Collingwood’s work 
from approximately 1925 – at least given the focus of the present study – is that that is 
about the time Collingwood begins to think about history in terms of his own logic of 
question and answer. Before 1925 – in Speculum Mentis, for example – there might be talk 
of ‘question and answer’, but Collingwood does not discuss its place in the practice of 
historians. ‘History’, in Speculum Mentis, is “the assertion of fact”.3 Similarly, in Religion and 
Philosophy there is some fascinating discussion of the relationship between history and 
philosophy in chapter three, ‘Religion and History’,4 but there is little about how to do 
history or about ‘question and answer’, and there is nothing that is neither said better nor 
superseded in later considerations of the relationship between history and philosophy. In 
short, these earlier works do not reflect Collingwood’s best answers to our questions. 
The policy regarding secondary material that I should warn the reader about from 
the outset is that I have tried to avoid replicating what other commentators have already 
said. Where I think what others have said is right I have said so, and provided references 
along with any information necessary about what is said there. This has had a significant 
effect on what I’ve included here and what I have excluded. In short, some of what I 
might have wanted to say at length myself has already been said, and usually said very 
well. There is a temptation with any extended project like this to treat other 
commentators’ works as sources and to paste into your own writing anything that 
                                                 
1 Dussen, History as a Science, p. 34 
2 Dussen, History as a Science, p. 6. I don’t wish to exaggerate my differences with Dussen because, as I’ve 
explained below, although I think the development around 1925/6 has nothing to do with ‘realism’ and 
‘idealism’ as those terms are usually intended, what Dussen means by them allows us to mean the same 
thing: namely, that before that date history was the function of mind that asserted “fact as such”, whereas 
after it Collingwood thought of the function of history as the construction of conclusions to certain kinds 
of questions by a systematic process of question and answer. If this is what Dussen means by ‘idealism’, 
and if by ‘realism’ he means history as “fact as such”, then we mean the same thing. 
3 SM, p. 201 
4 RP, pp. 37-55 
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supports one of your own arguments, deals with the same area, or in other ways offers 
shortcuts to getting sophisticated scholarship into your own work. Although I’ve tried to 
build on the good work already done in the field, I’ve sought to do so non-parasitically. 
Sometimes this means discussing something more briefly than might have been expected. 
I hope to have spared the reader the feeling that he might have found that same 
discussion conducted more ably elsewhere or, worse, the suspicion that he already has. 
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Part II 
 
The Logic of Question and Answer (Generically) 
 
  
 
i. The ‘questioning activity’ 
ii. The question-and-answer theory of logic 
iii. The ‘second rule’: finding out what a man means 
iv. The transition from science to history 
 
 
 
The key to unlocking the sense and coherence of almost everything Collingwood 
says about history is what he says about the ‘logic’ (or ‘theory’) of question and answer. 
This ‘theory’ appears right across Collingwood’s corpus, and in fact supports much more 
in his arguments than would be apparent to the average reader of his Autobiography, where 
the chapter ‘Question and Answer’ only really touches on the question-and-answer 
technique of understanding manifestations of human thought, and on Collingwood’s 
attack on ‘propositional logic’. It is my understanding that in fact almost everything 
Collingwood says about history as a mode of systematic thought – from the correct 
subject-matter of history and the importance of evidence, to re-enactment and the 
strange claim about the past existing ‘in’ the present – is connected through this logic of 
question and answer. 
In itself this is not terribly earth-shattering, since really it is only to reiterate 
Collingwood’s claim that history is inductive and properly proceeds by the ‘Baconian 
method’ – posing specific questions and answering them as best we can. But in relation 
to some of Collingwood’s specific points about history, and especially in relation to what 
correctives he has for contemporary debates in the history of ideas, it has a certain effect. 
We will see later whether (and if so, to what extent) the question-and-answer logic of 
Collingwood’s arguments about history has been appreciated by his readers. As I’ll 
explain in Part III, it seems that although ‘question and answer’ in general is frequently 
remarked upon by Collingwood scholars, especially in relation to his metaphysics, the 
extent to which his arguments in the philosophy of history draw upon those basic points 
is not sufficiently emphasised or realised. Certainly other commentators sympathetic to 
Collingwood’s conclusions do not commonly appeal to the logic of question and answer 
to demonstrate to their own readers the correctness of those conclusions. Finally, as we’ll 
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see in Part V, the extent to which today’s methodological debates in the history of ideas 
require, for their own health, a return to this ‘founding principle’ is difficult to overstate. 
Because I think this logic of question and answer is so important to Collingwood’s 
arguments in philosophy of history, and because it features so heavily in how I will 
answer certain misreadings and criticisms of some of Collingwood’s claims, I’ll provide 
first an overview of Collingwood’s theory of question and answer, in a sense 
‘generically’.1 
 
 
i 
The ‘questioning activity’ 
 
The essence of any science is what Collingwood calls ‘systematic thinking’.2 
When Collingwood says ‘science’, or ‘scientific history’, this is in fact what he means: 
‘science’ in the continental sense, an organised body of knowledge: une science; una scienza; 
eine Wissenschaft. (They’re always feminine nouns, though this is probably not what 
Nietzsche meant when he supposed that “truth is a woman”.3) 
In his Essay on Metaphysics Collingwood distinguishes the ‘scientific thinking’ on 
which an organised system of knowledge has to be based, from the ‘desultory’ and 
‘casual’ thinking of our everyday “unscientific consciousness”.4 Here is a colourful 
passage from that Essay which describes the relationship between these two ways in 
which we think, the systematic and the unsystematic: 
 
                                                 
1 I have not provided a history of the development of ‘question and answer’ in Collingwood’s thinking, 
partly because our questions do not demand it, and partly because Rex Martin has already done so. See Rex 
Martin, ‘Collingwood’s Logic of Question and Answer, its Relation to Absolute Presuppositions: a Brief 
History’, Collingwood and British Idealism Studies vol. 5 (1998), pp. 122-33 
2 A, pp. 25-6, 30-1; IH, pp. 269, 273; EM, p. 4. The statement in EM is probably the best: “The word 
‘science’, in its original sense, which is still its proper sense not in the English language alone but in the 
international language of European civilization, means a body of systematic or orderly thinking about a 
determinate subject-matter. This is the sense and the only sense in which I shall use it. There is also a slang 
sense of the word, unobjectionable (like all slang) on its lawful occasions, parallel to the slang use of the 
word ‘hall’ for a music-hall or the word ‘drink’ for alcoholic drink, in which it stands for natural science”. 
In his last book, The New Leviathan, Collingwood also signs up to Hobbes’s principle that language is a 
precondition and foundation where knowledge is not simply knowledge of ‘facts’, but of “the Consequence 
of one Affirmation to another”. See NL, 6.47; 6.43; 6.59; 22.8. Collingwood cites Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 
12-13 (original pagination), but see also p. 18. 
3 Beyond Good and Evil, Preface – Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil [1886] Helen Zimmern (trans.) 
(Mineola: Dover, 1997), p. ix 
4 EM, p. 22 
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In unscientific thinking our thoughts are coagulated into knots and tangles; we 
fish up a thought out of our minds like an anchor foul of its own cable, hanging 
upside-down and draped in seaweed with shellfish sticking to it, and dump the 
whole thing on deck quite pleased with ourselves for having got it up at all. 
Thinking scientifically means disentangling all this mess, and reducing a knot of 
thoughts in which everything sticks together anyhow to a system or series of 
thoughts in which thinking the thoughts is at the same time thinking the 
connexions between them.1 
 
This “high-grade thinking” we should be aiming at means “thinking energetically 
instead of idly: thinking hard instead of allowing your mind to drift”.2 When one 
becomes aware of this energetic mental effort, he then says, “one becomes aware of a 
mental hunger that is no longer satisfied by what swims into one’s mouth. One wants 
what is not there and will not come of itself. One swims about hunting for it. This 
ranging of the mind in search of its prey is called asking questions”.3 
So it is not ‘information’ or ‘data’ that are the starting point of systematic, 
scientific thinking. It is not the thing known. It is rather the question; the hunger; the 
“inherent restlessness of mind”.4 It is what I will call ‘the specific unknown’. The specific 
unknown is the thing that the scientist, whatever his precise discipline, wants to replace 
with a specific ‘known’. The answer is what he ‘desires’5; it is what replaces emptiness 
with repletion6; it is the thing that his investigative hunger presupposes to be the ‘good’7; 
it is what is pursued in what Collingwood calls the “hunt”.8 And desire, Collingwood 
writes in The New Leviathan, involves propositional thinking: “and a proposition is an answer 
to a question; and a question offers alternatives; so desire asks and answers the question 
‘What do I want?’”9 So “science in general”, Collingwood writes in the introduction to 
The Idea of History… 
                                                 
1 EM, pp. 22-3 
2 It is this that has given us, Collingwood says, “everything that we call specifically human”; it is by learning 
this power and how to execute it properly that man has transformed “the whole structure of his life by its 
means”. EM, p. 37 
3 EM, p. 37. Emphasis added. Rex Martin has reported that the logic of question and answer is absent 
from a 1938 “sketch” (p. 122) of the Essay on Metaphysics, and claims accordingly that it was first worked 
out in the Autobiography. See Rex Martin, ‘Collingwood’s Logic of Question and Answer’. All the same, the 
reader will see here instances of ‘question and answer’ from The Idea of History and elsewhere which shows, 
if not that the ‘theory’ was worked out before 1939, it was at least used terminologically. 
4 NL, 7.69 
5 NL, 11.1-11 
6 NL, 7.15 
7 NL, 11.4-41 
8 NL, 2.64 
9 NL,  11.22 
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does not consist in collecting what we already know and arranging it in this or 
that pattern. It consists in fastening upon something we do not know, and 
trying to discover it… That is why all science begins from the knowledge of our 
own ignorance: not our ignorance of everything, but our ignorance of some 
definite thing – the origin of parliament, the cause of cancer, the chemical 
composition of the sun, the way to make a pump work… Science is finding 
things out: and in that sense history is a science.1 
 
‘Finding things out’ is the movement from the here-and-now of ignorance to the 
there-and-then of knowledge.2 As well as in the normal sense of ‘logic’, ‘question and 
answer’ appears in chapter five of An Autobiography as a logic of inquiry – the logic of 
what Collingwood calls the “questioning activity”. He identifies it in several places with a 
basic Baconian/Cartesian principle of science which, he says, needs restating.3 He 
develops it further in The Idea of History,4 explaining how, again, “Francis Bacon laid it 
down in one of his memorable phrases that the natural scientist must ‘put Nature to the 
question’.” And he continues: 
 
What he [Bacon] was asserting was two things at once: first, that the scientist 
must take the initiative, deciding for himself what he wants to know and 
formulating this in his own mind in the shape of a question; and secondly, that 
he must find means of compelling nature to answer, devising tortures under 
which she can no longer hold her tongue. Here, in a single brief epigram, Bacon 
laid down once for all the true theory of experimental science.5 
 
The example here is ‘experimental’ natural science, but Collingwood has in mind 
all systematic, scientific thinking in general. And there are certain conditions that a 
scientific question must satisfy. “All modern science”, Collingwood writes in The New 
Leviathan, “recognizes what I will call the principle of the limited objective”, and he adds that 
                                                 
1 IH, p. 9 
2 NL, 7.44-45; 7.69; 8.13 
3 A, p. 30 
4 Bacon and Descartes are named in the introduction. See IH, p. 6. Descartes is also repeatedly named, this 
time in the company of Kant and Socrates, in the introduction to EPM. 
5 IH, p. 269. See also NL, 31.27 
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“this is the most fundamental difference between the modern sciences and the sciences 
of ancient Greece”.1 
 
Ancient sciences aimed at an unlimited objective. They defined their aims by 
asking questions like: ‘What is Nature?’ ‘What is Man?’ ‘What is Justice?’ ‘What 
is Virtue?’ A question of this sort was to be answered by a definition of the 
thing… The form of question: ‘What is x?’ demands an answer telling you the 
essence of x; telling you everything you need to know about x in order to work 
out a complete science of it. The idea of a science, for an ancient Greek, was 
not only the idea of a science of x but the idea of the complete science of x.2 
 
The instruction that follows for all scientific practice – a ‘methodological’ 
instruction if you like – is, “Limit your objective. Take time seriously. Aim at interpreting 
not, as the Greeks did, any and every fact in the natural world, but only those which you 
think need be interpreted, or can be interpreted… NOW, choose where to begin your 
attack. Select the problems that call for immediate attention. Resolve to let the rest 
wait.”3 
The questioning activity then advances with these limited problems being broken 
down into their logically necessitated parts, always increasingly particular questions 
offering increasingly particular alternatives:4 
 
For example, if my car will not go, I may spend an hour searching for the cause 
of its failure. If, during this hour, I take out number one plug, lay it on the 
engine, turn the starting-handle, and watch for a spark, my observation ‘number 
one plug is all right’ is an answer not to the question, ‘Why won’t my car go?’ but 
to the question, ‘Is it because number one plug is not sparking that my car won’t 
go?’5 
 
The process, then, contains moments of ‘supposing’ that some particular option 
might be the case rather than an alternative: in this example the ‘supposal’ moment is an 
implicit, supposed affirmation of the answer, ‘The car won’t go because number one plug 
                                                 
1 NL, 31.61. See also 8.58 
2 NL, 31.62-4 
3 NL, 31.68. For a further qualification, which we have no need to go into, see NL, 34.58. 
4 NL, 13.1 
5 A, pp. 32 
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is broken’. The supposition turns out, on being tested, to be false of course. But it is only 
because the question is preliminarily answered with a suppositional ‘yes’ that it is 
subjected to testing at all. This is what Collingwood means in Speculum Mentis when he 
says that “supposal and questioning are at bottom the same thing”.12 
The theory of question and answer as the essence of inquiry is not limited to 
Collingwood’s work of the 1930s. Here is a passage from Speculum Mentis (1924) in which 
Collingwood explains rather elegantly how the product of a systematic inquiry – 
knowledge – is asserted only at the close of a process of question and answer: 
 
Supposal and assertion are not two independent chapters in the history of mind; 
they are two opposite and correlative activities which form as it were the systole 
and diastole of knowledge itself. A crude empiricism imagines that knowledge is 
composed wholly of assertion: that to know and to assert are identical. But it is 
only when the knower looks back over his shoulder at the road he has travelled, 
that he identifies knowledge with assertion. Knowledge as a past fact, as 
something dead and done with – knowledge by the time it gets into 
encyclopaedias and text-books – does consist of assertion, and those who treat 
it as an affair of encyclopaedias and text-books may be forgiven for thinking 
that it is assertion and nothing else. But those who look upon it as an affair of 
discovery and exploration have never fallen into that error. People who are 
acquainted with knowledge at first hand have always known that assertions are 
only answers to questions.3 
 
The same point is made – characteristically, more concisely – near the end of 
Collingwood’s life, in The New Leviathan (1942), where “Knowing a thing is more than 
merely being conscious of it. Knowing involves asking questions and answering them”4; 
and “Knowledge is the conviction or assurance with which a man reaffirms a proposition 
he has already made after reflecting on the process of making it and satisfying himself 
that it is well and truly made.”5 
                                                 
1 SM, p. 78 
2 This answers, I think, James Somerville’s question concerning whether Collingwood’s later work retains 
the identification of questioning with supposal. It does, but Collingwood stops calling it ‘supposal’. See 
James Somerville, ‘Collingwood’s Logic of Question and Answer’, The Monist vol. 72, no. 4: The 
Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood, pp. 526-41 
3 SM, p. 77 
4 NL, 11.11 
5 NL, 14.22 
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The questioning activity, then, is the correct method for proceeding not only in 
the natural sciences, but in any form of inquiry that aims at going from the unknown to 
the known; from here-and-now emptiness to there-and-then repletion1; from confusion 
to conclusion. Everything, from building our knowledge of black holes and the monsters 
of the deep, to something as mundane and unconsciously investigative as finding the 
reason my car won’t start, every step on the path to knowledge per se depends on asking 
and answering questions. 
But what does Collingwood mean in Speculum Mentis when he says that “supposal 
and assertion” are “opposite and correlative activities”, the “systole and diastole of 
knowledge itself”?2 Part of what he means by this “principle of correlativity”,3 as he calls 
it in An Autobiography, is that different kinds of questions can only be ‘satisfied’ with 
different kinds of answers. This is part of what his car example4 (above) is meant to 
demonstrate. I’ll use the idea of ‘satisfying’ a question here almost as if it were a technical 
term: Collingwood uses it in his Essay on Metaphysics and in The New Leviathan.5 He also 
speaks of what a question “expects” in the same way.6 Questions, he means, are not 
satisfied by answers that are of a kind different to what they “expect”. This does not 
mean, of course, that questions are only satisfied by the content of the answer they 
expected. Correlativity concerns form, not content. An answer ‘satisfies’ a question when 
it is the right kind of answer, not because it is necessarily the right answer. Thus the 
question, ‘How many sugars would Tom like in his tea?’ is not ‘satisfied’ by the answer 
‘Tom loves sugar’. It may well be true that Tom loves sugar, but the question is not 
satisfied by that form of answer. Conversely the answer ‘one spoonful’ satisfies the 
question, even though it might be the wrong answer and leave the tea insufficiently 
sugary for the satisfaction of Tom’s sweet tooth. 
It follows that finding appropriate answers to different types of question will 
require different kinds of investigation. This is why many – or even most – of our 
questions cannot be answered solely by natural science, even though they are perfectly 
legitimate questions, and answerable by recourse to ‘systematic thinking’. At time of 
writing, investigators in The Hague are trying to establish whether Radovan Karadžić 
                                                 
1 NL, 7.15 
2 SM, p. 77 
3 A, p. 32. Collingwood means by the “principle of correlativity” the principle that an answer must 
correlate to a question as specific as itself. We’ll revisit this. The way I’m using it here is to refer to a 
second principle of correlativity: certain kinds of questions can only be satisfied by certain kinds of answers. 
4 A, p. 32 
5 EM, p. 74; NL, 7.45 
6 EM, pp. 73-4 
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ordered, or even knew about, the Srebrenica massacre in 1995. Now, even the readers of 
New Scientist already know enough about problem-solving to know that questions such as 
these cannot simply be handed over to natural scientists to investigate. It is still 
‘knowledge’ that is being pursued, of course, and pursued by way of a systematic 
investigation – in this case system institutionally settled as a legal process. 
As with a legal process, investigations of all kinds employ ‘evidence’. “Anything is 
evidence which can be used as evidence”, Collingwood writes, “and no one can tell what 
is going to serve him as evidence for answering a certain question until he has formulated 
the question”.1 In its potential the world is infinitely evidentiary. But it does not radiate 
knowledge. It does not tell us about itself. We have to interrogate it. This is to say that it 
is what is demanded by the question that gives us our principle of navigation, or principle 
of selection. And without a question there is no principle of navigation, and thus no 
evidence. 
All this provides some background to Collingwood’s description, in his 
Autobiography, of how he understood the Oxford ‘realist’ position concerning knowledge, 
and how he came to see that it was wrong: 
 
The Oxford ‘realists’ talked as if knowing were a simple ‘intuiting’ or a simple 
‘apprehending’ of some ‘reality’… so did Alexander, at Manchester, when he 
described knowing as the simple ‘compresence’ of two things, one of which was 
a mind… They granted that a man who wanted to know something might have 
to work, in ways that might be very complicated, in order to ‘put himself in a 
position’ from which it could be ‘apprehended’; but once the position had been 
attained there was nothing for him to do but ‘apprehend’ it, or perhaps fail to 
‘apprehend’ it.  
This doctrine… was quite incompatible with what I had learned in my 
‘laboratory’ of historical thought. The questioning activity, as I called it, was not 
an activity of achieving compresence with, or apprehension of, something; it 
was not preliminary to the act of knowing; it was one half (the other half being 
answering the question) of an act which in its totality was knowing.2 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 PH, p. 38 
2 A, pp. 25-6 
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ii 
The question-and-answer theory of logic 
 
This account of inductive scientific knowledge, how we discover and then know 
something to be true, carries obvious consequences for logic, the field Collingwood 
identifies as the scene of his revolt.1 (He says that he first developed his logic of question 
and answer in 1917 in a book called Truth and Contradiction.2) The message of 
Collingwood’s ‘revolt’ is this: The ‘units of thought’ we think of in a given discipline – 
‘propositions’, ‘judgements’, statements of ‘fact’ – all of these, Collingwood thinks, are 
actually “something more complex in which the proposition serve[s] as an answer to a 
question”.3 But this habit of stating propositions as if they are ‘units’, as if they are not 
composed of these two parts, has led to the assumption that truth and falsehood belong 
to propositions as such and the “indicative sentences”4 that express them, and that that 
truth or falsehood depends on whether the propositions ‘corresponds’, matches, reflects, 
or in some way conforms to a real something that is not a proposition. “Hence”, 
Collingwood comments, “that numerous and frightful offspring of propositional logic 
out of illiteracy, the various attempts at a ‘logical language’, beginning with the pedantry 
of the text-books about ‘reducing a proposition to logical form’, and ending, for the 
present, in the typographical jargon of [Whitehead and Russell’s] Principia Mathematica”.5 
Actually, Collingwood writes…  
 
If the meaning of a proposition is relative to the question it answers, its truth 
must be relative to the same thing. Meaning, agreement and contradiction, truth 
and falsehood, none of these belonged to propositions in their own right, 
propositions by themselves; they belonged only to propositions as the answers 
to questions: each proposition answering a question strictly correlative to itself.6 
 
                                                 
1 See IH, p. 274, and A, p. 33 
2 A, p. 42. Only chapter two of Truth and Contradiction survives, unpublished. (Bodleian Library, Dep. 16) 
Unfortunately for our purposes here the surviving fragment deals not with ‘question and answer’, but with 
the coherence theory of truth. Certainly the two are related, but for the purposes of the present study there 
is nothing in that fragment that is not put better in other work. It is also less accessible to most readers. 
3 A, pp. 34-5. See also the preceding discussion on the “early partnership between logic and grammar” 
(ibid.). 
4 A, p. 35 
5 A, pp. 35-6 (footnote) 
6 A, p. 33 
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‘Question and answer’ is therefore also a theory of truth. Truth does not belong 
to propositions either as a result of corresponding to some state of affairs that is not a 
proposition, or of ‘cohering’ with other propositions. Collingwood challenges such 
theories of truth because “they all presupposed what I have called the principle of 
propositional logic; and this principle I denied altogether”.1 Instead, he continues… 
 
It seemed to me that truth… was something that belonged… to a complex 
consisting of questions and answers… Each question and each answer in a 
given complex had to be relevant or appropriate, had to ‘belong’ both to the 
whole and to the place it occupied in the whole. Each question had to ‘arise’… 
Each answer must be ‘the right’ answer to the question it professes to answer… 
the answer which enables us to get ahead with the process of questioning and 
answering… it is ‘right’ because it constitutes a link, and a sound one, in the 
chain of questions and answers by which the falseness of that presupposition is 
made manifest.2 
 
There are, though, certain limits to what we can ask. All questions contain 
presuppositions. ‘Have you left off beating your wife?’ is a question which presupposes 
both that the man in question has a wife, and also that he has been in the habit of beating 
her.3 If either of these presuppositions is not being made, then the question is a 
“nonsense” question. Nonsense questions involve a presupposition which is not in fact 
being made – which, for Collingwood, means that such a question “does not arise”.4 
 
 
iii 
The ‘second rule’: finding out what a man means 
 
Finally, Collingwood’s theory of question and answer also applies to 
understanding or finding out what another man meant – what was meant by something 
‘done’. In chapter five of An Autobiography Collingwood explains that, during the First 
World War, he walked every day to the Admiralty past the Albert Memorial. Because the 
Memorial was “visibly mis-shapen, corrupt, crawling, verminous”, it “began to obsess 
                                                 
1 A, p. 36 
2 A, pp. 37-8 
3 See EM, p. 38 
4 EM, pp. 26-7 
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me”, he says.1 Later he adds that this “meditation on the Albert Memorial had taught me 
a second [rule], namely, ‘reconstruct the problem’; or, ‘never think you understand any 
statement made by a philosopher until you have decided, with the utmost possible 
accuracy, what the question is to which he means it for an answer’.”2 Here is how 
Collingwood explains how his theory of question and answer impacts upon 
understanding what a man means – and this is, as the reader has probably already begun 
to suspect, what is of particular relevance to the history of ideas. I’m afraid I’ve had to 
provide Collingwood’s explanation at length, albeit abridged. (All of my attempts to 
improve or shorten it through paraphrase failed): 
 
The Albert Memorial began by degrees to obsess me… a thing so obviously, so 
incontrovertibly, so indefensibly bad, why had Scott done it?… What relation 
was there, I began to ask myself, between what he had done and what he had 
tried to do?… 
My work in archaeology, as I have said, impressed upon me the 
importance of the ‘questioning activity’ in knowledge… I began by observing 
that you cannot find out what a man means by simply studying his spoken or 
written statements, even though he has spoken or written with perfect 
command of language and perfectly truthful intention. In order to find out his 
meaning you must also know what the question was (a question in his own 
mind, and presumed by him to be in yours) to which the thing he has said or 
written was meant as an answer… 
Now, the question ‘To what question did So-and-so intend this 
proposition for an answer?’ is an historical question, and therefore cannot be 
settled except by historical methods. When So-and-so wrote in a distant past, it 
is generally a very difficult one, because writers (at any rate good writers) always 
write for their contemporaries, and in particular for those who are ‘likely to be 
interested’, which means those who are already asking the question to which an 
answer is being offered; and consequently a writer very seldom explains what 
the question is that he is trying to answer. Later on, when he has become a 
‘classic’ and his contemporaries are all long dead, the question has been 
forgotten; especially if the answer he gave was generally acknowledged to be the 
                                                 
1 A, p. 29. Peter Johnson has offered a rather fun article about the various sources of the ideas 
Collingwood attributes to the Albert Memorial which, of course, deals with the logic of question and 
answer. See Peter Johnson, ‘R. G. Collingwood and the Albert Memorial’, Collingwood and British Idealism 
Studies, vol. 15, no. 1 (2009), pp. 7-40 
2 A, p. 74. The same point is also made in EM, pp. 23-5, 35-6. The notion goes right back to 
Collingwood’s first published book, Religion and Philosophy (1916). See RP, pp. 42-3 
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right answer; for in that case people stopped asking the question, and began 
asking the question that next arose. So the question asked by the original writer 
can only be reconstructed historically, often not without the exercise of 
considerable skill.1 
 
This requires little exegesis, I think. In order to know what someone ‘means’ you 
have to know what the question is that he is ‘answering’.2 As this is of great importance 
to Collingwood’s theory of how interpretive historical assertions are to be rightly made, 
we’ll return to it in the right place. What we’ve heard here is what Collingwood says 
about ‘question and answer’, as I’ve put it, ‘generically’. ‘Question and answer’ is the logic 
of all scientific inquiry; it is present in the ‘logic’ of truth claims; and it is a precondition 
of understanding what someone meant by doing or saying something. 
 
 
iv 
The transition from science to history 3 
 
It seems to me that the logic of question and answer is not only defensible: it is 
ingenious. By the means of the single compound concept ‘question and answer’ 
Collingwood unites all disciplines of inquiry, all ‘sciences’, in a question-and-answer 
method, and in their quest to fill out knowledge of the one true reality. But by means of 
that same concept Collingwood also shows why the investigative processes of different 
disciplines are properly autonomous of one another, and why they cannot be imposed 
upon one another. And the way he does this is by putting the question at the foundation 
of everything. Thus the respective methods of different disciplines are determined not by 
the objects that they investigate, but by what kind of question it is that the investigator 
asks about it.4 Method is a consequence of question. So-called ‘methodological’ questions, such 
as ‘What is the correct method of investigation in International Relations?’, or even 
worse (and commoner), ‘What is the correct unit of analysis?’, cannot be answered on 
                                                 
1 A, pp. 29-39 
2 Dussen has noted that, surprisingly, there is a correspondence with this idea in Popper, though Popper 
doesn’t know it. Popper, Dussen says, “emphasizes as well that an historian should reconstruct the 
problem situations of the past.” See Dussen, History as a Science, pp. 345-6 
3 Here I am trying to lead the reader to consider, in preparation for the next chapter, what this means for 
the ‘methodology’ of history. My subtitle is another reference to Collingwood’s own terminology. See the 
‘Transition’ chapter titles of SM, and the conclusion of IN: “We go from the idea of nature to the idea of 
history”. (IN, p. 177) 
4 This point is explained below. 
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their own terms, without knowing what question is driving the investigation or analysis 
they refer to. 
I certainly don’t claim to be the first to notice the potential of Collingwood’s 
theory of question and answer. Indeed, despite a couple of minor mistakes in what he 
takes Collingwood to be saying, I think the ingeniousness of question and answer is also 
noticed by Hans-Georg Gadamer – though he seems mostly excited by what it allows 
him to say about his ‘fusing’ of ‘horizons’.1 Our concern now is to assess what this logic 
of question and answer means first for history in general, and then, like Gadamer, to 
concern ourselves with what it means for the history of ideas. Gadamer, as I’ll explain, 
does not understand the significance of Collingwood’s theory of question and answer. If 
it is already obvious to the reader what that significance is likely to be, all the better, for it 
means that he will, like me, think of himself as being in some position to see what is so 
wrong with the way some writers are conducting their ‘methodological’ disputes at 
present, and therefore why it is within those walls especially necessary that, as Machiavelli 
said, “men who live together in any sort of institution regularly take stock of 
themselves”, and make themselves receptive to those “healthy” changes “that bring them 
back to their founding principles”.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method [1960] (Continuum, 2004), pp. 363-71 
2 Machiavelli, Discourses Book III, ch. 1 (pp. 190-1, 189) 
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Part III 
 
The Question-and-Answer Logic of History 
 
 
 
i. History as a science 
ii. History as a science: typology against chronology 
iii. Three forms of ‘history’ 
iv. The forms of history in an overlapping scale 
v. Three forms of history on a philosophical menu 
vi. Question-and-answer history in Collingwood scholarship 
vii. The special character of inference in history: a problem 
viii. The solution: the special character of historical questions 
ix. What makes historical questions ‘historical’? 
x. ‘What he meant’ 
xi. Universals and particulars 
xii. Processes 
xiii. Science and method 
xiv. The transition from general solutions to specific points 
xv. The ‘what-why’ paradox 
xvi. ‘Ideality’ and ‘constructionism’ 
 
 
 
i 
History as a science 
 
In the last chapter we saw some instances of Collingwood discussing ‘question 
and answer’ as a form of inquiry in general. I held back examples in which he discusses 
history specifically in conjunction with ‘question and answer’ in order to keep our 
examination of ‘question and answer’ in history in one place. The idea of history – “the 
idea of an imaginary picture of the past”, Collingwood says, is “in Cartesian language, 
innate; in Kantian language, a priori”.1 ‘Question and answer’ is one of the ways – and the 
only ‘systematic’ way – in which we fill in this innate idea. The best examples in 
Collingwood’s writings of ‘question and answer’ happening in historical investigation are 
probably those in chapter eleven of An Autobiography, ‘Roman Britain’. Here is quite a 
famous one: 
 
For example, long practice in excavation had taught me that one condition – 
indeed the most important condition – of success was that the person 
                                                 
1 IH, p. 248 
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responsible for any piece of digging, however small and however large, should 
know exactly why he was doing it. He must first of all decide what he wants to 
find out, and then decide what kind of digging will show it to him. This was the 
central principle of my ‘logic of question and answer’ as applied to archaeology.1 
 
The conjunction of history with ‘question and answer’ in Collingwood’s writings 
is by no means consistent. It does not occur, for example, in Speculum Mentis (1924). 
There is a very elegantly-written section called ‘Knowledge as Question and Answer’ in 
chapter three, ‘Art’, where Collingwood’s intention is simply to clarify the transition from 
art to religion.2 A direct, if brief, discussion of ‘question and answer’ is also given in 
chapter five, ‘Science’, where Collingwood explains what he means when he says that 
science is ‘supposal’.3 But in chapter six, ‘History’, ‘question and answer’ all but 
disappears. “The object of history is the assertion of fact”, Collingwood says there, and 
then: “To determine facts far distant in space and time is not the essence of history but 
its climax, the very heroism and bravado of the historical spirit in its defiance of 
empirical limitations.”4 – The climax of what exactly? Defying empirical limitations how? 
What is this “spirit”? Such questions are only answerable, I think, in light of later work. 
Meanwhile, in Speculum Mentis, Collingwood describes how history ‘breaks down’ in the 
face of its failure to achieve knowledge of its object, and mind then passes on to 
philosophy.5 This is because (or why) the chapter ‘History’ neglects the principle of 
question and answer when it is most needed. It is, as Collingwood only later shows, 
history as a science that enables history to achieve knowledge of its object – knowledge, 
that is, of its own characteristic kind – which, in Speculum Mentis, it does not. 
In the later work ‘question and answer’ becomes the fundamental feature of 
scientific history. This is why the opening chapter of The Principles of History contains an 
extended analogy of history with a criminal investigation, ‘Who killed John Doe?’. (The 
analogy was also published in §3 of The Idea of History’s ‘Epilegomena’,6 though there it is, 
of course, nearer the end than the beginning.) 
                                                 
1 A, p. 122. See, however, Alan Donagan’s discussion of the criticisms Collingwood received in an obituary 
by I. A. Richmond concerning Collingwood’s archaeological practice this point precisely. See Donagan, 
Later Philosophy, pp. 196-8 
2 SM, pp. 76-80. See particularly p. 76 for the immediate context of that discussion. 
3 By ‘supposal’, though, Collingwood means that it proceeds by question and answer. See SM, pp. 78, 186. 
It is, for this reason, also here that Collingwood explains how science is based on history – or, “Science is 
the question whose answer is history” – a claim he would repeat at the close of The Idea of Nature. See IN, 
pp. 174-7. See also SM, p. 202 
4 SM, p. 211 
5 SM, pp. 231-247 
6 PH, pp. 21-9; IH, pp. 266-73 
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For Collingwood, if history is to be a science – that is, an organized body of 
knowledge – then it must disentangle its knots of casual thinking, and understand why it 
can be, and is to be, based on systematic thinking. This is why ‘scissors and paste’ history 
is not scientific – and that is, essentially, what is wrong with it. The narratives produced 
by ‘scissors and paste’ will be compilations of other narratives, compiled with the aim of 
providing information about some given (past) subject. Of course the material used by 
the scissors-and-paste historian will help him to “provide this innate idea [the past] with 
detailed content”,1 but only by being treated as a ‘source’ of already-prepared information 
ripe for incorporation into the new narrative. The scientific historian, by contrast, uses 
evidence. I think little needs to be said to convince today’s academic historians that 
Collingwood is right about this.2 The “rubric” of scientific history, in the narratives 
produced by historians, is generally accepted to be what Collingwood says it is in his 
Essay on Metaphysics: i.e. “the evidence at our disposal obliges us to conclude that…”3 This 
“rubric” is missing from instances of ‘scissors and paste’. Scientific historical thinking will, 
Collingwood writes, “be exhibited in the clear-cut and orderly manner in which it states 
problems and marshals and interprets evidence for their solution”.4 So where the 
‘scissors-and-paste’ historian reads his books “in a receptive spirit, to find out what they 
said”, the “scientific historian reads them with a question in his mind, having taken the 
initiative by deciding for himself what he wants to find out from them… puts them to 
the torture, twisting a passage ostensibly about something quite different into an answer 
to the question he has decided to ask”.5 
What Collingwood means by ‘systematic thinking’ is again a process of question 
and answer.6 Scissors-and-paste history is not scientific for the simple reason that it is not 
investigative – at least not fully. It answers not questions, but tasks of another kind. It is 
what we might call ‘composite’.7 In terms of subject-matter, scissors-and-paste history 
might be perfectly consistent with what Collingwood argues – which is why A. F. Wilson 
                                                 
1 IH, p. 247. See also IH, p. 248, where Collingwood writes that “the idea of history itself” is “in Cartesian 
language, innate; in Kantian language, a priori”. Alan Donagan has claimed that, in light of his theory of 
presuppositions, Collingwood revised this notion that the idea of histoy itself is a priori, and replaced it with 
the doctrine that historians presuppose that idea. See Donagan, Later Philosophy, pp. 210-11 (Donagan cites 
EM, pp. 63-4) 
2 ‘Evidence’ is the title of Part I: chapter 1 of The Principles of History. See PH, pp. 7-38. Dussen has 
provided an interesting discussion of ‘evidence’ in Collingwood’s thinking in History as a Science. He draws 
particularly on some of Collingwood’s lesser-known works, such as ‘The Nature and Aims of a Philosophy 
of History’ and ‘The Limits of Historical Knowledge. See Dussen, History as a Science, pp. 287-95 
3 EM, p. 56 
4 EM, p. 65 
5 IH, pp. 269-70 
6 EM, p. 36 
7 See NL, 9.32-34 
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is right to suggest that scientific history and scissors-and-paste history overlap.1 But the 
narratives produced by scissors-and-paste will not therefore be answers which, in a 
schoolish phrase, ‘show their working’. Real, scientific history, on the other hand… 
 
has this in common with every other science: that the historian is not allowed to 
claim any single piece of knowledge, except where he can justify his claim by 
exhibiting to himself in the first place, and secondly to anyone else who is both 
able and willing to follow his demonstration, the grounds upon which it is 
based. This is what is meant, above, by describing history as inferential.2 
 
The introduction and opening chapter of The Principles of History are dedicated to 
explaining the idea that history is “inferential”, and to explicating the particular kind of 
inference that pertains to history. It is also here that ‘Who killed John Doe?’ appears. In 
that statement (‘history is inferential’) is contained the essence of what Collingwood is 
saying about the processes of scientific historical thinking, the methods of historians, and 
the objects of historical knowledge in relation to ‘question and answer’, albeit obliquely. 
The Principles of History was meant to proceed from general fundaments to specific points. 
‘Question and answer’, as the meaning of ‘inference’, is that fundament. 
In his 2005 article, ‘Collingwood’s Claim that History is a Science’, Dussen has 
provided a fascinating comparison of what Collingwood says about history being a 
science with the theory of the logic of ‘abduction’ of the American philosopher, C. S. 
Peirce. Dussen shows that what Collingwood says about inference in history coheres 
rather neatly with Peirce’s theory of this ‘third’ type of inference, different from both 
deduction and induction. Collingwood did not, Dussen says, manage to work it out in 
the same detail as Peirce, but nevertheless by comparing the two philosophers one can 
see that the methods of history described by Collingwood are such that can still be 
considered ‘scientific’.3 Dussen’s article is meant to show that Collingwood’s philosophy 
of historical method really is scientific, and in order to demonstrate this he remains 
perfectly faithful to what Collingwood both says and means. Dussen’s strategy is, though, 
quite unnecessary. As long as one recognises that science is organised inquiry, and that 
organised inquiry proceeds by a systematic series of question and answer, one can see the 
sense in Collingwood’s claim already. 
                                                 
1 A. F. Wilson, ‘Collingwood’s Forgotten Historiographic Revolution’, Collingwood and British Idealism Studies, 
vol. 8 (2001), pp. 57-8 
2 IH, p. 252 
3 Dussen, ‘Collingwood’s Claim’, p. 25 
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ii 
History as a science: typology against chronology 
 
After the publication of Speculum Mentis – as Dussen has meticulously discovered 
and admirably documented in his classic study of 1981, History as a Science1 – Collingwood 
turns his interest to history as a form of inquiry, and begins to treat the philosophy of 
history as the sorting-out of the methods of that inquiry. Dussen’s term for this is 
‘history as a science’, and he has already provided as detailed an account as could be 
needed of the early development in Collingwood’s thinking of history as a science – 
which, considering our purposes here, there is no need to reproduce.2 Dussen even 
quotes a passage from one of Collingwood’s letters to Croce in which he looks forward 
to the leisure he’ll soon have “to pursue the work on the philosophy of historical method 
which I regard as my chief task in philosophy”.3 Here I have varyingly used the terms 
‘scientific history’, ‘investigative history’, ‘historical inquiry’, and ‘what historians 
[properly] do’ as equivalents for what Dussen fairly consistently calls ‘history as a 
science’. In each case the “philosophy of historical method”, which Collingwood refers 
to in that letter to Croce, concerns sorting out how scientific history should be done. 
Dussen says, absolutely correctly, that what distinguishes from earlier work 
Collingwood’s 1925 essay, ‘The Nature and Aims of a Philosophy of History’, is that 
Collingwood strikingly begins by mentioning “actual historians”.4 There is, Dussen 
argues, a “dividing line” between the writings before 1925/26 and those after.5 This 
dividing line, for Dussen, is between an earlier ‘realist’ view of history, and a later 
‘idealist’ one (which he also calls by the name ‘anti-realist’). Dussen uses ‘realism’ as a 
shorthand term for the view of history in Speculum Mentis: that history is “the assertion of 
fact”, and that the object of historical consciousness is “fact as such” – individual facts, 
unique situations, and so on. This is part of the reason why, for Collingwood, it is history 
                                                 
1 Particularly interesting is Dussen’s discussion of Collingwood’s intermediate position in his 1925 article 
‘The Nature and Aims of a Philosophy of History’. See Dussen, History as a Science, pp. 27-31 
2 Indeed Dussen has provided more recently an article-length version of his reading of Collingwood’s claim 
that history is a science for Collingwood and British Idealism Studies. See vol. 13, no. 2 (2007), pp. 5-30 
3 See Dussen, History as a Science, pp. 31-2 
4 See Dussen, History as a Science, p. 28 
5 Dussen, History as a Science, p. 6. Dussen thinks the Lectures of 1926 and 1928 (the ‘Die manuscript’) give 
some insight into the origin of the themes of question and answer, evidence, and ‘the Baconian approach’, 
and I have no reason to think he’s wrong. See Dussen’s introduction to IH, p. xlvi 
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that classificatory science relies upon for the abstractions with which it deals. After 1926, 
Dussen says, Collingwood’s ‘idealist’ philosophy of history emerges.1 
Dussen’s terminology is, I think, confusing, not least because by calling 
Collingwood’s earlier position ‘realist’ he invites the reader to think that Collingwood 
uses his Autobiography to attack a position he previously defended.2 Treating as indicative 
of ‘realism’ Collingwood’s proposition, that the object of history is “fact as such” also 
injects into Speculum Mentis a contradiction which shouldn’t really be there. Dussen writes: 
 
In concluding our survey of Speculum Mentis it is important to note that Collingwood 
explicitly renounces realism; his discussion of historical philosophy makes this clear (SM, 
281-287). It is also clear, however, that at the same time his conception of history is a 
plainly realistic one.3 
 
There is no such contradiction. There is an important difference between what 
Collingwood means by ‘realism’ and what Dussen means by it. For Collingwood history 
in Speculum Mentis is “the assertion of fact” – the assertion of unique, individual facts; 
whereas ‘realism’ means the claim that facts that are supposed to be independent of the 
knowing mind. This latter is never Collingwood’s position. 
There is a complication to Dussen’s account beyond his terminology, which 
concerns his story about the first conception of history, “the assertion of fact”, being 
replaced. In The Social and Political Thought of R. G. Collingwood, David Boucher has 
provided a fascinating discussion concerning the relation between Collingwood’s 
conception of history and his moral philosophy – specifically in the concept of duty. 
We’ll have cause to return to this argument about history and duty later, when reviewing 
the social purpose of history. I mention it here merely to point out that Collingwood 
considers the theoretical counterpart to duty (the highest form of practical reason) to be 
history because “the agent is prepared for action in unique circumstances by identifying 
himself, or herself, with the world of fact in its entirety”. What Boucher has discovered, 
though he has no need to say so, is that the conception of history as “the assertion of 
fact” – individual, unique, concrete fact – actually survives into Collingwood’s later moral 
                                                 
1 This, Dussen thinks, shows what is wrong with Debbins’ contention (“that from the earlier essays to the 
later works there is no significant change”), and with a similar claim of Errol E. Harris. Dussen explains 
that Lionel Rubinoff misses it; that Rotenstreich observes it but fails to locate it properly; and he shows 
that Leon Goldstein’s view, though close to his own, misses the ‘watershed’ that he thinks he’s found. See 
Dussen, History as a Science, pp. 34-5 
2 Dussen, History as a Science, pp. 20-1 
3 Dussen, History as a Science, p. 27 
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philosophy and, in fact, into The New Leviathan. If this is the conception that Dussen 
intends to indicate when he says ‘realism’, and I think it is, then he is perhaps a little 
inaccurate to think that that conception was ever replaced by history as a science around 
1925/26. Actually, as we’ll now see, the earlier form was not ‘replaced’ by a later one, but 
survives as part of that later form. 
 
 
iii 
Three forms of ‘history’ 
 
My interest is not in establishing chronologies of thought-development, though 
I’m satisfied that Dussen’s evidence substantiates his claim concerning the time at which 
Collingwood’s philosophy of history as a science emerged. My interest is only in the 
difference between the way of thinking about history as something concerned with the 
individual “fact as such” (which Dussen identifies in Collingwood’s early philosophy of 
history, and which he calls ‘realism’), and the later ‘scientific’ way of thinking about 
history as an investigation, which is supposed by Dussen to replace it. Because Dussen’s 
question is chronological, his answer is that that difference is ‘around 1926’. Because 
mine is typological, that difference is a distinct sense of ‘history’ – as a word and concept. 
By looking at what Collingwood says about history through the lens of ‘question 
and answer’ something becomes clear. By ‘history’ Collingwood means, in his later 
philosophy, ‘scientific history’ – but by no means all the time. In fact he sometimes 
doesn’t intend the word ‘history’ to indicate an activity at all. The concept of ‘history’ 
which Collingwood appeals to in his argument about duty is not an activity, for example. 
I also think Dussen is a little inaccurate to refer to only two meanings of history in 
Collingwood’s work on the subject. There are, from what I have seen, at least three1 
distinct meanings, senses – or what I will call, in accordance with Collingwood’s own 
terminology, ‘forms’. These three forms of history are (and this is how I will number 
them): 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 See NL, 14.64 
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1. history as “the assertion of fact”; 
2. history as becoming (history as a process); and 
3. history as a type of investigation (history as a science).1 
 
Although the three are distinct senses of the word ‘history’, the meanings of them 
overlap – conceptually and, I think, chronologically. We’ll deal with the overlap next. 
First let’s establish the distinctness. 
Before 1925/26 Collingwood does not discuss history as a science. Instead 
‘history’ stands for that which is concerned with individual particular facts, rather than 
with classes of facts or universals. In Speculum Mentis history is the “assertion of fact”, but 
the reasoning by which the facts asserted are decided upon are not discussed at all. The 
facts asserted by the historical consciousness are individual and unique. ‘Charles was 
born at Dunfermline Palace’, and ‘the wound became infected’ are historical facts in this 
sense of the word ‘history’. Such facts are not classes, categories, or laws. They are not 
abstractions from concrete instances: they are the concrete instances. In Collingwood’s 
early thinking, the question of the right and the wrong ways to assert facts does not arise, 
which is why there is, in Speculum Mentis, no discussion of scientific history, no 
explanation of ‘question and answer’ in historical thinking, and no attack on ‘scissors and 
paste’. 
The second conception, history as a process, is probably the most familiar to 
anyone. It means, plainly, a succession of events or actions. It is the sense according to 
which “all history consists of changes”,2 and it is the sense in which we say ‘the history of 
Rome’, or ‘the history of literature’. It is also what Collingwood means by ‘history’ when 
he refers to “Historical Theology” in Religion and Philosophy.3 Most, if not all, historical 
narratives reflect this sense of ‘history’: stories that trace the changes within a given 
object of focus, such as the city of Rome, the concept of liberty in European political 
rhetoric, or, as in Religion and Philosophy, the nature of God. 
A philosophy of history in this sense would take as its subject something like 
what Collingwood says, in his Autobiography, was dealt with in his essay Libellus de 
Generatione: “It was primarily a study of the nature and implications of process or 
becoming… it was an attack on ‘realism’, showing how the non possumus of ‘realists’ 
                                                 
1 I do not intend to challenge the “three forms of historical thinking which have been practised since the 
Renaissance” identified by Donagan as being described in ‘Historical Evidence’. See Donagan, Later 
Philosophy, pp. 177-82 
2 NL, 26.76 
3 RP, pp. 37-8 
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towards a theory of history arose from their refusal to admit the reality of becoming”.1 
This sense of ‘history’ is also never replaced in Collingwood’s philosophy: it survives into 
The New Leviathan, his last book, where he says that ‘facts’ are really only abstractions 
from processes2 and, in a later chapter, that “in the life of mind there are no states, there 
are only processes”.3 Collingwood’s interest in Bergson and Whitehead pertains to this 
form of ‘history’: history as becoming, reality as becoming, reality as history. Everything 
in history and ‘from the point of view’ of history is in a state of becoming, or flux. The 
object of study does not remain the same as circumstances change around it: the object 
itself changes. ‘The history of England’ does not mean a narrative of all the things that 
have happened in England. It means the concept of ‘England’ as a specific becoming.4 
This is the sense in which, after only a moment’s reflection, we can agree that history is 
‘still happening’, because the process of things changing their form while remaining 
recognisably the same is never-ending.5 The ‘becoming’ of concepts is explained in An 
Essay on Philosophical Method, and also in an unpublished essay, ‘Sketch of a Logic of 
Becoming’.6 And this is the meaning of ‘history’ which Collingwood equates with ‘reality’ 
in the essay ‘Reality as History’ (1935).7 
Now, Dussen knows perfectly well that Collingwood sometimes engages in 
philosophy of this form of history – philosophy of ‘becoming’. But it doesn’t fit into the 
chronological scheme he is trying to express concerning Collingwood’s transition from 
‘realism’ to ‘idealism’ in his thinking about history. ‘History as process’, as Dussen calls it, 
therefore gets a brief mention in a subsection at the tail end of his chapter on the 
development of Collingwood’s thought on history. His chapter looks like this: 
 
2.1. From Religion and Philosophy to Speculum Mentis 
2.2. Collingwood and realism 
2.3. History: from realism to idealism 
2.4. History and science 
2.5. History as process 
 
                                                 
1 A, p. 99 
2 NL, 30.75-76 
3 NL, 34.62 
4 See R. G. Collingwood, Roman Britain [1923] (Oxford: Clarendon, 1945), p. 11 
5 For Collingwood natural processes and historical processes are distinct because, in a natural processes, 
the earlier form is replaced by the later. In an historical process the earlier form survives into the later. 
6 Bodleian Library, Collingwood manuscripts, Dep. 16/3 
7 It is this form of history that Stein Helgeby analyses in Action as History: The Historical Thought of R. G. 
Collingwood. See particularly ch. 2, ‘The World as Process’. 
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Sections 2.1 and 2.2 discuss the view of history according to which history is “the 
assertion of fact”. Section 2.4 is about scientific history. 2.3 is about the period during 
which Collingwood developed his view of scientific history out of his earlier view. And 
2.5 is about history as a process. 
I lay Dussen’s chapter plan out like this not in order to admonish him for failing 
to do something he never intended to do anyway, but to make something extremely plain 
to my own reader. By privileging the ‘activity’ sense of history – the sense in which 
history is done and, ideally, done properly – I have already placed in the foreground of the 
present study what is dealt with by Dussen in section 2.4, ‘history as a science’. The 
contents of 2.1, 2.2, and even 2.3 are of only overlapping interest. I am not attempting to 
furnish the reader with a proportionally representative overview of everything 
Collingwood says about history. Dussen has tried to do this already; the product of his 
labour is a fine piece of scholarship, and I don’t wish to make my own advances by 
reproducing his work here more than is necessary given the question to which the 
present study is offered as an answer. 
Dussen presents his illustration of Collingwood’s thinking with a chronological 
schema, and the order in which ‘realist’ history and ‘scientific’ history appear in 
Collingwood’s writings presents Dussen with little difficulty, because ‘history as a 
science’ clearly emerges when Dussen says it does. But ‘history as process’ does give 
Dussen some trouble.1 Although it is logically distinguishable, it occurs in Collingwood’s 
writings contemporarily with discussions of scientific history – in ‘Reality as History’, for 
instance. The problem for Dussen, then, is that Collingwood’s conception of history as a 
science is developed after 1926 and is never supplanted. But he also continues to write 
about history as a process in a way which does not seem to be about the same thing, but 
must somehow complement it. 
Furthermore, because Dussen is answering a chronological question, he misses 
what is actually quite an important reconciliation of the two main forms of history he is 
dealing with: the assertion of fact, and history as a science. The truth is, I think, that the 
relationship between them is not that of one form of history replacing another. It is a 
                                                 
1 One section in Dussen’s History as a Science is meant to provide the reader with as much background as he 
could need concerning The Idea of History for the discussions that follow of certain points from it. The 
section, though, is disrupted by Dussen’s conflation of what Collingwood says about history a parte objecti 
with what he says occasionally about history being a ‘process’ – which I have called ‘history as becoming’ 
in order to make a clearer distinction between this and the historian’s ‘process’ of question and answer. See 
Dussen, History as a Science, pp.63-79. In a later section called ‘Historical process’ Dussen tries to complete 
his documentation of what Collingwood thinks is history’s ‘object’. He says, on p. 276, that he would be 
“prepared to defend it”. 
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complementary relationship in which the first continues to exist somehow ‘within’ the 
second as an instance of what Collingwood calls ‘primitive survival’.1 As I’ve said, it is 
better to speak of three forms of history in Collingwood’s writings than two. And I think 
it is not only the two forms of history dealt with by Dussen that are logically 
distinguishable but also reconcilable. It is all three. 
Before I describe more fully the overlap of these three forms of ‘history’ as a 
philosophical concept, there is a terminological ambiguity to clarify. The activities of 
historians – the doing of history – are also processes. Scientific history, when it is done, 
takes the form of processes in real time – time spent wrestling with the confusions that 
are eventually turned into proper questions, time spent reviewing existing work, time 
spent in archives, time spent writing, and so on. It is a process that is (at least partly) 
investigative. Now, if by ‘process’ Collingwood always meant a process of answering 
historical questions, the second form of history, history as process, would be the same as 
the third, history as a science, and Dussen would be justified in saying that ‘history as 
process’ is just another way of saying ‘history as a science’. 
But conspicuously Collingwood does not mean this. In scientific history the 
process is a process of inquiry. In ‘history as process’, ‘process’ means becoming as such – 
or, at least, the kinds of processes and becomings with which history as a science deals. 
(I’ve tried to remove this ambiguity by substituting the word ‘becoming’ for ‘process’ 
where I mean to refer to the second form of history.) 
Dussen only has two forms of history to work with, divided by a line at 1925/26, 
so he has to fit ‘history as becoming’ into one of these two forms. He knows not to 
equate history as a process with history as a science. If he did, he would be claiming that, 
for Collingwood, the correct way to do history is the same as the correct way to take part 
in it. Dussen attempts instead to incorporate history as a process into history as the 
assertion of fact. This is much easier to do, and – apart from the fact that it implicitly 
spoils his claim about Collingwood’s ‘realism’ being replaced by 1926 – it seems perfectly 
reasonable, because we have a readily-available concept that allows the two forms to be 
treated together, and that concept is ‘the subject-matter of history’. The subject-matter of 
history, as Collingwood discusses it, is a combination of certain types of fact and certain 
types of process. Thus, for Dussen, certain kinds of process are the ‘objects’ of history, 
and history as a science complements it because is the ‘subjective’ counterpart. This 
reduces the two first forms of history in Collingwood’s thought to one: a form we could 
                                                 
1 NL, 9.5 
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call ‘history as the subject-matter of history’. The complete conception of history would 
then be the complete conception of the subject-matter of history; and the only 
philosophy of history that should be done would be the philosophy that sorts out what 
history should deal with. 
The fact that history as a science (on the ‘subjective’ side) does not displace its 
own ‘object’ (on the ‘objective’ side), either in practice or in theory, should suggest to 
Dussen that there is no need for the hallmarks of the ‘realism’ he identifies to be negated 
by the ‘idealism’ he identifies in Collingwood’s work from 1925/26. But as he’s identified 
a dividing line, he needs to state what it consists in. His answer is, essentially, that 
Collingwood becomes more ‘sceptical’ about the facts he previously believed (in the 
manner of a ‘realist’) history to be about. Throughout 2.3 (‘History: from realism to 
idealism’) Dussen treats the distinguishing mark of ‘realist’ history as the belief in facts, 
and that of ‘idealism’ (history as a science) as expressions of scepticism about those facts. 
This is why he concentrates on instances of Collingwood discussing the reality of the 
historical practice containing things that are partly known and partly unknown – which 
he treats, in Collingwood’s writings, as if it is the expression of a new, healthy, 
sophisticated scepticism. The story Dussen tells is that, from 1925, this scepticism began 
to creep into Collingwood’s thinking about history. 
My objections to this rearrangement are really the most minor criticisms of 
Dussen’s otherwise admirable summary. His is a mighty study, and the fraction of it that 
I am discussing here is a small one. My first criticism is especially minor, because the 
question of the correct subject-matter of history is indeed a far greater focus for 
Collingwood than either the question of the correct conception of facts or processes per 
se. But it is an objection all the same, because Dussen’s equation of the first and second 
forms of history cancels the being/becoming distinction between “fact as such” and 
process as such. The relationship between the facts of history and the processes of 
history are indeed complex, as I’ll explain next, but that relationship in Collingwood’s 
thinking is not one of plain equation. It is better to think of the subject-matter of history 
in Collingwood’s thought as something that invokes and combines two necessary but 
nevertheless distinct concepts: facts in their concrete individuality, and the processes 
from which they are abstracted.1 
Secondly, as we’ve already seen, Dussen’s proposed chronology does not work. 
Although it is true that history as a science becomes Collingwood’s interest from the 
                                                 
1 NL, 30.75-76, 34.62 
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mid-1920s, too much about history being concerned with unique, individual facts 
survives in Collingwood’s later work to allow us to say that the conception of history we 
see in Speculum Mentis is ever replaced. It is not “just a bit of youthful scholasticism which 
had somehow escaped his bonfire”.1 Rather, the very rudimentary claims about history 
made there are complemented by more sophisticated later thinking. This is why, having 
reviewed Speculum Mentis while writing his Autobiography fifteen years later, Collingwood 
finds nothing in it to retract. 
Finally, Dussen’s error is not so much what he concludes from his evidence, but 
what he sets out to decide. His is a chronological question which seeks changes in 
Collingwood’s view of history. The implicit question he sees Collingwood answering is 
‘What is history?’ and, he notices, the answers appear to change. When, after a certain 
point, a new answer is given to a question that remains the same, we commonly assume 
that the old answer is no longer being offered. This, I think, is not the case in 
Collingwood’s philosophy of history. Instead, the old answer is being offered implicitly 
as part of the new; the answer that was unsatisfactory is retained and made satisfactory 
through the extended form of the next answer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 NL, 5.21 
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iv 
The forms of history in an overlapping scale 
 
“When a concept has a dual significance, philosophical and non-philosophical, 
in its non-philosophical phase it qualifies a limited part of reality, whereas in its 
philosophical it leaks or escapes out of these limits and invades the 
neighbouring regions, tending at last to colour our thought of reality as a whole. 
As a non-philosophical concept it observes the rules of classification, its 
instances forming a class separate from other classes; as a philosophical concept 
it breaks these rules, and the class of its instances overlaps those of its co-
ordinate species.” 
– An Essay on Philosophical Method1 
 
‘History’ is a dually-significant, philosophical and non-philosophical, concept. 
We’ve already seen some of its non-philosophical significances: the story (or, more 
cautiously nowadays, a story, a history) of something; the things that have happened in a 
certain place; the human past, or the past in general. History in these senses obeys the 
rules of everyday classification by being distinct from fiction and mythology by being true, 
by not pretending to be the present, and by not pretending to be other subjects, such as 
physics or philosophy. 
But in its philosophical significance, at least as Collingwood explains it, history 
does indeed invade its neighbouring regions. Those invasions are properly pursued and 
properly limited only from the point of view of the highest form of history, ‘history as a 
science’. 
I’ve said that these three forms of history are distinct, but also that they ‘overlap’. 
The idea of classes overlapping and concepts being arranged in a scale of forms is 
outlined in An Essay on Philosophical Method.2 There is no need to describe it in general 
because it really demands an example. Collingwood, realising this, offers the example of 
philosophical concepts of the good,3 but we’ll stick with the concept of history. I must be 
clear first that I am not claiming that Collingwood’s methodology of history is the same 
as his methodology of philosophy, or that there are more parallels between the two than 
has been noticed. In fact in their methods philosophy and history are very distinct. What 
                                                 
1 EPM, p. 35 
2 See particularly EPM, pp. 26-91 
3 EPM, 54-91. See especially pp. 90-1 for the culmination of Collingwood’s example, the overlapping scale 
in moral theory: utility - expediency - duty. 
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I am claiming is that Collingwood’s philosophy of history, as a ‘system’ of philosophical 
thinking, conforms to what he says about how philosophy is to be done – “everywhere 
the same rule holds good”.1 
Each of these forms I’ve described offers an answer to the implicit question 
‘What is history?’ Each “member” of the scale is an answer that realizes the “generic 
essence”.2 But the lower member is “good in itself but bad relatively to its neighbour”.3 
Lower forms of ‘history’ are defective from the point of view of higher forms. They are 
not complete answers. In the instance of Collingwood’s philosophy of history, those 
‘defects’ tend to take the character of arbitrariness. Collingwood is aware that arbitrariness 
must somehow be eradicated from the description of a concept like history: 
 
Upholders of the doctrine under examination would say that here the historian 
is making an arbitrary distinction between things that are really the same, and 
that his conception of history is an unphilosophically narrow one, restricted by 
the imperfect development of his technique; very much as some historians… 
have mistakenly restricted the field of historical thought to the history of 
politics. The question must therefore be raised, why do historians habitually 
identify history with the history of human affairs?4 
 
Each form of history offers (or is) something of the “essence” of history, but the 
reason for that answer rather than another is not offered. Lower forms appear, then, not 
as satisfactory answers to a question, but as arbitrary, perhaps habitual, restrictions and 
definitions. It is only from the point of view of the highest form – history as a science – 
that the defective lower forms are cured of their arbitrariness. The primitive “essence” 
survives, while defects are negated. 
‘Question and answer’ helps to show in very simple terms what that overlap 
looks like. History, in the first form, means “the assertion of fact” – unique, individual, 
concrete facts, and not abstract rules or laws. The third form (history as a science) does 
not, as Dussen says, replace the first form in Collingwood’s thinking, but complements 
it, because ‘history’ in this third form means the investigations of historians whereby 
those individual facts are asserted. When, in Speculum Mentis, Collingwood stresses that 
                                                 
1 EPM, p. 44; NL, 10.34 
2 EPM, p. 82. For Collingwood’s explanation for why the Principle of Limited Objective does not abrogate 
“the idea of essence”, see NL, 36.21-24 
3 EPM, p.86 
4 See IH, pp. 212-13 
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history is the assertion of fact, he is showing that although ‘science’ deals in categories, 
classes, universals, and so on, its concepts are actually abstractions from the kind of 
individual facts that comprise reality, and with which history is concerned. The assertion 
of individual, unique, concrete facts is done not by a scientific consciousness, therefore, 
but by an historical one, which is why science presupposes history.1 
History still asserts individual facts in Collingwood’s thinking from 1925/26 
onwards, but now it is the method of the assertion that is in Collingwood’s sights.2 The 
emphasis now falls not on history asserting facts, but on history asserting facts. There are, 
he is then adding, good and bad ways of asserting historical facts. So, he begins to ask, 
which are the good, and which the bad? 
The overlap of the first and second forms of the concept ‘history’ has already 
been remarked upon. History as the assertion of individual facts overlaps with history as 
becoming in the ‘subject-matter’ of history. The subject-matter of history is processes (of 
a certain kind3) that really happened/that really are happening. Without the element of 
‘fact’ here, the subject-matter of history would be processes alone, which would mean 
that history might have the same subject-matter as fiction. And without the element of 
process, the subject-matter of history would be individual facts, or states of affairs at 
points in time: the processes by which one state of affairs becomes another, and then 
another, and so on, could not be narrated. That would be to cancel what all history 
hitherto told has been. 
For Collingwood it is only certain kinds of process that history should, and can, 
concern itself with. History should be about actions.4 Stein Helgeby’s Action as History is 
especially pertinent here. Helgeby is not interested in Collingwood’s philosophy of 
history as a science, and his chapter on the logic of question and answer is not about 
                                                 
1 SM, pp.201-2 
2 What I am crudely describing here is the development of the concept of ‘history’ in Collingwood’s 
thinking – or at least part of it. Gary Browning has already done something similar for Collingwood’s 
concept of philosophy, so I have not touched on that here. Browning pays special attention to 
consistencies with Hegel. See Browning, Rethinking R. G. Collingwood, pp. 27-50 
3 For a concise overview of Collingwood’s idea of the kinds of actions and processes that comprise the 
‘object’ or ‘subject-matter’ of history, see Mink’s summary in ‘Collingwood’s Historicism’, pp. 161-7 
4 In a short section of The Social and Political Thought of R. G. Collingwood called ‘Mind and history’, David 
Boucher discusses history as the “explanatory model which Collingwood used for the study of mind and its 
activities.” (See Boucher, Social and Political Thought, pp. 110-19. This passage taken from p. 110.) What 
Boucher finds is that through making the subject-matter of history “mind as pure act” (pp. 111-12), or 
mind as becoming, Collingwood aligns himself with a familiar idealist trope: the continuous identity of 
mind amid flux and change – the doctrine of absolute immanence. (See p. 114) He also finds that the 
subject-matter of history is conceived slightly differently in The Idea of History from how it is conceived in 
The New Leviathan. Because this study is concerned with history as a science, and because he has already 
done the work, these differences that Boucher has found are of no concern here. See Boucher, Social and 
Political Thought, pp. 110, 118-19 
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historical method.1 His intention is to analyse and exhibit in fine detail everything else 
Collingwood says about history. He analyses Collingwood’s theories of action, process – 
including his argument that reality is history, which Helgeby calls ‘The World as Process’2 
– and his theory of the link between philosophy and duty. It is a fine piece of 
scholarship. But whether Helgeby knows it or not, he has presented only Collingwood’s 
philosophy of history where ‘history’ denotes what I’m calling the ‘second’ form. 
Without the advantage of ‘retrospect’ from the form ‘history as a science’ – which 
Helgeby refers to occasionally as “epistemology”3 – those theories of action and of 
processes never lose their sense of arbitrariness, and the arguments Collingwood gives 
for their relevance to a philosophy of history are still only analyses of what is 
presupposed by history in the sense he intends. 
But where all three forms overlap, “history is a kind of research or inquiry”4; a 
science in which the conclusions established are the facts of a reality that is itself a 
process. Because this is the highest form of ‘history’, it incorporates the two lower forms, 
gives reason to what is hitherto arbitrary, and thus provides the most complete answer to 
the question of what history ‘is’. 
 
 
v 
The forms of history on a philosophical menu 
 
We face, then, three possible directions in which to continue pursuing our 
questions about the how and the why of history. We might pursue what Collingwood 
says about the method and value of history in any of these three forms. But only one of 
them suits both questions. 
The first form, according to which history is something concerned with unique, 
individual facts, is not (stated in this way) an activity at all, so there can be nothing to say 
about how to do it properly. Just because we have been told that there is an activity 
concerned with ‘unique, individual facts’ does not mean that we can work out how to do 
it, or say anything about why it is to be done. As long as we focus on the individual, 
                                                 
1 Helgeby therefore needn’t devote more than a paragraph to ‘question and answer’ as a theory of inquiry. 
See Action as History, p. 81. For the most part ‘question and answer’ is dealt with by Helgeby as it is dealt 
with by Mink: as a theory of logic in the abstract. See pp. 77-100 
2 Helgeby, Action as History, pp. 47-62. The discussion of reality as process only really gets going from p. 52. 
3 Helgeby, Action as History, p. 58 
4 IH, p. 9 
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unique, concrete nature of the facts asserted, we are concerned only with subject-matter, 
albeit incompletely described. As soon as we turn attention to the way in which the 
assertion is made, we have already left behind the first form of history. 
The second form, history as becoming, is a process, so it is not nonsense to talk 
about how one best ‘does’ it, or takes part in it. But that question is not yet about how to 
‘do’ history. It is instead about how to take part in becoming. It might, then, be taken 
quite reasonably as a question about how best to take part in the process of human 
history – which is a question about how to live a good life. If history is change as such, a 
philosopher of history (of ‘history’ in this sense) might even exploit contemporary 
parlance and offer advice on how to be a good ‘change agent’. Secondly, the value of the 
historical process, or the question of what it is for, makes sense only with the 
presupposition – and an ‘absolute presupposition’ at that1 – that reality has a purpose at 
all. And historians do not need to share that presupposition. 
Taken together these two forms give us the subject-matter of history. But even if 
we take Collingwood’s side and define the subject-matter as res gestae as he does2 – things 
done, done deliberately for reasons, and done in reality not in fiction – we still have no 
reason to evaluate different ways of doing it. Helgeby’s Action as History is as complete an 
account of Collingwood’s philosophy of history as ‘the subject-matter of history’ as one 
could want. “The underlying idea of the study (and which I take to be Collingwood’s)”, 
he says, “is that to give an account of history is to give an account of action, and to give 
an account of action is to give an account of history”.3 But it is precisely because he 
accepts the equation of the second form unmodified that Helgeby cannot discuss what 
Collingwood says about how investigative history is done and why.4 With these two 
forms of history taken together (giving us a philosophy of history as its own subject-
matter), ‘scissors and paste’ is perfectly legitimate, as long as it doesn’t stray from the 
subject-matter of action. And although it makes sense to ask what scissors-and-paste 
history could be for, the answer remains a matter for utility or caprice, because there is 
nothing within its codes of practice that points to a more specific purpose or value. 
There is nothing wrong with history born of propagandistic intent, for example. 
                                                 
1 See EM, pp. 29-33 
2 IH, p. 9 
3 Helgeby, Action as History, p. 2 
4 Quite rightly Helgeby does attempt to deal with Collingwood’s argument about the purpose of history as 
serving the concept of duty. But, as I’ve explained below, regardless of whether or not the reader, unlike 
Alan Donagan, can extend his agreement to Collingwood’s theory of duty, the whole argument about 
history and duty does not actually do justice to his philosophy of history anyway. See Helgeby, Action as 
History, pp. 121-37 
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There is a further point to make about doing philosophy of history by recourse 
to philosophy of subject-matter. Like Dussen, David Boucher has provided, in his Social 
and Political Thought of R. G. Collingwood, an insightful account of how Collingwood’s 
discussions of the subject-matter of history invoke his philosophy of mind.1 Boucher 
illuminates the very fine points of Collingwood’s philosophy of the subject-matter of 
history, says what this reveals about his philosophy of mind, and eventually explains how 
Collingwood thinks it serves morality.2 Dussen’s and Boucher’s focus on Collingwood’s 
philosophy of mind is entirely faithful to Collingwood because, as Mink has also noticed, 
most of what is discussed in The Idea of History belongs to the philosophy of mind, rather 
(Mink says) “than to what is ordinarily called ‘the philosophy of history’.”3 But these 
discussions of the subject-matter of history are not about how history is done according 
to Collingwood – and, in view of their respective aims, they don’t need to be. 
Boucher is, however, unusual in paying close attention to what Collingwood 
takes Locke’s “historical, plain Method” to be.4 Now this, you might think, says 
something about how history is to be done. It is, after all, called a ‘method’. The 
historical plain method is briefly discussed in both The Idea of History and The New 
Leviathan. And What Boucher notices – rightly – is that the historical plain method isn’t 
an investigative historical method at all. Locke means by it (according to Collingwood’s 
description) merely the aim of accounting for “the ways whereby our understandings 
come to attain those notions of things we have”.5 By “historical, plain Method” Locke 
means, then, making claims, or assertions, about how we got our ideas.6 Nothing is said 
about the procedure whereby those assertions are arrived at or made, either by Locke or 
by Collingwood’s reading of Locke’s historical plain method. In fact the historical plain 
method refers only, again, to the kind of process that forms the subject-matter of 
historical narrative. According to these criteria, Locke’s theory of private property as laid 
out in the Second Treatise, and Rousseau’s similar but importantly different version in his 
Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, both accord perfectly with the historical plain method 
– even though both accounts are entirely speculative and offer nothing resembling good 
                                                 
1 See Boucher, Social and Political Thought, pp. 110-19 
2 Collingwood thinks the idiographic nature of history serves the true conception of duty. His argument 
though, as I’ve said in Chapter Six, does not work. My only intention here is to remind the reader that 
subject-matter does not have a purpose: only activities have a purpose. 
3 Mink, ‘Collingwood’s Historicism’, p. 155 
4 See Boucher, Social and Political Thought, pp. 111-12 
5 IH, pp. 71-2 
6 IH, pp. 71-2 
 - 64 -
evidence. If this is a ‘method’, it is not investigative at all, let alone scientifically 
investigative. 
Now, if “historical, plain Method” were taken to mean digging up the 
presuppositions of our current ideas, and presenting them chronologically forwards – 
which is to say ‘archaeologically backwards’ – with the deepest (absolute) presuppositions 
coming first, and the narrative culminating in ‘the present’, then the Second Treatise is such 
a work. Indeed, The New Leviathan too would then be a work of historical plain method.1 
But that would not accord at all with what Collingwood says about the importance of 
historians using relics and offering evidence to the court of truth in history. In fact, it 
would be a kind of pseudo-history: it would be metaphysics narrated as history. 
Furthermore Collingwood does not say that this is what he means by historical plain 
method. In The New Leviathan he actually says that “the essence of this [historical plain] 
method is concentration upon facts. ‘Facts’ is a name for what history is about: facta, gesta, 
things done, piεpiραγµένα, deeds”.2 What this shows is, firstly, that historical plain method 
is not what Collingwood means by history as a science; and secondly, it shows how easily 
a philosopher of history can be diverted from an analysis of method into a discussion of 
the features of the kind of thing that method is supposed to deal with. 
The fact that these two lower forms of history, each on its own or taken together, 
respond to two perfectly ordinary questions about an activity either (a) by making a 
nonsense of them, or (b) by leaving their answers so much to caprice that answering 
them becomes frivolous, indicates that they are inadequate conceptions of history. The 
only form of history in Collingwood’s thinking that fits with our questions is, then, 
scientific history. Indeed, it is partly because only scientific history can deal with such 
questions that it is ‘higher’ than the other forms which it anyway contains. As history is 
something that can be done, it is possible potentially that it may be done well or badly. 
And as it is a special activity it presupposes some kind of purpose, so it makes sense to 
ask what that activity is for. 
                                                 
1 This, I think, is what Gary Browning takes The New Leviathan to be. “The New Leviathan reveals that 
Collingwood is committed to the Hegelian project of working out a highly generalised historical account of 
the development of freedom”, he says. Browning, Rethinking R. G. Collingwood, p. 95. See also p. 75 where 
Browning says that, for Collingwood, philosophy “rethinks the principles underlying practices, which have 
been developed historically”; and see especially pp. 125-33 where Browning stresses the Hegelianism of The 
New Leviathan, and compares it to The Philosophy of Mind and The Philosophy of Right. I daresay Browning has a 
point. My own point is merely that the philosophical method of The New Leviathan – even if it does 
coincide with what Collingwood takes as Locke’s historical plain method – is not the method of 
investigative history. 
2 NL, 9.11. See also 9.2 
 - 65 -
From here on we’re dealing almost entirely with history as a science – that is, the 
mode of ‘Baconian’, systematic, question-and-answer thinking that we call history. I 
define Collingwood’s work on history as a science as that which concerns how history is 
to be done properly; the philosophy of historical method which, in his letter to Croce, he 
looked forward to working on; the “problems in historical methodology” which he says 
in his Autobiography his “head was already full of”1; and the answers to one of the three 
opening questions of the 1926 ‘Lectures’, “What is the best way of doing it? in other 
words, what are the principles of method by which historical study is or ought to be 
guided?”.2 
“Strangely enough”, Dussen writes, “his [Collingwood’s] views on the 
methodological aspects of history have not received the attention one would expect – 
and, one should add, they deserve”.3 Dussen adds that “it is no exaggeration to assert 
that Collingwood’s contribution to the theory of historical methodology is an almost 
completely neglected aspect of his thought on history”.4 
This neglect seems to be due at least in part to a debate going back to the mid-
1950s over whether what Collingwood says about history is to be taken to be taken as 
‘methodology’ of history at all, rather than, perhaps, just a ‘philosophy of history’ in a less 
prescriptive sense – something like ‘what we’re doing’ when we do history.5 This debate 
had already been widely discussed – more, I think, than it deserved to be. If 
Collingwood’s writings had nothing prescriptively ‘methodological’ about them, then he 
not only fails to put into writing whatever it was he had in mind when he wrote, in his 
Autobiography, that his “head was already full of problems in historical methodology”,6 but 
he also fails to attempt an answer to one of those three opening questions laid out in his 
                                                 
1 A, p. 85 
2 L26, IH, p. 359 
3 Dussen, History as a Science, p. 283. Dussen continues shortly after by pointing to the (then) emerging 
work of Cebik, Couse, and Coady. See note 2 on p. 415. He also explains, on pp. 292-3, why he supersedes 
what they’ve said. 
4 Dussen, History as a Science, p. 295 
5 The debate arose in the context of discussing the doctrine of re-enactment. For a neat overview of this 
debate see Margit Hurup Nielsen, ‘Re-Enactment and Reconstruction in Collingwood’s Philosophy of 
History’, History and Theory vol. 20, no. 1 (February, 1981), p. 3 (figures identified on p. 4, note 11). Fred 
Inglis refers obliquely to the same debate; see History Man, p. 84. The debate then rather burst its banks, 
and was carried on as if what was at stake was not only the correct interpretation of the doctrine of re-
enactment specifically, but what Collingwood says about historical knowledge in general. See for instance 
R. B. Smith, ‘R. G. Collingwood’s definition of historical knowledge’, History of European Ideas 33 (2007), pp. 
350-71. It is of course possible to think that the doctrine of re-enactment is ‘non-methodological’ in the 
sense that it is meant to signal something about what is demanded for the satisfaction of historical 
questions, without concluding that Collingwood has nothing to say about historical method. See Dussen’s 
discussion of this in History as a Science, p. 283 
6 A, p. 85 
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own 1926 ‘Lectures’, “What is the best way of doing it? in other words, what are the 
principles of method by which historical study is or ought to be guided?”1 
This debate over whether or not Collingwood is to be read ‘methodologically’ is 
anyway, I think, based on a false dichotomy. The whole purpose of The Idea of History is 
to exhibit the great variety of ways people have thought about history, about the past, 
and of how they have practised history as a discipline; and Collingwood intends the 
reader to learn from this historical overview something about the correct and incorrect 
ways to think about all of those. Collingwood’s philosophy of history is prescriptive in the 
regard that it describes what he takes to be the correct way of thinking about and doing 
history. If it weren’t meant to be this, then there would be no reason for him to devote 
so much of The Idea of History to explaining to his readers/audience what was and is 
wrong with so much of what he describes, which he does in every one of his short case-
studies. Collingwood’s is indeed a study of the historian’s method, but not ‘method’ in the 
sense of recommending to historians how to compare, date, and verify their sources, 
telling archaeologists what clues to look for on the surface, or how to organise and 
present their findings. That may be the sort of thing that ‘methodologically’-minded 
readers are sometimes looking for. But Collingwood’s ‘methodology’, although still 
prescriptive, is more general than that, more abstracted from such details of practice.2 
Take the three ‘rules of method’ he prescribes in ‘The Historical Imagination’, for 
instance: (1) The historian’s picture must be localized in time and space; (2) it must be 
coherent with itself, since there can only be one true past; and (3) it must stand in a 
particular relation to evidence.3 These three rules of method are hardly debatable: the 
first two are actually presuppositions of historical practice as everyone knows it already. 
But they are no less prescriptive, no less methodological, just because historians already 
presuppose them.4 
It is no longer true to say that history as a science has been neglected, and this is 
due largely to Dussen. History as a Science is a mighty work, and the reader must not think 
that the criticisms I have made of some of its minutiae constitute an attack on it or its 
author. But it should be noticed that, because I have outlined history as a science as ‘the 
                                                 
1 L26, IH, p. 359 
2 Collingwood, I think, says as much about the methods of historians in general as it is possible to say 
without inviting infinite possible exceptions. As Louis Mink points out in Mind, History and Dialectic, “no 
matter how circumspect and carefully qualified your generalization, it can be confuted in an instant by a 
university president with original ideas and a post to fill – or even, for that matter, by an historian with 
original ideas”. Mink, Mind, History and Dialectic, p. 161 
3 IH, p. 246 
4 This same ‘general’ or ‘abstract’ prescriptive methodology is to be found also in An Autobiography. See for 
example A, pp. 84-7 
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highest form of history’, which Dussen does not, I must now explain how what 
Collingwood says about the lower forms is ‘absorbed’ by it – how the “essence” of 
history they offered survives into the highest form – and how this fits with what we’ve 
already heard about ‘question and answer’. Because Dussen does not entertain the idea 
that the two different forms of history he discusses complement each other, he does not 
need to outline how this ‘absorption’ works. And because he does not see the 
importance of ‘question and answer’ that I do in Collingwood’s philosophy of scientific 
history, he does not need to devote the space to describing, as I have, the characteristics 
of historical questions. 
Conversely, Louis Mink has written about Collingwood’s philosophy of history as 
part of an overlapping scale of forms, which he thinks makes sense only in view of the 
‘dialectical’ nature of Collingwood’s philosophy as a whole. According to what Mink says 
in his article ‘Collingwood’s Historicism: A Dialectic of Process’, in his statements about 
activities and processes in general Collingwood “is thinking of them at different levels 
related so that one includes but transforms the other. A relation of this sort is dialectical”.1 
“A dialectical series”, he says later, “is cumulative in the sense that earlier or ‘lower’ 
members are not merely replaced by later or ‘higher’ members but are preserved 
although modified in the later ones”2; “the key to understanding Collingwood’s thought 
is an appreciation of how fundamentally and pervasively dialectical it is”.3 
I have avoided the term ‘dialectical’ here, since I’ve found it to invite more 
misunderstanding into discussion than it does clarity.4 What it would indicate here, were 
it to be employed is, I think, clear enough anyway.5 Now, Mink closes his article, 
‘Collingwood’s Historicism’, by claiming that appreciating the dialectical nature of 
Collingwood’s thinking shows why it has been “so subject to misinterpretation”. The 
meaning of Collingwood’s general principles (or “recessive doctrines”), Mink says, “is 
dependent on his conception of dialectic as a presupposition, and it is they [sic] which 
most systematically relate his ‘principles of history’ to his larger philosophy”.6 
                                                 
1 Mink, ‘Collingwood’s Historicism’, p. 168. Mink provides an overview of how he understands ‘dialectic’ 
in Collingwood’s Essay on Philosophical Method (on pp. 170-3). 
2 Mink, ‘Collingwood’s Historicism’, p. 173. Mink cites NL, 9.51 
3 Mink, ‘Collingwood’s Historicism’, p. 168 
4 Any of Collingwood’s readers who wishes to discuss Hegel-style dialectics in his work ought to consult 
first NL, 33.83-92, especially (in reference to Collingwood’s philosophy of history) 33.92. 
5 A further reason I have avoided it is that it might too easily be confused with the distinct sense of 
‘dialectic’ Collingwood employs in The New Leviathan. See NL, 24.57. Both are to be contrasted with the 
sense Collingwood thinks Hegel (mistakenly) gives to ‘dialectic’, and Marx’s attack on free will by his 
modification of it. See NL, 33.83-99 
6 Mink, ‘Collingwood’s Historicism’, p. 177 
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My dissatisfactions with these claims are, again, very minor. Firstly, what Mink 
says here closes his article: he does not go on to show his reader exactly how, in view of 
this ‘dialectical nature’, Collingwood’s principles of history make sense – though he 
recognises that, more generally, Collingwood’s view is that “earlier terms are retrospectively 
and only retrospectively both necessary and sufficient”.1 And secondly, Mink seems to imply 
that those principles can only be assented to by one prepared to presuppose ‘dialectical’ 
philosophy. I think most writers in philosophy of history will not assent so readily to 
such a presupposition, albeit partly because of what they think ‘dialectics’ means. But it 
seems to me that they don’t need to assent to ‘dialectics’ anyway. They only need to 
presuppose history as a science in Collingwood’s basic, ‘Baconian’ sense. We’ll shortly 
see exactly what this entails. I will attempt to give the account that Mink doesn’t give, 
and try to explain why Collingwood’s embattled doctrines make sense in view – in 
‘retrospective’ view – of history as a science. My answer is, in short, that the features of 
history that Collingwood discusses, in contexts other than that of how history is to be 
done scientifically, are absorbed as terms of a unique kind of question – the historical 
question – to which history as a science, uniquely, asserts answers. 
When I say ‘they are absorbed’ I don’t mean that this is what Collingwood is 
trying to describe. He isn’t, and to claim that he is would be a claim about Collingwood’s 
secret intentions that would starve the reader of evidence. I mean rather that this is how 
Collingwood’s conclusions are rescued from his sometimes weak arguments – weak 
because they often fail to be conclusive, and sometimes don’t quite succeed in shaking 
off ‘arbitrariness’. The way in which I’m trying to provide that rescue, however, is faithful 
to the question-and-answer logic of history as a science, upon which as we’ve seen 
Collingwood certainly does intend to insist. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Mink, ‘Collingwood’s Historicism’, pp. 174-5 
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vi 
Question-and-answer history in Collingwood scholarship 
 
First let us survey the existing work on the subject now at hand: ‘question and 
answer’ in Collingwood’s philosophy of history. My claim is not that those who have 
studied Collingwood’s philosophy of history have always missed the question-and-answer 
principle,1 but rather that they might not always see, or remember, how thoroughgoing it 
is meant to be for all systematic thinking, all science. They do not see it as having the 
same thoroughgoing significance to Collingwood’s philosophy of history that I do, and 
they have not offered defences of his contentions that appeal to ‘question and answer’ in 
history. 
Alan Donagan devotes chapter four of his excellent Later Philosophy of R. G. 
Collingwood (1962) to ‘Question and Answer’.2 It is an insightful discussion of the theme 
and, in what it deals with, perfectly accurate. But Donagan is concerned only very briefly 
with history in that chapter. Mostly it is dedicated to the theory of presuppositions in 
itself.3 Even in §3 of the chapter, ‘The Functions of Interrogative Thinking’, Donagan 
says nothing about history. Donagan saves history for two later chapters, ‘Scientific 
History’ and ‘The Philosophy of History’. Quite rightly, a ten-page section in the former 
chapter deals with ‘Question and Evidence’.4 There Donagan discusses the formal logic 
used by historians (especially tollendo tollens demonstrations) to connect their evidence to 
their conclusions. There is more on the principle of question and answer in archaeology 
specifically in a later four-page section,5 where Donagan’s intention is only to defend 
Collingwood’s principle against certain misinterpretations – including the misreading 
according to which “to pose a problem permitted its answer to be predicted”. He also 
discusses the criticisms Collingwood received in an obituary from I. A. Richmond 
concerning his archaeological practice specifically. In chapter nine, ‘The Philosophy of 
History’, Donagan discusses several of Collingwood’s arguments about history, including 
                                                 
1 Dussen has said that he finds it “amazing how little attention has been paid by philosophers interested in 
Collingwood’s philosophy of history to his activities in the fields of archaeology and history”. He also 
reminds his readers that “Collingwood made it abundantly clear in his Autobiography how closely his theory 
of history was based on his archaeological and historical practice”. (See Dussen, History as a Science, p. 201) 
The general thrust of the present essay is that philosophers writing about Collingwood have also 
commonly paid little attention to the full scope of ‘question and answer’. I would suggest that the two 
oversights may well be related. 
2 Donagan, Later Philosophy, pp. 66-93 
3 Donagan, Later Philosophy, pp. 66-79. For Donagan’s explanation of how Collingwood’s conception of 
presuppositions differs from that of other (later) thinkers, see pp. 68-72. 
4 Donagan, Later Philosophy, pp. 182-91 
5 Donagan, Later Philosophy, pp. 196-200 
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his presuppositions, his doctrine of re-enactment, and his claims about history and what 
Donagan calls “practical wisdom”. But except for a short mention in the section on re-
enactment, he does not refer to the logic of question and answer – and even there it is a 
little obscured by Dongan’s tendency to refer to it in passing as ‘Baconian’ thinking.1 
The Later Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood deserves its reputation as a ‘classic’ study 
and, as we’ve seen, ‘question and answer’ is by no means absent from it. But there are 
lacunae. (See summary below.) Again, these lacunae are not failings: Donagan probably 
never intended to speak to such tasks. It is my intention here merely to discover where 
there is room for more to be said and where there isn’t. 
Louis Mink’s Mind, History and Dialectic: The Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood (1969) is 
another ‘classic’ study. Mink’s sub-section, ‘The “Logic of Question and Answer,” and 
Some Criticisms of It’, actually falls in chapter five, ‘The Logic of Thought’, and not in 
chapter six, ‘The Grammar of Action: History’. ‘Question and answer’ makes no 
significant reappearance in the chapter on history. It is because Mink limits ‘question and 
answer’ to his treatment of Collingwood’s logic that he makes his job of defending some 
of Collingwood’s claims about history more difficult, I think, than it needs to be. It is, 
though, quite an artificial limitation, as I think Mink probably realised. He says, while 
discussing ‘question and answer’, that what Collingwood “had in mind was not a 
propositional logic at all, or a substitute for one, but a theory of inquiry. He was interested 
not at all in the theory of proof, which is the subject of formal logic, but in the theory of 
discovery, which formal logic does not even claim to deal with”.2 Mink is right, and it is this 
theory of inquiry as it pertains to history as a science that the present study is given over 
to. 
More recently, in Action as History: The Historical Thought of R. G. Collingwood (2004), 
Stein Helgeby has renewed Mink’s divorce of ‘question and answer’ from Collingwood’s 
philosophy of history. Helgeby’s book is a fine exposition of Collingwood’s theories of 
action,3 thought,4 process,5 and morality.6 All of these, he says, form parts of 
Collingwood’s philosophy of history. As I’ve explained, Helgeby is not wrong. But, as a 
treatment of Collingwood’s philosophy of history, it is incomplete, because it neglects 
                                                 
1 See especially Later Philosophy, pp. 214-16 (Donagan’s section on re-enactment), and within that his very 
brief (paragraph-long) argument that re-enactment is still methodologically ‘Baconian’. 
2 Mink, Mind, History and Dialectic, p. 124. See also p. 138 
3 The whole book really presents a theory of action, but Helgeby’s discussion of “activity” specifically is to 
be found in Action as History, pp. 27-45 
4 Helgeby, Action as History, pp. 63-76 
5 Helgeby, Action as History, pp. 47-62 
6 Helgeby, Action as History, pp. 121-37 
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history as a science. Helgeby is satisfied with the second form of history, according to 
which history ‘is’ its own subject-matter, which comprises processes of a particular kind. 
Helgeby therefore needn’t devote more than a paragraph to ‘question and answer’ as a 
theory of inquiry.1 For the most part ‘question and answer’ is dealt with by Helgeby as it 
is dealt with by Mink: as a theory of logic in the abstract.2 
Another recent work, Marnie Hughes-Warrington’s How Good an Historian Shall I 
Be? R.G. Collingwood, the Historical Imagination and Education (2003), is a very suggestive 
study of the relevance of Collingwood’s philosophy of history to education – in theory 
and in practice. With this in mind she revisits debates around re-enactment, the subject-
matter of history, and history’s claim to self-knowledge. She is particularly focused, 
though, on Collingwood’s theory of ‘historical imagination’. Imagination and historical 
imagination are of particular importance to education, she argues, and she has provided a 
very high-quality discussion of what Collingwood says about how the imagination 
operates in history.3 What she does not discuss is how imagination relates to ‘question 
and answer’, and how ‘question and answer’ operates in historical thinking. Rather, 
historical imagination in its a priori guise is taken to be a method of its own.4 This is, I 
think, because she is interested in the implications of Collingwood’s philosophy for 
history as a lesson, and not history as a science. There is nothing wrong with this focus. 
But it does mean that she has nothing to say about the possible educational implications 
of what Collingwood says about the importance of framing historical questions properly. 
Hughes-Warrington also ignores ‘question and answer’ in her discussion of re-enactment. 
This, I think, forces her into a diversionary comparison of Collingwood’s process of re-
enactment with Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language. I have explained in the right place 
why this is diversionary and anyway unnecessary. 
We’ve already heard much from Jan van der Dussen. His admirably thorough 
History as a Science: The Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood (1981) is of greatest relevance to the 
present study, which is why I mention him last. Dussen’s treatment of ‘Question and 
Answer’ in History as a Science falls precisely where it should: in his chapter on ‘Historical 
                                                 
1 Helgeby, Action as History, p. 81. The discussion is also exegetical. 
2 Helgeby, Action as History, pp. 77-100. With his great benefit of years of reading Helgeby has, however, 
been able to provide a more extensive overview of other commentators’ work on ‘question and answer’ in 
general than I have here. See Action as History, pp. 84-8. On pp. 88-91 there is also a neat comparison of 
Collingwood with Dewey. 
3 See Hughes-Warrington, pp.129-54 
4 See Hughes-Warrington, pp.135-45 
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Method’.1 He discusses ‘question and answer’ as a “logic of inquiry” in history; and he 
devotes a couple of pages to each of three requirements laid out by Collingwood for a 
question to be meaningful – namely, that it must ‘arise’, that its relation to evidence must 
be clear, and that it must be put in the right way. There is also a short discussion of 
‘limited objective’. Dussen deals masterfully with each, and draws on his usual depth and 
breadth of knowledge of Collingwood’s writings, published and unpublished. 
To summarise: The effect of some commentators’ neglect of the fact that, for 
Collingwood, scientific knowledge means answers to questions has been two-fold. 
Firstly, elaborate defences of some of Collingwood’s apparently contentious points about 
history have been mounted which might easily have achieved their aims by showing that, 
with the question-and-answer principle in position, there was little need for a defence of 
that kind in the first place. And secondly a dispute has been allowed to erupt over 
whether Collingwood thought historical facts and knowledge were ‘objective’, or whether 
he thought they were ‘subjective’2 (xvi, below). 
The first can, I think, be said of Louis Mink’s defences of what he thinks are 
Collingwood’s six key theses in his ambitious study, Mind, History and Dialectic.3 Mink’s six 
key theses are at least partly inspired by the layout of Alan Donagan’s chapter, ‘The 
Philosophy of History’,4 published eight years earlier. Donagan’s strategy is similar, firstly 
in so far as he mostly attempts to defend Collingwood’s claims on Collingwood’s own 
terms in order to remain faithful to the original reasoning, and secondly in so far as he 
doesn’t appeal to the logic of question and answer for those defences. 
Donagan’s strategy is, though, interestingly superior to Mink’s, because he very 
frankly admits that the points Collingwood presents as arguments about history – i.e. that 
it is about thoughts/the insides of actions; that historians must re-enact past thoughts; 
that past thoughts ‘live’ in the present, etc. – are in fact presuppositions of the kind of 
history Collingwood has in mind.5 Donagan is right, and I’ll warn the reader now that 
this is a point I will repeat here ad nauseam. What are frequently taken to be 
Collingwood’s argument about why history ‘is this’ or is ‘about this’ are actually attempts 
to shore up the presuppositions that those conceptions of history make – which is not 
the same thing. 
                                                 
1 See Dussen, History as a Science. Dussen’s chapter ‘Historical Method’ covers pp. 283-308. Of that chapter, 
pp. 295-305 deal with ‘question and answer’. 
2 Dussen has documented this dispute in a section of History as a Science called ‘Historical Objectivity’. See 
pp. 119. I also deal with this below in conjunction with the dispute over ‘constructionism’. 
3 See pp. 157-94 
4 Donagan, Later Philosophy, pp. 210-47 
5 See Donagan, Later Philosophy, pp. 210-47 
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Dussen’s lacunae are much tighter – more, as we say, ‘niche’. In neither History as 
a Science nor his article ‘Collingwood’s Claim that History is a Science’ does Dussen say 
anything about what sense ‘question and answer’ might make of re-enactment1 (Part IV, 
below); or of the ‘what-why paradox’ (xv, below); or what it might help to clarify about 
the historical ‘object’ (xvi, below). And he does not discuss ‘question and answer’ in the 
section of History as a Science on ‘The Use of History’ (Part VI, below). Dussen’s book will 
not be surpassed for some time, but one minor shortfall is that he is not interested in 
historical questions beyond what Collingwood says quite explicitly.2 
In what remains of this ‘Part’ of my study I have selected and discussed from 
Collingwood’s writings four ‘key theses’ of my own: first, that history is only about 
meaning (x); second, that history is about particulars and not universals (xi); third, that 
history is about processes (xii); and fourth, that once the historian knows what was done 
he knows why it was done (xv). Fifthly (xvi) I have dealt with this debate about 
‘objectivism’ and ‘subjectivism’ / ‘realism’ and ‘constructionism’.3 
My principle of selection has been either (a) that the point is an important 
contention in the context of what Collingwood was trying to correct, so that seeing the 
sense in it is important to evaluating him as a thinker on history; or (b) that the point 
pertains especially to debates about ‘method’ in the history of ideas still. All of these 
‘theses’, I am now saying, are actually presuppositions of scientific history. In general 
these presuppositions of scientific history that Collingwood discusses are actually widely 
shared. They can be bolstered in other ways,4 or they might not be questioned at all. The 
difficulties around these points can be ‘unlocked’, I will show, by using ‘question and 
answer’ as something like what Gary Browning calls a “skeleton key”.5 
 
 
                                                 
1 See History as a Science, pp. 96-109. Dussen’s argument is based on deciding into which of two categories 
the doctrine of re-enactment falls, methodological or non-methodological. I have explained below why the 
dichotomy between the two categories is a false one. 
2 See for example History as a Science, pp. 354-5, where Dussen follows loyally Collingwood’s reasoning 
about the distinctness of history from natural science owing to a difference between natural and historical 
processes. 
3 Dussen has documented this dispute in a section of History as a Science called ‘Historical Objectivity’. See 
Dussen, History as a Science, pp. 119. I also deal with this below in conjunction with the dispute over 
‘constructionism’. 
4 Donagan too defends those presuppositions. But when he comes to an argument that is not about the 
presuppositions of history, but concerns instead the practical use of history, his defence turns into attack. 
See his Later Philosophy, pp. 236-47 
5 Browning, Rethinking R. G. Collingwood, p. 2 
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vii 
The special character of inference in history: a problem 
 
Now, it is not part of Dussen’s purpose, either in History as a Science or in 
‘Collingwood’s Claim’, to deal with Collingwood’s assertion that history is a distinct 
science. Yet this is the crux of Collingwood’s contentions about history as a science. 
‘History as a science’ is not ‘history as part of another science’. Plenty of the authors 
dealt with in The Idea of History contend that history could be made more scientific, but 
Collingwood attacks them because he thinks what they say bulldozes history’s 
distinctness. In general, Collingwood appeals to features of the natural-scientific model 
of knowledge that do not exist in history, or do not exist in the same way: features such 
as ascertaining facts, withholding value judgements, and framing laws or “subsuming” 
objects under them.1 Because it has been so successful over the last few centuries, 
Collingwood says, that kind of science, that model of knowledge, had attained default 
status as the model of knowledge per se. This is probably why, Collingwood observes, 
recent philosophy of science had ‘totally neglected’ history.2 All of this, Collingwood 
thinks, was accepted by the historians or philosophers of his youth: 
 
Any of them, without special preparation, could have given an entire set of 
lectures on the problems of ‘scientific’ method. And when they discussed the 
theory of knowledge it was plain that, as a rule, they regarded the word 
‘knowledge’ in that phrase as more or less equivalent to knowledge of the world 
of nature or physical world… My ‘realist’ friends, when I said this to them, 
replied that there was no gap at all; that their theory of knowledge was a theory 
of knowledge, not a theory of this kind of knowledge or that kind of 
knowledge; that certainly it applied to ‘scientific’ knowledge, but equally to 
historical knowledge or any other kind I liked to name; and that it was foolish to 
think that one kind of knowledge could need a special epistemological study all 
to itself.3 
 
There was, then, a gap in the philosophy of history that was invisible to these 
thinkers because it was thought to have been filled by ‘the’ theory of knowledge more 
                                                 
1 IH, pp. 126-7 
2 A, p. 84 
3 A, pp. 84-5 
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generally. “I could see”, Collingwood continues, “that they were mistaken”.1 Anyone 
who attempted the application of natural-scientific knowledge to history would find, “if 
he knew what historical thinking was like, that no such application was possible”.2 
I think ‘question and answer’ serves very well Collingwood’s arguments for 
history as a distinct science. And, it seems to me, he does need rescuing on that point, 
since he typically circumnavigates what is essential: the starting point of history as a 
distinct science is a type of question that is distinctly ‘historical’. By ‘circumnavigate’ I 
mean that, in order to make his point, Collingwood usually discusses history as being 
distinct on account of (1) a distinct subject-matter and/or (2) a distinct form of 
inference. But, in the first place, this argument about distinct subject-matter is actually 
one he also attacks; while, in the second, he never successfully explains the supposed 
specialness of historical inference. What he should have argued instead of all of this, 
especially in view of his own logic of question and answer, is that, as I’ve said, history is 
the science that answers questions of a particular character, and is the only science that 
can do so.3 
That’s the overview. Here’s the detail: It is commonly thought that sciences are 
distinct because of essential differences between their respectively distinct subject-matter, 
or ‘objects’. Collingwood gives his readers plenty of reasons to think that this is his 
argument for the distinctness of history as a science. He even introduces The Idea of 
History by telling the reader that “historical thought has an object with peculiarities of its 
own”.4 History is the science of res gestae, he says.5 This argument has been faithfully 
followed by the ever close-reading Jan van der Dussen, who says that Collingwood’s 
“refusal to reduce natural science to history is derived from the distinction between a 
natural and an historical process”.6 It is also faithfully followed by Alan Donagan who (as 
Dussen would later) opens his description of ‘scientific history’ with a distinction 
between different types of object.7 Stein Helgeby has since written a whole book on the 
distinct subject-matter of history, Action as History. “The epistemology of history follows 
from the character of its object”, he says; “In Collingwood’s view, because the processes 
of nature differ from the processes of history, our knowledge of nature and of history 
                                                 
1 A, p. 85 
2 A, p. 85 
3 IH, pp. 220-1. See also pp. 239-40 
4 IH, p. 5 
5 IH, p. 9 
6 Dussen, History as a Science, p. 354 
7 Donagan, Later Philosophy, pp. 176-7 
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differ, and the methods of each differ”.1 More recently still, Gary Browning observes that 
there is “overlap” between the subject-matter and method of history. Browning is right 
about this. But the kind of overlap he describes is one in which the subject-matter 
“demands a free rational investigation that respects [it]”.2 There is, he explains at length, 
“reciprocity” between method and subject-matter. Later this reciprocity turns out to be a 
“unity”.3 This “unity”, Browning says, links Collingwood and Hegel, and additionally 
shows what is wrong with Walsh’s assumption that method and subject-matter are 
“separate”.4 
But it is not really Collingwood’s position that what makes history distinct is that 
it deals with a distinct class of objects, a distinct ‘subject-matter’. In ‘Reality as History’ 
Collingwood tells his reader, rather tersely, that 
 
the true scope of historical thinking has been much misunderstood. It has been 
supposed to be a special kind of thinking appropriate to a special kind of 
object… According to this doctrine, historicity was peculiar to mind; nature had 
no history; thinking historically was therefore right and proper when we were 
thinking about mind, but about nature it was right to think scientifically as 
distinct from historically.5 
 
This would do as a summary of what Collingwood is almost always thought to 
argue. But this conception, Collingwood then says, “rested on a fundamental mistake”: 
 
                                                 
1 Helgeby, Action as History , p. 58 
2 Browning, Rethinking R. G. Collingwood, p. 78. Next we’ll see why, despite all of this, the relationship 
between subject-matter and method should actually be the other way round. Subject-matter does not 
determine method for a science. It is that science’s characteristic question that determines the science’s 
subject-matter. Because method, for Browning, is implied by subject-matter, Collingwood’s agreement with 
Hegel concerning the question of subject-matter signals agreement with Hegel concerning method. 
(Browning, Rethinking R. G. Collingwood, p. 84-90) But of course Hegel does not offer the kind of 
philosophy of history that could explain, for instance, what is wrong with ‘scissors and paste’. Hegel is not 
talking about how historians should proceed in their inquiries. And indeed Collingwood actually attacks 
Hegel for conceiving of history’s ‘dialectic’ such that “everything argued itself into existence”. (NL, 33.85) 
Browning is right that subject-matter and method are not, as he claims Walsh thinks, “separate”, but 
neither are they a “unity”. When Browning points to a shared philosophy of historical method he is really 
referring to what is described by both Collingwood and Hegel as history’s subject-matter. That form of 
history – ‘history’ as the subject-matter of history (which is what Helgeby’s book is about) – is contained 
within Collingwood’s ‘history as a science’. It is part of it, but does not exhaust it. 
3 Browning, Rethinking R. G. Collingwood, p. 92 
4 Browning, Rethinking R. G. Collingwood, p. 93 
5 See PH, p.179. This is a direct contradiction of something Collingwood had written earlier, and which is 
cited (directly from the manuscript) by Dussen. The passage reads: “In the seventeenth century, he says, 
“[i]t was evident that physical science had discovered its own proper object and (what comes to the same 
thing) the proper methods of investigating that object”. See Dussen, History as a Science, p. 284 
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Scientific thought is in reality based not on a recognition that certain peculiar 
kinds of things need to be thought of in that peculiar way, but on a belief that 
this is the way in which thinking is to be done.1 
 
The difference between (and the relation between) these two sciences is not, it 
turns out, on the objective side, but on the subjective side. En route to making this point, 
Collingwood also accuses (I think wrongly) the ‘theorists of the Geisteswissenschaften’ of 
making the very mistake that those I’ve just named, Dussen, Donagan, and Helgeby, 
attribute to Collingwood himself.2 Where, Collingwood thinks, the Geisteswissenschaft 
theorists held the distinction between different sciences to be based on two essentially 
different kinds of object, he sees that it is actually the two different kinds of thinking that 
produces the two species of science. The difference between natural science and history 
does not, for Collingwood, owe to a difference inhering to the two sciences’ objects in 
themselves – their ‘subject-matter’. Rather the difference is on the ‘subjective’ side, the 
way of systematically thinking about them. (It is ironic, considering Browning’s argument, 
that Collingwood also attacks Hegel for making this very mistake.3) 
Collingwood’s point is a good one, and it is by no means limited to the essay 
‘Reality as History’.4 The same object, he says in The New Leviathan, can be the focus of 
both a natural-scientific inquiry, and an historical inquiry – but this does not make them 
the same kinds of inquiry. Asking ‘What is Man?’ (where the object is ‘man’) invokes 
more than one kind of inquiry.5 Neither of these inquiries, Collingwood says, “can do 
anything but harm, either to itself or to its fellow, by trespassing on its fellow’s hunt”. 
“Of these two different forms of science”, he adds, “the one that has started a hare must catch 
it”.6 The “hunt”, then, is the pursuit, and not the hare itself. The same ‘subject-matter’ 
can, then, be the object of different sciences.7 Collingwood also reminds the reader of 
something else “laid down by Bacon and Descartes in the seventeenth [century]: to speak 
not merely ‘to the subject’ but ‘to the point’”.8 
                                                 
1 PH, p. 179 
2 PH, p.179 
3 IH, p. 434-5 
4 See NL, 2.6-64 for a later example. 
5NL, 1.83-84 
6 NL, 2.64-65 
7 The reader will see below why it is this principle – the principle that it is not the subject-matter itself, but 
something else that makes a science what it is – that makes Collingwood’s metaphysics more relevant to his 
philosophy of history, and that philosophy of history more enduringly provocative. 
8 NL, 1.19. See also 1.4-43 
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So, if the methods of natural science are inappropriate to history, it is not because 
the object of inquiry – man, mind, res gestae, the ‘inside’ of actions – is inappropriate to 
natural science, but because natural science does something in its form of scientific 
thinking, its form of inference, that historians cannot do, or do not need to do. 
So what is it? What is so special about the systematic thinking of history? Perhaps 
it is the “special characteristics of historical inference”?1 Section V of ‘Epilegomena’ §3 is 
called ‘Historical inference’, so it is here that one might expect to find the supposed 
“special characteristics of historical inference” explained.2 But once there we find 
Collingwood discussing only the supposed difference between ‘compulsive’ and 
‘permissive’ inference, and the problem of implication. And what he says about this, it 
turns out, “arises in history or pseudo-history of any kind whatever, and indeed in any 
kind of science or pseudo-science”. So ‘permissive’ or ‘implicative’ inference is not a 
special characteristic of historical inference at all.3 Collingwood also claims that those 
special characteristics are the historian’s thinking ‘critically’ or being ‘autonomous’; using 
evidence; using the imagination to ‘fill in the gaps’; and ‘re-enacting’ past thought. But he 
is surely wrong if he thinks any except possibly the last is exclusive to history. 
Collingwood’s doctrine of re-enactment has of course been challenged on all 
sorts of grounds. As it is very important to his philosophical reputation at present, I’ve 
devoted all of Part IV of this study to the doctrine. I might as well tell the reader now 
that I think Collingwood is right to think re-enactment a necessary condition of historical 
knowledge, but only because it can be rephrased in an entirely commonsensical way 
which removes from it all the ‘sting’, and everything that has been thought controversial 
or unscientific about it. 
But, even in view of this, re-enactment does not demonstrate the distinctness of 
historical thinking – at least, not on its own – because re-enactment is not a ‘feature’ that 
is exclusive to history among the activities of mind. We re-enact thoughts in 
Collingwood’s sense all the time: when we are being told a funny story, for example, or 
when we are following the reasoning of another person’s conference paper, or identifying 
flaws in an opponent’s logic. Even if listening to a story or someone else’s reasoning is 
(or involves) what Collingwood calls ‘historical thinking’, that does not mean that 
instances of thought re-enactment are scientific historical investigations. It may be one 
                                                 
1 IH, p. 256 
2 IH, p. 256 
3 Dussen has also voiced dissatisfaction with what Collingwood says about historical inference, though for 
different reasons. He is looking for a description of what historical inference is; I am looking more 
specifically for what is peculiar about historical inference. See Dussen, ‘Collingwood’s Claim’, pp. 7-11 
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‘feature’ of history as a science, but too much is still missing for it to demonstrate 
history’s distinctness alone. 
 
 
viii 
The solution: the special character of historical questions 
 
The following passage is taken from the part of Collingwood’s Essay on 
Metaphysics where he attempts to show that there is no science of pure being. 
Nevertheless, what Collingwood says here is of interest to the present discussion, 
because it is a rare instance of his discussing explicitly how the subject-matter, method, 
and special problems of a given science relate to each other. Here is what he says: 
 
An ordinary science is the science of some definite subject-matter, having 
special problems of its own that arise out of the special peculiarities of the 
subject-matter, and special methods of its own that arise out of the special 
problems; whereas the ‘science of pure being’ has a subject-matter which is not 
a something but a nothing, a subject-matter which has no special peculiarities 
and therefore gives rise to no special problems and no special methods.1 
 
What this passage proves is, firstly, that a distinct science arises from problems of 
its own which are “special” (read ‘distinct’), and that those special problems are 
themselves somehow related to a “subject-matter” which is not itself “special”, but which 
is “definite”. I take this to mean that the ‘distinctness’ of a science comes directly from 
the distinct class of problems, and only indirectly from subject-matter – whether or not 
subject-matters can have special peculiarities that serve scientific classification rather than 
philosophical overlapping classes. But this passage from the Essay on Metaphysics also 
discusses “special methods”. It is to the problem of delineating those “special methods” 
that so much of Collingwood’s work on history offers solutions. But here we can also see 
that those special methods themselves “arise out of the special problems”. 
This, then, is what I think Collingwood’s arguments mean – either (or both) by 
his own authorial intention, or by logical implication: If all knowledge and truth in fact 
belongs to a “complex consisting of questions and answers”, then all historical 
knowledge must only be a distinct kind of knowledge because of its relation to the 
                                                 
1 EM, pp. 14-15 
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distinct kind of questions or problems it answers, or ‘correlates’ to. This puts the fact 
that humans have, or produce, historical questions at the foundation of everything we 
can say about how history is done or why. The principle here is that, whatever it is or 
however it is done, history is a one of Collingwood’s “various specialized forms of 
consciousness”1 – historical consciousness – because its starting points are questions that 
are distinctly ‘historical’. If history is a special science, it is because its questions are of a 
special kind, meaning that they may have a special characteristic or combination of 
characteristics, and/or that they may have a special presupposition or combination of 
presuppositions. The answer is the former: it is certain characteristics, namely, the kind 
of thing that an historical question demands, or, in Collingwood’s own term, “expects”.2 
Questions that are composed in a certain way can only be ‘satisfied’ by answers 
composed in a correlative way. 
The task of a philosophy of history as a distinct science is to demonstrate what 
those characteristics are that make historical questions distinctly ‘historical’. Something 
similar is true of the task of demonstrating that historical knowledge is possible. A 
philosophical demonstration that historical knowledge is possible, the question that lies 
at the root of ‘neo-Kantian’ philosophy of history, is achievable simply by showing that 
historical questions are possible – by showing, that is, that they are not ‘nonsense’ 
questions, that they do not presuppose anything that may not be presupposed, and 
perhaps that they are in some way answerable without importing further nonsense into 
their practical answering strategies. And an explanation of what history is for involves 
explaining why historical questions are important or, at least, in some way relevant to 
human life in general, and why answering them is important. 
I’m giving this principle – the principle that what makes a science distinct is that 
it answers a distinct kind of question – the quasi-technical name ‘the starting question 
principle’. There are flashes of the starting question principle in The Idea of History, albeit 
in a sometimes obscured form. In a passage in §1 of the ‘Epilegomena’ Collingwood 
discusses whether “the ordinary historian” is right to maintain that “all history properly 
called is the history of human affairs”, or whether he is in fact making an 
“unphilosophically narrow”, “arbitrary distinction” between objects of the human past 
(such as are dealt with by archaeologists) and objects of the natural past, such as are dealt 
with by geologists and palaeontologists. What Collingwood then says is this: 
 
                                                 
1 NL, 4.17 
2 EM, pp. 73-4 
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In order to answer this question, it is not enough to consider the characteristics 
of historical method as it actually exists, for the question at issue is whether, as 
it actually exists, it covers the whole field which properly belongs to it. We must 
ask what is the general nature of the problems which this method is designed to solve. When 
we have done so, it will appear that the special problem of the historian is one 
which does not arise in the case of natural science.1 
 
The arbitrariness of subject-matter, Collingwood is saying, is negated by 
answering the question about the general nature of history’s problems. In this passage 
Collingwood has formulated a specific way of carrying out the task for philosophy of 
history which he explained briefly in his ‘Outlines of a philosophy of history’ in 1928: 
“the philosophy in the old Voltairean and Hegelian sense is concerned only with history 
a parte objecti”, he says; “but the philosophy of history in our sense is concerned with 
history a parte subjecti… it is primarily a logic of historical method”.2 
Collingwood’s philosophy of history is, in its highest form, a “logic of historical 
method” in just this sense. Despite everything he says about the subject-matter of 
history, his attention to the ‘subjective side’ of historical practice – the thought processes 
of historians – is also fairly consistent. But what is not consistent is his saying that the 
most important feature of that “logic”, in the method distinct to history, is what lies at 
the root of historical thinking, its starting point – and that this starting point is an 
historical question. The rare expressions of this starting question principle, the above 
examples included, are limited to Collingwood’s ‘mature’ thinking, and even then they are 
not consistent. It is a great shame that he neglects it. It is as if he had for so long known 
that the answer to his questions about history are to be answered by examining the 
‘subjective’ side of what historians do, that he never manages to hold the specific “nature 
of the problems” principle in his mind, and returns habitually to the a parte subjecti 
principle in general. We should be slow to admonish thinkers for not having found their 
most sophisticated answers at an early point in their lives. Collingwood’s 1920s writings 
are those of a sociable Oxford thirty-something, after all. But it is a failing that, having 
successfully found and formulated it at least once, Collingwood does not continue to use 
the same point, or to make a great display about what this principle shows. The starting 
question principle would certainly, I think, have provided him with an easy way to 
explain the special character of scientific history among the other kinds of scientific 
                                                 
1 IH, pp. 212-13. Emphasis added. 
2 IH, p. 434-5 
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thinking. The systematic character of a science will, Collingwood says, “be exhibited in 
the clear-cut and orderly manner in which it states problems and marshals and interprets 
evidence for their solution”.1 But, in his quest to show how history is such a science, he 
focuses almost entirely on the correct way of marshalling and interpreting evidence, to 
the near total neglect of the correct way of stating problems in history. This, I know, is a 
strong way of putting it. How can I justify it? How is this ‘neglect’ manifest? 
Well, there are all those instances where Collingwood tells his reader that 
“historical thought has an object with peculiarities of its own”;2 history is the science of 
res gestae;3 res gestae are the correct “subject-matter of history”.4 But we’ve already seen that 
it is not, according to much of what Collingwood says, the ‘object’ of a science, but 
something about its ‘subjective’ side that makes it what it is. Hegel and Voltaire, 
Collingwood claims, failed to see this,5 as supposedly did the nineteenth century’s 
theorists of Geisteswissenschaft, he says in ‘Reality as history’, who again appealed to the 
special kind of object with which a science deals in order to indicate the special character 
of that science. 
But we’ve already seen that, when properly defined, the first two forms of history 
(‘the assertion of fact’ and ‘becoming’) do characterise the subject-matter of history. And 
if Collingwood doesn’t really think that, why does he devote so much of even his mature 
writings to clarifying the subject-matter of history? By putting together the claim that 
history has its own special subject-matter, and the claim that the differences between 
sciences owes not to differences in their respective objects, but to differences in the 
‘points of view’, I have decided that the two can be reconciled. They are, to use the 
technical language, ‘dialectically’ related, not ‘eristically’ related.6 The question-and-
answer logic of what Collingwood is saying is this: 
Although history does deal with res gestae, that distinct ‘object’ or ‘subject-matter’ is 
not, strictly speaking, what constitutes the special character of history. It is rather that 
historians properly ask a kind of question which has such characteristics that it can only 
be sensibly (i.e. not nonsensically) asked about res gestae. The distinction is slight, but 
important. One can ask questions about res gestae which are not themselves historical 
questions, because they might not meet other conditions of what it is for a question to be 
                                                 
1 EM, p. 65 
2 IH, p. 5 
3 IH, p. 9 
4 ‘The Subject-matter of History’ is the title of §5 of The Idea of History’s ‘Epilegomena’. 
5 IH, p. 434-5 
6 See NL, 24.57-58, 26.21-22 
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‘historical’. But if you ask historical questions about things that are not res gestae, you ask 
nonsense questions. 
How else is the neglect of the starting question principle manifest? The chapter 
‘Question and Answer’ in An Autobiography deals with the importance of understanding 
the questions or problems of others in order that one (the historian) might understand 
their solutions – what they ‘meant’. That chapter deals also with propositional logic and 
truth in general, with consequences for historical truth which are not there explicated. 
But it does not discuss explicitly historical questions as that to which historical 
knowledge is the answer. This might be because Collingwood thought it followed on 
obviously enough from what he’d said about all truth and knowledge and the principle of 
correlativity. It might also be because he considered it such an ordinary presupposition of 
historical method that it hardly needed explication. Or, alternatively, it might be because 
he didn’t even make this starting question principle explicit to himself – he ‘didn’t realise’ 
it. It is more likely though that he failed to state this principle explicitly in the chapter 
‘Question and Answer’ because the arguments he makes there are aimed chiefly at 
proponents of “the current logic”. In short, that chapter is not motivated by the desire to 
lay out comprehensively a description of historical truth and method. A final alternative, 
which I’m saying can be ruled out, is that Collingwood had really concluded that the 
correct starting point for historical thinking was something other than a question. 
But just because I say it can be ruled out as what Collingwood thinks does not 
mean that it is not what he all too often says. “It is true that in history, as in exact 
science, the normal process of thought is inferential”, Collingwood says in The Idea of 
History, and he continues: “But the starting points are of very different kinds.”1 Now this 
looks promising. Unfortunately, what follows is not a statement to the effect that the 
difference of starting point between these sciences is the difference in the kind of 
question asked: it is rather a claim that exact scientists start with “assumptions” where 
historians start with “relics”.2 
This is obviously not right, as a natural scientist might seek natural-scientific 
knowledge of something that is man-made, as we do today with carbon dating; and 
historians always work with “assumptions”. Like all forms of thought, history has its own 
                                                 
1 IH, pp. 250-1 
2 IH, pp. 250-1. In the sense that it might be a relic that inspires an historian’s question, this is of course 
right – or at least possible. Similarly it is true that scientists’ questions contain assumptions. But it is not 
consistent with Collingwood’s account that ‘historical thinking’ begins here. Historical thinking is 
systematic thinking, and all systematic thinking begins with questions. The way to reconcile this – which 
Collingwood does not – is to point out that historians’ questions contain the idea of the relic in question 
within their ‘terms’; or, the question concerns the relic, in some way. 
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presuppositions. Next, rather than explain how this itself might lead to or inspire 
questions of a different species, Collingwood moves straight on to discuss the different 
kinds of conclusion that follow from this difference of starting point: natural scientists’ 
conclusions are about universals, “things which have no special habitation in space or 
time”, whereas the historian’s conclusions are idiographic, being “about events, each 
having a place and date of its own”. Now, Collingwood’s focus here is not really  the 
differing characteristics of ‘starting points’, but rather other differences that might be 
observed within the lines of reasoning typically thrown up by inquiries in these sciences. 
So the real nature of the difference of starting point has been neglected here too. 
This is quite a significant example, because although most readers have 
encountered it in The Idea of History, it was actually composed for the introduction to The 
Principles of History, Collingwood’s intended masterwork on the philosophy of history. It is 
followed, of course, by chapter one, which for obvious reasons is intended to elaborate 
on the ‘starting point’ of history. Chapter one is not called ‘The Historical Question’, 
though, it is called ‘Evidence’. The centrality of the question only becomes apparent 
twenty pages in, where Collingwood says: “The scientific historian reads them [books] 
with a question in his mind, having taken the initiative by deciding for himself what he 
wants to find out from them.”1 Even here Collingwood does not explain how what he is 
saying proves his point about the special distinctness of history from natural science. 
Jan van der Dussen has, I think, followed Collingwood’s thinking so well that he 
repeats his error about history’s special starting point. Chapter seven of History as a Science 
proceeds directly from 7.1, which deals with the historical ‘object’, to 7.2, which is called 
‘Evidence’. “The way evidence is used by historians being the starting-point”, Dussen 
says, “the question arises how this is done or should be done”.2 A sub-section called 
‘Question and Answer’ follows only some pages later.3 In his later article, ‘Collingwood’s 
Claim that History is a Science’, Dussen explains very nicely what historical inference is 
for Collingwood, by way of the comparison with C. S. Peirce. But again he ignores the 
distinctness of history’s questions.4 
                                                 
1 PH, p. 25. Also IH, p. 269 
2 Dussen, History as a Science, p. 289 
3 History as a Science, p. 295. Dussen’s discussion of ‘Evidence’ is very detailed and, as I have no need to 
compete with it, I’d rather direct the reader to it. See Dussen, History as a Science, pp. 287-95 
4 In the context of what this later article is for, Dussen’s ignoring questions is perfectly excusable, because 
he is not attempting to explain why for Collingwood historical inference is distinct. He only wants to show 
why inference in history is scientific, an objective in which he succeeds very convincingly. See Dussen, 
‘Collingwood’s Claim’, especially pp. 7-11, 14-15, and the applied examples on pp. 15-17 and 18-20. There 
is one minor point where I think Dussen’s ignoring the question principle intrudes on his interpretation of 
what Collingwood says: he describes ‘what the evidence says’ as if ‘what it says’ is the same as what Henry 
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The reason we can call these examples of Collingwood’s ‘neglectful’ of the 
starting question principle is not simply that they do not mention it, or do not mention it 
properly. An author can’t be criticised for failing to state some principle or other every 
time he says anything at all. It is rather that he either promises to discuss what it is that 
makes history a distinct science, or that by focusing on what makes historical questions 
‘historical’ he would have hit upon a quicker and better way of answering the points 
we’ve just seen him trying to deal with, and others which we will see him trying to deal 
with next. 
So perhaps Collingwood does not consider historical questions to be distinct 
from the questions answered by other sciences? Perhaps there are only individual 
questions, and there are various sciences for answering them which we can choose 
between by some other principle? That principle is either mere preference, or it relates to 
the grounds upon which one science is appropriate to certain questions, and another 
science is appropriate to other kinds of question. If the importance of history as a 
distinct science is to be a matter of anything other than preference, there must be 
something about certain kinds of questions that makes them the preserve of history. 
I’ll clarify again that I am not trying to conflate different kinds of claims about 
Collingwood’s work by ‘providing a reading’. What I have said, I think, is the best 
extension of Collingwood’s own logic of question and answer, and that which best 
supports his more embattled arguments about history. But it is not what he always says, 
and it is probably not what he always meant. To claim that this is what Collingwood 
‘really means’, or what he ‘tried to say’, would be an insult to his obvious talent for lucid 
self-expression. 
When Collingwood does not neglect the starting question principle however, the 
effect is, I think, efficient and conclusive. We’ve seen one example from The Idea of 
History. “We must ask what is the general nature of the problems which this method is 
designed to solve”, he says. “When we have done so, it will appear that the special 
problem of the historian is one which does not arise in the case of natural science.”1 
We’ve also seen the intriguing triangulation of problem, method, and subject-matter, in 
                                                                                                                                            
I’s edict ‘says’. What Collingwood really means when he discusses what evidence ‘says’, in The Principles of 
History, is what the evidence shows. See PH, pp. 48-9, and Dussen’s discussion of it in ‘Collingwood’s 
Claim’, p. 21. There is also one point where Dussen comes very close to discussing the ‘specific’ questions 
to which “abductive inferences” seek answers – he is, at that point, discussing Jaakko Hintikka’s article 
‘What is Abduction?’ On the subject of “the inquirer’s specific questions”, though, Dussen declines to 
comment further. See Dussen, ‘Collingwood’s Claim’, p. 29. 
1 IH, pp. 212-13. Emphasis added. 
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the Essay on Metaphysics. 1 There is another example in Collingwood’s last book – itself a 
model of efficient argument and conclusive demonstration – The New Leviathan. There 
Collingwood states with bold conciseness that each of the “two approaches to the 
problem of self-knowledge: the natural sciences and the science of man” has “its own 
problems and must solve them by its own methods”, and that “neither can do anything 
but harm, either to itself or to its fellow, by trespassing on its fellow’s hunt”.2 In order to 
understand how the two ‘sides’ of man relate to each other, he adds – which is essentially 
the ‘mind-body problem’ – we need to know about the relationship between the two 
breeds of epistemology, and not simply more ‘about man’. Collingwood does not always 
neglect the starting question principle, then. Indeed it seems to me that when he deals 
with points in the philosophy of history by reference to it, his arguments are at their 
strongest. 
 
 
ix 
What makes historical questions ‘historical’? 
 
So what are the special peculiarities of the problems with which this distinct 
science, history, deals? One might have thought that what makes an historical question 
historical, is that it is about the past. The non-philosophical significance of the term 
‘history’, imported into philosophy, would seem to demand dealing with the idea of ‘the 
past’ first. Indeed Collingwood made exactly this assumption at the outset of his 1926 
‘Lectures’, so he opens with a discussion of what the past is.3 Thereafter, though, this is 
an assumption that he fairly consistently tries to overturn. ‘Historical thinking’ is equally 
about the present – or at least the very recent past that we call the present.4 This is, I 
think, because in the highest form of history – the form in which ‘history’ is the 
systematic answering of a certain kind of question – the non-philosophical distinction between 
past and present is cancelled. There is no difference because both past and present can be 
investigated in exactly the same ‘historical’ way. Collingwood writes in his Autobiography 
about his experiences of academic seminars, for example: 
 
                                                 
1 EM, pp. 14-15 
2 NL, 2.6-64 
3 See L26, IH, pp. 363-5 
4 See for example EM, pp. 56-7 
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This habit of following and taking part in discussions where both subject and 
method were other people’s proved extremely valuable to me… To think in that 
way about philosophies not your own, as I have hinted, is to think about them 
historically.1 
 
Historical questions can then, one presumes, also be about ‘the present’. One 
might even pose and answer an historical question about what someone is really trying to 
do by making such-and-such an argument in a conference paper, before that someone 
has even got himself safely out of the room and into the sanctuary of the buffet queue. 
The distinctness of historical questions has nothing to do with the objects of inquiry 
being things past. 
So, again, what are the special peculiarities of the problems with which history 
deals? Actually it seems that Collingwood says very little about the distinct features of 
historical questions – and this probably cannot be unrelated to what we’ve already 
observed to be his habit of neglecting the starting question principle in general. 
To be charitable, one might suppose that Collingwood doesn’t discuss the 
distinct form of historical questions very much because he thinks he’s already done so 
sufficiently somewhere. There are, after all, also sections in the 1926 ‘Lectures’ 
summarised in the contents under the titles ‘How historical problems arise’2 and ‘Primary 
and secondary problems’.3 But here Collingwood discusses only the fact that historical 
problems arise in the present, and the fact that there is a closer relationship than is 
usually realised between questions about history, and questions about the history of 
history. There is actually nothing about what it is that makes an historical question 
‘historical’. There is also a very short passage in the 1928 essay, ‘The Limits of Historical 
Knowledge’, which arises without warning in the midst of a discussion about historical 
‘realism’, which does more or less describe the organising principle of historical thinking 
as a “central question”. Here Collingwood even hints at the form taken by that “central 
question” in general: 
 
It is enough for the present to have stated the general thesis that all historical 
thought is the historical interpretation of the present; that its central question is: 
                                                 
1 A, pp. 57-8 
2 L26, IH, pp. 406-7. How historical questions ‘arise’ is also dealt with in the Autobiography. See A, p. 114 
3 L26, IH, pp. 407-8 
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“How has this world as it now exists come to be what it is?” and that for this 
reason the past concerns the historian only so far as it has led to the present.1 
 
But what Collingwood says here might serve equally well as a general 
characteristic of the kind of questions asked not of ‘things done’, but of things that have 
turned out a certain way as a result of a quite unconscious natural process. ‘How did we 
come to have two kidneys?’, for instance – or, as an example of a biological development 
which obviously reflects no intelligent planning, ‘Why do we have wisdom teeth?’ 
Collingwood would see, if he were trying to prove it, that this cannot work as a 
demonstration that history has a distinct kind of question. The fact that he leaves it so 
rough is proof, I think, that he is not trying to make that argument here at all. So if he 
thinks he’s already explained the distinctness of historical questions, he can’t be thinking 
of these discussions; and, if he is, he’s wrong about what they contained. 
There is also a section called ‘the question’ in §3 of The Idea of History’s 
‘Epilegomena’, ‘Historical Evidence’ (also the opening chapter of The Principles of History).2 
But it contains nothing about the specific features of historical questions, and merely 
illustrates how investigation of all kinds depends on questioning, and how one primary 
question can and should be broken down into constituent parts of sub-questions. 
It was initially quite surprising to me, in view of what Collingwood says about the 
question-and-answer nature of all systematic thought, that there are so few points at 
which he discusses explicitly what it is that makes ‘historical questions’ historical. I do 
not think this is deliberate evasiveness. I think in fact he thinks he throws a lot of light 
on this question, but never explicitly, and not deliberately, because he habitually discusses 
historical answers, especially what counts as an historical answer. This is partly because it 
is actually quite difficult to describe the characteristics of different types of question – a 
‘typology’ of historical questions – without slipping into typologies of (a) what those 
questions can be about, i.e. of their ‘objects’ or ‘subject-matter’, or (b) how questions of 
that kind would be (as I’ve put it) ‘satisfied’, or (as Collingwood puts it) what they 
“expect”.3 Recognising this difficulty, we can only try to overcome it more satisfactorily 
than Collingwood did. When I say that the typology of historical questions – the 
typology that supports Collingwood’s arguments about history – is expressed in terms of 
‘historical answers’ I mean to refer to history a parte objecti, in both the sense of what 
                                                 
1 EPH, p. 102 
2 IH, pp. 269-74; but also republished as something closer to its originally-intended role in PH, pp. 24-9. 
3 EM, pp. 73-4 
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historical inquiry ‘produces’ (the facts it asserts), and the sense of what it is about (the 
facts and processes of history); and I also mean historical answering, the way in which 
historical answers are produced, historians’ ‘methods’, their reasoning. This 
concentration on historical answers and answering in Collingwood’s work is an effect 
both of the difficulty of classifying historical questions themselves, and of the actual 
question Collingwood poses himself, ‘What are the special characteristics of historical 
inference?’ – and by ‘inference’ he is already thinking of the historian’s process of 
question and answer as underway. 
So given that Collingwood won’t tell us himself, let us devise some tortures for 
his philosophy so that he might yield clues about what makes a question an historical 
question. Questions and answers are, Collingwood says, correlative. It is therefore from 
the material of Collingwood’s theories of history in the forms just outlined that we have 
to re-tailor something to clothe a typological dummy in order to behold the special 
features of an historical question. I’ve probably made it sound much more complicated 
than I needed to, but it is quite straightforward. 
 
 
x 
‘What he meant’ 
 
Once we are looking for instances of Collingwood outlining and explaining the 
special character not of historical inference, but of historical questions, certain passages 
become much more helpful. As significant as any, I think, is the following from An 
Autobiography: 
 
Now, ‘To what question did So-and-so intend this proposition for an answer?’ 
is an historical question, and therefore cannot be settled except by historical 
methods.1  
 
I must have read this passage fifty times before I noticed that what is important 
about it is not the claim that it is a matter of historical fact what question a past author 
was trying to answer, and that this is therefore investigable by normal historical methods, 
but rather that it is an historical question, because it is inquiring about another’s reasoning. 
                                                 
1 A, p. 39 
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In An Essay on Metaphysics Collingwood is more explicit: “Historical questions are 
questions in which one tries to understand what somebody was doing on a certain 
occasion.”1 This is what Collingwood means when he says that the historian… 
 
is investigating not mere events (where by a mere event I mean one which has 
only an outside and no inside) but actions, and an action is a unity of the outside 
and inside of an event… His work may begin by discovering the outside of an 
event, but it can never end there… his main task is to think himself into this 
action, to discern the thought of its agent. 2 
 
In The Idea of History Collingwood writes that the business of the historian when 
faced with certain written words is to “discover what the person who wrote those words 
meant by them”, and, he continues, “this means discovering the thought… which he 
expressed by them”.3 The question here is, then, ‘What did this author mean by this?’ – 
an historical question. This example is closely followed by others in which the question 
seems to be the same but rephrased: ‘What is the historical significance of this edict?’, 
‘How are we to understand this passage of ancient philosophy?’4 “It cannot,” 
Collingwood then says, “be denied by anybody that these descriptions… call attention to 
the central feature of all historical thinking”.5 The ‘central feature’ he is referring to here 
is the re-enactment of past thinking in the historian’s own mind.6 By putting it this way – 
in terms of the ideal of re-thinking and the kind of description offered by historians – he 
is privileging his definition of what it is to answer these questions correctly. He is 
explaining what satisfies typical historical questions. The “central feature” of historical 
thinking as he’s just described it is equally what the questions which initiate historical 
thinking demand in common. An historical question arises when instead of knowing 
‘what someone meant by something’ I have only a specific ‘unknown’. This is why, as 
long as I’m simply reading Leviathan and making sense of it, as long as no questions arise 
about what Hobbes means, I’m not doing history – at least, not history as a science, let 
alone systematic history of political thinking. I am simply reading an old book. 
This ‘meaning’ that exists in an historical question as the specific unknown might 
be of a text or speech, but it might also be of a silent action. People can ‘mean’ things by 
                                                 
1 EM, p. 191 
2 IH, p. 213 
3 IH, pp. 282-3 
4 All IH, p. 283 
5 IH, p. 283 
6 IH, p. 215 
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actions – indeed, that is why we make a distinction between things that were done (res 
gestae) and things that happened (‘events’).1 History provides “narratives of purposive 
activity”, Collingwood says.2 His way of expressing this, as is well known, is that history 
pertains to “the inside of the event… that in it which can only be described in terms of 
thought”.3 
It might be objected that I am only putting into question form something that 
might just as well be phrased like this: ‘the subject-matter of history is meaningful 
action’.4 This would be to forget that Collingwood rightly objects to the distinctness of a 
science being thought to owe to the distinctness of its objects, and insists instead on the 
distinctness being on the ‘subjective’ side. Consider, for instance, the differences between 
an historian’s inquiry and a coroner’s in the case of a deliberate act of murder. In both 
inquiries the ‘object’ or ‘subject-matter’ is the same. But to analyse the mode of inquiry 
by asking ‘What is deliberate action?’ would be to invite a diversionary inquiry on the 
‘ancient’ scientific model of questioning without limited objectives. And anyway it would 
reveal nothing about the two sciences or the differences between them. As Collingwood 
puts it in The Idea of History, “The methods of criminal detection are not at every point 
identical with those of scientific history, because their ultimate purpose is not the same”.5 
It is in relation to the purpose, and not to the ‘subject-matter’, that the differences 
become obvious. The historian would ask what the murderer ‘meant’ by his deed. The 
coroner asks only what caused the death. 
All of this seems to indicate that the essence of history is hermeneutic inquiry, 
and that historical questions are hermeneutic questions. The historian seeks to discern 
the thoughts of others by re-thinking them himself.6 Historical knowledge therefore is 
hermeneutic understanding.7 This is what introduces Collingwood’s notorious claim that 
“the history of thought, and therefore all history, is the re-enactment of past thought in 
the historian’s own mind”.8 
                                                 
1 Most of the time Collingwood uses the term ‘action’, though in The New Leviathan he explains his new 
preference for the term “deed”. (NL, 13.86) Here I’ll follow Collingwood’s usage and use them non-
technically, and more or less interchangeably. 
2 A, p. 109 
3 IH, p. 213 
4 Thanks to ES for forcing me to clarify this. 
5 IH, p. 268 
6 IH, p. 215 
7 This is why Dussen’s distinction between historical methodology on the one hand (how the historian 
arrives at his knowledge), and hermeneutics on the other (how the historian comes to understand) is a false 
one. See Dussen, History as a Science, pp. 296-7 
8 IH, p. 215. Dussen provides a comprehensive overview of the objections made to Collingwood’s claim 
that “all history is the history of thought”, though he declines to offer a defence of it. See History as a 
Science, pp. 81-8 
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Dussen makes a minor blunder, then, in distinguishing between “two aspects of 
the logic of question and answer: that of historical understanding (hermeneutics) and that 
of historical inquiry (historical methodology in the broad sense)”.1 I can quite see why 
Dussen would be led to make this distinction. When Collingwood discusses ‘question 
and answer’ in the Autobiography, the ‘Baconian’ principle of inquiry is dealt with 
separately from the discussion of reconstructing authors’ questions. Dussen has certainly 
followed Collingwood’s apparent distinction very closely – as he always does. But the 
two cannot really be separated when what one wants is a fuller description than 
Collingwood provides explicitly of what the characteristics are of the questions to which 
historians’ inquiries are meant to provide answers. They are themselves necessarily 
hermeneutic questions.2 Because Dussen separates the two, he has to explain the 
relevance of ‘question and answer’ to hermeneutics by appealing to the problem-solving 
nature of history a parte objecti.3 Now, it is certainly Collingwood’s position, I think, that 
all ‘action’ is ‘problem-solving’, and Dussen follows Collingwood’s reasoning that, 
therefore, knowing the problem means understanding the solution. But because the logic 
of inquiry has already been dealt with, Dussen does not ask how the historian discovers 
what the agent’s problem was.4 The answer is, of course, by normal historical inquiry. 
All historical questions thus share a certain presupposition: namely, that the thing 
of which meaning is being sought ‘means’ something, or was ‘meant’ for something. The 
fact that this is a presupposition of historical inquiry is attested in An Autobiography, 
where Collingwood refers to questions about history’s subject-matter as “metaphysical”.5 
In his sense of ‘metaphysical’, this means that ‘meanings’ are presuppositions of 
historical questions. If the relic does not in fact mean anything – i.e. if it is not a 
‘something done’ – then the question about what was meant by it is a nonsense question. 
This does not mean that historical questions are nonsense questions. It means that 
historical questions are sometimes posed even though they contain false presuppositions. 
In practice, historians are almost always right to assume that what they are asking 
about was meant for something.6 It is, though, possible to get this wrong, and historians 
might try to interpret an object or series of marks that look man-made, but which are in 
                                                 
1 Dussen, History as a Science, pp. 296-7 
2 Dussen’s distinction returns in a later discussion where he aims to cover the role that the logic of 
question and answer plays in historical understanding (History as a Science, pp. 344-5). Dussen is forced to 
say only that “history a parte objecti should be seen as problem-solving in nature”. (History as a Science, p. 345) 
3 See Dussen, History as a Science, pp. 344-5 
4 See Dussen, History as a Science, pp. 345-50 
5 A, p. 77 
6 Here I’m using Collingwood’s technical terminology deliberately. See EM, pp. 27-8 
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fact natural phenomena. The false presupposition is that they are ‘things done’. It is 
forgivable for a child to ask, ‘What is the purpose of this amazing structure?’ when he 
encounters the Giant’s Causeway, for instance, but only because his presupposition that 
it was built by man is a forgivable presupposition. The presupposition that unusual 
natural phenomena like the Giant’s Causeway are the relics of actions is perhaps the 
reason why people formulate elaborate myths and stories in order to make sense of 
them, before they eventually relinquish the presupposition and recognise them as natural 
phenomena. In the case of the Giant’s Causeway, the problem presupposed by the old 
myth was that the sea was blocking someone’s desired journey on foot between Ireland 
and Great Britain – and he must, given the form his solution took, have been a very big 
someone. 
What I have just described is the presence of an earlier form of ‘history’ in the 
highest form, history as a science. That earlier form is the concept that history is 
primarily about the actions of people, and not about natural phenomena except as they 
affect the doings of men. As The Idea of History demonstrates, this has been the typical 
subject-matter of history since long before it was realised that history was a science that 
operated by posing and answering questions, let alone questions of a unique kind. But it 
is only, as it were, retrospectively that that selectiveness is anything less than “an arbitrary 
distinction”, a ‘mistaken restriction’.1 Properly historical questions have as their specific 
unknown what someone ‘meant’ by something. Since philosophers became especially 
interested in language, there has been a tendency to distinguish between different 
philosophies of history by the different accounts of ‘meaning’ they give. Although 
Collingwood offers theories of language,2 his philosophy of history has no use for such 
debates. The important thing for historical questions is the legitimacy of presupposing in 
at least some sense that somebody ‘meant’ something by what he ‘did’. Until that 
presupposition is seriously challenged, narratives formulated in answer to the 
“academic”, “make-believe”3 question ‘What is meaning?’ are of no practical relevance to 
working historians. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 IH, p. 213 
2 See for example NL, ch. VI 
3 NL, 2.51, 2.55 
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xi 
Universals and particulars 
 
As well as being about deeds done, history is concerned with unique, individual 
facts; not “what mind always and everywhere does”, but “only what mind has done on certain 
definite occasions”.1 This is part of the reason why Collingwood insists that natural science 
actually depends upon history. The categories, classes and rules with which natural 
science properly operates are abstractions from the unique, individual facts of reality, he 
says. This form of history, I am now claiming, is absorbed into history as a science as 
another feature of historical questions. And it is this combination of features which 
makes historical questions distinct from any other kind of question, and hence history a 
distinct science. 
I have struggled greatly with what Collingwood says about this, because until the 
‘individuality’ of historical knowledge is put into the language of ‘question and answer’, 
some of what Collingwood says about it seems a little contradictory. It would be easy to 
maintain, as he does in Speculum Mentis, that history, unlike natural science, is about 
particular facts as such. In The Idea of History he praises those historians of the nineteenth 
century who saw that their business “was to ascertain facts by the use of this critical 
method, and to reject the invitation given them by the positivists to hurry on to a 
supposed second stage, the discovery of general laws”.2 But Collingwood also has 
examples in his 1920s work of how history does provide ‘general’ knowledge and rules: 
“we can now assert that Samian bowls of shape 29 went out of use about A.D. 80”, he 
says; and history can also provide predictions, such as “green-glaze pottery will be found 
in a mediaeval ruin”.3 He also offers general rules, apparently suggested by history, in his 
last book, The New Leviathan. “The Turks are no exception to the rule which elsewhere, to 
the best of my knowledge, is unbroken: the rule that barbarists in the end have always 
been beaten; a rule which I state here merely as a conclusion arrived at by the inductive 
study of cases… an inductive proposition ‘tells you what to expect’”.4 
Dussen, as I’ve already said, doesn’t pursue Collingwood’s grounds for claiming 
that history is a distinct science – only that it is a science. So it is this trope of ‘universals 
versus particulars’ that Dussen identifies as the characteristic of Collingwood’s 
                                                 
1 NL, 9.18 
2 IH, p. 130 
3 EPH, pp. 31-2. There are other similar objections in IH, pp. 166-7 
4 NL, 45.94. See also 16.21. For more rules see 44.35-39 
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conception of history, and then traces very nicely through its early development in 
Collingwood’s writings of the 1920s.1 There can be a science of particulars, Dussen is 
saying, and, as Collingwood shows in his philosophy of history, it can be scientific. 
Although Dussen has surveyed to a depth that can only be admired Collingwood’s essays 
of the 1920s, including the essay ‘Are History and Science Different Kinds of 
Knowledge?’,2 exceptions like those I’ve pointed to about what history can also ‘provide’ 
he seems to ignore. Dussen is not attempting to mislead his readers: his task is different 
from mine. Collingwood’s attempt to distinguish where in historical thinking 
generalizations and universals are appropriate, and where they are not, is messy in those 
essays and elsewhere,3 and Dussen does as well as anyone could to follow Collingwood’s 
struggle with it and to present his readers with a faithful version.4 
Here, then, is how I think Collingwood’s various claims about universality and 
particularity in history can be reconciled. Again it has to do with what historical questions 
demand. The specific unknowns of historical questions are individual, unique instances, 
and not general rules or laws. It is perfectly true that history can provide rules and 
predictions, but as long as one’s inquiry is aimed at rules and predictions, one’s question 
is not itself historical. This is why Walsh’s attack on Collingwood – for what Walsh 
thinks is the claim that there should never be any appeal to generalization in historical 
thinking – actually gets to the heart of the matter. “I have already said that I agree”, 
Walsh says, “that it is not the business of the historian to arrive at universal truths: we do 
not find historians ending their works with a list of results stated in general terms. But 
that does not mean that there is no appeal to such generalizations in history…”5 Walsh 
thinks that Collingwood’s claim is the latter, but actually it is merely the former. 
The ‘results’ of the natural scientist’s inferences are abstract universals, “in one 
sense everywhere and in another nowhere”, which is why natural scientists study the 
“constant or recurring features in all events of a certain kind”.6 The historian’s results are 
though “not abstract but concrete, not universal but individual”.7 This is because answer 
and question are correlative – or, ‘results’ and ‘specific unknowns’ are correlative. The 
                                                 
1 Dussen, History as a Science, pp. 41-52 
2 EPH, pp. 23-33. Dussen does in fact discuss this essay briefly in History as a Science. See pp. 41-7 
3 This ‘messiness’ is evident in the competing understandings that have sprung up in reaction to it. See for 
example W. H. Walsh, ‘The Character of a Historical Explanation’. 
4 See Dussen, History as a Science, pp. 41-52 
5 W. H. Walsh (with A. M. MacIver & M. Ginsberg), Symposium: ‘The Character of a Historical 
Explanation’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes vol. 21, Explanation in History and 
Philosophy (1947), p. 60 
6 IH, p. 250 
7 IH, p. 234 
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historian knows, for example, “that no explanation of the French Revolution can be the 
right one which will fit any other revolution”.1 This does not mean that there are not 
historical rules about revolutions that ‘tell us what to expect’.2 It means simply that a 
historian’s specific unknown is never a rule about the mechanisms and causes of 
revolutions as a class of occurrences.3 Thus, when an historian claims that an action is to 
be ‘understood’ by virtue of a particular chain of events that ‘produced’ it, and which 
‘always’ produces this kind of outcome, he is not ‘thinking historically’. He is not 
thinking historically because his conclusion does not satisfy an historical question. This is 
why psychological explanations leave ‘historical’ subjects “completely unilluminated”.4 
An historian who offers biological, psychological, or economic answers to historical 
questions cancels history’s distinctness by implicitly accepting that the unknowns of 
historians have no typological differences from the unknowns of biologists, 
psychologists, or economists. He cancels history’s distinctness because he replaces a 
distinctly historical question with one that is not historical. Collingwood in fact says this, 
regarding natural science, in ‘Reality as History’. “Scientific thought” – and here he 
means natural-scientific thought – “does not answer the question asked. Instead of 
explaining why this and nothing else happens, it explains why something of this kind 
happens. And scientific thought only succeeds so long as we are content with thus 
altering the question”.5 
This, then, is how the ‘idiographic’ subject-matter of history is absorbed into 
history as a science. Although Collingwood’s claim is always phrased in terms of the 
different nature of explanation provided by the historian, its root is a difference in what 
is sought by the historian – his specific unknown. Collingwood attempts to explain this, 
as many still do, by showing that there is more than one kind of ‘explanation’, more than 
one sense of ‘cause’ – which is what he thinks positivism cannot face. But in fact what 
positivism cannot face is the very idea that there are different kinds of question.6 
Questions pursuing specific unknowns that are not ‘nomothetic’ rules or laws are not 
known to positivism – at least, not as questions that can produce scientific knowledge. 
 
                                                 
1 PH, p. 180 
2 NL, 16.21, 45.94 
3 The concept and wording is paralleled in NL, 16.63. 
4 A, p. 93 
5 PH, p. 179 
6 In Religion and Philosophy Collingwood identifies “historical positivism” as failing on the grounds that 
history is unable to answer “theological questions”. See RP, pp. 43, 38 
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xii 
Processes 
 
Finally we need to see how what I’ve called the second form of history, ‘history 
as becoming’, is incorporated in the higher form, history as a science. Not much needs to 
be said here to illuminate the processual nature of the specific unknowns of historical 
questions. Firstly it is not simply a single idea that an historical investigation seeks to 
discover, but a thought process: the kind of process in which an action is related to its 
agent’s reason or reasons for doing it; the kind in which a practical solution is related to 
the problem it overcame. In this sense the ‘processes’ in which historians are interested 
are better elucidated by Collingwood in his philosophy of mind than in his philosophy of 
historical method. As I’ve already said, the ‘subject-matter of history’ serves as the 
concept in which the overlap between those two analyses – philosophy of history and 
philosophy of mind – consists. “History”, Collingwood says, “therefore, cannot be made 
to square with theories according to which the object of knowledge is abstract and 
changeless, a logical entity towards which the mind may take up various attitudes”.1 Part 
of what he is trying to express is that historians seek to discover not unique, individual 
states of affairs that once stood (as ‘states’), but unique, individual processes that once 
happened. 
Secondly historical answers are never given as single propositions, but are always 
presented as narratives, and/or incorporated into narratives. The narratives of historical 
writing, in reality, reflect a mixture of the different forms of history – as would be 
expected of a form of history that contains ‘primitive survivals’ of other forms. As a 
narrative purely of history as a science, an historical narrative would explain the question 
posed, the process whereby it was answered – what evidence was found and so on – and 
end with the conclusion. The narrative of history as a science is formally closer to an 
account of a good archaeological investigation, in that it would be a narrative not 
supported by evidence, but a narrative of the evidence. 
Although there are usually elements of this – when historians say ‘but from his 
correspondence we can see’, and things like that – narratives of that kind are mixed in 
with narrations of one situation becoming another. Thus history as process is absorbed 
into history as a science in various ways, never completely replaced, and never completely 
                                                 
1 IH, p. 234 
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dominant. ‘Process’, in short, survives as a feature of historical questions and as a feature 
of historical narrative. 
 
 
xiii 
Science and method 
 
We’ve now seen some of the significance of ‘question and answer’ – the essence 
of all systematic thinking, all science – in Collingwood’s philosophy of history. 
Specifically we’ve seen how the highest form of history, history as a science, absorbs the 
lower forms that it complements by taking them as characteristics of its distinct type of 
question. There has been plenty about posing questions, but so far very little about 
answering them – about, that is, the distinct methods by which scientific historians 
provide answers. 
The significance of Collingwood’s logic of question and answer to the 
‘methodology’ of providing historical answers is quite iconoclastic, especially in view of 
the ever-expanding literature on the subject. The important principle is that questions are 
answered by using evidence to offer the best available conclusion to other historians.1 
Evidence is the most important part of the process of constructing answers, which is 
why The Principles of History opens with a chapter dedicated to it entirely. “Anything is 
evidence which can be used as evidence”, he writes, “and no one can tell what is going to 
serve him as evidence for answering a certain question until he has formulated the 
question”.2 In §2 of the ‘Epilegomena’ (‘The Historical Imagination’), Collingwood 
discusses the ‘principles of method’ according to which evidence can and should be used. 
He ends with the bold statement that “The evidence available for solving any given 
problem changes with every change of historical method and with every variation in the 
competence of historians. The principles by which this evidence is interpreted change 
too”.3 Now, Collingwood is not, I think, merely describing changes in historical 
standards over time here. What he is prescribing is that the use of evidence not be 
subordinated to special methodological rules at all. The only ‘rules’ of method that 
determine the ways in which evidence may be used are the ‘rules’ of normal logical 
demonstration in practice. (Alan Donagan has already provided ample examples of this 
                                                 
1 IH, p. 246 
2 PH, p. 38 
3 IH, p. 248 
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in The Later Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood.1) What Collingwood means, when he says that 
there is “nothing other than historical thought itself, by appeal to which its conclusions 
may be verified”,2 is that conclusions are not verified by appeal to “academic 
discussions”3 about what evidence means, what sort of thing should be thought of as 
evidence and what shouldn’t, or how evidence should be used in the abstract (normal 
logic excepted). Such discussions offer only abstractions formulated parasitically from 
concrete attempts to answer historical questions. This is not to say, of course, that 
individual cases of misusing evidence cannot resemble each other. But it is to say that the 
only way to evaluate the methods of evidence-use employed by an historian is to ask 
whether what he has done has helped or hindered his investigation in the case at hand4; 
whether his conclusion survives all the tests that could be devised for it5; and whether the 
evidence proves what it is supposed to – that is, whether we are convinced.6 We criticise 
an historian’s method when he ignores likely alternative answers or sub-answers, or when 
he draws invalid conclusions from the evidence he’s presented, or when the evidence he 
discusses is irrelevant. We can also point out that his question is actually ‘nonsense’, or 
that it isn’t specific enough. But the particular kind of evidence which needs to be 
considered, the particular degree of reasonable doubt which can be permitted, the terms 
that ought to be employed in the narratives an historian presents and so on, are not 
things that can be dismissed or recommended in abstraction from a particular piece of 
historical work. A particular kind or use of evidence might be clearly appropriate in one 
investigation while entirely redundant in another.7 As far as questions of method go, the 
“academic” methodological philosopher who “has all his ideas cut and dried and his 
answer ready for any challenge” has actually put himself in “a very dangerous position”. 
Like Collingwood’s ‘barbarist’, “he is giving away the initiative… It is no compensation 
for losing the initiative to be ready with an answer to every problem with which the 
enemy may confront you; it means always being one jump behind him”.8 
                                                 
1 See Later Philosophy, pp. 182-92 
2 IH, p. 243 
3 NL, 2.55 
4 Goldstein writes, in a footnote to his bold essay ‘Collingwood on the Constitution of the Historical Past’, 
that “Collingwood’s is a theory about what the discipline of history is and how it carries out its work; it 
does not purport to say what historians ought to do, other, of course, than to say that they ought to do 
historical work to the best of their ability.” Leon J. Goldstein, ‘Collingwood on the Constitution of the 
Historical Past’, in Krausz (ed.), Critical Essays on the Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood, p. 248, note 1 
5 See Donagan, Later Philosophy, p. 183 
6 NL, p. 4.74 
7 I recently heard a colleague’s paper which entreated researchers in International Relations to “use more 
data”. 
8 NL, 41.58-61 
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What Collingwood says about the autonomous problem-solving of historians – 
and what he has to say about methodological prescription being relative to particular 
investigations – shows, I think, what is wrong with one of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s 
methodological contentions. In his own discussion of Collingwood in Truth and Method – 
a discussion he also gives the subtitle ‘The Logic of Question and Answer’ – Gadamer 
says this: “That a historical text is made the object of interpretation means that it puts a 
question to the interpreter.” The text puts the question to the interpreter, Gadamer says. It 
is not, then, the historian who puts the text to a question. Indeed Gadamer is quite explicit 
about this being a ‘reversal’ of the Collingwood position.1 But what Gadamer’s reversal 
entails is that a given text can only be used as evidence for answering the same questions it 
was originally supposed to answer. If historians of ideas must, in order to understand a 
text, reconstruct the questions to which they were intended as answers, it is (Gadamer is 
saying) illegitimate to use them as evidence for answering one’s own questions. This is 
why Gadamer says “that “making the text speak” is not an arbitrary procedure that we 
undertake on our own initiative but that, as a question, it is related to the answer that is 
expected in the text”.2 This principle of method is necessary, Gadamer thinks, if we are 
to be “open to the experience of history”.3 
But in view of Collingwood’s autonomous historical method, we can see why 
Gadamer must be wrong. Scientific historians are no longer tied to the questions of other 
writers as, Collingwood says, nineteenth-century historians were.4 Gadamer’s historian, 
then, is prevented by a prior methodological proscription from using texts as evidence 
unless those texts have already given express consent that they may be approached for 
solving their own questions. In view of what Collingwood says, Gadamer must be wrong 
to think that it is past texts themselves that open us up to the ‘experience’ of history. It is 
rather the unlimited range of possible historical questions we might want to ask that 
opens up the experience of investigating history. Collingwood might have commented 
that the only experience facilitated by such a principle of method as Gadamer’s is the 
cramped experience of working like an historian of the nineteenth century.5 
Finally, some questions have been raised about something Collingwood seems to 
describe as another ‘method’ in The Idea of History: namely, the “a priori” function of the 
                                                 
1 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 366 
2 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 370 
3 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 370 
4 IH, pp. 260-1 
5 IH, pp. 260-1 
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historical imagination.1 The discussion of it spans roughly the second half of §2 of the 
‘Epilegomena’ (‘The Historical Imagination’).2 What Collingwood describes as the “a 
priori” function of the historical imagination is actually just a possible logical use of 
evidence for constructing historical answers: he is describing the situation in which 
accepting A means committing yourself to accepting B, even though there is no 
‘independent’ evidence for B (that is, evidence independent of A). Collingwood illustrates 
this point with unperceived physical objects. Even without having seen them we know 
that the table has an under-side, that the egg has an inside, that the moon has a back, etc. 
It is an uncharacteristically poor analogy, intended only to show that sometimes in 
historical reasoning one thing can be as evidence for something else that is then, if the 
first is accepted, certain. Collingwood’s example is better than his analogies: If Caesar 
was in Rome one day and in Gaul some time later, it follows a priori that there must have 
been a journey, Collingwood says.3 I think we should avoid quibbling over his use of the 
term “a priori”, and concentrate on the actual point.4 That point is that, when a fellow 
historian points out that there is no record of this journey, he ought anyway to be 
convinced, given that he accepts that Caesar was in Rome one day and in Gaul some 
time later. Some evidence leaves other possible explanations. But some admits no other 
explanation: if we accept these two ‘fixed points’, then we have what is in common 
speech called ‘hard’ evidence of what has been inferred. 
 
 
                                                 
1 IH, pp. 240-8 
2 Mink considered the point about the a priori imagination to be of sufficient importance to devote a short 
section of his Mind, History and Dialectic to showing that we can “give sense” to it by recourse to “the 
development in his thinking of the theory of mind and the theory of absolute presuppositions”. (Mind, 
History and Dialectic, p. 183. The discussion continues onto p. 186.) Mink’s defence does not misconstrue 
anything of what Collingwood meant in the passages he cites. But the recourse to Collingwood’s theory of 
mind and of absolute presuppositions – that is, the recourse to Collingwood’s metaphysics – is actually 
unnecessary for making sense of the “a priori” function of the historical imagination. Mink makes it 
necessary by putting Collingwood into a jam that he “apparently does not see”: namely, that “by his own 
account, even though evidence may be used to fill in details of the historian’s “picture,” he has ruled out 
the possibility that evidence could either confirm or disconfirm the outlines of that picture”. (p. 184) “Now 
I would suggest”, he continues, “that the mystery of these descriptions is dispelled if we recognize the “a 
priori imagination” as an early and imperfect attempt to bring out the notion of a “constellation of 
absolute presuppositions”. (p. 185) He then confuses the issue further by discussing the relation of these 
presuppositions to another claim, also in ‘The Historical Imagination’, that history is itself a priori – “in 
Cartesian language, “innate”.” (pp. 185-6. Collingwood’s claim is in IH, p. 248) I won’t reproduce for the 
reader the rest of Mink’s defence since, as I’ve already said that, although it is not wrong, and although it is 
very interesting on its own account, it is unnecessary as a defence of Collingwood’s point. More recently 
Marnie Hughes-Warrington has made what she thinks Collingwood says about the a priori historical 
imagination part of her message for teaching. See Hughes-Warrington, pp.135-45 
3 IH, p. 240 
4 My thanks to ES for explaining to me with great commitment why this is “not what a priori means”. 
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xiv 
The transition from general solutions to specific points 
 
There is much about the distinctness of historical questions that remains to be 
elaborated upon, let alone philosophically demonstrated to be right. I will now combine 
tasks. I want to find out whether certain of Collingwood’s claims about history – and, by 
extension, the history of ideas – are right. I’ve already shown how some of his arguments 
about history can be made more intelligible by relating them to his fundamental logic of 
question and answer and his theory of knowledge production by ‘systematic thinking’, 
and now we’ll now begin to do this for more of his contentions. To repeat: It seems to 
me that ‘question and answer’ provides simple support for even Collingwood’s most 
contentious claims about history, and that overlooking it has tended to generate 
unnecessarily elaborate defences of them among sympathetic commentators. 
The contentions I’ll deal with are (xv) that when the historian knows what 
happened he also knows why it happened; and (xvi) that history exists in the minds of 
historians. I’ve devoted Part IV entirely to the claim that historians must re-enact past 
thoughts. Following that I’ve discussed in Part V Collingwood’s claim that (vii-x) 
historians must not ask only what an author thought but also whether he was right. And 
in Part VI I’ve discussed his claims that (vi-xi) history is necessary or conducive to 
freedom, duty, civilization, and progress. 
Our first set of tasks then is to find out whether those contentions can be more 
easily demonstrated by way of the logic of question and answer. And secondly (this is the 
combination of tasks) in each case we’ll see what those arguments of Collingwood’s can 
tell us to fill out our hitherto rough characterisation of historical questions. The 
alternative would be to try the reader’s patience further with a growing list of what 
historical questions demand, while defending Collingwood only in passing against some 
major criticisms. It’s because those criticisms and debates are more significant than 
would deserve only marginal discussion that I’ve organised further discussion of 
historical questions around them. 
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xv 
The ‘what-why’ paradox 
 
We’ll start with a claim that continues to cause some aggravation among 
Collingwood’s commentators, even the most sympathetic ones: “an historical fact once 
genuinely ascertained, grasped by the historian’s re-enactment of the agent’s thought in 
his mind, is already explained”, Collingwood writes in The Idea of History. “For the 
historian there is no difference between discovering what happened and discovering why 
it happened.”1 
This is a consistent claim throughout Collingwood’s mature writings on history, 
and I think little really needs to be said to elaborate what is counter-intuitive about it. In 
history ‘generically’ it means there is no difference between knowing what Caesar did, 
and knowing why he did it. In the history of ideas – and we’ll deal with this in the right 
place – this seems tantamount to holding that once you know what Hobbes says, you 
already know why he said it. 
Alan Donagan has said that this is perhaps Collingwood’s “boldest saying” about 
history.2 William H. Dray, though, always remained unconvinced by what he gave the 
convenient title “the what-why paradox”.3 But actually I’ve come to think that 
Collingwood is even right about this – again, by virtue of the question-and-answer theory 
of scientific history, which reveals a terminological ambiguity to ‘what happened’. I’ll try 
to illustrate this with an exaggeratedly simple example. 
There is a common-sense difference between knowing, in the first place, what 
Nelson’s manoeuvres at Trafalgar were and, in the second, knowing why he made them.4 
The first seems to be the fact, and the second the explanation. One possible rescue of 
Collingwood’s argument, that the ‘what’ and the ‘why’ are in fact the same, would be to 
say that you might be able to describe some manoeuvres without knowing why they were 
                                                 
1 IH, pp. 176-7. My emphasis. 
2 Donagan, Later Philosophy, p. 200. Donagan’s explanation of the point eventually won the agreement of 
W. H. Walsh. Compare Walsh’s argument in ‘The Character of a Historical Explanation’ (1947), with a 
statement in his Introduction to the Philosophy of History (London: Hutchinson, 1951), p. 71, where he says “I 
should… no longer wish to rely on the passage from The Idea of History… to show that Collingwood 
believed thought to be self-explanatory, as Donagan has convinced me that the word ‘it’ at the end of the 
second sentence was intended to refer back to ‘event’ in the first”. See also Dussen, History as a Science, pp. 
114, 392 
3 See Dray, History as Re-enactment, pp. 72-80. Dray’s struggle with the “what-why paradox” is indicative of a 
deeper struggle with Collingwood’s definition of historical knowledge, which is what Dray wrestles with in 
his section of History as Re-enactment devoted to ‘Re-enactive Explanation and Completeness’ (pp. 72-80). 
See also Dussen’s dealing with Dray in History as a Science, pp. 114-15. Dussen does not say whether Dray is 
right or wrong, so I’ve corrected this little lacuna here. 
4 NL, 5.33 
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made, but you would not thereby ‘understand’ what the manoeuvres were. This ‘what they 
really were’ refers to the idea that you would not see them in their full ‘light’. It is an 
appeal to a sense of ‘understanding’ something in which much more context has to be 
included in a description of an action, with the aim of showing its ‘true significance’ or 
something of that kind. 
This usage of ‘understanding’ – which I think is rife in contemporary history of 
political thought – does not, though, work terribly well as expressed in this way. Firstly 
no action can ever be described in its ‘full’ significance. The historian must still select 
what is ‘illuminating’ and what is not, relative to the purpose of his analysis. His purpose 
is never to achieve a description which leaves nothing out at all. So it is not clear that a 
very rudimentary description of Nelson’s manoeuvres is actually always inadequate for all 
purposes. By the same token, there is no reason to think that historians of ideas should 
have to give ‘full’ accounts of agents’ intentions. Accounts of military moves and 
intentions that are not ‘full’ are not really illegitimate history: they are just associated with 
knowing less. 
This attempt at a rescue does suggest a better answer though. Louis Mink has 
already attempted one in line with the logic of question and answer in his Mind, History 
and Dialectic. Collingwood, for Mink, really means to say that an historical narrative is not 
a story supported by evidence, but is the statement of the evidence itself. In this sense, 
when the historian knows what happened he already knows why he knows it.1 Mink’s is a 
fine book, and the shortcomings of his defence of this point are not great. But his point 
is obviously not the same as Collingwood’s. 
My defence is different and, I think, truer to Collingwood’s intention. It is 
important to keep the concept of ‘explanation’ and ‘cause’ in history tied to the concrete 
example of what is demanded by the question, otherwise explanation becomes a very 
slippery concept indeed. “For ‘causing’ we may substitute ‘making’, ‘inducing’, 
‘persuading’, ‘urging’, ‘forcing’, ‘compelling’, according to differences in the kind of 
motive in question”, Collingwood says in his Essay on Metaphysics.2 “It should be 
remembered”, Dussen adds, “that the questioning activity has to stop somewhere, 
because otherwise one can go on asking “why” as long as one pleases”.3 He is right. 
                                                 
1 Mink, Mind, History and Dialectic, pp. 187-94, especially pp. 192-3 
2 EM, p. 290 
3 Dussen, History as a Science, p.110. Dussen also cites an argument of Dray’s which appeals to “levels” of 
‘why’ questions. See W. H. Dray, ‘Historical Understanding as Re-thinking’, University of Toronto Quarterly 27 
(1958), pp. 200-15) Although I don’t disagree with Dray on this, I think his is an unnecessarily complex 
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An historical question, we already know, takes the form of what someone meant 
by what he did. Now, the ‘situation’ in which the agent ‘did’ whatever it was he did might 
well have had irreducibly ‘natural’ features: material stuff like oak, gunpowder, shot, 
canvas, etc. – things with ‘objective’ material properties. But questions about, for 
example, where exactly the vessels involved in the Battle of Trafalgar were in relation to 
each other at a given point, where they were an hour later, what speed they were moving 
at, and where they all were by the end, would not be complete historical questions on 
their own. Such questions admittedly concern processes, and they are in principle 
answerable, and furthermore they are answerable by recourse to the same kinds of 
systematic evidence-sifting that historians usually use. But they would not be historical 
questions if they did not pursuing what was ‘done’ with all these arrangements of wood 
and cannon moving through brine. The specific unknown in questions of past logistics 
not a ‘what he meant’. The historian must go further, for Collingwood, because an 
historical question is not such that it can be satisfied by logistical description alone. 
Suppose our question concerns the fact that Nelson sailed Victory at a right-angle 
directly into the Franco-Spanish line, and takes the form ‘What was Nelson doing?’ If by 
‘What was he doing?’ our question meant ‘What did he think he was doing?’ – which is 
what, for Collingwood, historical questions do mean – then we might phrase the same 
question as ‘What did Nelson think he was doing?’ But the same thing is expressible – 
and this is important – as ‘Why did he do that?’ What he did, and why he did it signify the 
same specific unknown in these three questions. The answer to the question (simplified 
for the sake of example) is that Nelson was trying to break up the Franco-Spanish line. 
Thus ‘what he did’, in a form correlative to the historical question, is not the blank 
logistical event of Victory approaching Villeneuve’s defensive line at right-angles. What 
Nelson was doing was attempting to break the Franco-Spanish line. 
The ‘paradox’ Dray wrestles with owes to the ambiguity of ‘what happened’. As 
logistical knowledge, what happened is that Victory approached at a right-angle. As 
historical knowledge, what happened is that Nelson tried to break the line. Historical 
knowledge is not any knowledge about the past: it comprises only answers to historical 
questions. Logistical knowledge correlates to only logistical questions. As historical 
knowledge, knowing what Nelson did means knowing why he thus manoeuvred Victory. 
This is Collingwood’s point. But Dray’s objection is that knowing what happened 
logistically, knowing that Victory approached at a right-angle, is not the same as knowing 
                                                                                                                                            
way of dealing with a point which can be more simply tidied up by appealing to what the question itself 
demands for its satisfaction. 
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what Nelson thought he was doing. This is quite true – in fact it is the very point 
Collingwood is trying to make. But where the ‘what happened’ in Collingwood’s example 
is historical knowledge, the ‘what happened’ in Dray’s objection says nothing about what 
was done, so it is not historical knowledge. 
The confusion is amplified when mangled by the language of explanation or 
causation – even when the attempt is being made to define an historical sense of those 
words. This is why Collingwood too opens his discussion, in his Essay on Metaphysics, by 
making it quite plain that the sense of ‘causation’ meant by an historian when he speaks 
of a cause may be expressed in other terms “according to differences in the kind of 
motive in question”.1 
Alan Donagan has offered a strong attempt to make sense of historical 
explanation in Collingwood.2 What makes his account so good is that he refers obliquely 
but repeatedly to the sorts of things it is “an historian’s business to know”. What 
weakens it, on the other hand, is that because he is looking for a definition of 
‘explanation’, rather than one of historical questions, he falls into the trap of thinking 
that only individual acts count as explanations for Collingwood, and therefore “he was a 
methodological individualist, in the strongest sense of that disputable term”. (This 
objection is dealt with in Part IV, below.) 
Back to our example: What is our historian trying to explain? If he is trying to 
‘explain’ the logistical move in terms of Nelson’s plan, then he is just trying to answer an 
historical question. Knowing the answer to this historical question will mean that he has 
explained what happened historically, which means he has explained why it happened. 
But if he is trying to explain Nelson’s plan itself, then he has at some point begun to 
demand more detail about that plan. That is the demand of another question, if it was 
not already contained in his first. Nelson wanted to break the line in order to inflict 
maximum damage to the Franco-Spanish ships; he wanted a conclusive battle; he wanted 
to secure British control of the sea, etc. This is where Mink’s interpretation isn’t quite 
precise enough. An historical description does not, as he supposed, need to leave “no 
questions” about the manoeuvre “unanswered”.3 It only needs to answer the question 
originally posed. 
The point I’m trying to make here is that the ‘what happened?’ in a properly 
historical question is synonymous with a ‘why?’, and a specific ‘why’ at that. The passage 
                                                 
1 EM, p. 290. See also Boucher’s interesting discussion of this in Social and Political Thought, pp. 115-16. 
2 See Donagan, Later Philosophy, pp. 200-9 
3 Mink, Mind, History and Dialectic, p. 189 
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I quoted a few pages ago shows Collingwood referring to “an historical fact” and a “what 
happened”. Both stand, in this passage, for an historical question that has already been 
answered – the answer “genuinely ascertained”. Here is that passage again: 
 
an historical fact once genuinely ascertained, grasped by the historian’s re-
enactment of the agent’s thought in his mind, is already explained. For the 
historian there is no difference between discovering what happened and 
discovering why it happened.1 
 
Is Dray to blame for failing to see all this? Not in the slightest. Collingwood is, I 
think, responsible for his own terminological ambiguity. The fact that he doesn’t explain 
his claim about ‘what-why’ by reference to the question-and-answer logic of historical 
inquiry leads Dray to ask about the special logic of historical explanation according to 
Collingwood, and he rightly realises that “the explanatory ideal is formally different in the 
re-enactive and [natural] scientific cases”.2 But Dray is never, I think, quite able to make 
full sense of the ‘form’ Collingwood thinks explanations in history must take, because all 
the time Dray carries with his reading the assumption that that which has been explained 
is unambiguously the outward material fact or event – which is not, for Collingwood, an 
historical fact at all, since it does not correlate to an historical question. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 IH, pp. 176-7. Emphasis added. 
2 See Dray, History as Re-Enactment, p. 77 
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xvi 
‘Ideality’ and ‘constructionism’ 
 
Most of what Collingwood has to say about historical knowledge applies to 
‘history a parte subjecti’ – that is, it is about what happens on the ‘subjective side’, the side 
where the historian is investigating and constructing his knowledge.1 What he leaves 
unclear is what this means for ‘history a parte objecti’, what is known. This has led some 
commentators to ask whether, for Collingwood, history a parte objecti is something real 
and objective, or merely constructed in some way ‘subjectively’.2 
This question is at the heart of a dispute that has claimed not inconsiderable man 
hours on the part of eminent Collingwood scholars, because it pertains to the nature of 
the ‘facts’ that constitute something like ‘historical reality’. It has also, I think rightly, 
been recognised by some Collingwood scholars that what has been called ‘historical 
constructionism’ is actually essential to recognising why Collingwood thought it was in 
history that the false dichotomy between mind and its object is overcome,3 and thereby 
an important feature of his brand of ‘idealism’. ‘Constructionism’ in these debates means 
the position that something, in this case ‘history’ or ‘the past’, is constructed, or created, 
whether imaginarily, socially, institutionally, or by whatever other means, rather than 
being ‘real’, ‘objective’, or simply ‘given’. So although there may be little at stake for 
working historians, there is a major philosophical point here, especially for Collingwood 
scholars. This is why it deserves some discussion in light of what I’m saying about the 
‘special character’ of history being its characteristic type of question. To some readers, it 
seems that Collingwood is taking an apparently circular, ‘idealist’ position that historians 
create the very objects they are investigating, and invent the very facts they are meant to 
be discovering. Some have attacked Collingwood for making historical knowledge 
‘subjective’, or ‘relativistic’.4 It is clear, then, what is at stake here. If the past isn’t ‘real’, 
                                                 
1 Indeed Collingwood is quite explicit about this. See IH, pp. 434-5 
2 For the sake of simplicity I am dealing at once with what seem sometimes to be two debates: one about 
whether history is real or merely constructed, and the other about whether historical facts are objective or 
subjective. The latter is dealt with exclusively by Dussen in History as a Science (pp. 119-23). In all the ways 
that are important, the disputes essentially line up together: the ‘objectivists’ on the one side, and the 
‘constructionists’ and ‘subjectivists’ on the other. 
3 See for example Boucher’s introduction to EPP, pp. 48-9 
4 Dussen has documented this dispute in a section of History as a Science called ‘Historical Objectivity’. He 
cites among those who have attacked Collingwood for being a ‘subjectivist’ or ‘relativist’ D. M. Mackinnon, 
who says that Collingwood “flirt[ed] with a complete relativism”; M. Mendelbaum, who thinks the doctrine 
of re-enactment must “inevitably lead to scepticism”; J. N. Hartt, who says something similar about 
Collingwood’s thinking leading to scepticism; and B. Verhaegen, who describes the “subjectivism” that 
Collingwood apparently shares with Croce. See Dussen, History as a Science, pp. 119-23, and his 
corresponding references on pp. 393-4 
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and therefore isn’t something we can claim ‘knowledge’ of, then what is the point of 
historians? 
The fact that it does remain unclear in Collingwood’s writings whether man’s 
historical past, in this sense, is truly ‘discovered’ or merely ‘constructed’ is attested by the 
uncertainty on this point among commentators.1 The question generated much debate in 
the 1980s by distinguished scholars like Dray, who argued that Collingwood wasn’t a 
‘constructionist’, and Leon Goldstein, who insisted that he was. (See below.) Margit 
Hurup Nielsen doesn’t enter the debate, but she seems to accept Collingwood’s historical 
constructionism – in fact she seems to take it for granted, though she prefers the term 
‘constructivism’2 – and notes that some interpreters have considered the scope of 
Collingwood’s historical methodology to be broader than usually thought, i.e. “to consist 
of the establishing or constitution of historical facts, not the explanation of them”.3 “The 
question whether or not the distinction between constitution/establishing or explanation 
is tenable per se – or in relation to Collingwood – is a matter”, she says, “not to be 
discussed here”.4 
It is, though, to be discussed here. It seems to me that Collingwood intended for 
the two questions of (1) how the objects, past thoughts, exist, and (2) how we can know 
them, to have one answer: by inferring from evidence to construct answers to historical 
questions. It is only in the highest form of history, history as a science, that this becomes 
clear. History still ‘asserts facts’, but the philosophy of scientific history is about 
straightening out how those assertions are decided upon. It is also only in history as a 
science that the apparent mutual exclusion of ‘realism’ and ‘constructionism’ is dissolved. 
As long as they are treated, as they are by Stein Helgeby,5 as two competing answers to 
the same “first-order” question about history, they cannot be resolved. From the point of 
                                                 
1 See for example Leon Goldstein, ‘Collingwood on the Constitution of the Historical Past’; and Elazar 
Weinryb, ‘Re-Enactment in Retrospect’, The Monist vol. 72, no. 4: The Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood 
(October, 1989), pp. 568-80. One of David Boucher’s early essays on the idea of the ‘creation of the past’ 
with regard to Oakeshott and Collingwood shows that he was at one time uncertain about it. See David 
Boucher, ‘The Creation of the Past: British Idealism and Michael Oakeshott’s Philosophy of History’, 
History and Theory vol. 23, no. 2 (May, 1984), especially pp. 204-6 
2 Nielsen, p. 1. Nielsen addresses Collingwood’s “constructivism” more explicitly on p. 26, where she 
defines it thus: “By a “constructivist,” I mean one who regards history primarily as an activity, not as an 
“object.” Constructivism is in opposition to a “discovery theory” of history… [and] is based on a sceptical 
evaluation of the possibilities of knowing the real past, but it is not itself a sceptical – only a relativistic – 
position. A theory of this kind would consider answers to metaphysical, ontological, or, in fact, any kind of 
theoretical questions about history, to be determined by the character of the process which brings history 
about, that is by the method by which “past facts” are constituted, constructed, or as we may say “re”-
constructed. The problem of method is, therefore, the central problem for such a position.” Nielsen, p. 26 
3 Nielsen, p. 6 
4 Nielsen, p. 6, note 24 
5 Helgeby, Action as History, pp. 48-52 
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view of history as a science, though, there is nothing hypocritical about historians 
constructing conclusions while taking the idea of historical truth as a presupposition of 
their practice. 
Dray’s first article on the subject was written in 1980. He republished his 
‘objectivist’ thesis in volume one of Collingwood Studies (1994), and in 1995 he improved 
and reaffirmed it in History as Re-Enactment: R. G. Collingwood’s Idea of History. Here is what 
Dray says in History as Re-enactment: 
 
Many critics have read into what he says… the doctrine that what we normally 
call historical events are not past realities, but mere mental constructions, 
thoughts generated in the minds of historians by their own inquiries, the true 
object of historical knowledge therefore being present, not past…1 
 
For Dray, Collingwood should nevertheless be seen as an ‘objectivist’, and he 
points to the apparently ‘realistic’ language Collingwood uses when talking about the 
work, material, and conclusions of historians. Collingwood describes, Dray points out, 
the ‘re-enactment’ of past thought, “reconstructing, re-evoking, re-creating, re-thinking, 
reviving, even repeating, the past”; and it would seem impossible to do this with 
something that is not ‘there’ to have these things done with it.2 So none of this, Dray 
thinks, would make sense on a constructionist interpretation; and neither would the long 
passage in The Idea of History in which the author explains how the re-enacted thought of 
the historian should be the same as that of the (original) agent.3 “I have little doubt that he 
had constructionist moments”, Dray writes, “but, as I read him, his constructionist 
tendencies recede into the background of his thought [after the late twenties], only 
occasionally gaining fresh, if sometimes startling, expression… I can see nothing in 
Collingwood’s mature philosophy of history that required him to be a constructionist”.4 
Collingwood, then, on Dray’s account, mostly remained committed to the view that the 
past, even the inside of history, is or was in some sense real, and is therefore to be 
discovered, not created, by the historian.5 This is not to say that we should call 
Collingwood a ‘realist’, of course – no-one who’d read An Autobiography would want to 
                                                 
1 Dray, History as Re-enactment, p. 8 
2 W. H. Dray, ‘Was Collingwood an Historical Constructionist?’, Collingwood Studies vol. 1 (1994), p. 59 
3 See Dray, ‘Was Collingwood an Historical Constructionist?’, p. 61. Dray cites IH, p. 283 (footnotes) 
4 Dray, ‘Was Collingwood an Historical Constructionist?’, p. 59 
5 Dray, ‘Was Collingwood an Historical Constructionist?’, p. 59 
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be so clumsy. But we should, Dray thinks, read Collingwood as an ‘objectivist’, rather 
than a ‘constructionist’. 
Dray is right that many of these ‘constructionist moments’ arise in work from 
before the late twenties. In ‘The Limits of Historical Knowledge’ (1928) Collingwood 
explains how… 
 
Again, historical realism involves the absurdity of thinking of the past as 
something still existing by itself… a world where Galileo’s weight is still falling, 
where the smoke of Nero’s Rome still fills the intelligible air, and where 
interglacial man is still laboriously learning to chip flints. This limbo, where 
events which have finished happening still go on, is familiar to us all; it is the 
room in the fairy-tale, where all the old moons are kept behind the door; it is 
the answer to the poet’s refrain: Mais où sont les neiges d’antan? It is the land east 
of the sun and west of the moon. Its prose name is Nowhere.1 
 
In the same article Collingwood also discusses the ‘rules’ of the game of history, 
and what they tell us about the idea of “what really happened”. I’m afraid I have 
provided this passage at length, albeit abridged, since I think the reader will find here 
further proof for what I’ve said already about scientific historical thinking, as well as 
correspondences with passages we’ve already seen from Collingwood’s later work: 
 
One rule – the first – runs thus: “You must not say anything, however true, for 
which you cannot produce evidence.” The game is won not by the player who 
can reconstitute what really happened, but by the player who can show that his 
view of what happened is the one which the evidence accessible to all players, 
when criticised up to the hilt, supports. Suppose a given view is in fact the 
correct one, and suppose (granted it were possible) that all the extant evidence, 
interpreted with the maximum degree of skill, led to a different view, no 
evidence supporting the correct view: in that case the holder of the correct view 
would lose the game, the holder of the other view win it… For there is no way 
of knowing what view is “correct,” except by finding what the evidence, 
critically interpreted, proves. A view defined as “correct, but not supported by 
the evidence,” is a view by definition unknowable, incapable of being the goal 
of the historian’s search… 
                                                 
1 EPH, p. 101 
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 But, I shall be told, I have frankly reduced history to a game. I have 
deprived its narratives of all objective value, and degraded them to a mere 
existence in the interpretation of arbitrarily selected bodies of evidence, every 
such body being selected by the operation of chance and confessedly impotent 
to prove the truth. 
 It is time to drop the metaphor of a game. The so-called rules of the 
game are really the definition of what historical thinking is; the winner of the 
game is the historian proper – the person who thinks historically, whose 
thought fulfils the ideal of historical truth. For historical thinking means nothing 
else than interpreting all the evidence with the maximum degree of critical skill. 
It does not mean discovering what really happened, if “what really happened” is 
anything other than “what the evidence indicates.” …“What really happened” in 
this sense of the phrase is simply the thing in itself, the thing defined as out of 
all relation to the knower of it, not only unknown but unknowable, not only 
unknowable but non-existent.1 
 
Perhaps the reader will think that I am exaggerating Collingwood’s 
‘constructionism’ by giving an account of the question-and-answer nature of historical 
investigation and then grafting onto its root some specimens trimmed from 
Collingwood’s ‘early’ philosophy of history – roughly the 1920s variety supposed by Dray 
to be distinct from the mature variety. So here are some reaffirmations, harvested this 
time from The Idea of History: 
 
Hence all theories of knowledge that conceive it as a transaction or relation 
between a subject and an object both actually existing, and confronting or 
compresent to one another, theories that take acquaintance as the essence of 
knowledge, make history impossible.2 
 
The fundamental thesis there [in Bradley’s Appearance and Reality] is that reality is 
not something other than its appearances, hidden behind them, but is these 
appearances themselves, forming a whole of which we can say that it forms a 
single system consisting of experience and that all our experiences form part of 
it. A reality so defined can only be the life of mind itself, that is, history.3  
 
                                                 
1 EPH, pp. 98-9 
2 IH, p. 233. Emphasis added. 
3 IH, p. 141 
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This principle has served us to distinguish history from natural science on the 
one hand, as the study of a given or objective world distinct from the act of thinking it, 
and on the other from psychology as the study of immediate experience, 
sensation, and feeling, which, though the activity of a mind, is not the activity of 
thinking.1 
 
There is also a brief explanation in chapter four of An Autobiography of why the 
‘realist’ theory of knowledge, according to which the mind ‘apprehends’ (or is 
‘compresent’ with) what is known, is incompatible with the experience of historical 
thinking.2 Collingwood has various physical metaphors for this misconception of the 
historical fact: “the positivistic view of history as a crude lump of magma”3; “a solid 
block for us to study”,4 etc. Actually, he says, what we call the ‘facts’ of history are “to be 
apprehended not empirically but by a process of inference according to rational 
principles from data given or rather discovered in the light of these principles”.5 
Historical facts are, then, arrived at inferentially from “data” or, what he really means 
here, from evidence.6 The ‘facts’ of history are, as Bradley says, actually conclusions.7 
Leon Goldstein, in his powerful essay ‘Collingwood on the Constitution of the 
Historical Past’, argues for a ‘constructionist’ interpretation of Collingwood.8 But apart 
from a couple of passing references to evidence, he ignores the theory of question and 
answer. I think this indicates that Goldstein doesn’t consider, as Collingwood does, the 
process of historical construction and the process of historical inquiry to be the same 
thing. Because he ignores ‘question and answer’, Goldstein has to find some other 
‘technique’ of the working historian to identify with the construction process. For 
Goldstein, that ‘technique’ or ‘method’ is re-enactment. As well as missing the most 
fundamental principle of historical inquiry, then, Goldstein’s identification of 
constructionism with re-enactment plays into the hands of Collingwood’s less charitable 
critics, because it allows him to be seen as abandoning evidence, and conjuring up pasts 
in the imagination without it. 
                                                 
1 IH, p. 305. Emphasis added. 
2 See A, pp. 25-6 
3 L26, IH, p. 417 
4 L26, IH, p. 419 
5 IH, p. 176 
6 IH, pp. 132-3 
7 F. H. Bradley, The Presuppositions of Critical History (Oxford: James Parker & Co., 1874), pp. 9-10 
8 Published in Michael Krausz’s edited collection, Critical Essays on the Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood. See pp. 
241-67 
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Among Collingwood scholars the question of Collingwood’s ‘constructionism’ 
was never conclusively settled. Anyway, the right to apply this label to Collingwood’s 
name is not what is really at stake: more important is the dispute it stands for concerning 
what Collingwood is actually saying. If ‘constructionism’ means that historical knowledge 
is ‘not objective’, or is knowledge of things that did not really happen, and that therefore 
historical claims are in some way illusory, then Dray is right that Collingwood is not an 
historical constructionist. History for Collingwood is real, there is historical reality, there 
are historical facts. And Dray is right: certainly Collingwood is discussing a discipline that 
deals in facts, reality, and discovery. 
But Dray misses Collingwood’s ‘constructionism’ because of the framing of his 
question. Rather than to ask whether, for Collingwood, the historical world is ‘unreal’ as 
opposed to ‘real’, it is better to ask what is entailed by Collingwood’s idea of scientific 
history, specifically by its practice and by its presupposition that there is one historical 
truth, and that two irreconcilable claims about it cannot both be right. Dray’s question 
forces the historical world into either of two positions which, for Collingwood, would 
both be wrong. The first is that the historical world is independent of the observer. This 
is in fact the ‘horn of the dilemma’ accepted, Collingwood thinks, by English philosophy 
following Bradley, and which (he writes in The Idea of History) resulted in Oxford and 
Cambridge ‘realism’. And the second position has to be that the ‘historical world’ is 
‘unreal’, which is to convert history into plain fantasy.1 
The question is, then, how can we have historical knowledge, given that 
‘knowledge’ can no longer be thought to be acquaintance between the subject – the 
‘knowing’ historian – and his (independent) object, the ‘known’? Collingwood thinks this 
is the problem dealt with by Bradley, and “It remains to be seen”, he says in The Idea of 
History, “whether, sixty years later, his problem, which in the meantime I believe no 
English-speaking philosopher has discussed in print, can be advanced beyond the point 
at which he left it”.2 
I’ve argued that Collingwood’s attempt to advance the point consists in his 
attempt to explain that the truth of claims about historical reality and historical facts is 
correlative to the questions that are asked by historians, and to the rigour and reliability 
of the constructive processes by which conclusions are preliminarily established. The 
most accurate sense in which we can apply the term ‘constructionism’ to Collingwood 
                                                 
1 Collingwood criticises Simmel for precisely this second mistake: Simmel does not, in Collingwood’s view, 
do enough to prevent the subject of historical knowledge from becoming an ‘illusion’. See IH, pp. 170-1 
2 IH, p. 240 
 - 115 -
becomes clear, I think, when the reader co-ordinates what Collingwood says about 
historical thinking and historical knowledge with what he says about the question-and-
answer logic of systematic thinking – the “thinking hard” to which is due “everything 
that we call specifically human”.1 If by ‘constructionism’ we mean this, then to deny 
Collingwood’s constructionism one has to overlook, it seems, not only all of those 
passages in which Collingwood attacks the idea that the historical object is ‘there’ 
compresently,  to be apprehended like something still happening, but also his claim that 
the ‘known’ of history is the conclusion itself – that is, that history is inferential. The 
historian’s conclusions, which are formulated as narratives, are not propositions true or 
false by virtue of their correspondence to some reality that is not a proposition. 
Conclusions are ‘right’ when they follow from good, sound reasoning about what the 
evidence shows. 
This is to say, in simple terms, that ‘history a parte objecti’ is ‘ideal’ because the 
conclusions of history as a science are in this sense ‘ideal’. Historical facts are the product 
of an inquiring mind. To slip for a moment into technical language, Collingwood’s 
inquiry into historical knowledge must, then, prioritise the ‘a parte subjecti’ examination of 
historical epistemology, with any ‘ontological’ theory of history emerging from it 
secondarily. Indeed he says so quite explicitly in chapter two of The Principles of History: 
 
There are two questions to be asked whenever anyone inquires into the nature 
of any science: … the first question concerns the subjective characteristics of 
the science, its peculiarities as a kind of thinking; the second concerns the 
characteristics of its object, that which in the course of this thinking people 
come to know. 
What I shall try to show in this section is not only that of these two 
questions the one I have put first must necessarily be asked before the one I 
have put second, but that when in due course we come to ask the second we 
can answer it only by a fresh and closer consideration of the first.2 
 
The fact that this debate can arise among readers who know Collingwood’s 
writings better than most shows, I think, that our man also failed to state his arguments 
                                                 
1 EM, p. 37 
2 PH, pp. 39-40. He adds on p. 43 “any systematic consideration of history must begin by discussing 
history a parte subjecti, history as a special form of thinking which goes on in the minds of historians, and go 
on afterwards to discuss history a parte objecti…” and on p. 48 “so long as any unanswered questions remain 
about the object of historical knowledge, the only way in which we can answer them is by inquiring more 
closely into the nature of historical thinking”. 
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explicitly enough. Collingwood’s answer to the a parte objecti question of how historical 
facts exist is only stated scantly, sometimes confusingly, and usually only implicitly – and 
this is the side of the question Dray and Goldstein were struggling to clarify in the 1980s. 
They struggled because Collingwood’s writings in the philosophy of history deal 
overwhelmingly with this second, ‘subjective’ question of historical knowing, and indeed 
part of what is confusing about Collingwood, at least initially, is that his examination of 
historical epistemology seems to proceed without any proper, explicit statement of how 
that which is the object of inquiry exists. This only makes sense in view of history as a 
science, which clarifies why it is that in order to find out an entity’s mode of existence we 
must begin with an investigation of how the mind experiences the ‘encounter’ with it. In 
the case of a ‘known’ object, this means investigating how we construct knowledge of it. 
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Part IV 
 
The ‘Doctrine of Re-enactment’ 
 
 
 
i. A survey of the site 
ii. Critique 
iii. Defence 1: analysis of ‘object’ processes 
iv. The problems with philosophy of history via philosophy of 
mind 
v. Defence 2: ‘question and answer’ 
vi. Textual foundation 
vii. Criticisms answered 
viii. ‘Methodological individualism’ 
ix. Further criticisms answered 
x. ‘Intuitivism’ 
xi. History, hermeneutics and language 
 
 
 
i 
A survey of the site 
 
We now come to what has become Collingwood’s most notorious contention in 
connection to history: that “the history of thought, and therefore all history, is the re-
enactment of past thought in the historian’s own mind”.1 This has been called 
Collingwood’s ‘doctrine of re-enactment’. I’ll continue to use the term, though the same 
concept also appears as ‘re-thinking’ and occasionally as ‘re-experiencing thoughts’.2 
The doctrine of re-enactment became a sort of target for authors writing about 
methodology in the history of ideas in the 1960s and ’70s, so its influence has mostly 
taken this reverse form. Quentin Skinner’s attitude reflects today’s general consensus. He 
writes: 
 
Nothing I am saying presupposes the discredited hermeneutic ambition of 
stepping empathetically into other people’s shoes and attempting (in R. G. 
Collingwood’s unfortunate phrase) to think their thoughts after them… the 
                                                 
1 IH, p. 215 
2 Instead of ‘doctrine of re-enactment’ Dussen prefers to use the term ‘concept of re-thinking’. I consider 
this equally legitimate, though the reader might benefit from being told that we mean the same thing. See 
Dussen, History as a Science, pp. 72-8 
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mysterious empathetic process that old-fashioned hermeneutics may have led us 
to believe [in].1 
 
Skinner has repeated his attack on re-enactment in his contribution to Dario 
Castiglione and Iain Hampsher-Monk’s edited collection of essays, The History of Political 
Thought in National Context (2001), despite the promising title of his chapter, ‘The rise of, 
challenge to and prospects for a Collingwoodian approach to the history of political 
thought’. A re-examination of Collingwood’s infamous doctrine, it turns out, is not 
among those prospects. “We can surely never hope”, Skinner says, “to abolish the 
historical distance between ourselves and our forebears, speaking as though we can spirit 
away the influence of everything that has intervened, empathetically reliving their 
experience and retelling it as it was lived”.2 In light of this, one might think that Skinner’s 
own position is a little contradictory: “My aspiration is not of course to enter into the 
thought-processes of long-dead thinkers”, he says; “it is simply to use the ordinary 
techniques of historical inquiry to grasp their concepts, to follow their distinctions, to 
appreciate their beliefs and, so far as possible, to see things their way”.3 
Initially re-enactment was taken by commentators such as Gardiner and Walsh as 
a prescription of one among other possible methodologies of historiography. They had a 
point: the fact is that in many of its appearances in Collingwood’s writing, re-enactment 
is described as an activity. Re-enactment is not, Collingwood writes, “a passive surrender 
to the spell of another’s mind; it is a labour of active and therefore critical thinking”.4 It is 
clear enough that, for Collingwood, the re-enactment of past thoughts is the sine qua non 
of historical thinking at least; though sometimes he discusses it as if it is synonymous 
with ‘historical thinking’. 
It seemed to these early commentators, then, that re-enactment was being 
prescribed by Collingwood as an historical method. This consensus was soon reversed by 
Alan Donagan’s 1956 article ‘The Verification of Historical Theses’ in The Philosophical 
Quarterly. (Gardiner and Walsh openly changed their minds.5) Donagan’s contention was 
that re-enactment is in fact an “element in the goal of historical inquiry”; “part of the end 
                                                 
1 Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics, vol. I, Regarding Method (Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 120 
2 Skinner, ‘The rise of, challenge to and prospects for a Collingwoodian approach to the history of political 
thought’, in D. Castiglione and I. W. Hampsher-Monk, (eds), The History of Political Thought in National 
Context (Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 185 
3 Skinner, Regarding Method, p. 3 
4 IH, p. 215. See also p. 218 
5 See Nielsen, pp. 3-4, and especially note 15, where Nielsen cites her own conversations with Gardiner 
and Walsh in 1975. 
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an historian strives to accomplish”.1 On this point, as I’ve explained below, Donagan was 
(and is) right. The message that has been taken from what Donagan says is that 
Collingwood is not doing methodology of history. This view, which has become widely 
shared, Margit Hurup Nielsen calls the ‘non-methodological’ interpretation.2 In a recent 
article for Collingwood and British Idealism Studies, Dussen reaffirms it, albeit with a new 
name: the “transcendental interpretation” of re-enactment which has replaced the 
“misconceived methodological interpretation”, he says, means “taking the doctrine of re-
enactment to be describing a universal and necessary characteristic of history”3 – not, 
then, a prescribed ‘method’. 
But the apparent difference between the ‘methodological’ and the ‘non-
methodological’ interpretation is not a real difference. By returning to the primacy of 
‘question and answer’, and in particular Donagan’s original point back in 1956, we can 
see why. The doctrine of re-enactment prescribes a necessary condition of historical 
knowledge, because properly-formulated historical questions cannot be satisfied without 
it. The methodological implication of Donagan’s correct interpretation is that an 
historical question that does not demand or “expect” re-enacted thought is not an 
historical question at all. Historians therefore must pursue only such questions – 
otherwise they are not historians. This part of the study is devoted entirely to clarifying 
and evaluating the doctrine of re-enactment. First let’s begin with what Collingwood 
actually says about it. 
For such a notorious ‘doctrine’, re-enactment seems strikingly simple, a little 
obvious even, and it is certainly not original: Wilhelm von Humboldt pointed out in his 
1821 essay ‘On the Historian’s Task’ that the task of understanding past thoughts seems 
to be one of attempted replication in a present mind.4 Collingwood’s version is stated in 
what is still its most accessible and essential form in §4 of the ‘Epilegomena’ of The Idea of 
History, ‘History as Re-enactment of Past Experience’:5 
 
                                                 
1 Donagan, ‘The Verification of Historical Theses’, The Philosophical Quarterly 6 (1956), p. 199-200 
2 Nielsen, p. 3. Nielsen numbers among this group Walsh, Donagan, Toulmin, Dussen, “and possibly 
Rubinoff”. See Nielsen, p. 4, note 11. Dussen identifies R. G. Shoemaker, Toulmin, Rubinoff, P. Gardiner, 
and Rex Martin. See Dussen, History as a Science, pp.103-5. See also Dray, History as Re-enactment, pp. 52, 54-
5, and his article (W. H. Dray) ‘R. G. Collingwood and the Acquaintance Theory of Knowledge’, Revue 
Internationale de Philosophie 11 (1957), 420-32 
3 Dussen, ‘Collingwood’s Claim’, p. 6 
4 Wilhelm von Humboldt, ‘On the Historian’s Task’, reprinted in History and Theory, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1967) 
5 The first editor of The Idea of History, T. M. Knox, made ‘History as Re-enactment of Past Experience’ §4 
of the ‘Epilegomena’. It was originally a lecture given in 1936. 
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When a man thinks historically, he has before him certain documents or relics 
of the past. His business is to discover what the past was which has left these 
relics behind it. For example, the relics are certain written words; and in that 
case he has to discover what the person who wrote those words meant by them. 
This means discovering the thought… which he expressed by them. To 
discover what this thought was, the historian must think it again for himself. 
…and only in so far as he does this has he any historical knowledge, as distinct 
from merely philological knowledge, of the meaning of the edict. 1 
 
Collingwood’s point here is, firstly, that understanding ‘what somebody meant’ 
means having in mind the same thoughts, rather than different ones. In itself this is 
hardly controversial, just as it is not controversial to say that misunderstanding ‘what he 
meant’ is when people ascribe to the words of others thought-content that is different 
from that intended by the speaker. (It is also the content of thought that is re-enacted, not 
the original act of thinking.2) 
Re-enactment though is not only about reading and understanding “documents”: 
it is about all history, and applies equally to objects that ‘embody thought’ that were not 
intended as communication. Understanding an iron implement ‘historically’, for instance, 
requires re-thinking the idea ‘embodied’ in it. Collingwood’s metaphorical phrase for this 
is seeing the object historically, ‘from the inside’, as mind – metaphorical because the 
idea, of course, is not really ‘inside’ the object. It is to understand the thought embodied 
that is to have historical knowledge.3 We understand such an implement historically 
when and only when we have enacted the thought embodied in it4 – which might be the 
idea of hacking at something with it with the intention of severing or crushing, or of 
drilling a hole in it, removing nails with it, etc. This is, we then think, the ‘same thought’ 
that the implement’s maker would have had when he decided that an implement serving 
such a function needed to be made. 
This does not mean that it is the aim of historians to discover ‘purposes’ in a 
uniform sense – what Hobbes’s ‘purpose’ in writing Leviathan was, for example. Rather 
                                                 
1 IH, pp. 282-3 
2 There is a parallel with the act/content distinction in EM, p. 29, where “that which is presupposed” is 
distinguished from “the act of presupposing”. Dussen has identified that the misreadings of re-enactment, 
or ‘re-thinking’, of Walsh and Karl Popper owe to their failures to grasp this distinction. See Dussen, 
History as a Science, pp. 319-20 
3 In his Autobiography Collingwood writes “but in history these were narratives of purposive activity, and the 
evidence for them consisted of relics they had left behind (books or potsherds, the principle was the same) 
which became evidence precisely to the extent to which the historian conceived them in terms of purpose, 
that is, understood what they were for”. A, p. 109 
4 A, p. 109 
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they ask their characteristic questions about ‘solutions’ in a sense so broad that these 
questions can be asked of all purposive thought. 
All of this seems fairly straightforward and, if true, perhaps trivially so. But 
Collingwood’s attempt to illustrate what is really a very simple idea again leaves him 
inviting more questions than he answers. The difference between the thought contained 
in the original action, and the thought content sought by the historian, is simply that in 
the latter case the thought, although itself the same, is (in Collingwood’s phrase) 
“incapsulated”.1 This invites questions such as ‘How does incapsulation work?’, ‘Is this a 
special function of mind?’, ‘How do we know if we are incapsulating?’, ‘What is the 
status of ‘the incapsulated’?’, ‘Is it still the same idea if it’s incapsulated in a different 
mind and context?’, and so on. Collingwood attempts to deal with such questions in the 
following passage: 
 
The difference is one of context. To Nelson, that thought was a present 
thought; to me, it is a past thought living in the present but (as I have elsewhere 
put it) incapsulated, not free. What is an incapsulated thought? It is a thought 
which, though perfectly alive, forms no part of the question-answer complex 
which constitutes what people call the ‘real’ life, the superficial or obvious 
present, of the mind in question… 
So I reached my third position: ‘Historical knowledge is the re-
enactment of a past thought incapsulated in a context of present thoughts 
which, by contradicting it, confine it to a plane different from theirs.’2 
 
Other things Collingwood says about re-enactment confuse the picture still 
further. The designation of this construction as a ‘re-’ – as a repetition of an earlier, 
cognate process – is, he says, what orientates the activity towards history, executed by the 
mind ‘disentangling’ the past from the present.3 The ‘re-’, then, is applied because the 
thinker must recognise or designate thought as ‘past’ – and this becomes a conscious 
activity which is history itself: 
  
One can only apprehend a thought by thinking it, and apprehend a past 
thought by re-thinking it… History means not re-thinking what has been 
                                                 
1 See A, pp. 113-14 
2 A, pp. 113-14 
3 IH, p. 243. See also Nielsen, p. 12 
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thought before [in the sense of merely – and perhaps inadvertently – 
repeating it] but thinking about yourself as re-thinking it.1 
 
My intention next is to show how ‘question and answer’ rescues Collingwood’s 
confused and (therefore) embattled doctrine of re-enactment, not only from the 
bombardment it has received from critics, but also from the inadequate support it has 
been offered by other commentators. I’ll begin with the attacks. 
 
 
ii 
Critique 
 
Whatever else he might be trying to do, Collingwood is clearly entering 
hermeneutic territory here, so it isn’t surprising that protests arise mostly among 
philosophers of hermeneutics. Following the posthumous publication of The Idea of 
History in 1946 it became commonplace for the doctrine of re-enactment, however 
interpreted, to be described as ‘obscure’, ‘metaphysical’, and ‘mystical’. G. Barraclough, in 
the Times Literary Supplement, called re-enactment “sublime mysticism and nonsense”,2 
while Georges Lefebvre attacked Collingwood for advocating a kind of “communion” 
with the reality of the past – as if what lurked behind the doctrine was the need for 
clairvoyance, or for entry into a trance.3 
One can understand their view. Understanding another person might be taken to 
mean understanding what it was like to be him, saying what he was saying, doing what he 
was doing. Collingwood’s account of what happens when the historian understands 
Nelson’s words encourages this interpretation: “what I am doing is to think myself into 
the position of being all covered with decorations”, Collingwood writes.4 He seems, then, 
to be invoking something like empathy, or what some nineteenth-century German 
thinkers had developed as a theory of Einfühlung.5 On this account, Collingwood’s 
doctrine of re-enactment tells historians that it is their job to try to describe things for 
                                                 
1 PH, p. 223 
2 G. Barraclough, Times Literary Supplement (January 6, 1956), p. 2. See Nielsen, p. 3, note 9 
3 Georges Lefebvre, review of The Idea of History, in Révue historique 202 (July-September 1949), p. 133. See 
David Bates, ‘Rediscovering Collingwood’s Spiritual History (In and Out of Context)’, History and Theory 
vol. 35, no. 1 (February, 1996), p. 34 
4 A, p. 112 
5 For a brief summary of how ‘empathy’ and Einfühlung were employed by Herder, Dilthey et al, and how 
those usages shaped discussion of re-enactment, see Hughes-Warrington, pp. 47-52 
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their readers in such a way that they too can know ‘what it was like’. There are other 
similar expressions. In The Idea of History Collingwood writes that historical knowledge is 
really “knowledge of the past in the present, the self-knowledge of the historian’s own 
mind as the present revival and reliving of past experiences”.1 Reliving other people’s 
experiences, of course, seems more mysterious than merely grasping someone else’s 
reasoning. 
It is no longer the common view among Collingwood scholars that re-enactment 
is mystical. Received opinion now takes the doctrine seriously.2 But the view that re-
enactment is ‘mystical’ is still common among those who, though perhaps less familiar 
with why Collingwood says some of the things he says, nevertheless take inspiration from 
some of it – those such as Quentin Skinner, for example.3 
By way of an historical note, Collingwood has not been the only casualty of this 
kind of charge. In the mid-twentieth century the so-called Verstehen tradition, whose 
figures are commonly identified as Dilthey, Croce and Collingwood (Willem DeVries 
gives these three the regrettable school name ‘classical interpretationists’4), was under 
attack en masse. Part of the assault came from the quarters Collingwood would have 
identified as the traditional enemies of his kind of thinking: ‘positivists’ and ‘realists’. But, 
more importantly for our purposes here, in the 1950s a new strategy of anti-positivism, 
based on the philosophy of language, was taking hold of the theory of the social sciences 
generally, and it quickly started to affect what became the ‘methodological debates’ of the 
history of ideas. Re-enactment was exiled as part of this coup. 
The claims of the new school were two: firstly that re-enactment is not necessary 
for historical knowledge. We can still achieve understanding in history without, as 
Skinner sees it, “stepping empathetically into other people’s shoes and attempting (in R. 
G. Collingwood’s unfortunate phrase) to think thoughts after them”.5 And the second 
claim was that philosophy of language now afforded insights, or conceptual ‘tools’, that 
could be used to formulate a better philosophical account of meaning and understanding 
in history (and in the history of ideas) than had been offered by the authors of the 
Verstehen tradition, to whom such insights were unavailable. The kind of account 
Collingwood gives of how we understand other minds is, it now seemed, recognisably 
                                                 
1 IH, p. 175 
2 Nielsen, pp. 3-4 
3 See Skinner, Regarding Method, p. 120 
4 Willem A. DeVries (‘Meaning and Interpretation in History’, in History and Theory vol. 22, no. 3 (October, 
1983), pp. 253-63) identifies ‘classical interpretationists’ as “Dilthey, Croce, and Collingwood” (p. 253). 
5 Skinner, Regarding Method, p. 120 
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the old empiricist theory of linguistic communication, which Wittgenstein had attacked. 
Verstehen authors like Collingwood represented the tradition the linguistic school wanted 
to be seen as both reviving, against positivism (in the sense that meaning and 
understanding were still not cancelled in favour of natural-scientific concepts and terms), 
and superseding through improved attention to language and linguistic context.1 The new 
school would replace ‘classical’ accounts of interpretation and understanding with their 
own version, and there was little doubt where the weaknesses of the old philosophy lay: 
‘Classical interpretationist’ theory had misplaced ‘meaning’, and had, as a result, relied on 
“some mysterious faculty of insight through re-enactment”.2 And as P. M. S. Hacker sees 
it… 
 
The terms in which such thinkers and their followers attempted inchoately to 
articulate the character of the form of knowledge and understanding which they 
thought distinctive of hermeneutics, ‘fantasia’, ‘inner understanding’, 
‘Einfühlung’, ‘acts of divination’, ‘empathetic understanding’ (and, in the 
twentieth century, ‘re-enactment’ (Collingwood)), were obscure and their 
attempts to explain them were philosophically unilluminating. 3 
 
Collingwood and his predecessors, it seemed, had failed “to give a coherent and 
philosophically illuminating explanation” of historical understanding.4 We’ll now see that 
in fact Collingwood does provide a coherent explanation, even though he also provides a 
lot of confusing ones. This final criticism would, though, still potentially stand that 
Collingwood’s attempt to explain re-enactment is ‘unilluminating’. So that’s how we’ll 
take it. The doctrine of re-enactment is accused, then, of being (1) mysterious, (2) 
‘empiricist’ and the same as that shown to be false by Wittgenstein, (3) anyway 
unnecessary, and (4) “philosophically unilluminating”. 
 
                                                 
1 I’ve used a more cautious term, but Robert Lamb has observed the same thing: “This location of 
language as the source of both structure and agency contrasts sharply with the other methodological 
traditions that the Cambridge School has successfully usurped.” See Robert Lamb, ‘Quentin Skinner’s 
Revised Historical Contextualism: A Critique’, History of the Human Sciences vol. 22 (2009), p. 55 
2 DeVries, p. 259 
3 The full passage runs “The terms in which such thinkers and their followers attempted inchoately to 
articulate the character of the form of knowledge and understanding which they thought distinctive of 
hermeneutics, ‘fantasia’, ‘inner understanding’, ‘Einfühlung’, ‘acts of divination’, ‘empathetic understanding’ 
(and, in the twentieth century, ‘re-enactment’ (Collingwood)), were obscure and their attempts to explain 
them were philosophically unilluminating.” P. M. S. Hacker, ‘Wittgenstein and the Autonomy of 
Humanistic Understanding’, e-Journal Philosophie der Psychologie (November, 2007), pp. 14-15 
4 Hacker, p. 15 
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iii 
Defence 1: analysis of ‘object’ processes 
 
One possible way of defending Collingwood’s doctrine of re-enactment would 
be to point to the coherence of re-enactment with what he says about language, 
inference, ideas and feelings, in his works on history and on other subjects. Such a 
defence would draw, in short, on what can reasonably be called Collingwood’s 
philosophy of mind.1 The intention would be to insinuate something similar to what 
Leon Goldstein was bold enough to say explicitly: “all those critics who have treated 
rethinking as a species of empathy or intuition have simply no idea at all of what it 
involves”.2 
But there is too much wrong with this particular line of defence, as I’ll explain 
once I’ve illustrated it. There is a better defence of the doctrine of re-enactment that can 
be mounted based on the logic of question and answer. It is not the argument 
Collingwood actually makes, or intends to make: it is mine. But still it does not force 
Collingwood to say anything that he does not already say, or to make any argument that 
is not already logically implied. 
The first possible defence goes like this: Part of the reason the doctrine of re-
enactment has been thought mysterious is perhaps that some readers have failed to 
notice Collingwood’s insistence that it is not feeling or the experience of life in general 
that is re-enacted: it is only thoughts. So the claim that re-enactment is ‘mysterious’ can 
only be made if one overloads the cart that the doctrine is meant to be pulling. 
According to most interpretations, at least outside of discussions among Collingwood 
specialists, re-enactment means putting yourself into the shoes of others and attempting 
(in Quentin Skinner’s unfortunate phrase) to see things their way.3 It is thought to be 
about finding out and communicating ‘what it was like’. This is anyway the root of 
Skinner’s criticism: that Collingwood wants us to transpose ourselves into the 
perspective of others, which might involve the ‘spirit of the age’, etc. An Autobiography 
contains a passage that is particularly misleading in this regard: that in which 
                                                 
1 This is in fact the strategy Dussen employs in defence of Collingwood in History as a Science. Dussen, I 
think, follows Collingwood’s own reasoning extremely faithfully. See Dussen, History as a Science, pp. 262-9, 
316-20. Mink has also pointed out that “the main questions of The Idea of History belong to the philosophy 
of mind rather than to what is ordinarily called the ‘philosophy of history’”. See Mink, ‘Collingwood’s 
Historicism’, p. 155 
2 Goldstein, ‘Collingwood on the Constitution of the Historical Past’, pp. 253-4 
3 See Skinner, Regarding Method, p. 3. See also p. 120 
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Collingwood says “what I am doing is to think myself into the position of being all 
covered with decorations”.1 
But it is actually only rational thought, or ‘ideas’ that are and can be re-enacted, 
according to Collingwood. This is also clear from a proper reading of the passage about 
Nelson’s decorations, which is also about what it means to grasp (and ‘think through’) 
for oneself the thoughts embodied in Nelson’s words “in honour I won them, in honour 
I will die with them”. If this is overlooked then reading Leviathan and ‘re-enacting’ 
Hobbes’s thinking sounds a little bit like a game in which the participant pretends to be 
Thomas Hobbes, his head filled with feeling, fear, and ambition – a whole psychological 
structure containing the memories of a geometric epiphany, recent debates at Great Tew, 
and the spectral memory of an imprisoned king. If re-enactment is required for 
understanding in history, and if re-enactment means all this, then historians must almost 
become a special caste of psychological time-travellers. 
But none of this is what Collingwood is talking about. He says explicitly that 
historians can only re-enact thoughts. Feelings are actually un-re-enactable.2 There are 
inherent differences between thoughts and feelings, ‘ontological’ differences, as they are 
differences in how each relates to “the general structure of experience”.3 Collingwood 
attempts to illustrate these differences in The Principles of Art.4 There is, he writes, “a 
                                                 
1 A, p. 112. This is why, although it sounds strange, Goldstein is right when he says that Collingwood’s 
doctrine of re-enactment is not about ‘understanding’, but is in fact about knowing the past in some other 
sense. (See Golstein, ‘Dray on re-enactment and constructionism’ [Review: History as Re-enactment: R. G. 
Collingwood’s Idea of History, by William H. Dray], History and Theory vol. 37, no. 3 (October, 1998), p. 410. Of 
course, prima facie Goldstein is wrong: history is, for Collingwood, about understanding the actions of 
others. Goldstein’s intention is really only to distance re-enactment from explanation (p. 413) and from 
‘understanding’ in a technical sense, as a version of the alleged ‘Verstehen’ ambition of ‘knowing what it was 
like’; that is, thickly laden with feeling content and psychological structures. This is the charge of which he 
rightly wants Collingwood’s doctrine of re-enactment cleared. 
2 NL, 5.5-55. Christopher Parker – The English Idea of History from Coleridge to Collingwood (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2000) – notes that “Much effort has gone into arguing about whether or not Collingwood allowed for 
emotional re-enactment or just re-enactment of reasoned thought according to the logic of the situation, 
whether that be a purely philosophical situation or a more practical one.” (Parker, p. 166) The confusion 
Parker refers to can, I think, be defused by noting that, in The Principles of Art, Collingwood uses ‘thought’ 
and ‘feeling’ as if they are the two subclasses of ‘emotion’. ‘Thought’ is emotion raised out of the world of 
impressions by retention before the consciousness. Feeling is emotion that has not been so raised, but 
which the individual comes to understand through expression. Thus one kind of emotion can (technically) 
be re-enacted, and the other cannot. I have tried to acknowledge the ambiguity by saying ‘feelings’ where 
some other commentators might use ‘feelings’ and ‘emotions’ interchangeably. See also Hughes-
Warrington, pp. 78-80, for example. 
3 PA, p. 236 
4 Collingwood explains much about the nature of thought, feeling, impression, expression, etc. in The 
Principles of Art. This, of course, gives great credence to the view that The Principles of Art is an important 
resource for filling out the details of Collingwood’s philosophy of history. The same points, and certainly 
those that bear as much upon philosophy of history as they do upon philosophy of art, are actually put 
more concisely in The New Leviathan. See especially chs IV-X 
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special kind of privacy about feelings, in contrast with what may be called the publicity of 
thoughts”: 
 
A hundred people in the street may all feel cold, but each person’s feeling is 
private to himself… it is simply a feeling in them, or rather a hundred different 
feelings, each private to the person who feels it, but each in certain ways like all 
the rest… 
But if they all think that the thermometer reads 22° Fahrenheit, they are all 
thinking the same thought: this thought is public to them all. …the ‘fact’ or 
‘proposition’ or ‘thought’ that there are ten degrees of frost is not a hundred 
different ‘facts’ or ‘propositions’ or ‘thoughts’; it is one ‘fact’ or ‘proposition’ or 
‘thought’ which a hundred different people ‘apprehend’ or ‘assent to’ or ‘think’. 1 
 
The privacy of ‘feeling,’ Collingwood writes, means that it is ‘carried away’ by 
time.2 This is simply to say that once a person stops feeling cold, that sensation of 
coldness ceases to exist, and it cannot even be compared with another feeling of coldness 
by the same person, because it does not remain ‘present’ before the mind. Any future 
sensation of cold will not be ‘the same’ one as before being re-enacted. When one has a 
similar feeling at another time – say I am angry one day because my train is delayed, and 
angry another day because the same thing happens – it is not the same anger. “The flux of 
sense, it would seem, destroys any sensum before it has lasted long enough to permit of its 
relations being studied.”3 
Feeling, Collingwood is saying, is completely immersed in its context; it is 
inseparable from its context; it is private to the individual and to the moment. It cannot 
be ‘lifted’ out of its immediate context, so it cannot be re-enacted. This is why, strictly 
speaking, it is only true to say that we can ‘understand’ our own feelings. We cannot 
understand another’s anger, as we cannot relate to that same anger as he does. We can 
‘know’ his anger as an idea, but we cannot take part in the same anger ‘from the inside’. 
Thinking, however, is a different ‘level’ of experience from feeling or impression, 
(though it still originates in the ‘raw material’ of human emotion).4 Ideas are present to 
mind in a way that feelings are not: we can voluntarily hold ideas in the mind, or recall 
                                                 
1 PA, pp. 157-8. I have rearranged the order of some of the sentences for clarity. 
2 Here Collingwood echoes a passage in Bradley’s Presuppositions of Critical History. See especially pp. 8-9 
3 PA, p. 169. See also p. 168 
4 See PA, p. 249. The relationship between emotion and thought, like much of the philosophy of mind 
presented in The Principles of Art, is repeated in The New Leviathan. See NL, 41.33 
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them at a later stage,1 and this is what has ‘lifted’ thought out of its immediate context. 
(All of this, of course, goes back to Hume and Locke.) Thus emancipated from the ‘flux 
of sense’ that carries feeling away with it, the idea ‘22°F’ is something re-enactable by 
another consciousness – that is, another can stand in the same relation to that idea as the 
original thinker. When apprehended again, it is not a phenomenologically similar 
experience – it really is the same idea apprehended by two different thinkers. 
Thought, then, is ‘universal’ in a way that feeling is not.2 It stands in a different 
relation from feeling to “the general structure of experience”.3 Both thought and feeling 
(or idea and impression) are present to consciousness, and both seem to have unlimited 
potential content. But the differences in how they relate to “the general structure of 
experience” show that thought is re-enactable, and hence historically knowable, while the 
other, feeling, is not re-enactable, and is therefore historically unknowable.4 
Finally, a note: Collingwood is not terminologically consistent with his analysis in 
The Principles of Art. He often says that historians have to re-enact the ‘experiences’ of past 
individuals. But this does not show that he does not believe his own argument; it only 
shows that he does not always use ‘thought’ and ‘experience’ as technical terms. Indeed 
this is probably why the doctrine of re-enactment is thought by some readers to be about 
‘feeling what it was like’ to be a past person. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 In ‘The Subject-matter of History’ Collingwood says that it is this retention in mind which ‘positively’ 
identifies thinking is also the activity of becoming aware of the self “persisting through the diversity of its 
own acts”. See IH, p. 306 
2 See IH, p. 309 
3 PA, p. 236 
4 Collingwood’s distinction between feeling and thinking echoes some passages of Bradley’s Presuppositions 
of Critical History, one of Collingwood’s ‘starting points’. Here is what Bradley says: “An assertion, and 
much more so a proof, is intellectual; it is a judgement which implies the exercise of the understanding; and 
the terms united by the judgement must therefore fall within the sphere of understanding. They must be 
objects for the intellect, and so, in a sense more or less entire, relative to the intellect; in a word intelligible. 
But the essence of mere sensation was the entire absence of the intellectual, and hence to make one single 
affirmation with respect to sensation, as sensation, is to treat as relative to the understanding that which is 
supposed to exclude the understanding; and this is a contradiction.” Bradley, The Presuppositions of Critical 
History, pp. 7-8 
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iv 
The problems with philosophy of history via philosophy of mind 
 
In History as a Science, Jan van der Dussen stages a defence similar to that just 
sketched of Collingwood’s claim that all history is the history of thought, and that 
historical knowledge is thought re-thought. Dussen appeals, as I just have, to 
Collingwood’s philosophy of mind, which seems to clear Collingwood of the ‘mystical’ 
charge.1 According to Dussen “we cannot avoid the conclusion that it is impossible to 
give a proper assessment of Collingwood’s philosophy of history based only on The Idea 
of History. For this work is only understandable within the context of a philosophy of 
mind, which is not explained in it”.2 
In The Later Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood, Alan Donagan makes a similar 
observation. Collingwood’s “most original contribution to the methodology of scientific 
history”, Donagan says, “rests on an analysis of conscious action”.3 Dussen puts his case 
powerfully, and what he shows rather brilliantly is that what Collingwood says about 
history fits with what he says about mind; and that critics cannot complete their attacks 
on Collingwood’s philosophy of history without taking that philosophy of mind into 
account. More recently Marnie Hughes-Warrington has appealed to alleged parallels in 
the philosophy of mind and language which she argues are shared by Collingwood and 
Wittgenstein.4 “On his [Wittgenstein’s] account”, she writes, “understanding others is 
made possible by virtue of the training we receive in the language rules of our 
community. Though not as explicitly stated, that same view of language underpins 
Collingwood’s view of re-enactment”.5 
Now, these defences certainly ‘illuminate’ Collingwood’s philosophy of mind 
(and, in Hughes-Warrington’s case, of language) and the coherence between it and the 
doctrine of re-enactment – the coherence that Collingwood does not really explicate. By 
stressing that history is the history of thought, and not therefore also of feelings, they put 
to bed the old charge that re-enactment is ‘mysterious’, and demonstrate the scholarly 
                                                 
1 Dussen’s defence is aimed at answering objections canvassed by him (and therefore not here) to what 
Collingwood says about human action, purpose, the ‘inside’ of history, and the past living in the present. 
Because he’s already done this, I have not reproduced his work here. See Dussen, History as a Science, p.257 
2 Dussen, History as a Science, p. 259. See also Dussen’s extended attempt to rescue re-enactment in this way 
on pp. 316-20 
3 Donagan, Later Philosophy, p. 192 
4 Hughes-Warrington, pp. 61-71 
5 Hughes-Warrington, p. 66 
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virtue of returning an author’s contention to the wider context of other works by him, 
and by others. 
There are still problems, of course, especially with Collingwood’s claim that 
feelings cannot be re-enacted. Collingwood might deny its possibility, but we can think of 
instances in which sensation does not really seem to be ‘carried away by time’, but seems 
to be retained without being ‘converted into an idea’. It makes perfect sense to say that 
one feels colder today than one did yesterday; and we can taste, compare, and 
communicate the tastes of different wines.1 It is also quite easy for anyone who tries to 
recall at will the taste of an orange or the smell of mothballs. Perhaps even more 
familiarly, when I reflect on some recent embarrassment, the feeling of embarrassment 
often returns just as strongly as anything we could mean by the ‘idea’ of embarrassment 
and of its cause in that instance – and this sometimes even comes complete with a wince 
and a hand over the eyes. Collingwood might be guilty here of his own “Fallacy of 
Misplaced Argument”: “arguing about any object immediately given to consciousness”.2 
But it is not because of little problems like these in Collingwood’s philosophy of 
mind or language that such defences fail. It is because they don’t anyway demonstrate 
that this coherence with other areas of Collingwood’s philosophy rescues the doctrine of 
re-enactment. The charge that re-enactment is “unnecessary” for history still survives, as 
does the charge that it is “philosophically unilluminating” for working historians. 
Furthermore, these defences actually only show that the doctrine of re-enactment carries 
certain implicit presuppositions, some of which are made explicit in Collingwood’s 
philosophy of mind. And this does the doctrine no real service, since Collingwood now 
appears to be invoking a theory of psychology that seems rather rudimentary. Re-
enactment then becomes vulnerable to the declaration that thought and feeling are not, 
as a matter of psychological fact, so tidily separable. (Indeed Collingwood scholars can 
even point out that the distinction between thought and emotion is much less clear in 
The New Leviathan.) This demonstrated, either we can, pace Collingwood, re-enact the 
feelings of others, or alternatively, also pace Collingwood, thoughts cannot be re-enacted. 
These failures are due to the dominance of the ‘non-methodological’ 
interpretation. If re-enactment is not meant to be necessary method for historians to 
follow, then it doesn’t matter that historians think it “unnecessary”, and that challenge 
doesn’t need to be refuted. In a recent article for Collingwood and British Idealism Studies, 
Dussen modifies his position. The doctrine of re-enactment, he now says, addresses a 
                                                 
1 My thanks for these examples to ES and IHM. 
2 NL, 4.73 
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general issue in the philosophy of mind.1 It seems to me that, because Dussen now 
recognises that Collingwood’s philosophy of mind does not rescue the claim that 
historians do and must re-enact past thoughts, he has revised the question for which 
Collingwood intends it as an answer. 
But the doctrine of re-enactment is intended as something historians should do, 
and when it is so ‘methodologically’ interpreted, different objections arise from what 
we’ve just heard. In an article for the inaugural volume of Collingwood Studies (1994) Stein 
Helgeby praises Collingwood for finding “rationality and historical process among people 
previously thought to be irrational, savage or ‘natural’”; for showing that folklore can be 
used as historical evidence by recognising that “the themes of such stories are integral to 
the customs and beliefs of the people who tell them”, rather than springing from the 
‘unconscious’; and for showing colonised peoples not as passive victims, but as actively 
resisting incursion, “constructing options and negotiating solutions”.2 
But, if it is meant as a prescriptive historical method, the doctrine of re-
enactment might also be attacked for this same thing. Collingwood seems to recognise 
thought as the sole currency in which mind performs its transactions. If this is so, 
Collingwoodian history might be too rationalistic, too intellectualistic – even too 
‘propositional’. The re-experiencing of emotion and feeling is too philosophically 
problematic for him (our critic could complain), so perhaps this is why he dismisses 
emotion and feeling from history. This would certainly make for sterile historical writing 
where, for example, the state of Charles’s emotions as he stepped out onto the scaffold 
to face the headsman’s axe cannot, and should not, be of any interest to us (or even 
should not be narrated) – only his public-relations logic of wearing two shirts, or the 
rational processes informing his last words to the gathered mob. History hampered in 
this way, our criticism goes, makes for a science of human affairs that is obviously not fit 
for purpose. After all, ‘human affairs’ very often means the tangled social wreckages of 
people acting out of irrational preference, cowardliness, high-spirited frivolity, or what 
Wyndham Lewis calls man’s “instinct for blood and carnage”. So ignoring all of this, or 
trying to convert it all into the language of ideas and intentions, seems to put 
                                                 
1 Dussen, ‘Collingwood’s Claim’, pp. 6-7. Dussen is borrowing Giuseppina D’Oro’s terminology. See 
D’Oro, ‘Collingwood on Re-enactment and The Identity of Thought’, Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 
38 (2000), pp. 87-101. See especially p. 87 
2 Stein Helgeby, ‘Action, Duty and Self-Knowledge’, p. 87 
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Collingwood (as Lewis says of Shaw) “in a weak position where the science of life is 
concerned”.1 
 
 
v 
Defence 2: ‘question and answer’ 
 
‘Question and answer’ helps, first, to make sense of the doctrine of re-enactment 
and, second, to defend it against these surviving and additional criticisms. When 
Collingwood refers to ‘re-enacting’ the thoughts of another he is simply struggling to 
summarise what historical questions aim to achieve, in words that are both specific 
enough to apply only to historical questions, and general enough to apply to all historical 
questions. This is why the dispute between the prescriptive ‘methodological’ 
interpretation and the descriptive ‘non-methodological’ interpretation is an imaginary 
one. Re-enactment is both an ‘activity’ of the historian, and a definition of historical 
knowledge, in the sense that it is ‘what the historian is after’. Alan Donagan has already 
contended, in his 1956 article, that re-enactment is in fact an “element in the goal of 
historical inquiry”; “part of the end an historian strives to accomplish”.2 In The Later 
Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood, Donagan cleared up a further point: the doctrine of re-
enactment is not a ‘method’ in itself. It is, as a goal of inquiry, still compatible with the 
Baconian historical method used to reach it.3 In retrospect, Collingwood scholarship 
would have been better off had Donagan made more of this second point than he in fact 
did. He devotes only a paragraph to pointing it out, and does not expand on what he 
assumes his reader already knows: namely, what “Baconian” means. But although I want 
to return to these points, I don’t want to return to the defence of the doctrine that 
Donagan actually presents in the same chapter. Unfortunately for our purposes here, 
Donagan drops the appeal to ‘question and answer’ for his defence, and instead mounts 
one more faithful to Collingwood’s own intentions.4 The result is, in line with much of 
what we’ve already heard, only a defence of what re-enactment presupposes.  
                                                 
1 Wyndham Lewis, The Art of Being Ruled [1926] Reed Way Dasenbrock (ed.) (Santa Rosa: Black Sparrow 
Press, 1989), p. 61 
2 Donagan, ‘The Verification of Historical Theses’, p. 199-200 
3 Donagan, Later Philosophy, pp. 215-16. Gary Browning does not discuss this, but he does emphasise this 
compatibility of re-enactment with ‘Baconian’ method by using quite consistently ‘rethinking’ and 
‘evidence’ in conjunction. See Rethinking R. G. Collingwood, pp. 13, 15, 74, for example. 
4 Donagan, Later Philosophy, pp. 216-22 
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I’ll repeat that I am claiming that it is Collingwood’s intention to prescribe a form 
of history in which the historian seeks to re-enact past thoughts. But I am not claiming 
that it was ever his intention to argue for this by recourse to the principle of question and 
answer as I will here. My claim is only that ‘question and answer’ makes sense of the 
necessity for historians to re-enact thought. That is, I am rescuing Collingwood’s primary 
intention. 
What Donagan noted in his 1956 article, and in The Later Philosophy of R. G. 
Collingwood, has the power, I think, to answer the criticisms I’ve outlined. Furthermore, 
there is no need to shoe-horn Collingwood’s philosophy of mind into agreement with 
Wittgenstein-style philosophy of language, as Marnie Hughes-Warrington has done,1 to 
sustain its continuing relevance to historians. The philosophy of understanding that 
Hughes-Warrington discusses may be perfectly adequate for explaining how we 
understand people in conversations. But what she ignores is that history for Collingwood 
is not conversation, and making sense of his doctrine of re-enactment does not require 
pretending that it is. The difference is that conversation is not necessarily investigative: 
scientific history necessarily is. And investigations, if they are to be scientific, must have a 
clear idea of what they aim to discover. Re-enactment makes sense, and makes sense in 
Collingwood’s own terms, when it is seen as a requirement of properly historical 
questions. 
The good sense of the doctrine of re-enactment is to be demonstrated not by 
pointing to Collingwood’s philosophy of mind, but by reflecting on the metaphysics of 
scientific history. I mean this is Collingwood’s sense. The possibility of re-enactment is an 
absolute presupposition of the kind of questions to which scientific history provides 
answers.2 Re-enactment of thought means simply ‘following reasoning’. This is why the 
question of whether or not re-enactment is possible is really only an “academic”3 one. We 
presuppose it so often in everyday activity that somebody who demanded a 
demonstration that people can follow the reasoning of others would just be inviting 
                                                 
1 See Hughes-Warrington, pp. 61-71 
2 Donagan has already observed that re-enactment is a presupposition of history. (Later Philosophy, pp. 213, 
216) It seems to me that it would be more faithful to Collingwood’s own terminology to say that it is an 
absolute presupposition, for the reasons that I have outlined here: namely, that it is not a presupposition that 
can be tested. This is not to say that re-enactment is something that must be presupposed by all historians 
at all times. Absolute presuppositions are different from ‘innate’ or a priori concepts for exactly that reason. 
Indeed Donagan discusses the fascinating quirk of Collingwood’s 1925 essay, ‘The Nature and Aims of a 
Philosophy of History’, that he denies the possibility of re-enacting past thoughts. See Later Philosophy, pp. 
216-22 
3 NL, 2.5-55 
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ridicule. We do not need a philosophy of thought, ideas, or mind in general. We just need 
to know what ‘reasoning’ means: 
 
‘REASON’ as the name of a mental function or form of consciousness, rational 
thinking, is thinking one thing, x, because you think another thing, y; where y is 
your ‘reason’ or, as it is sometimes called, your ‘ground’ for thinking x.1 
 
Reason applies not only to thinking x, but also to deciding to do x. Again, reason 
means deciding to do x because you think another thing, y; where y is your ‘reason’ or, as 
it is sometimes called, your ‘ground’ for doing x. 2 The ‘thought’ that is aimed at by an 
historical question is not ‘a thought’ in a simple sense. What historians really aim at are, 
in Collingwood’s terms, “constellations”3 of thoughts, whether it be the x and the y 
constellated, or a plurality of ‘reasons’. In practice there are few actions that have one 
simple ‘y’ – there is usually a constellation of ‘y’s. They can be disentangled by whatever it 
is the historian wants to know specifically about his subject’s reasoning. 
The terminological advantage to ‘re-enacting’ the thoughts of others over simply 
‘understanding’ the thoughts of others is that it distinguishes between knowing ‘that’ 
another person thinks x, and knowing ‘what’ he thinks in the sense of actually following 
his reasoning between x and y. One ‘re-enacts’ the reasoning. In political argument, for 
example, there is a difference between (on the one hand) knowing ‘that’ my opponent ‘is 
a Marxist’ and that he therefore ‘thinks Marxist thoughts’, and (on the other) knowing his 
reasoning – his ‘y’s and his ‘x’s – on a specific point. It is quite obvious, when put like 
this, that ‘following his reasoning’ implies thinking through a line of reasoning that is in 
some sense ‘the same’ as his. If this is what Collingwood means, then it is not particularly 
contentious in itself. Obviously this is possible. If it weren’t then it would be impossible 
to see, in an argument, where my opponent had gone wrong in his reasoning. This is 
simply to say that before I can identify a logical leap I must first ‘follow’ the logic. 
If we could not re-enact thoughts, or if we attempted to do without the 
presupposition that we can follow other people’s reasoning, then all disputes – even 
philosophical ones – would be essentially rhetorical, or “eristical”, in the sense that they 
would be show debates, displaying a barrage of ‘x’s. Instead of following another’s 
                                                 
1 NL, 14.1 
2 See NL, 14.3 
3 See EM, p. 66 
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reasoning it would be good enough to say to myself something like ‘Well he thinks x. He 
is, after all, a Marxist’. 
We’ve seen that the recruitment from The Principles of Art of Collingwood’s 
distinctions between actions and passions, thoughts and feelings, as if Collingwood’s 
philosophy of mind underpins his philosophy of history, actually makes his philosophy of 
history seem dependent on that philosophy of mind. It is not. His distinction between 
actio and passio (which he says he takes from Hume1) simply illustrates a presupposition of 
historical questions. Historical questions presuppose that the deed was an actio, not a 
passio, which is to presuppose that there is a y which relates to the x as its ‘reason’, its 
‘ground’. 
Passio, involuntary conscious processes, such as feelings and reflex actions, are not 
the subjects of history because, applied to them, the question ‘What did he mean?’ is a 
nonsense question. In a case of passio, there is no y. Because there is no y, x is not really 
done ‘on purpose’. x just ‘happens’. What somebody ‘meant’ by sneezing, or by getting 
hot in a greenhouse, or by something that was done to him, is literally ‘nothing’.2 This is 
because, I am now saying, there is no reasoning, and no ‘problem’ to which such 
processes are the ‘solution’. “The activity of feeling or sensation contained no element of 
self-criticism”, Collingwood says in his Essay on Metaphysics; “The business of thinking 
includes the discovery and correction of its own errors. That is no part of the business of 
seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, tasting, and experiencing the emotions associated with 
them.”3 (Collingwood’s technical term for this is ‘criteriological’.) The point here is that 
where there is no ‘y’ to pursue, a necessary condition of an historical question is absent. 
That is why historical questions that presuppose a problem to which the Giant’s 
Causeway is a solution – or a problem to which Charles’s fear on the scaffold is a solution 
– are nonsense questions. 
Collingwood explains actions in terms of things that are done, as we say, “on 
purpose”.4 The same thing can be expressed by saying that, where there is a reasoned 
action, part of the constellation of ‘y’s is some ‘problem’ feature in a situation that the 
agent considers to be in need of rectification. Indeed, this is a necessary presupposition 
for any action, since thinking only other ‘y’s does not make one decide to do x. There has 
to be a perceived need for ‘something to be done about this’, and the agent must have the 
                                                 
1 PA, p. 177 
2 See Collingwood’s example of the fear aroused in a child by the perception of a blazing red curtain. PA, 
p. 161 
3 EM, p. 110 
4 IH, p. 309 
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determination that it will be he who does it. There is, then, an inherent relationship 
between the deed and the problem it addresses. This is why Collingwood says, in his 
Essay on Metaphysics, that it is not only those who write history that solve problems, but also 
“people who are said to ‘make history’.”1 Historical questions, we might say, carry the 
presupposition that ‘this solves some sort of problem’. 
There is, finally, an obvious parallel between the question-and-answer structure of 
action and the question-and-answer structure of historical inquiry. But that parallel should 
not be falsely stated. It is a confusion to think that the two processes of question and 
answer somehow clip together so that someone’s reasoning is made automatically 
available to an historian once he has grasped his subject’s question.2 The sequence of 
question-and-answer thinking that the historian wants to re-enact is not identical to the 
question-and-answer sequence of his own investigation. Rather, historical questions 
presuppose actions intended to ‘solve’. That is all. 
 
 
vi 
Textual foundation 
 
That the doctrine of re-enactment points back to the historical question has not, 
I think, been widely considered, despite the fact that Alan Donagan interpreted it for 
Collingwood’s readers so clearly and so accurately in his 1956 article, and pointed out, if 
only briefly, that the ‘method’ implied by it was still “Baconian”.3 In his 1988 article for 
The Monist, ‘Re-Enactment in Retrospect’, Elazar Weinryb dismisses something similar to 
the defence I’ve given here as an interpretation with “no textual foundation”.4 According 
to this interpretation, he says, re-enactment, “the very identity of the historian’s thoughts 
with the agent’s, constitute[s] the final consequence or goal to be achieved by successful 
explanation”. The interpretation Weinryb is attacking is a little different from what I’m 
claiming here to be the question-and-answer logic of re-enactment, because what he’s 
attacking has to do with ‘explanation’. I think we’ve already dealt enough with what 
‘explanation’ means for Collingwood’s scientific historian: it just stands for ‘what he 
                                                 
1 EM, p. 65 
2 I’ve argued below that Dimitris Vardoulakis is guilty of making this mistake. See Dimitris Vardoulakis, 
‘‘Clumsy Questioners’: Questioning and the Meaning of Meaning in Collingwood’, Collingwood and British 
Idealism Studies vol. 11, no. 1 (2005), p. 53, specifically what Vardoulakis calls the “logos” of history. 
3 Donagan, Later Philosophy, pp. 215-16 
4 Weinryb, p. 570 
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wants to know’. Anyway, whether or not the reader thinks Weinryb is attacking 
something like my interpretation, I’ll take his criticism that it lacks “textual foundation”, 
and show that it does not. 
Re-enactment is frequently discussed in The Idea of History in conjunction with 
‘what the historian wants to know’. One of Collingwood’s criticisms of Kant is that he 
did not see that the historian “has to re-create them [the events of history] inside his own 
mind, re-enacting for himself so much of the experience of the men who took part in 
them as he wishes to understand”.1 The first mention of re-enactment in The Idea of 
History, in the section on Tacitus, even emphasises that re-enactment is necessary not 
only for historical ‘understanding’ in some vague sense, but explicitly in relation to 
history as a science – that is, as something that answers questions. “History cannot be 
scientifically written”, Collingwood says, “unless the historian can re-enact in his own 
mind the experience of the people whose actions he is narrating”.2 Re-enactment, this 
means, is necessary for the satisfaction of scientific-historical questions.3 The same point 
is repeated in §1 of the ‘Epilegomena’: Actions… 
 
have an inner side, consisting of processes of thought; and what the historian is 
looking for is these processes of thought. All history is the history of thought. But 
how does the historian discern the thoughts which he is trying to discover? 
There is only one way in which it can be done: by re-thinking them in his own 
mind.4 
 
Re-enactment, then, is necessary for historical thinking because historical 
questions properly conceived are of such a kind that they can only be satisfied by re-
enacted thought. Re-enactment is a characteristic of all history and only history because it 
is demanded only by historical questions, and by all properly historical questions. In fact 
to take the opposite view, as Weinryb does, that “there is no good sense in arguing that 
the aim of historical inquiry is to reproduce the agent’s thoughts”,5 is to miss entirely the 
‘starting question principle’ for why history is a distinct science. 
 
                                                 
1 IH, p. 97 
2 IH, p. 39 
3 See also IH, p. 115 
4 IH, p. 215. Passages might be produced which show re-enactment being discussed without any attendant 
mention of questions or of ‘what the historian wants to find out’. But such passages could only show 
Collingwood assuming that readers will remember that history is and should be a science. 
5 Weinryb, p. 571 
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vii 
Criticisms answered 
 
The fact that history is the answering of questions also helps us to strengthen 
Collingwood’s claim that the historical re-enactment of sensations, feelings, and so on, is 
impossible. I’ve pointed out that it is actually “immediately given to consciousness”1 that 
the flavour of wine, the smell of oranges and mothballs, and the precise feeling of past 
embarrassments can be recalled. Here, though, I think we would also have to pervert 
Collingwood’s intention, albeit for the health of the conclusion. I am not interested in 
defending Collingwood’s claim that we can never remember or re-enact feelings. That is 
a point concerned with categorising certain phenomena by how they relate to experience 
in general – i.e. by their ‘ontology’. It is philosophy of mind.2 I will not offer a defence 
here because there is little to be gained by it for our purposes. It could serve only as an 
attempt to support a presupposition of scientific history that could anyway be supported 
otherwise, if it were even seriously challenged in the first place: namely, the 
presupposition that one can seek another’s reasons for doing x without also attempting 
to re-enact his feelings. My only interest here is in history, and it seems that although we 
might be able to remember or re-enact our own feelings, or ‘re-experience’ them, 
whatever it is when we are doing so, we are not doing history. Historical thinking is 
inferential. Comparing the taste of one wine to another by remembering the flavour of 
an earlier one is not inference. It is memory.3 
But isn’t it true that Collingwood holds thinking and feeling – actions and 
impressions – to be so starkly distinguishable, and the second of each of these pairs so 
irrelevant to history? It is not true. If we recall again what makes an historical question 
historical we will see quite easily, I think, what Collingwood means, and why he is right. 
The basic point is that historical questions can only aim at understanding the reasons 
why So-and-so did or thought x. The critic will object that an historian might ask ‘Was 
Charles I afraid?’, and in the context of a broader historical question that might be 
perfectly legitimate. But what this means is that the historian’s question is of a kind that 
will be satisfied by ‘fear’ as an idea. Fear ‘as an idea’ is not the same as fear as a feeling. 
The question does not demand, for its satisfaction, that the historian also feel Charles’s 
                                                 
1 NL, 4.73 
2 For a clearer and, I think, more convincing statement than that presented in The Principles of Art, see NL, 
ch. V. 
3 See NL, 5.17 
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fear upon the scaffold. There is no such thing as an historical question that is answered – 
that is, satisfied – by the achievement of a feeling. Feelings might attend certain 
discoveries, of course: a wife will most probably be angry and dismayed when her secret 
investigation into whether her husband is having an affair leads to the conclusion that he 
is. But the question would not remain unanswered just because she felt nothing. This is 
why historians can investigate questions to which pertain all sorts of emotional and 
existential turbulence, and why they can carry out those investigations admirably and 
conclude properly without ever feeling anything – except professional satisfaction. It is 
only the historian who ‘feels’ the emotion of satisfaction, and not the question itself. 
For Collingwood, historical questions, and the investigations that attempt to 
answer them, are always quests to re-enact past reasoning. It is a shame that Collingwood 
attempts to put this ‘the other way round’, by describing re-enactment as a process and 
character of ‘historical thinking’ and ‘historical knowledge’. It is, more importantly, a 
feature of historical questions.1 Historical questions arise when we become aware that we 
do not know, or are insufficiently clear regarding, the precise reasoning ‘embodied’ in 
whatever our relic or outward event expressing some deliberate action happens to be, 
and when we become aware that we should like to ‘know’ that reasoning. 
The principle that the aim to re-enact thought is a necessary component of the 
historical question shows what is wrong with Goldstein’s attack on those such as 
Donagan,2 who apparently think that re-enactment is about ‘explanation’ rather than 
about historical knowledge in some other sense. “Re-enactment of past thought is part – 
indeed a central part – of his [Collingwood’s] conception of how the historical past is 
known or constituted in historical research”, Goldstein writes; “It has nothing to do with 
explanation at all.”3 Goldstein’s attack, though, is based on a false distinction between 
what the historian wants to know, and the explanation he is looking for. The specific 
unknown of an historical question can always be phrased as an ‘explanation’. The 
                                                 
1 Dussen quotes a passage which makes this quite obvious: “it is necessary to consider not the 
characteristics of historical method (for the question at issue concerns a supposed limitation in that 
method as hitherto practised) but the terms of the problem which this method is designed to solve.” It is a 
little surprising that, having quoted it, Dussen ignores the “terms of the problem” part and goes on to 
discuss re-enactment as an “aspect” of historical knowledge which is “an essential feature”. See Dussen, 
History as a Science, p. 313 
2 See Goldstein, ‘Collingwood on the Constitution of the Historical Past’, pp. 241-67. Goldstein’s attack on 
Donagan specifically begins on pp. 254-5. He has more unnamed targets in his sights, though. “Almost no-
one, I am sure”, Goldstein says in his opening paragraph (p. 241), “doubts for a moment that the well-
known dictum about the historian rethinking or re-enacting past thought is intended as a contribution to a 
theory of historical explanation”. 
3 Goldstein, ‘Collingwood on the Constitution of the Historical Past’, p. 244. See also pp. 245, 247, and 
250, where Goldstein accidentally attacks one of Collingwood’s own doctrines: “As I understand 
Collingwood”, he says, “thus far we have been learning what happened, but not why”. 
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thoughts re-enacted by an historian and the explanation he offers are not different in his 
narrative, unless he silently changes his implicit question between one and the other. This 
is why Collingwood says, in his Essay on Metaphysics, that the sense of ‘causation’ meant by 
an historian when he speaks of a cause may be expressed in other terms “according to 
differences in the kind of motive in question”.1 
 
 
viii 
‘Methodological individualism’ 
 
The question-and-answer defence of re-enactment also relieves Collingwood of 
the charge of ‘methodological individualism’ often levelled against him.2 For some 
readers, because Collingwood is privileging individuals and their reasoned actions, there 
could be no histories of states, societies, cultures, institutions, or of ‘concepts’ 
themselves. Mink discusses this as well, and he has some good examples: “what then 
becomes of the history of economic and parliamentary institutions, of legal codes, of the 
relation of warfare and technology, and so on?”, he asks.3 Furthermore, it seems that 
Begriffsgeschichte – the ‘history of concepts’ which is now an international movement4 – is 
not Geschichte at all. (Some agreement might be made by renaming it Begriffserzählung – the 
mere ‘tales of concepts’.) Is it true that Collingwoodian history must jettison all of this 
subject-matter? 
It is not true. Again Mink has already attempted a defence of this, albeit one that 
I think I can put more efficiently. Mink starts by acknowledging a problem which 
Collingwood “overlooks”:5 If the thoughts of individuals are the only things that can be 
re-enacted, then Collingwood (Mink says) would seem to be wrong about Vico’s great 
discovery that history can describe the developments of societies, institutions, language, 
customs, law, government, etc.6 What Mink says over the next seven pages is that re-
enactable thoughts can go beyond the individual on account of shared absolute 
presuppositions. “The theory of absolute presuppositions thus provides the link between 
                                                 
1 EM, p. 290. See also Boucher’s interesting discussion of this in Social and Political Thought, pp. 115-16 
2 See Donagan, Later Philosophy, pp. 206-7. There are apparently good reasons for maintaining 
Collingwood’s ‘individualism’. See for example NL, 21.27 – one of Collingwood’s wonderfully 
uncompromising statements. 
3 Mink, Mind, History and Dialectic, p. 159 
4 Quentin Skinner describes Begriffsgeschichte as the current preoccupation of German historians. See 
Skinner, ‘Collingwoodian approach’, p. 175 
5 Mink, Mind, History and Dialectic, pp. 174-5 
6 Mink, Mind, History and Dialectic, p. 174 
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individual thought and action on the one hand and human institutions on the other”.1 
Mink demonstrates sophisticated understanding and a skill for handling arguments from 
a broad range of Collingwood’s writings which I can only envy. I do not think his 
explanation is inconsistent with anything Collingwood says. But because Mink takes at 
face value what Collingwood says about ‘subject-matter’, his defence generates more 
complications than he solves, and does so unnecessarily. The complication in his defence 
is that Collingwood nowhere says that the rethinking of group reasoning is dependent on 
that group sharing absolute presuppositions. It ought, in fact, to be possible for people 
with different absolute presuppositions to reason together and to decide on at least some 
collective actions. On Mink’s account, the historian has to establish a group’s shared 
absolute presuppositions before he can attempt to re-enact ‘their’ thought as a group. 
Dussen also bravely attempts to defend Collingwood against the charge of 
‘methodological individualism’. His defence, different from Mink’s, is still not quite 
convincing. Dussen shows that Collingwood does in fact refer to the English mind, the 
Chinese mind, the Greek and Roman spirit, and that he does concede that ideas can be 
shared in traditions, and so on.2 But this does not defend Collingwood against the charge 
that his doctrine of re-enactment is ‘methodologically individualistic’. Indeed, it might 
show only that he is not consistently set against the language of corporate minds, or that 
he does not follow his own prescriptions for how history should be written. 
The better defence, in light of what an historical question has to be, would be 
this. The question is, ‘Is it ‘nonsense’ to ask what ‘their’ reasoning was?’ Is it nonsense, 
for example, to ask ‘Why did that group of Scouts move their tent to the other side of 
the hedge?’ If such questions were, by following Collingwood’s reasoning, ‘nonsense’, 
then it would be true that ‘methodological individualism’ follows from Collingwood’s 
reasoning. But it is not a consequence of Collingwood’s reasoning that such questions 
are nonsense, because he nowhere says that the presupposition that res gestae, ‘things 
done’, can be done by groups of people, is false – and he is obviously right not to claim 
this. Indeed, according to what Collingwood writes in The New Leviathan, “the will to 
civilization is… the sheer exercise of will, joining with these others to do something 
about the situation in which you find yourselves”.3 The problem-solving logic of action 
clarifies the point. Whatever philosophy of mind we take to best represent the processes 
of thinking and action, we can still agree that people can come together in recognition of 
                                                 
1 Mink, Mind, History and Dialectic, p. 178 
2 See Dussen, History as a Science, pp. 324-6 
3 NL, 37.18 
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a shared problem, discuss reasonable courses of action, and execute solutions based on 
collective reasoning. “Social activity”, Collingwood writes, “is a sharing of activity 
between different agents, the activity shared still figuring in the consciousness of those 
agents as a single, undivided activity; not a case of ‘I do this and you do that’, but a case 
of ‘we do this’”.1 If we can agree on that, then we can agree that historians can ask 
questions pursuing varying details of the content of that reasoning. 
It is the alternative that is the incomplete historical question: asking not why a 
collective did such-and-such, or whether they were right, but merely which individuals 
said what in the conversation or debate. A question such as ‘Why did those Scouts move 
their tent to the other side of the hedge?’ is a question that conforms to all of 
Collingwood’s demands for historical questions.2 The objection of a ‘methodological 
individualist’ would be that group reasoning and group action are only the aggregates of 
many individuals reasoning and acting. It seems that this is an important consideration. 
But it is not, because an historical question about something done by a group is complete 
as long as what the historian wants to know – that is, as long as what would ‘satisfy’ his 
question – would be correlatively ‘shared’: something about what ‘their’ reasoning was, 
and why they did what they did. The historian might of course come to be dissatisfied by 
general terms, and he might want to know how one particular Scout sought to influence 
the eventual decision. But although this would still be an historical question, it would be 
a different one. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 NL, 16.41 
2 Though one might also have to ask ‘and were they right to do so?’ (see Parts V & VI, below) 
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ix 
‘Trans-history’ 
 
There has been some discussion of whether the doctrine of re-enactment 
presupposes a transcendent Platonic ‘plane of ideas’. Collingwood brought this upon 
himself, probably, by writing in his Autobiography that “Historical knowledge is the re-
enactment of a past thought incapsulated in a context of present thoughts which, by 
contradicting it, confine it to a plane different from theirs”.1 H. A. Hodges, for instance, 
thinks re-enactment “involves attributing to acts of thought a certain independence of 
date, a certain super-temporal identity”, and he adds the following: 
 
Collingwood in The Idea of History does not press on very far into the 
metaphysical consequences of this; but it is clear that that way lies the doctrine 
of the ultimate unity of all minds in the One Mind, which he undoubtedly held  
when he wrote Speculum Mentis, and never expressly repudiated.2 
 
A rare example of someone embracing Collingwood for precisely this perceived 
feature is David Bates, whose ‘Rediscovering Collingwood’s Spiritual History’3 is an 
attempt to explain how Collingwood’s theory of thought is built on theological 
principles.4 Bates calls Collingwood’s theory of thought ‘Platonic’, or ‘transcendent’, 
based on this theory that ideas exist outside of the earthly flux of time and space, and in a 
mode of existence which is not enjoyed by feeling. Indeed for David Bates this is, for 
Collingwood, the ultimate reality of ideas. For Collingwood the idea that we must re-
enact all derive (according to Bates) from the ‘One Great Idea’ that expresses itself 
through individual actors.5 
Now, although Collingwood says there is something ‘universal’ about all action,6 
he stops short of what Bates reads into him, namely, positing thoughts as existing on 
another (eternal) plane, as if waiting to be apprehended. In fact Collingwood calls this 
kind of knowledge, which he identifies with Bosanquet, Cook Wilson, Joseph and Inge, a 
                                                 
1 A, pp. 113-14 
2 H. A. Hodges, The Philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952), p. 338 
3 Bates, pp. 29-55 
4 In a sense Collingwood does believe his philosophy is based on theological principles, because all science 
is based on Christian presuppositions. (See EM, pp. 185-227) This is not, though, what Bates means.  
5 Bates, pp. 29-55 
6 See IH, p. 309 
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“complete misunderstanding of history”.1 Meanwhile Peter Lewis argues the reverse, 
insisting that Collingwood, like Wittgenstein, is saying that all thought, all meaning, is 
contextual.2 
It seems to me that, in view of the logic of question and answer, this debate 
about whether thoughts are ‘transcendent’, as Hodges and Bates contend, or ‘contextual’ 
as according to Lewis, does not arise. Understanding thoughts does not require a 
transcendental plane where thoughts exist, as Bates excitedly declares, and neither does it 
demand imaginary transference ‘into the context’ as Lewis says. It requires simply, as 
we’ve already seen, being able to follow other people’s reasoning.3 
 
 
x 
‘Intuitivism’ 
 
We’re now in a better position to make sense of some commentators’ claims that 
re-enactment is an historical method relying ultimately on ‘intuition’, and we’re in a better 
position to see what is wrong with that criticism. The claim is that, although Collingwood 
aims at prescribing a methodology for the re-enactment of past thought, he ultimately 
relies most on the historian’s ‘intuition’ to achieve it. Jonathan Cohen, in his ‘Survey of 
Work in the Philosophy of History, 1946-1950’, describes Collingwood’s “quasi-
Spinozist scientia intuitiva” 4; Hayden White, in an article on Collingwood and Toynbee, 
says that Collingwood resolves “historical knowledge into intuition”5; and Arthur 
Marwick, in his Nature of History, says of Collingwood’s conception of history that it 
“turned out to depend solely on the historian’s intuition”.6 These commentators7 read 
                                                 
1 IH, p. 143. The full passage runs: “This complete misunderstanding of history has been restated an 
emphasized in later times by Dr. Inge, who follows Bosanquet in conceiving the proper object of 
knowledge Platonically as a timeless world of pure universality. It is reflected, too, in treatises on logic like 
those of Cook Wilson and Joseph, where the special problems of historical thinking are passed over in 
silence.” 
2 See Peter Lewis, ‘Collingwood and Wittgenstein: Struggling with Darkness,’ Collingwood Studies V: 
Explorations (1998), pp. 28-39 
3 By ‘reasoning’ I am again following Collingwood’s meaning as explained in NL, 14.1: “thinking one thing, 
x, because you think another thing, y; where y is your ‘reason’ or, as it is sometimes called, your ‘ground’ 
for thinking x”. 
4 J. Cohen, ‘Survey of Work in the Philosophy of History, 1946-1950’, Philosophical Quarterly vol. 2, no. 7 
(1952), p. 177 
5 Hayden White, ‘Collingwood and Toynbee: Transitions in English Historical Thought’, English Miscellany 
8 (1956), p. 88 
6 Marwick, The Nature of History (London: Macmillan, 1970), p. 83 
7 Nielsen cites others. See Nielsen, p. 4. For a more comprehensive overview see Dussen, History as a 
Science, pp. 93-6 
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Collingwood’s answer to the question, ‘What does the historian do when he is really re-
enacting’ – i.e. when he is correctly attributing thought to a past agent – ‘which he does not 
do when it gets it wrong?’, to be ‘He correctly intuits’. Nielsen calls this the 
‘methodological intuitivist’ interpretation, and adds that she thinks this interpretation 
“justified”. By identifying in Collingwood’s philosophy of history the ultimate reliance on 
intuition, these commentators seem to be claiming that Collingwood gives up on the 
‘scientific’ method for historical interpretation. A return to the fundamental question-
and-answer principle of history shows why this ‘intuitivist’ charge is wrong. 
In The Principles of History, Collingwood describes the processes through which the 
historian must go: 
 
First, he must satisfy himself that the copy [of Henry I’s charter], as far as it 
goes, is a true one… Secondly, he must satisfy himself that the original was 
genuine… Thirdly, being now satisfied that what he has before him faithfully 
represents a genuine original, he must read it, and find out what it says. 
Fourthly, having settled in his own mind what it says, he must decide what it 
means, that is to say, what Henry I was ‘driving at’ when he issued that charter: 
how the king envisaged the situation he was dealing with, and how he intended 
that it should be altered.1 
 
Now, what is the difference between the third step, finding out what something 
says, and the fourth step, deciding what it means? Finding out what something says, 
Collingwood adds, is “of exactly the same kind as reading a work of fiction or a warning 
to trespassers. Investigations concerning the nature of this process are carried out by the 
science of language, which is not philology but aesthetic”.2 Collingwood repeats this 
claim about the ‘aesthetic’ nature of reading several times in this part of The Principles of 
History: “It occurs in every case of historical thinking… [but] in itself, it is simply an 
aesthetic activity, which is why a science of aesthetic is an indispensible precondition to 
any science of historical method”, he says.3 What kind of process it really is, he writes, “I 
have tried to explain at some length elsewhere; and as this [The Principles of History] is not a 
book about aesthetic it would not be proper to repeat it here”.4 In a note the editor, W. 
H. Dray, directs the reader to the contemporaneous Principles of Art, and specifically to 
                                                 
1 PH, p. 51 
2 PH, p. 52 
3 PH, p. 52 
4 PH, p. 54 
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chapter eleven, which is called ‘Language’.1 There Collingwood explains how 
understanding works in conversation, and he adds that whatever he says about speech 
here holds true for all language. Here is what he says: 
 
The person to whom speech is addressed… too, is a speaker, and is accustomed 
to make his emotions known to himself by speaking to himself. Each of the two 
persons concerned is conscious of the other’s personality as correlative to his 
own… The hearer, therefore, conscious that he is being addressed by another 
person like himself (without that original consciousness the so-called 
communication of emotion by language could never take place), takes what he 
hears exactly as if it were speech of his own: he speaks to himself with the 
words that he hears addressed to him, and thus constructs in himself the idea 
which those words express. At the same time, being conscious of the speaker as 
a person other than himself, he attributes that idea to this other person. 
Understanding what some one says to you is thus attributing to him the idea 
which his words arouse in yourself; and this implies treating them as words of 
your own.2 
 
It is likely, I think, that some readers have noted Collingwood’s rudimentary 
account of understanding presented in The Principles of Art, noted his insistence that it is 
an ‘aesthetic’ process, and taken this ‘aesthetic’ process to apply directly to Collingwood’s 
account of understanding in history. They have implicitly concluded that, although 
Collingwood explicitly describes two consecutive steps, (1) finding out what something 
says and (2) deciding what it means, he actually implicitly thinks they are the same. Thus, 
historical understanding for Collingwood is intuitive and aesthetic, not scientific. 
But what Collingwood means by calling this process ‘aesthetic’ is that it only aims 
at being, as Marnie Hughes-Warrington puts it, “internally, not externally coherent”.3 By 
‘finding out what it says’ Collingwood just means ‘reading’. It would be a 
misunderstanding to think, though, that Collingwood is talking about scientific history 
here. Collingwood says not only that the historian must read, but also that he “must 
decide what it means”.4 
                                                 
1 PH, p. 54, note 20 
2 PA, p. 250 
3 Hughes-Warrington, p. 136. The distinction is made again on p. 139. 
4 PH, p. 51 
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It might be thought that Collingwood’s distinction is between (1) deciding what 
the public meaning of the words is, and (2) deciding what the agent’s intention is. This 
would be disastrously wrong. The potential disaster is a massive diversion into 
“academic”1 philosophy of language and literary theory. By the standards of today’s 
philosophy of language, Collingwood will quickly appear to be out of his depth, and thus 
useless to today’s debates. 
The crucial distinction is not between ‘saying’ and ‘meaning’, but between 
‘reading’ and ‘deciding’. It is this difference that shows why ‘finding out what it says’ is 
not the same as ‘deciding what it means’ – nothing to do with some other difference 
between ‘saying’ and ‘meaning’. The second step, ‘deciding what it means’, signifies an 
historical investigation. The question is, as we’ve heard, ‘What does he mean by it?’; the 
conclusion that satisfies the question is ‘He meant this’; the historian’s process of 
investigation is aimed at coming finally to that decision. It involves a consciousness of 
alternatives, the consultation of evidence, deliberate choice, and an asserted conclusion. 
The first step, by contrast, is just reading. Reading, like conversation, does not 
presuppose an investigation. One can read and understand without there being a 
purposive investigation from (as I’ve put it) ‘confusion to conclusion’. History, 
Collingwood has already said, is inferential. It is not aesthetic. 
Outside of a purposive investigation of ‘what he meant’, one might say that there 
is no time lag between reading a text and understanding it. That is what literary theorists 
are appealing to when they speak of the impossibility of approaching texts without 
certain conceptual ‘frameworks’. But we are talking not about ‘understanding’ in some 
everyday sense here, as Collingwood is in The Principles of Art: we are talking about 
constructing answers to satisfy specific historical unknowns. And on this account, eliding 
Collingwood’s distinction means claiming that the historian can answer his question 
about the meaning of an act, utterance, or text in the same way that he ‘reads’ it: through 
an aesthetic process, without inference and without evidence – a process that looks 
something like intuition. Now this would obviously be daft. Yet according to the 
commentators we’ve heard, Collingwood falls foul of precisely this – the very thing for 
which he criticises Croce.2 If what is meant by ‘intuition’ is more aesthetic than it is 
inferential; and if intuition is closer to the process of reading than it is to the process of 
inquiry; then scientific history demands more than intuition. It demands decision. 
 
                                                 
1 NL, 2.55 
2 See Nielsen, pp. 8-9 
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xi 
History, hermeneutics, and language 
 
I have said that, according to what Collingwood says about historical knowledge, 
historical questions are essentially ‘hermeneutic’ questions. All I mean by this is that they 
are questions about what somebody ‘meant’ by saying something or by doing something. 
In a recent article for Collingwood and British Idealism Studies, Dimitris Vardoulakis 
argues that “Collingwood should be read as a hermeneutic philosopher”.1 Vardoulakis 
uses his amusingly-titled article, ‘‘Clumsy Questioners’: Questioning and the Meaning of 
Meaning in Collingwood’, to present what he takes to be Collingwood’s hermeneutic 
theory. What Vardoulakis presents is a sophisticated set of arguments about expression, 
understanding, subjectivity, experience and the aesthetic, and about language. And to do 
so he draws upon three important works in twentieth-century philosophy, Martin 
Heidegger’s Being and Time, Hans Georg Gadamer’s Truth and Method, and Collingwood’s 
own Principles of Art. 
It would be a mistake, however, to take what Vardoulakis discusses as pertaining 
to Collingwood’s philosophy of history. This, I know, sounds a little strange, because it is 
now customary to treat an author’s philosophy of historical method – especially when 
that author is concerned with the interpretation of meanings – as inseparable from what 
he says about language and expression in general. Because hermeneuticians discuss both, 
contemporary philosophy is in the habit of describing both as ‘hermeneutics’. But in 
Collingwood’s case the two are to be separated. On the one hand there is the logic of 
historical method, which concerns the questions answered by historians and the ways in 
which they answer them; and on the other there is the theory of language as explicated in 
The Principles of Art. The two must not be falsely related.2 We’ve just seen one form the 
false relation can take. Here is another. 
For Collingwood, in order to find out what someone meant you must reconstruct 
his question. The question of what somebody’s question (or problem) was is itself “an 
historical question, and therefore”, he writes in his Autobiography, “cannot be settled 
except by historical methods”.3 By ‘historical methods’ Collingwood means simply 
question, evidence, provisional conclusion. That is actually the essential process by which 
the meanings of other people’s actions are to be grasped. 
                                                 
1 Vardoulakis, p. 40 
2 As I think they are by Vardoulakis. See Vardoulakis, p. 53 
3 A, p. 39 
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For much of his article, Vardoulakis does not really say anything deliberately to 
contradict this. His concern is to show that, far from what he is usually thought to say, 
Collingwood actually formulates a theory of meaning which has expressions filled with 
the full range of human experience – not only consisting of propositions. If Vardoulakis 
had continued to present Collingwood’s theory of language as it is presented in The 
Principles of Art – as an account of a kind of action, rather than something with 
methodological relevance to what historians do – then there would have been no 
confusion. But he chooses to present what he says as Collingwood’s ‘hermeneutic’ 
theory. A hermeneutic theory is an account of how we can or should get at the meanings 
of things. It comes from ἑρµηνεύω, meaning roughly to interpret or to translate. But it 
can also be used to denote ‘a theory of meaning’ – and this blurs the distinction between 
a theory of how people intend the things they say and do, and a theory of how other 
people grasp those intentions. This is Vardoulakis’s intention when he says that 
“Collingwood’s conception of a meaning is hermeneutical”.1 The question to which that 
“conception” is intended as an answer is then allowed to change: from ‘What happens 
when we express?’ it becomes ‘How are we to understand?’ Thus Collingwood’s theory 
of language as laid out in The Principles of Art becomes, as presented by Vardoulakis, a 
theory of interpretation. This is why, at the end of his article, Vardoulakis begins to 
present this ‘hermeneutic’ as the centre of Collingwood’s conception of history as well.2 
Thus, what Collingwood says in The Principles of Art is now being presented as an 
alternative to the method of question and answer. Furthermore it is an alternative that is 
more detailed as a process, more conceptually complex, and more conducive to 
identifying the continuities with Heidegger and Gadamer that Vardoulakis is pleased to 
find. It is because Vardoulakis makes this move at the end of his article that it is 
important to say more about why The Principles of Art has very little to do with history. 
Vardoulakis’s case is, at first glance, a convincing one – partly because he rightly 
focuses upon the logic of question and answer. What he says, though, is that “in a 
hermeneutical context… the logic of question and answer is the logos of the 
understanding”.3 What he means by this is that ‘question and answer’ is Collingwood’s 
version of how Dasein puts into words (as discourse) the “totality-of-significations of 
intelligibility”.4 ‘Question and answer’, for Vardoulakis, is “the language that finds 
                                                 
1 Vardoulakis, p. 58 
2 Vardoulakis, pp. 57-9 
3 Vardoulakis, p. 53 
4 Vardoulakis, pp. 52-3 
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meaning in the world and constitutes our self-understanding, the ‘conversation that we 
ourselves are’.”1 Furthermore, according to Vardoulakis, ‘meaning’ in Collingwood 
contains emotions and “experiences” – so meaning is far from the ‘propositional’ 
meaning of answers to questions that Collingwood is usually thought to have stuck to. 
There are, further, “no unexpressed emotions”: so meaning is infinite, he says. Language 
is not an instrument used to communicate the conversations we have: it is the 
conversations we have. Language is not an instrument used to communicate our 
experience of the world: it is the world. Because of this we must, according to 
Vardoulakis’s Collingwood, immerse ourselves in the discourses of past thinkers. This is 
the only practical advice Collingwood’s hermeneutic philosophy, according to 
Vardoulakis, seems to offer. Our experience of others’ meaning can only ever be 
“aesthetic”.2 
Let us remind ourselves of two fundamental principles of Collingwood’s 
philosophy of history. First, history is (or can be) a science, and sciences answer specific 
questions systematically by using evidence. In their conclusions, sciences point to that 
evidence. Secondly, thinking historically requires re-enacting thought. Only thought is re-
enacted in history, because it is only thought that historical questions aim at. 
At best, Vardoulakis has identified a contradiction in Collingwood. Either 
understanding what others meant involves finding out what it was like for the agent, or it 
involves merely answering specific questions; either it is aesthetic, or it is inferential. 
Of course, Collingwood has not contradicted himself. Vardoulakis is mistaken to 
think that what Collingwood says in The Principles of Art amounts to a hermeneutic theory. 
In the first place, historians pose and try to answer specific questions. They do not try to 
find out ‘what it was like’ to hold a certain world-view, or what it was like to be 
immersed in a discourse. Historians try to answer historical questions: they do not try to 
experience other people’s feelings. In the second place, even if Collingwood does mean 
to say, in The Principles of Art, that meaning includes emotions, this only shows that such a 
theory of meaning does not correspond with what he thinks historians pursue. Historical 
questions separate what they want from what they don’t want: because they pursue 
people’s reasoning, historical questions are satisfied by thoughts re-thought without 
feelings re-felt. 
Vardoulakis’s mistake owes to a presupposition that a theory of action is 
correlative with a theory of interpretation – or that it at least indicates, where it is 
                                                 
1 Vardoulakis, p. 53. Vardoulakis is quoting Gadamer. 
2 Vardoulakis, pp. 55-56 
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missing, what a theory of interpretation ought to contain. In his terminology he also 
presupposes that a ‘hermeneutic’ theory answers both questions simultaneously: the 
question of meaning formation, and meaning understanding. But the chapters towards 
the end of The Principles of Art describe a theory of expression, and theories of expression 
are not theories of historical interpretation waiting to be inverted. Collingwood is actually 
a very useful figure in the history of philosophy for making precisely this point. Historical 
investigation is not simply expression done backwards. Thus, although Collingwood’s 
discussion of language in The Principles of Art is very interesting in its own right – as is 
Vardoulakis’s discussion of it – it actually doesn’t tell us anything about what historians 
should do, or what the wider purpose is of them doing it. 
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The Question-and-Answer Logic of the History of Ideas 
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i 
Transitions: from history ‘generically’ to the history of ideas 
 
So far we’ve examined arguments of Collingwood’s that were intended for 
thinking about history, as I’ve put it, ‘generically’. I have tried to deal with them in such a 
way that their relevance to history in general has been maintained, though it has probably 
been obvious to the reader what the implications have been for the history of ideas 
specifically. 
I’ve sought to emphasise a principle which in Collingwood’s thinking is implicit 
and irregularly expressed, but crucial: historical inference, method, and knowledge are 
what they are, and have the features that they do, because of the peculiar and shared 
features of historical questions (III: viii). All scientific knowledge is the fruit of question 
answering (II: i). The process of scientific knowing is a process of answering questions, 
and the knowledge itself is those questions answered. There are some questions that arise 
with certain features that make them what we can call ‘historical’ (III: ix-xiii). Those 
features determine the correct way of answering them which, because the question is of a 
different kind, is distinct from the correct way of answering natural-scientific questions. 
Those features which we call historical make the answering process ‘history’ as a form of 
inquiry, and the conclusion of that inquiry ‘history a parte objecti’ (III: ix). 
Now, if the history of ideas, as a specific discipline, is a ‘science’, it must pose and 
answer questions – questions that are not ‘nonsense’, and questions which are, at least in 
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principle, answerable. And if the history of ideas is a distinct science from history 
‘generically’, then it must be able to outline those features of its characteristic questions 
which distinguish them from what we’ve hitherto called historical questions. Those 
distinct questions (of which at present we are only supposing the existence) we could 
give a distinct classificatory title: perhaps ‘history-of-ideas questions’, or ‘idea-history 
questions’. 
The attentive reader would see instantly what would be wrong here. In both 
formulations the case for distinctness appeals to the distinct object of which its questions 
are asked. But as we’ve seen (III: vii-viii), questions about a distinct class of objects are 
not necessarily homogeneous formally. It is possible, though nonsensical, to pose an 
historical question about an inappropriate object: ‘Why was this built here?’ is a good 
question where ‘this’ means Hadrian’s Wall, but a nonsense one where ‘this’ is the 
Giant’s Causeway. The presupposition that someone meant something by it – that 
someone was trying to solve a problem or a constellation of problems by building it – is 
sound in the first case, but false in the second. 
Furthermore, ‘ideas’ are not a distinct class of objects within history. As we’ve 
seen, all historical thinking demands the re-enactment of ideas, since all historical 
questions arise when the specific unknown is somebody’s reasoning. Although historians 
working on the Battle of Trafalgar have to deal with a great deal of logistics and details 
about movements and timings and so on, their specific unknown, if (for Collingwood) 
they are working properly as historians, is someone’s reasoning, and not those logistics 
themselves. 
The history of thought, then, is not distinct from history – at least, not formally. 
Its characteristic questions, inference, and forms of knowledge produced, are not 
different in form from those of other historians. Its questions are satisfied by the same 
sorts of things; they “expect”1 the same kind of answer. This brings us to what is more or 
less the status quo. Most historians of ideas, of philosophy, or of political thought, are 
‘historians’ in their own minds anyway, regardless of whatever else they do. So if all 
historians are, when properly conceived, historians of ideas, why are the historians of 
ideas who call themselves such distinguished institutionally? 
They are distinguished for institutional convenience. And this convenience owes 
to two things: firstly, their ‘material’, and secondly, where their questions arise. Both 
factors are ultimately rooted in the kinds of problem-solving which historians of ideas 
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take as their specific unknowns and try to ‘know’. Those problems tend to be argument 
problems rather than logistical problems, which is why their solutions take the form of 
texts, pamphlets, speeches and so on. That is what I mean by saying the distinct ‘material’ 
lends itself to institutional convenience. The ‘relics’ of the history of ideas are still res 
gestae, of course – they are things done with words. Secondly the historical problems solved 
by historians of ideas tend to arise not only out of the institutionally ‘historical’ kind of 
historical thinking, but out of distinct modes of thinking. If historians of political thought 
situate themselves in politics departments it is not because they are appalled that people 
in history departments are cynically uninterested in the thinking behind political actions, 
but because the questions they try to answer frequently arise out of political thinking 
itself. If historians of philosophy situate themselves in philosophy departments it is not 
because historians are unphilosophical philistines, but because philosophers produce a 
lot of historical questions. ‘Has Kant already shown us how to solve this?’ is an example 
of an historical question which philosophers are more likely to ask than any (other) kind 
of historian, since it is of more relevance to what philosophers are doing anyway. 
It is from this fact – the fact that some historical questions are centred on other 
people’s attempted solutions to political questions – that the history of political thought 
makes sense as a defined field, albeit one with ‘crumbly edges’, and one with no method 
that is uniquely its own. However, the institutional distinctness of a field encourages the 
view that that distinctness rests upon methodological distinctness, and that distinctness 
in turn is achievable only by forgetting Collingwood’s principle of the starting question 
and relapsing into the assumption that different object makes for different method. You 
very quickly end up with something like the current state of affairs, which on a 
Collingwoodian view looks not only clumsy, but also likely to give rise to misconceptions 
of what historians are doing, and how they are to do it: namely, that conception 
according to which normal historians deal with ‘what happened’, while historians of ideas 
deal with the important ideas of great thinkers; the conception according to which the 
correct methodological philosophy of the latter requires some thorough analysis of what 
texts, meanings, and speech acts are as objects. 
In fact, though, the differences between these methodological debates and their 
cousins over in history departments ought not to be distinct from each other at all, 
except for where the ins and outs of ‘how you would show this’ could be of only very 
minor interest to historians not asking about people’s solutions to argument problems. 
Certainly if done properly they ought to ‘fit together’. 
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A further reason for the distinctness of these debates about how to do history of 
ideas is, though, that they actually presuppose some of Collingwood’s arguments about 
history ‘generically’. Most obviously, historians of ideas presuppose that what they do is 
‘about ideas’, ‘about thought’, and they might even be very relaxed about the 
‘constructionist’ claim (which might discomfit naval historians among others) that these 
past ideas only exist for as long as they continue to be thought and discussed in the 
present. Historians of ideas presuppose further that working out ‘what he meant’ is a 
staple of the discipline; they presuppose that the formulation of rules or laws is foreign, 
or at least not conducive, to their purposes; and they presuppose their inquiry’s 
satisfaction with unique, individual thought constellations. I might remind the reader that 
I am talking about working historians of ideas, and probably professionals. The 
discipline’s initiates, undergraduates, might well have to be taught to presuppose these 
things. 
In their roles as researchers, historians of ideas also think very little of ‘scissors 
and paste’. Reproducing the narratives of other historians of ideas at length with nothing 
to say about them yourself is frowned upon. It fails the ‘contribution’, or ‘novelty’ test. 
But as well as this, just as ‘scissors and paste’ is a bad way to answer questions in history 
generically, so it is a terrible way of answering the kinds of questions about arguments 
that historians of ideas might be asking. This is because the archetypal historical question 
arises, ‘What did So-and-so mean by this?’ There are two ways Collingwood’s point 
about the testimonies of authorities can be manifested here. Firstly I might simply read 
and repeat the statement of an authoritative commentator, say Quentin Skinner, that 
‘what Hobbes means is…’ – and what would follow would be Skinner’s version of what 
Hobbes meant, which would in fact be my own version of Skinner’s account. I think it is 
fair to say that for many people the fact that I have obviously read Skinner, know what 
he says, and have repeated it in my own work, would itself give me some kind of 
credibility as an historian. But in view of what Collingwood says about scientific history, 
it is obvious why I am not ‘thinking historically’ when I think that the question is best 
answered by repeating someone else’s answer. It is simply ‘scissors and paste’. 
But why use a secondary authority at all, in a case such as this? If I want to know 
what something means, surely (common sense would suggest) I cannot do better than to 
read the text, or look at the thing? As we’ve seen it is not, for Collingwood, sufficient as 
‘historical knowing’ simply to read the text as if that is the same thing as finding out what 
So-and-so meant by it. Simply ‘reading’ something, finding out ‘what it says’, Collingwood 
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calls an ‘aesthetic’ process, which is not to be confused with ‘deciding what it means’ (IV: 
x). Where the first is, in a sense, ‘immediate’, the second is an inferential process from 
confusion to conclusion. Scientific historical method has to be inferential. If the two are 
conflated, then the interpretation of texts (including archaeological ‘texts’) appear falsely 
to be unproblematic. Here is an amusing passage on this from the Autobiography in which, 
the reader will notice, archaeology is explicitly compared to textual analysis: 
 
‘’Sblood!’ says Hamlet, ‘do you think I am easier to be played on than a pipe?’ Those 
eminent philosophers, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, think tout bonnement that they can 
discover what the Parmenides is about by merely reading it; but if you took them to the 
south gate of Housesteads and said, ‘Please distinguish the various periods of 
construction here, and explain what purpose the builders of each period had in mind’, 
they would protest ‘Believe me, I cannot’. Do they think the Parmenides is easier to 
understand than a rotten little Roman fort? ’Sblood!1 
 
Historians of ideas, I think it is safe to say, presuppose that working out ‘what he 
meant’ requires more than just ‘reading’ in the sense I’ve discussed. 
But there is much of what we’ve heard already that historians of ideas do not 
presuppose. Firstly we had what W. H. Dray has called Collingwood’s ‘what-why 
paradox’. Collingwood’s own examples for ‘knowing what was done’ and ‘knowing why 
it was done’ take the form of actions more physical than textual or rhetorical. As applied 
to these latter kinds of action, Collingwood’s claim is prima facie just wrong, and seems to 
be an endorsement of audience naivety. If knowing why Hobbes said what he said means 
simply knowing what he said, then the correct method for study by an historian of 
political thought seems to be reduced to precisely what Collingwood warns against: ‘Just 
read Leviathan and you’ll know why Hobbes wrote it’. Or, worse, it seems to pervert for 
no good reason a basic assumption shared by historians of political thought, as well as by 
political commentators: namely, that sometimes people say something in a certain way in 
order to hide their real reason for saying it, or in order to smuggle into it a message in 
such a way that they cannot be accused of actually having said it at all. The ‘what-why’ 
paradox, then, needs some further explanation if it is to make sense for historians of 
ideas. 
I’ve already explained (III: xv) that what Collingwood means here is that the 
‘what’ and the ‘why’ questions are, for historians, the same, so long as the ‘what’ question 
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is properly historical. What Nelson did was to try to break the Franco-Spanish line. The 
reason why he sailed Victory at a right-angle was that he was trying to break the Franco-
Spanish line. As historical facts – that is, as conclusions to historical questions – the two 
are the same. The misunderstanding, which Dray expresses very clearly, owes to thinking 
that ‘what was done’ in history can be the ‘sailing at a right-angle’, which is not the sort 
of thing Collingwood intends by an historical fact, at least not a complete one, but might 
very well serve as a term in an historical question. 
This is the reason why the strangeness of the what-why paradox is exacerbated 
by being applied to the history of ideas specifically. Knowing what Hobbes says and 
knowing why he says it are even more obviously different things. Collingwood, of course, 
has history generically in mind when he discusses ‘what-why’, and is not thinking of 
speech acts. But if all history is the history of ideas, and if res gestae are supposed to 
include acts of speech or writing, as I am sure Collingwood meant for them to, then it 
seems the ‘paradox’ is only becoming more and more problematic. 
It can, though, be defended by resisting the translation of ‘what he did’ into ‘what 
he said’, and instead translating it as ‘what he did by saying x’. Knowing what Hobbes did 
by saying x means knowing why Hobbes said x, where (and only where) the specific 
unknown signified by the ‘why’ question is the same as that signified by the question 
‘What did he do?’ Knowing merely ‘what he says’ is, as Collingwood says, a mere 
precondition. 
It will be objected that actually Hobbes did many things at once by saying x. This 
might be perfectly true, but the historian is entitled to ask about as few or as many ‘y’s, as 
many reasons, as he wishes, and the ‘why’ explanation he produces – which is to say, the 
narrative of ‘what Hobbes did’ that he proposes as his answer – is to be judged by 
whether it answers the historian’s original question, and not by whether it answers 
further possible ‘why’s and further possible descriptions of ‘what Hobbes did’ which 
pertain not to his question, but to further possible questions that he is not logically 
compelled to ask. 
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ii 
Collingwood and the history of ideas today 
 
But there are other of Collingwood’s arguments concerning history which I have 
held back until now. These are points that relate more specifically, both in their contexts 
in Collingwood’s work and in the present day, to the history of philosophy. The most 
obvious example is probably Collingwood’s contention that in the history of philosophy 
there are no eternal questions. Collingwood’s argument for this is explained by reference 
to political theory in An Autobiography,1 but it is also an argument which remains in 
circulation in today’s debates, since Quentin Skinner re-launched it in his seminal 1969 
article, ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’. 
I have held these specific points back until now because, in the first place, in a 
study like this it is better to go from the general to the specific – rather than to attempt 
to move in the opposite direction; and, in the second, because the ‘generic’ points are 
needed for the specific ones to make sense. For example, we’ll deal here with what 
Collingwood calls his ‘rapprochement’ between history and philosophy. What he says about 
this rapprochement presupposes the doctrine of re-enactment, so now that we’ve dealt with 
that we’re in a better position to examine the rapprochement. Similarly, making sense of 
Collingwood’s apparently contradictory position on the relevance of context to 
understanding in history requires some existing knowledge of what he says about 
‘question and answer’, as both the method for inquiry, and as the ‘second rule’ for 
understanding what someone meant by something by reconstructing his question. 
Now, on each of the points dealt with in this study the question arises, on what 
grounds Collingwood is still relevant to contemporary thinking on that point. The 
question divides naturally into two: firstly, what does Collingwood say that can now be 
reasserted as a valuable contribution in current disputes? And, secondly, what does he say 
that nobody is talking about anymore, but which nevertheless seems to be right? 
In order to demonstrate the continuing value of Collingwood’s arguments in this 
chapter to the debates of today I’ll point to the relationship between two of 
Collingwood’s ‘big’ arguments and the work of the figure at the centre of today’s debates, 
Quentin Skinner. Skinner’s best-known and most provocative claim, which has earned 
him the label ‘contextualist’, is logically fixed to a Collingwoodian anchor. In order to 
understand a text, Skinner says in ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’, 
                                                 
1 A, pp. 61-3 
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the historian must know something about its context, and he must not make the mistake 
of thinking that great texts are typically attempts to deal with the supposed eternal or 
‘perennial’ questions of their subject. Skinner re-fashioned Collingwood’s point about 
eternal questions well in 1969, and he has been under constant attack ever since. But 
despite the fact that Skinner at times points to Collingwood’s formative influence, he 
nevertheless neglects to adopt the good available defences that are easily derivable from 
the basics of his work.  
In answer to the second question – what Collingwood is right about which 
nobody is discussing anymore – it is my view that both Collingwood’s rapprochement 
between history and philosophy, and his answers to the question of what history is for 
(for our purposes, what the history of philosophy is for), ought to be revisited. The 
former concerns whether historians of ideas ought to ask whether the authors they study 
were right. Skinner appears, for various reasons, to answer in the negative, and thus 
destroy Collingwood’s rapprochement. The question itself – whether we ought to ask not 
only ‘what he meant’ but also whether he was right – I have given a thorough treatment 
below (vii-x), while the question of what history/the history of ideas is for is the subject 
of Part VI. 
 
 
iii 
Skinner and Collingwood 
 
I’ve chosen Quentin Skinner for special examination here because of his central 
position in current argument, in the first place; and, in the second, because he has in his 
own words “explicitly pointed to Collingwood as a major intellectual influence”, 
especially in view of “the fact that Collingwood is unquestionably the leading anti-
positivist Idealist in recent English philosophy”.1 Skinner has repeated this less often in 
recent times than he did in his early writings2 – not, I think, because it has become less 
true, but because he never likes to repeat himself without at the same time saying 
something slightly different. 
                                                 
1 Skinner, ‘Some Problems in the Analysis of Political Thought and Action,’ pp. 283-4 
2 Richard Tuck has already surveyed the impact of Collingwood on those writing intellectual history in the 
1960s; of course he deals with Skinner, and I think he corroborates his story. See Tuck, ‘The Contribution 
of History’, pp. 72-89 
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But it seems to me that Skinner is justified in making this claim about the 
influence of Collingwood not only on biographic grounds, but also on logical ones. By 
this I mean to say that Skinner contradicts Collingwood’s principles in only one area, and 
that area is nothing to do with context or re-enacting thoughts.1 Despite the apparently 
revolutionary effect on ‘contextualist’ thinking of philosophy of language, Skinner’s 
investigation of historical method actually remains within what we could call 
‘Collingwoodian parameters’. It is true though that Skinner sometimes likes to present 
himself as having in some way displaced Collingwood – or, in Robert Lamb’s word, 
“usurped” thinkers like him.2 Skinner’s mildly self-contradictory3 attitude to the doctrine 
of re-enactment, for instance, is an obvious attempt to cut himself loose from 
Collingwood’s ‘idealist’ moorings. But ‘Cambridge School’ historians have also been glad 
to identify themselves as Collingwood’s heirs. Collingwood deals, from an anti-positivist 
position, with ostensibly similar questions about the philosophy, or methodology, of the 
history of ideas, particularly regarding the nature of interpretation and understanding 
through dismissing the supposedly ‘eternal’ questions of philosophy and reconstructing 
authors’ actual problems. Collingwood is the best-known Anglophone philosopher of 
history of the ‘pre-linguistic’ decades; and in some ways he is the philosopher of history 
par excellence, with always one hand in practical history, and the other in theory which, in 
his case, was based on a very broad knowledge of the history of the philosophy of history. 
But Cambridge School authors have also sought to distance themselves from 
Collingwood’s reputation. Collingwood had not said enough for their liking about the 
importance of locating thinking in its social or (especially) in its linguistic context. In fact, 
Collingwood says a little too much about why the content of re-enacted thought is non-
contextual. He seems, as we’ll see below, to attack the very need to consult ‘context’ that 
the Cambridge School is now presenting as its main doctrine. All of this, Skinner might 
have said (but didn’t), is probably a consequence of Collingwood’s underdeveloped 
philosophy of language, which permits a theory of thought and action that overlooks the 
importance of socio-linguistic context in the formation, development, and historical 
understanding of ideas. 
                                                 
1 It is in fact his attack on Collingwood’s rapprochement between history and philosophy – see below. 
2 …though this is the story often told by both supporters and critics of Skinner. See for instance Robert 
Lamb’s ‘Critique’, p. 8 
3 “My aspiration is not of course to enter into the thought-processes of long-dead thinkers”, he says; “it is 
simply to use the ordinary techniques of historical enquiry to grasp their concepts, to follow their 
distinctions, to appreciate their beliefs and, so far as possible, to see things their way”. Skinner, Regarding 
Method, p. 3 
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Like Collingwood, Skinner is a practising historian, writing philosophy – and 
more specifically philosophy of history, and he cites Collingwood several times in volume 
one of his Visions of Politics, the 2002 volume that ‘regards method’.1 There Collingwood 
is invoked above all for the discovery of a common historical error, the proposition 
which has provoked a great deal of commotion among Skinner’s own critics: that in 
philosophy there are no perennial problems, “only individual answers to individual 
questions, and potentially as many different questions as there are questioners”.2 Skinner 
is right to attribute this to Collingwood,3 (though Collingwood’s term is “eternal” 
problems).4 And Skinner is also right to echo what Collingwood thinks follows from it. 
“Rather than looking for directly applicable ‘lessons’ in the history of philosophy”, he 
says, “we shall do better to learn to do our own thinking for ourselves”.5 
By reconstructing authors’ questions, it becomes clear that different philosophies 
are not different attempts to answer the same questions.6 The following passage is from 
the chapter of An Autobiography called ‘The History of Philosophy’. Its relation to what is 
discussed in the chapter ‘Question and Answer’ is, though, quite clear. I’m afraid I must 
again paste the argument almost in full, though I have abridged it where possible: 
 
This way of treating other people’s thoughts, though formally deducible 
from my ‘logic of question and answer’, had been my habit long before I began 
                                                 
1 Its chapters, when still recognisable from earlier articles and essays from the late 1960s 70s and 80s, have 
been significantly revised. 
2 Skinner, Regarding Method, p. 88 
3 See A, pp. 60-1. Collingwood writes “Was it really true, I asked myself, that the problems of philosophy 
were, even in the loosest sense of that word, eternal? Was it really true that different philosophies were 
different attempts to answer the same questions? I soon discovered that it was not true; it was merely a 
vulgar error, consequent on a kind of historical myopia which, deceived by superficial resemblances, failed 
to detect profound differences. The first point at which I saw a perfectly clear gleam of daylight was in 
political theory.” 
4 The terminological difference is not so significant as long as Skinner’s ‘perennial’ is taken to mean the 
same thing. Lamb rightly points out in his ‘Critique’ (pp. 14-15) that Collingwood uses ‘eternal’ instead, and 
explains why he thinks the idea of ‘perennial problems’ is more defensible as long as ‘perennial’ is taken in 
its usual sense of “something that lasts for a very long time”. Lamb is appealing to the continuing identity 
of problems through change. His point here is, I think, the same as Collingwood’s. Here is what 
Collingwood writes in his Autobiography: “If ‘eternal’ is used in its vulgar and inaccurate sense, as equivalent 
to ‘lasting for a considerable time’, the phrase ‘eternal problem’ may be used to designate collectively a 
series of problems connected by a process of historical change, such that their continuity is discernible 
even by the presumably rather unintelligent eye of the person who thus misuses the world, but the 
differences between them not so discernible.” (A, p. 68, footnote 1) If, in light of ‘re-enactment’, we were 
to push the metaphor ad absurdum and speak of ‘deciduous problems’, dormant in winter and re-enlivened 
in spring, then our overlapping scale of botanic analogies would be complete. 
5 Skinner, Regarding Method, p. 88. Compare with A, pp. 118-19. As for Collingwood, for Skinner part of 
what man learns from doing history is that he is free. However, Skinner also thinks this to be an 
unpromising line of thought, and that it is best not to make any effort to explain or develop it. See Skinner, 
Regarding Method, p. 24 
6 See also EM, p. 72 for a parallel attack on the ‘eternal’ or ‘crucial’ or ‘central’ problems in metaphysics. 
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working that logic out. To think in that way about philosophies not your own, 
as I have hinted, is to think about them historically… History did not mean 
knowing what events followed what. It meant getting inside other people’s 
heads, looking at their situation through their eyes, and thinking for yourself 
whether the way in which they tackled it was the right way… 
It was a doctrine of ‘realism’ (and this is why Pritchard was so cross 
with me) that in this sense of the word history there was no history of 
philosophy. The ‘realists’ thought that the problems with which philosophy is 
concerned are unchanging. They thought that Plato, Aristotle, the Epicureans, 
the Stoics, the Schoolmen, the Cartesians, &c., had all asked themselves the 
same set of questions, and had given different answers to them… 
Was it really true, I asked myself, that the problems of philosophy were, 
even in the loosest sense of that word, eternal? Was it really true that different 
philosophies were different attempts to answer the same questions? I soon 
discovered that it was not true; it was merely a vulgar error, consequent on a 
kind of historical myopia which, deceived by superficial resemblances, failed to 
detect profound differences. The first point at which I saw a perfectly clear 
gleam of daylight was in political theory. Take Plato’s Republic and Hobbes’s 
Leviathan, so far as they are concerned with politics. Obviously the political 
theories they set forth are not the same. But do they represent two different 
theories of the same thing? Can you say that the Republic gives one account of 
‘the nature of the State’ and the Leviathan another? No; because Plato’s ‘State’ is 
the Greek Dόλις, and Hobbes’s is the absolutist State of the seventeenth 
century… You can call the two things the same if you insist; but if you do you 
must admit that the thing has got diablement changé en route… What even the best 
and wisest of those who are engaged in politics are trying to do has altered…1 
 
There is something wrong with Collingwood’s illustration which should be 
explicated right away. Collingwood appeals to the difference between what Plato and 
Hobbes are referring to as the ‘State’, rather than to the questions to which these two 
texts are answers. Although it is quite true that the analyses of the state that allow Plato 
and Hobbes to get ahead in their thinking reveal different conceptions of the state, it is 
much more important that The Republic is an attempt to answer the question ‘What is 
justice?’, while Leviathan is intended as the answer to a question concerning why men 
ought to obey the established sovereign power – as well as to answer much else besides. 
                                                 
1 A, pp. 60-1. Collingwood has some amusing analogies for the above error, which I’ll only refer to in 
order to avoid trying the reader’s patience any further: see A, pp. 64-5. 
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Collingwood’s illustration might be misleading as a consequence of his attempt to 
take a short-cut to a further point he wants to make: that by treating texts in his way – 
that is, by reconstructing questions – we come to realise that the connexion between one 
past theory of the state and another later one is not a connexion by universal definition, 
but by a sameness of historical process: “and the difference is the difference between one 
thing which in the course of that process has turned into something else, and the other 
thing into which it has turned”.1 The history of political theory, then, Collingwood can 
show, is “not the history of different answers given to one and the same question, but 
the history of a problem more or less constantly changing, whose solution was changing 
with it”.2 The moral Skinner takes from this – as we’ll see shortly – is that ‘their’ 
questions are not ours, and therefore we should not, as historians, ask whether their 
answers were true. 
The debate over perennial questions is as healthy as ever, and I have nothing to 
add to it that has not already been said. Our concern here is, anyway, Collingwood and 
his claims about history that are, in view of ‘question and answer’, more sensible than 
they have often been taken to be. His position on eternal questions is not so complicated 
that it needs re-explaining. It is perfectly obvious to the most casual reader how it relates 
to the logic of question and answer.3 What is more interesting for our purposes is what 
follows from the rejection of eternal, or ‘perennial’, problems. 
 
 
v 
Context 
 
What follows from the rejection of eternal problems, as Collingwood realised, is 
that knowing what an author meant requires working out the actual question which his 
text was (and is) intended as an answer.4 This is also what Collingwood means when he 
says: “If you cannot tell what a proposition means unless you know what question it is 
meant to answer, you will mistake its meaning if you make a mistake about that 
question”.5 The historian reconstructs this question by using evidence, and he 
                                                 
1 A, p. 62 
2 A, p. 62 
3 See A, pp. 60-4, followed by p. 39 
4 See Skinner, Regarding Method, pp. 83, 115-16. Skinner refers to An Autobiography. 
5 A, p. 33 
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presupposes that what he needs in his head is a question that is the same as that 
broached by the original author.1 That identity of ‘problem’ is his presupposed aim. 
Skinner never contradicts this principle of the historian trying to share his 
author’s questions. The errors of bad historical practice he identifies as plaguing the 
history of ideas can all be reduced to it, because they are all forms of introducing false or 
inappropriate questions – or, in his terms, of ‘contaminating’ the understanding of past 
texts “by the unconscious application of paradigms the familiarity of which, to the 
historian, disguises an essential inapplicability to the past”.2 This is especially likely if we 
take political thought to be constituted by questions which might only be characteristic 
of contemporary or recent debates; or if we assess a past author according to the extent 
to which he reminds us of ourselves3; or if we upbraid him for failing to mention a 
doctrine which we now regard as not omissible, or for failing to contribute to a debate 
we now think of as, again, constitutive of political writing per se. My point is merely that 
what is wrong with anachronisms like this is that we understand the terms of the 
question differently. So here in ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’ we 
have Skinner elaborating on Collingwood’s basic point with examples of how this 
mistake actually occurs in the work of historians. 
In order to really understand a text, for Skinner, you must know what an author 
thought he was ‘doing’ with it, and in it. And in order to know what he was ‘doing’ it is 
necessary, Skinner says, to know something of the situation in which he saw himself – 
the context without which the author’s intentions make no sense.4 We might be able to 
understand something about what an author thought he was doing by examining a text in 
isolation but, unless we consider the relevant features of the text’s context, we cannot 
grasp what he was doing. Our understanding of that text, in short, will be impoverished. 
Skinner came under instant fire for this in the early 1970s in articles by literary 
theorists like Anthony Savile and S. H. Olsen,5 who maintained that the fundamental 
                                                 
1 Perhaps surprisingly at least one of Skinner’s critics, John Keane, considers this sufficient grounds for 
attack. The injunction to re-enact a past author’s actual thought behind an utterance reveals in Skinner’s 
thinking, Keane claims, a “long-since abandoned” form of “objectivism” and “positivism”. See John 
Keane, ‘More theses on the philosophy of history’, in James Tully (ed.) Meaning and Context, pp. 204-17. See 
especially pp. 205-6. If by “objectivism” Keane means a historian’s wish to construct as accurate an answer 
as possible to the question of what the author meant by saying this, or of what question he was trying to 
answer, then the sensible historian’s advice would probably be to plead guilty. 
2 Skinner, Regarding Method, p. 59 
3 Skinner, Regarding Method, p.63 
4 Skinner, ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’, History and Theory vol. 8 (1969), pp. 48-9 
5 Skinner, ‘Hermeneutics and the Role of History’, New Literary History vol. 7 (1975), p. 217. See Anthony 
Savile, ‘The Place of Intention in the Concept of Art’, in Harold Osborne (ed.), Aesthetics (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press), pp. 158-76. (Skinner points particularly to pp. 170-1.) See Skinner, ‘Some Problems in 
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guide to an author’s intentions in writing is provided by the text itself – or at least that is 
how historians of ideas ought to approach texts. A ‘separate’ study of an author’s context 
such as Skinner insists upon cannot, they say, enable the historian to understand anything 
of the text which he could not get from studying the text itself. 
Mark Bevir has spent much of the last twenty years also trying to “counter the 
claim that historians must study the linguistic context of a text if they are to recover the 
meaning of that text”,1 and his most focused attack on what he used to call “soft 
linguistic contextualists” – whom he has now re-branded “conventionalists”, and recently 
decided are a breed of “modernists” – is to be found in ‘The Errors of Linguistic 
Contextualism’ of 1992.2 For Bevir, Skinner’s insistence that historians must study context 
(rather than that they may) is logically invalid. Although ‘study the linguistic context of an 
utterance’ is a “useful heuristic maxim”, Bevir says, doing so “is not necessary or 
sufficient for understanding”.3 Understanding, he adds, “does not presuppose prior 
knowledge of the relevant linguistic context”, and in fact “there is no definite procedure 
that historians must follow in order to recover intentions”.4 It follows that… 
 
if historians can come to understand a text even when they have a faulty view of 
the conventions that apply to that text, then clearly they need not necessarily 
study the linguistic context of texts.5 
 
Skinner is therefore wrong, Bevir thinks, to present his “methods as logics of 
discovery” – that is, as pre-requisites of understanding or knowledge – because “no 
method can be a prerequisite of good history whether it be contextualism, 
conventionalism, or something else”.6 Furthermore, Bevir adds, it cannot even be 
necessary to know the context of the arguments that ‘contextualists’ also insist upon, 
because authors are not always out to contribute to contemporary arguments. (His 
example is Annie Besant’s Four Great Religions.) So whether they are writing without 
                                                                                                                                            
the Analysis of Political Thought and Action’, p. 217. Stein Hangom Olsen, ‘Authorial Intention’, British 
Journal of Aesthetics 13, pp. 219-31. Skinner points particularly to p. 229. 
1 Bevir, ‘The Errors of Linguistic Contextualism’, History and Theory vol. 31(1992), p. 278 
2 Bevir’s argument in ‘The Role of Contexts in Understanding and Explanation’ eight years later is broadly 
the same, and the chapter on ‘Meaning’ in his Logic of the History of Ideas is obviously another revised version 
of the same thing. See Mark Bevir, ‘The Role of Contexts in Understanding and Explanation’, Human 
Studies vol. 23, no. 4 (2000), pp. 395-411; Mark Bevir, The Logic of the History of Ideas (Cambridge University 
Press, 1999) 
3 Bevir, ‘The Role of Contexts’, p. 395; ‘The Errors of Linguistic Contextualism’, p. 276 
4 Bevir, ‘The Errors of Linguistic Contextualism’, p. 297 
5 Bevir, ‘The Errors of Linguistic Contextualism’, p. 290 
6 Bevir, ‘The Role of Contexts’, p. 399 
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reference to other texts, or whether they are openly and explicitly responding to other 
texts, in neither case is it necessary “to locate the text within a linguistic context in order 
to secure uptake of the author’s intention in writing that text”.1 We can sometimes 
understand an author’s intention in writing a text, Bevir concludes, even though we know 
nothing of the contemporary context. 
There is, though, a fundamental sense in which knowledge of the context is not 
only a ‘prerequisite’ for understanding, or a mere “heuristic maxim” as Bevir thinks it is: 
it is actually inherent to knowing what an author thought he was saying in a text and 
what he thought he was doing by writing it and distributing it in the first place. Without 
knowing something of the ‘context’ in the sense I intend by this, no utterance can be 
understood, and Annie Besant’s Four Great Religions would be a complete mystery to 
historians of ideas. I am referring to reconstructing the question, or the problem. 
I don’t know whether Bevir realises that the principle he is attacking is also 
Collingwood’s. (I think probably not.2) But this is anyway where Skinner might use 
Collingwood’s ‘second rule’ about reconstructing authors’ questions, and connect it to 
the context within which agents do things with words. Skinner does not do this, though, 
and I think the reason is that Collingwood seems at first blush to offer Skinner very little 
about ‘context’ explicitly, and I am sure Skinner has not failed to notice this. An 
Autobiography says nothing about ‘context’, and although Collingwood does discuss it in 
The Idea of History, he actually appears openly hostile to it. Here is a passage from The Idea 
of History which a critic sympathetic to Collingwood could even level against Skinner: 
 
It has been said that anything torn from its context is thereby mutilated and 
falsified; and that, in consequence, to know any one thing, we must know its 
context, which implies knowing the whole universe. I do not propose to discuss 
this doctrine in its whole bearing, but only to remind the reader of its connexion 
with the view that reality is immediate experience, and its corollary that thought, 
which inevitably tears things out of their context, can never be true. On such a 
doctrine Euclid’s act of thinking on a given occasion that these angles are equal 
would be what it was only in relation to the total context of his then experience, 
                                                 
1 Bevir, ‘The Errors of Linguistic Contextualism’, p. 291 
2 For more on what is wrong with Bevir’s criticisms of Skinner, see my article (Christopher Fear), ‘The 
question-and-answer logic of historical context’, History of the Human Sciences vol. 26, no. 3 (2013), pp. 68-81. 
See especially pp. 77-9 
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including such things as his being in a good temper and having a slave standing 
behind his right shoulder.1 
 
I don’t quote this passage with the intention of endorsing Collingwood’s straw-
man arguments (“…which implies knowing the whole universe”), but rather with that of 
showing that there would appear to be a significant divergence between these two 
authors. It is obvious how one might use these apparently anti-contextual sentiments to 
undermine Skinner’s claim to Collingwood’s legacy, or even to attack his claims about 
the importance of understanding through context outright. It is not so obvious how 
Collingwood might actually support ‘contextualism’. 
But it would be a mistake to think that Collingwood is attacking in these passages 
‘context’ in something like the form now appealed to by Skinner. The kind of context 
Collingwood rejects the need for is the ‘re-experiencing’ of the author’s context, that is, 
reconstructing the experiential context: the feelings the author had at the time of writing, 
the light by which he wrote, the pen in hand, or – as here – the slave standing behind his 
shoulder. None of this is relevant to historical understanding, for Collingwood, because 
although this kind of context is part of the author’s situation ‘as he sees it’, it is not the 
situation pertaining to the problem or question he is trying to solve or answer. 
But secondly, and more importantly, context is, for Collingwood, not only 
relevant to understanding, but integral to it when what is meant by ‘context’ is (a) the 
terms of the problem the author saw himself as facing, and/or (b) the medium of 
expressing the solution. 
 
 
v 
Questions and problems 
 
No work of philosophy, Collingwood says, can be understood until the reader 
knows the question to which the text is intended as an answer.2 ‘Knowing’ the agent’s 
context in this sense – that is, as the features pertaining to the problem – is part of what 
it means to see the agent’s situation as he himself saw it.3 
                                                 
1 IH, p. 298. See also p. 303 
2 A, pp. 31, 55 
3 A, 58, 31-9. See also EM, p. 21, where Collingwood writes “Among these there are some [thoughts] 
which stand in a particular relation to the thought he has stated: they are not merely its context, they are its 
presuppositions.” 
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For works of philosophy the concept of a ‘question’ is more or less self-
explanatory. For the actions of architects or of naval strategists, though – or of the kinds 
of rhetorical performers about whom Skinner writes – we should take Collingwood’s 
‘questions’ more comprehensively, as ‘problems’, the ‘situation’ in which intervention is 
thought by the agent to be desirable.1 Naval commanders, architects and rhetoricians 
‘solve’ in a more general sense. Their ‘problems’, their ‘difficulties’, are things like large 
French fleets likely to invade their homeland if allowed to resupply at Naples; or a queen 
and public that expects a grand but sombre memorial to a world-class statesman, and a 
competition to be the man who designed it; or, for parliamentarians and rhetoricians, an 
audience or populace that needs to have its mind changed about something. 
Questions and problems are by no means simple. “A highly detailed and 
particularized proposition must be the answer”, Collingwood adds, “not to a vague and 
generalized question, but to a question as detailed and particularized as itself”.2 And he 
continues: 
 
People will speak of a savage as ‘confronted by the eternal problem of obtaining 
food’. But what really confronts him is the problem, quite transitory like all 
things human, of spearing this fish, or digging up this root, or finding 
blackberries in this wood.3 
 
In order to understand Nelson’s orders at the Battle of Trafalgar, then, the naval 
historian has to grasp the terms of Nelson’s problem much more sophisticatedly than 
would be implied by saying that his problem was ‘Villeneuve’ – or, more abstractly still, 
‘Napoleon’. Indeed, in order to ‘understand’ any single manoeuvre executed during that 
battle we have to see the correlative problem to which it was a solution, and in as much 
logical, logistical detail as the captain responsible for solving it would have seen it. The 
same goes for Hobbes, whose context in this sense is far more than ‘the Civil War’. 
Hobbes’ ‘question’ would in fact require for its explication a work at least as detailed and 
particularized as the Leviathan itself (and, I suspect, that several times over). Hobbes’s 
complex problem ‘arises’ out of the situation of his social and political milieu, his private 
                                                 
1 Skinner is loyal to this principle. The prefaces to his The Foundations of Modern Political Thought contain 
explicit statements that we must see authors’ problems as they saw them. “In order to see them [texts] as 
answers to specific questions”, he says, “we need to know something about the society in which they were 
written”; “political life itself sets the main problems for the political theorist”. Skinner, The Foundations of 
Modern Political Thought, vol. 1, The Renaissance (Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. xiii, xi 
2 A, p. 32 
3 A, pp. 32-33 
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readings and conversations, perhaps also private feuds over some point or other that he 
wanted to settle along the way, and so on. Each might add ‘terms’ to the problem that 
Leviathan is meant to solve, and each is potentially historically investigable. Skinner’s own 
Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes is meant to show, for example, that part of 
the problem to which Leviathan is a solution is the problem of reason alone being 
deficient for demonstrating truth to readers.1 The rhetorical eloquence of Leviathan is, 
Skinner shows, partly a deliberate solution to this problem. This therefore indicates a 
more basic problem in Hobbes’s mind, which there is no real need for him to explicate: 
namely, ‘at present, not enough people recognise certain important political truths’ – 
truths, that is, of scientia civilis. Perhaps the more historically remote a problem becomes, 
the more work historians have to do to explain to their readers all the important ways in 
which the terms of that question differ from what they might have assumed. This is one 
reason why historians of ideas never, in fact, seek to understand a text in its entirety. The 
notion that they do this is something of a dummy premise in “academic”2 
methodological arguments. Historians of ideas try rather to answer much more specific 
questions about a specific aspect of a text or an author’s work more widely. 
The point is that studying the context in this sense is more than a mere “heuristic 
maxim”, because it is a necessary condition of understanding a solution that one know 
something, and perhaps that one know rather a lot, about the problem to which it is 
intended as a solution. It is a necessary condition not because it is empirically the case 
that when it is eschewed – that is, when one does not know the question – one does not 
understand its solution. Rather it is a necessary condition by definition. Because 
historians want to know the reason, or some of the reasons, for agents deciding to do x, 
they cannot answer their questions without knowing the ‘problem’ which it was 
supposed x would rectify. 
Bevir thinks that if an author is writing with another particular author in mind – 
against him, in support of him, or whatever – then he will usually say so explicitly, and 
there is therefore no need for Skinner’s separate studies aimed at yielding “prior 
theories”.3 Paying renewed attention to Collingwood reminds us that there are always 
terms of an author’s complex ‘problem’ that authors simply assume their readers will 
share. Indeed it might not even have occurred to them that it is possible to live in this 
                                                 
1 Skinner Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes (Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 2-4 
2 NL, 2.55 
3 Bevir, ‘The Errors of Linguistic Contextualism’, p. 291 
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world without assuming the very things they therefore quite reasonably leave unsaid. 
Collingwood writes: 
 
writers (at any rate good writers) always write for their contemporaries, and in 
particular for those who are ‘likely to be interested’, which means those who are 
already asking the question to which an answer is being offered; and 
consequently a writer very seldom explains what the question is that he is trying 
to answer.1 
 
 
 
vi 
Context as evidence 
 
Let us grant that the ‘context’ of a text, in the basic question-and-answer sense I 
have just outlined, might be fully comprehensible from studying only the text itself; and 
let us grant that there really are such texts: they were intended by the author to be fully 
understandable on their own terms, and more or less are. Do historians, then, ever need 
to study anything but the text itself, or should they, as Savile and Olsen insisted in their 
ripostes, treat all texts as the works of authors who ought to have written everything into 
them that would be required for their correct interpretation? 
This question can be very easily solved – or actually, I think, dissolved – by 
remembering a second facet of Collingwood’s logic of question and answer. Good 
historical method, like all other good scientific method, begins always with a question, 
and in order to answer their questions historians must use evidence. “Anything is 
evidence which can be used as evidence”, Collingwood writes in The Principles of History, 
“and no one can tell what is going to serve him as evidence for answering a certain 
question until he has formulated the question”.2 
What the ‘Skinnerite’ historian wants to know is what his authors thought they 
were doing when they wrote their texts. That is the question he brings to his study. In 
order to construct conclusions to a question like this, the historian has to use evidence. 
This is what Collingwood means as well, when he writes in his Autobiography that “the 
                                                 
1 A, p. 39 
2 PH, p. 38 
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question ‘To what question did So-and-so intend this proposition for an answer?’ is an 
historical question, and therefore cannot be settled except by historical methods”.1 
The text itself is obviously part of that evidence, and usually the first port of call. 
But to prejudge it as the only evidence relevant to constructing an answer, without finding 
out what other evidence there might be among what Skinner calls a “range of 
extratextual aids”2 that could help to refine the historian’s conclusion, could only be 
considered careless. Yet this is what it actually means to disregard ‘context’ in this slightly 
different sense of ‘what is going on around the text’ or ‘outside’ the text. It is to prejudge 
evidence yet unseen. Skinner concedes that there are some texts that are ‘autonomous’, 
and might contain everything that the historian needs to understand the author’s 
intentions. But this is only to say that evidence useful to answering that question outside 
of what is offered wholly within the text is yet to be found. He points out, obviously 
rightly, that nothing is to be gained from assuming this that is not already covered by a 
‘contextual’ approach which makes sure that such an assumption is correct. This is 
because the study of ‘context’ that Skinner is appealing to, as the historian encounters it, 
is not the study of a fundamentally different kind of evidence – it is just looking for more 
evidence to help him answer his question. The mistake Skinner’s targets are making is 
mapping onto the text/extra-text distinction the obsolete historian’s distinction between 
‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ sources. As Collingwood rightly points out in The Principles of 
History, the court of truth in history is other historians, who compare one’s constructions 
with all available evidence,3 and no longer make such a distinction. It is, then, quite clear 
what is lost by those historians who disregard extra-textual evidence, or consider it 
‘secondary’, but not at all clear what they gain, other than the increased risk that other 
historians can easily find evidence to falsify their conclusions. 
When Skinner says that it is a necessary condition of answering a question of 
intention that one first ‘study’ the conventions of a time, he is not saying that historians, 
to do their work properly, begin with a complete and quite separate study of those 
conventions in order to produce a body of knowledge which can then be taken to the 
reading table, as one might prepare a body of notes before an important negotiation. 
When he advises a study of the prevailing conventions, he is calling, in Bevir’s view, for 
                                                 
1 A, p. 39 
2 Skinner, ‘Hermeneutics and the Role of History’, p. 228 
3 In The Idea of History Collingwood writes: “the historian’s picture stands in a peculiar relation to something 
called evidence. The only way in which the historian or any one else can judge, even tentatively, of its truth 
is by considering this relation; and, in practice, what we mean by asking whether an historical statement is 
true is whether it can be justified by an appeal to the evidence: for a truth unable to be so justified is to the 
historian a thing of no interest.” IH, p. 246 
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the formulation of a “prior theory that covers the conventions in terms of which the 
author expressed his illocutionary intentions in writing that text”.1 This “prior theory” is, 
then, supposed to be something like an historian’s substitute for the ‘socio-cultural 
background’ he cannot otherwise share with the subjects of his study. 
But this is not what Skinner is endorsing. The ‘study of context’ is not a 
substitute socio-cultural background for the historian’s reading. It is rather – and this is 
all Skinner means – that the historian’s investigation of context leads from his question 
about what an utterance means to some idea about what the author’s question or 
problem was. This is because his first question about an utterance, necessary to 
understanding in the sense in which he pursues it, is ‘What is this an answer to?’ or, 
‘What was this supposed to solve?’ A study aimed at elucidating the question in sufficient 
detail is a study of context, but it cannot take place before the historian has even 
formulated his starting, or ‘primary’, question. Skinner’s only mistake is inaccurately 
calling the study of context a “separate form of study”. It is not separate at all: it serves 
the original historical question. Indeed Skinner acknowledges this too in volume one of 
his Foundations: “When we attempt in this way to locate a text within its appropriate 
context”, he says, “we are not merely providing historical ‘background’ for our 
interpretation; we are already engaged in the act of interpretation itself”.2 
 
 
vii 
The ‘rapprochement’ between history and philosophy 
 
If, as Collingwood and Skinner say they do, the theories and pronouncements of 
the classic authors in the history of political thought provide answers to questions that 
are not ours, that are not eternal or perennial, but that are in fact limited to the problems 
of their own time; and if the purpose of the history of ideas is to illuminate those 
answers in light of those historical contexts, then can it still be legitimate to ask – as 
Collingwood insists historians must ask – not only, ‘What was our author’s answer?’ but 
also, ‘Was he right?’? “History did not mean knowing what events followed what”, he 
writes in his Autobiography, “it meant getting inside other people’s heads, looking at their 
situation through their eyes, and thinking for yourself whether the way in which they 
                                                 
1 Bevir, ‘The Errors of Linguistic Contextualism’, p. 289 
2 Skinner, The Renaissance, p. xiv 
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tackled it was the right way”.1 “What is required, if I am to know Plato’s philosophy”, he 
says in The Idea of History, “is both to re-think it in my own mind and also to think other 
things in the light of which I can judge it”.2 Withholding these value judgements in 
history is not only unnecessary, he says, it is “crippling”.3 And he adds, by way of 
rhetorical force (again in An Autobiography), that “everybody who has learnt to think 
historically knows it already; and no amount of argument could teach it to a person who 
had not learnt to think historically”.4 
Today Skinner preaches the exact opposite of this, and seems to have invited the 
criticism that he reduces the discipline to a “conducted tour of a graveyard”.5 Skinner 
has, I think, attacked a basic principle of what Collingwood considered his life’s work, a 
“rapprochement between philosophy and history”, and he has – if Collingwood’s argument 
is right – fallen for one of the errors as Collingwood’s ‘realist’ contemporaries in the 
1920s and 1930s: he has made the past “dead”, and studying past philosophy 
“worthless”.6 
The result of Skinner’s claim and others like it has been to split the discipline of 
the history of ideas into two distinct ‘approaches’ to the same material. There is a kind of 
division of labour between historians on the one side, and philosophers on the other. 
The historians ask, ‘What did our author actually think he was saying or doing?’, and their 
suggested answers are subjected to the normal rules of historical research. On the other 
side there is the ‘philosophical’ approach, which is used in a “non-historical” way7 for 
two purposes: First, to use a past author’s ideas selectively, often as a proxy or 
supporting authority, for ‘throwing light’ on a contemporary problem that we might 
openly acknowledge was not a problem he faced, but that he can nevertheless be made 
useful for solving. And secondly, they put historical context aside for the purpose of 
helping to teach the great texts to undergraduates who are encountering them for the 
first time, and who can only be made to engage by encouraging them to ‘argue’ with the 
                                                 
1 A, p. 58. See also IH, pp. 215-16 
2 IH, p. 301 
3 IH, p. 132 
4 A, p. 70 
5 Skinner, Regarding Method, p. 125 
6 EPM, p. 212 
7 Kenneth Minogue, ‘Method in intellectual history: Quentin Skinner’s Foundations’, in James Tully (ed.) 
Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 176-193. 
See 178. 
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old ideas of dead authors. For whichever of these two purposes it is employed, this 
‘philosophical’ approach does not proclaim itself to be historically sensitive.1 
Collingwood’s death predated by almost thirty years the bipartite split in the 
history of ideas I have just described, yet his attempt to bring about a rapprochement 
between philosophy and history presupposes something just like it. To Collingwood a 
rapprochement between philosophy and history was of no small importance. He describes it 
as his “life’s work”2; it certainly goes back at least as far as 19263; and it may even have 
constituted a reason for writing The New Leviathan.4 This is partly because that term, 
“rapprochement between philosophy and history”, covers a lot of what Collingwood thinks 
are interrelated points and inquiries. It means recognizing that philosophical questions 
change through time and their answers change with them, which means that 
philosophers, to be able to understand properly the texts they are studying, have to 
become better historians. It also means, to Collingwood, the need for historians to 
become better philosophers, so that they may address the philosophical assumptions 
behind their own practice. It also means explaining why history affords self-knowledge of 
the mind5; and it therefore means showing philosophically why the study of the history of 
                                                 
1 See also Hampsher-Monk, ‘Politics, political theory and its history’, in D. Castiglione & I. W. Hampsher-
Monk (eds), The History of Political Thought in National Context, pp. 38-39 
2 A, p. 77 
3 See the closing section of L26, section 77, which concludes with the following startling passage: “And 
therefore history is the immediate and direct source of all philosophical problems. Destroy history, and you 
destroy the nourishment on which philosophy feeds; foster and develop a sound historical consciousness, 
and you have under your hand all, except its own methods, that philosophy needs. All philosophy is the 
philosophy of history.” L26, IH, pp. 359-425. This passage p. 425 
4 See Boucher, Social and Political Thought, p. 37. See especially Boucher’s insightful discussion of the 
rapprochement as a whole, or the “resolution” of philosophy into history on pp. 37-51. 
5 A, pp. 107-19. For some of Collingwood’s commentators the rapprochement refers to the eventual 
‘resolution’ or ‘liquidation’ of philosophy and history into the same thing: ‘history’. In an interesting article 
for Collingwood and British Idealism Studies, Kenneth McIntyre describes how, in Collingwood’s thinking, 
history resolves the dualism which science posits between the universal and particular, and allows the 
emergence of philosophy. See Kenneth McIntyre, ‘History or Philosophy? Collingwood on Understanding 
Human Activity’, Collingwood and British Idealism Studies, vol. 11, no. 1 (2005). McIntyre’s interpretation of 
the rapprochement is very interesting, partly because he argues that what actually happens is that history is 
liquidated by philosophy, rather than the other way round. (pp. 83-5) But it is clear that the conception of 
history McIntyre describes as overcoming science and making way for philosophy is not ‘history as a 
science’. Indeed, his consistent use of ‘science’ as shorthand for ‘natural science’ indicates that McIntyre 
thinks that what is most valuable about Collingwood’s philosophy of history is that it offers a critique of 
scientific thinking. (pp. 61-4) “History consists of a body of concrete facts from which science abstracts its 
objects”, McIntyre says; and later, “historical experience overcomes the dualism which science posits 
between the universal and the particular by comprehending the distinct character and integral relation of 
both”. (See for example pp. 61-93, particularly p. 62) The conceptions of history McIntyre is talking about 
are what I have called (by following Dussen) the ‘first’, where the object of history is “fact as such”; and 
the ‘second’, the conception of history as becoming. It is history as becoming that unites the particular 
facts of the first conception, by relating them to the universal becoming. There is nothing wrong with 
McIntyre’s focus. As I’ve said, the forms of history which he is privileging are not those that became 
obsolete in Collingwood’s later thought: they both survive in it. But the form of history in which we are 
most interested here, history as a science, is not discussed by McIntyre. The rapprochement between 
philosophy and history as a science remains, then, in need of some illustration. 
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thought (which for Collingwood is what all history is1) is essential for the maintenance of 
progress and civilization.2 
The ‘doctrine’ of Collingwood’s rapprochement between philosophy and history to 
which I would like to pay particular and exclusive attention here concerns history as a 
science, and it is the contention that historians must ask not only ‘what he thought’ (or 
did), but also ‘Was he right?’ As I’ve said, the point is contemporarily important because 
it is also the one that seems directly threatened by a fundamental thesis that the 
‘contextualists’ nailed to the church door at the dawning of their Reformation. For 
simplicity I will refer to this doctrine as ‘the’ rapprochement, though I realise that the 
rapprochement includes much else besides that is connected. What is threatened is the claim 
that the historian should not, or cannot, ask what So-and-so’s theory was without asking 
whether it was true. The ‘contextualist’ thesis conversely is that the historical question, 
‘What was So-and-so’s theory?’ can, and perhaps should, be kept separate from the 
philosophical question, ‘Was it true?’ Indeed, according to Skinner, the second question 
requires a kind of deliberate historical naivety,3 has nothing to do with historical 
understanding, and is not part of the historian’s task.4 
This non-agreement begins in fact with the fundamental agreement that we’ve 
already seen: that there are no eternal (or ‘perennial’) questions in philosophy, and 
historians must reconstruct their authors’ questions, or problems, in order to understand 
as they did the solutions they offered. The failure to realise this is, Collingwood says, 
characteristic of his ‘realist’ contemporaries.5 But Collingwood’s attack on ‘realism’ goes 
further. Because ‘realists’ think philosophers deal with eternal questions, 
 
the question, ‘what was Aristotle’s theory of duty?’ would be an ‘historical’ 
question. And it would be wholly separate from the philosophical question, ‘was 
it true?’ Thus the ‘history’ of philosophy [for ‘realists’] was an inquiry which had 
nothing to do with the question whether Plato’s theory of Ideas (for example) 
was true or false, but only with the question what it was.6 
                                                 
1 A, pp. 109-10 
2 See IH, pp. 334, and A, pp. 90-92, 115 
3 Skinner, ‘Meaning and Understanding’, p. 50 
4 Skinner, ‘A reply to my critics’, in James Tully (ed.) Meaning & Context, p. 257. Also in Regarding Method, p. 
53 
5 The term ‘realist’ is used by Collingwood (always with single quotation marks) to indicate the self-
identification of John Cook Wilson, H. A. Pritchard, H. W. B. Joseph, and Collingwood’s own tutor E. F. 
Carritt. See A, pp. 18-22. He also refers to “the parallel and more or less allied school at Cambridge” of G. 
E. Moore. See A, p. 22 
6 A, 59 
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This for Collingwood is tantamount to an emasculation of the history of 
philosophy.1 What he proposes instead is that the historical question and the 
philosophical question are not in fact separate, and that they can and should be brought 
together under the term “historical questions”.2 This means that historians can and 
should describe past theories and say and explain why they were wrong or right. 
Examples of this rapprochement principle are easy to come by in Collingwood’s own 
treatment of past philosophy. The Idea of History provides not only descriptions, but also 
critical assessments of each of the thinkers discussed. The New Leviathan contains more 
colourful examples, such as “Plato is the man who planted on the European world the 
crazy idea that education ought to be professionalized”.3 In many cases, this included, 
Collingwood’s wording strikes the reader as a deliberate affront to the orthodox conceit 
of the historian’s impartiality. 
The question of whether historians should or should not ask of their authors 
‘Was he right?’ is obviously an important one to settle, because here we have one of 
today’s leading historians of ideas apparently seeking to proscribe a practice without 
which Collingwood thinks history would be “worthless”.4 
In recent years Skinner has reformulated some of his positions and is said to have 
taken a genealogical turn which, far from distancing him further from the old 
archaeologist Collingwood, is thought by some to have brought these two sides back 
together.5 But firstly this might not make any difference: the fact that the pieces are being 
stuck back together is not proof that the vase was never smashed. My question is 
whether Skinner has destroyed Collingwood’s rapprochement. The question of whether he is 
still grinding the pieces under his heel or attempting to scoop them up and repair the 
damage is a different question. But secondly, this apparently Nietzsche-inspired 
adjustment of Skinner’s earlier position still seems to be something different from the 
rapprochement as Collingwood describes it. There might now be a desire to take up a 
‘critical’ stance towards what we have inherited from earlier thinkers, but there is still no 
commitment to asking, by historical necessity, ‘Was it true?’ 
 
                                                 
1 A, p. 72-6 
2 A, p. 72 
3 NL, 37.4. See also Collingwood’s dismissal of Dilthey (IH, p. 173); his treatment of Hume (IH, p. 76); 
and his declaration that Hobbes’s Leviathan is “the world’s greatest store of political wisdom” (NL, p. lx). 
4 EM, p. 212 
5 See Melissa Lane, ‘Doing Our Own Thinking for Ourselves’, Journal of the History of Ideas vol. 73, no. 1 
(2012), pp. 71-72. See also Lamb, ‘Recent Developments’, pp. 246-65, particularly 256-8. 
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viii 
Skinner’s alleged attack 
 
There were apparent warnings against the ‘truth question’ right from the start of 
Skinner’s career. In ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’, he points to 
two “vital implications” of what he discusses: firstly that “the classic texts cannot be 
concerned with our questions and answers, but only with their own”; and secondly that 
“there is in consequence simply no hope of seeking the point of studying the history of 
ideas in the attempt to learn directly from the classic authors by focusing on their 
attempted answers to supposedly timeless questions”.1 We cannot hope to learn directly 
from Plato’s answers, Skinner writes: 
 
For if we are to learn from Plato, it is not enough that the discussion should 
seem, at a very abstract level, to pose a question relevant to us… to our own 
culture and period. As soon as we begin to study Plato’s arguments, however, 
the sense in which the issue of participation is the same for himself and 
ourselves dissolves into absurdity… All I wish to insist is that whenever it is 
claimed that the point of the historical study of such questions is that we may 
learn directly from the answers, it will be found that what counts as an answer 
will usually look, in a different culture or period, so different in itself that it can 
hardly be in the least useful even to go on thinking of the relevant question as 
being “the same” in the required sense after all. More crudely: we must learn to 
do our own thinking for ourselves.2 
 
This certainly looks like an attack on the historian who wants to ask ‘and was 
Plato right?’, so it looks like an attack on Collingwood’s rapprochement. But is it? Charles 
Taylor was still unsure in 1988, so he used his chapter in James Tully’s edited collection 
of essays, Meaning and Context, to ask the question directly: “What”, he asks Skinner, “is 
the truth value of the theories the texts expound?”3 
Other critics are more certain that Skinner is attacking the legitimacy of asking 
the truth question, but for what I think turn out to be two false reasons. Firstly, they 
                                                 
1 Skinner, ‘Meaning and Understanding’, p. 50 
2 Skinner, ‘Meaning and Understanding’, p. 51-2 
3 Charles Taylor, ‘The hermeneutics of conflict’, in James Tully (ed.), Meaning & Context: Quentin Skinner and 
His Critics, p. 219. Taylor admits that he is “uncertain whether Skinner wants to bracket the question of 
truth, and unclear, if he does, on what basis”. (Taylor, p. 220) He says something similar on p. 223: “Is this 
neo-Clausewitzian thesis Skinner’s? I’m not sure it is”; and on p. 226: “But does Skinner really want to go 
this route? I am still uncertain.” 
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think it follows from dismissing perennial problems; and secondly (and relatedly) they 
think he reduces all philosophy to rhetoric. The critics, conversely, want to defend the 
legitimacy of using past philosophy in the contexts of new arguments, and argue that the 
pretence of Skinner’s contextual definition of ‘meaning’ would prevent them from doing 
so. This, though, is a false protest, and we should see it off first to avoid confusion over 
what is at stake. 
When Skinner says ‘meaning’ he presupposes what is sought by an historian, and 
not the use to which certain ideas can be put. Skinner’s critics sometimes object to being 
apparently told by Skinner that they should not use historical texts in the context of 
contemporary debates. They think Skinner is attempting to silence the present (and 
future) use of past ideas in new contexts, and that he is doing so by asserting the 
hegemony of original authorial intention. This is why they have apparently “repeatedly 
complained” that what he says “reduces the study of the history of thought to nothing 
more edifying than a conducted tour of a graveyard”.1 They think that Skinner’s 
Collingwoodian warning – that imposing false perennial questions means historical 
misunderstanding – amounts to a warning against philosophical misuse.2 
But in fact Skinner is not telling them anything of the kind, because there is a 
difference between understanding and use which is crushed by competing definitions of 
‘meaning’. If I use Hegel’s observation that “the owl of Minerva begins her flight only at 
the fall of dusk” to explain to the reader of a fashion magazine why it is that the moment 
at which the latest style craze is successfully formulated in glossy print is also the 
moment at which it becomes advisable no longer to dress in that way, my historical 
transgression is not the elaborate and pretentious use of Hegel, but the further claim that 
‘Hegel was talking about clothes in this passage’. This is where use begins to masquerade 
as historical understanding. 
‘Contextualism’ is concerned with the historical understanding, and not with the 
use of past ideas. (This is why Kenneth Minogue’s attempt to defend against Skinner the 
unhistorical use of authors for contemporary philosophical ends is not really a defence 
that needs to be mounted.3) In the example case of use I have suggested, an author 
                                                 
1 Skinner, Regarding Method, p. 125 
2 This is at least according to Lamb, who describes Skinner’s “recent tendency to utilise past political 
thought in contemporary philosophical debates, something that flies in the face of his earliest 
methodological arguments”. See Lamb, ‘Recent Developments’, p. 249. Lamb provides his explanation in 
footnote 11 (p. 249), where he makes explicit what I think is his mistake, and that of others: “Skinner’s 
early methodological writing flatly denied that past thought could be used in this way because of the non-
existence of ‘perennial problems’ in philosophy.” 
3 See Minogue, p. 179 
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knows that the ‘owl of Minerva’ idea is not really Hegel’s when it is shoe-horned into a 
question of fashion. 
Some of Skinner’s critics, such as John Keane, commonly defend use by doing 
exactly the opposite of what they should do: they bundle understanding and use together, 
and do so by appealing to the ambiguity of the term ‘meaning’, and to the validity or 
legitimacy of providing different ‘readings’.1 But the distinction between understanding 
and use is important to maintain during these debates, because a discussion about the 
rights and wrongs of one is not simultaneously a discussion about the rights and wrongs 
of the other. One reason they might appear to be the same is that contributors to these 
debates pursue arguments by conceptual analysis over the ‘real’ definitions of these 
ambiguous terms, especially of ‘meaning’ – which is a project that unfortunately takes us 
even further away from the real question. This diversion is apparent throughout Mark 
Bevir’s The Logic of the History of Ideas, though he is perfectly open about it.2 
Back, then, to Skinner’s attack on asking the ‘truth question’ about past authors’ 
claims. The first criticism – that Skinner attacks the possibility of philosophical thinking 
because he dismisses the existence of perennial problems – operates by characterizing 
philosophical thinking as thinking about a certain kind of object: the ‘abstract’, the ‘trans-
historical’, the ‘eternal’, and so on. Kenneth Minogue, for instance, argues that ideas are 
“abstract and universal, and it is in virtue of this character that they allow communication 
to bridge such gulfs as person to person, epoch to epoch and culture to culture”.3 Bevir 
argues, in one of his early articles against Skinner, that it is only because there 
“undoubtedly” are various senses in which perennial problems do exist that we 
“legitimately can approach classic works… as works that express beliefs relating to 
problems we too can ponder”; only because of perennial problems, Bevir continues, that 
“we may, if we wish, discuss the relevance of their views… for us today”; and only 
because of perennial problems that past texts can “confront” us and offer us “arguments, 
beliefs, and theories which remain relevant to us”.4 Similarly Robert Lamb has recently 
objected that Skinner’s deletion of the “abstract” level, and his insistence on the 
“localism” of any argument, reduces its “trans-historical import”.5 According to Lamb, if 
                                                 
1 See Keane, pp. 204-17. See especially pp. 205-6 
2 Bevir, The Logic of the History of Ideas. See most of Bevir’s preface, especially pp. 8-10, 16, and also pp. 31-7 
3 Minogue, p. 186 
4 Bevir, ‘Are There Perennial Problems in Political Theory?’, Political Studies vol. 42 (1994), pp. 662-75. See 
p. 673. Emphasis added. 
5 See Lamb’s ‘Critique’, pp. 58-9. Lamb also distinguishes between “eternal” problems, which he thinks 
Skinner is right to follow Collingwood in dismissing, and “perennial” problems in the sense of “enduring,” 
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an author thinks of himself as dealing with a question in an ‘always and everywhere’ way, 
then he has given his reader permission to ask the truth question about his work.1 
It is true that Skinner rejects perennial problems and says that the only histories 
that can be written of ideas are histories of their use in arguments.2 But it is not true that 
we need to invoke a trans-historical, abstract level for ideas to exist in, if all we want to 
do is to maintain the possibility of understanding philosophical arguments across time – 
and it does not become necessary even when we want to evaluate them. There is nothing 
more inherently accessible about ideas that (in Collingwood’s amusing phrase) live “in 
Plato’s Republic” than there is about those that live “in the sewage of Romulus”.3 
Skinner’s critics want to preserve the idea of perennial problems for fear of losing either 
or both of these possibilities. But Collingwood’s rapprochement does not require a plane of 
ideas and eternal problems abstracted from the earthly mêlée either. Skinner could, if he 
wished, point to Collingwood’s argument, in his Essay on Philosophical Method, that 
philosophy is not recognized by the abstracts and universals in which it deals, but by 
marks that “characterize it as an activity or process”4 – an argument which is perfectly 
compatible with Skinner’s chief points. 
For philosophical arguments to be appreciated by the historian, all that is 
required is that, using evidence, he come to know enough about the question the author 
thought he was answering that he might be able to follow whatever reasoning he is 
looking for. 
But not only is Skinner not interested in philosophy in the erroneous sense of 
universal, abstract theories: he is not really interested in philosophical thinking at all. This 
is not meant derogatorily, he says it himself.5 Skinner studies instead political rhetorical 
activity which, as his work demonstrates, has every bit as rich a past as philosophical 
activity, and seems to hold the best cards in the suits of bloodless coercion and carefully-
phrased violence. But because of this, some of Skinner’s critics take him to be claiming 
that all philosophical communication is really rhetoric, or (especially) that all political 
                                                                                                                                            
which he thinks Skinner is wrong to dismiss. See Lamb, ‘Critique’, pp. 59-63. In fact Skinner does not deny 
that many of our disputes are “long-standing”. See Skinner, ‘A reply to my critics’, p. 283 
1 See Lamb, ‘Critique’, p. 58. This point of Lamb’s, I think, doesn’t follow. The Skinnerite historian might 
be able simultaneously to understand that the author saw himself as doing this, and see why the author was 
mistaken – to see why, that is, the terms of his problem were actually more historically specific than the 
author realised. Meanwhile, if we can ask the truth question, there is no reason to limit ourselves to those 
authors who intended their arguments to be abstract enough to reach beyond immediate contextual 
horizons. 
2 Skinner, Regarding Method, p. 283 
3 See NL, 17.7 
4 See EPM, p. 3 
5 Skinner, Regarding Method, p. 182 
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philosophical communication is rhetorical. This is the second false account of how and 
why Skinner attacks Collingwood’s rapprochement. Thus, on this reading, it is because 
concepts and logics are so deeply embedded in their immediate contexts in argument that 
the rightness or wrongness of them cannot be commented upon. This is what Lamb 
means when he says that, “for Skinner, as for Collingwood, there is no stable distinction 
to be made between history and philosophy: all philosophical questions are actually 
historical questions”.1 Of course, this crushing of philosophical evaluation by historical 
fact would be a very different thing to Collingwood’s rapprochement. Critics like Lamb are 
quite right to point out that not all authors are trying to convince an audience, and that 
some are engaging in genuine, earnest attempts to answer philosophical problems 
inherited from the past – and sometimes, diablement changé en route,2 from the distant past. 
But Skinner does not contradict this. When he says that “the only histories of 
ideas to be written are histories of their uses in argument”,3 he says nothing that 
undermines the integrity of earnest philosophical thinking generally. It is not, I think, 
Skinner’s position that all philosophy is rhetorical activity characterized predominantly by 
the desire to convince an audience. It is simply that changes in political rhetoric are the 
subjects of his historical work.4 ‘Arguments’ are also philosophically honest attempts to 
solve problems; one’s ‘argument’ says ‘I think this is the right answer, and here’s why’. 
‘Argument’ is not a term reserved exclusively for eristic public performances.5 
Perhaps, then, historians of philosophy have nothing to worry about from 
Skinner, and vice versa? Perhaps both can ask the ‘success question’ about their agents’ 
doings in their own characteristic ways. Collingwood, as we’ll see below, does not permit 
this. But before seeing why let’s pursue the reasoning behind this preliminary apartheid 
between historians living “in Plato’s Republic” and those, like Skinner, living “in the 
sewage of Romulus”. 
Historians of rhetoric are interested only in past rhetorical actions – shifts in 
meaning, rhetorical manoeuvres, conceptual coups, etc. They can ask whether a speaker 
or writer succeeded in achieving his intentions, or whether he failed, or whether he 
achieved something in between (a mixture of both, or it had some unseen consequence, 
or what have you). They can comment, it seems, on the success or failure of a rhetorical 
act by pointing to evidence. They might even add that ‘this was a clever solution’, or ‘it 
                                                 
1 Lamb, ‘Critique’, p. 59 
2 A, p. 61 
3 Skinner, Regarding Method, p. 86 
4 Skinner, Regarding Method, p. 182 
5 NL, 24.57-58, 26.21-22 
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failed because it was too obvious to everyone that the reasoning did not follow’. But it 
seems that the question of whether or not the agent ‘was right’ to do or say something 
could only be commented on by reference to his relative intended outcome. Taylor has 
captured the reasoning more concisely than I have: “The context of struggle”, he says, 
“can be kept separate from the context of truth”.1 The ‘truth question’, then, seems not 
to arise with regard to rhetorical acts, because the ‘success’ of their actions is assessed 
differently. 
Collingwood’s focus is not on rhetorical practice, but on philosophical thinking. 
Assessments of philosophical success seem different because, as Collingwood says, when 
a past solution is understood, its question is “re-opened”.2 The relevant features of a 
philosophical situation are the terms of a question, and by resurrecting them in all their 
particular intricacies we face the question ourselves. The success of a past philosophical 
manoeuvre, a proposed answer to a question, is therefore constantly up for assessment as 
long as its terms are sufficiently comprehensible. And if they are not comprehensible, we 
haven’t understood the philosophy. We can see, for example, that a solution was wrong, 
even though historical evidence suggests that nearly everyone at the time was convinced 
by it. Or we can see that an ignored or ridiculed answer to a question was in fact a good 
one, or even the right one. This is why, for Collingwood, historical thinking and 
philosophical thinking are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, if we follow Collingwood, it is 
not only in the case of using a past philosophical text that philosophical thinking is 
necessitated: it is also part and parcel of understanding it – and all perfectly within the 
parameters of, as Skinner says, “seeing things their way”, without introducing 
inappropriate perennial questions, and without appealing to the trans-historical power of 
the abstract. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Taylor, p. 220 
2 A, p. 75 
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ix 
Skinner’s real attack 
 
I have not sought to clear Skinner of the charge of attacking historians who ask 
the truth question about past arguments. In fact, I’ve already said that he is guilty of it. 
But I have tried to show that he does not argue that today’s philosophers may not draw 
upon the ideas of the past, that he does not argue that all argument is rhetorical, and I’ve 
tried to show that if he does destroy Collingwood’s rapprochement between philosophy and 
history it is not, as some of his critics complain, because of his rejection of perennial 
questions – which of course Collingwood also rejects.1 Those who want to defend the 
historian’s right to ask ‘Was he right?’ do not have to presuppose that there are perennial 
or eternal questions of philosophy, and they do not have to presuppose that 
philosophical argument takes place on some trans-historical plane. As we’ll see shortly, 
Collingwood presupposes neither of these things. 
Now, it is actually possible to argue that in fact Skinner has developed a kind of 
rapprochement of his own – and one that still has nothing to do with his apparent 
‘genealogical turn’ of recent years. In his chapter in Meaning and Understanding, Charles 
Taylor asks Skinner about “the relationship between the explanation of beliefs and the 
assessment of their rationality and truth”.2 He then asks a different question, whether the 
historian can “avoid taking a stand on the truth of the ideas he is examining”.3 In his 
reply4 Skinner deals with both questions at once and says that, if Taylor means that an 
historian “should somehow seek to discount or set aside the fact that he or she holds 
certain beliefs to be true and others false”, then “my answer is that I am sure no historian 
can ever perform such an act of forgetting, and that it would in any case be most unwise 
to try”.5 (Collingwood says exactly this in a lively 1936 paper called ‘Can Historians be 
Impartial?’6) 
Skinner deals with the question of truth and rationality assessment mostly in view 
of the ‘explanation’ question. But when he turns his attention to the possibility of 
historians assessing the rationality of past beliefs uncoupled from the question of what 
                                                 
1 See A, p. 60-4 
2 Skinner, ‘A reply to my critics’, p. 236. See also Regarding Method, pp. 27-56. The corresponding passage 
there is on p. 27. 
3 Taylor, p. 224 
4 Parts of ‘A reply to my critics’, roughly pp. 236-59, were re-written and republished fourteen years later in 
Regarding Method as ch. 3, ‘Interpretation, rationality and truth’ (pp. 27-56). See Regarding Method, p. 27 
(footnote) 
5 Skinner, ‘A reply to my critics’, p. 236 
6 Published in PH, pp. 209-18 
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this means for explanation, a rapprochement of his own begins to emerge. This Skinner 
does not only say is legitimate: he explicitly recommends it,1 and echoes what Collingwood 
says about evaluative philosophical thinking.2 “We can still apply the concept of 
rationality in the criticism of such an agent’s beliefs”, Skinner says, “for it remains to be 
asked whether they held their belief in the light of, rather than in the face of, the criteria 
locally accepted as appropriate for the formation and testing of beliefs”.3 The historian 
should not assume that just because something turned out to be false it means that the 
agent was irrational to believe that it was true, since whether or not it is rational to 
believe x depends on having “good grounds”4 given the available information and the 
rest of the “web of belief” or “thought-complex”.5 A belief that does not cohere with the 
rest of the thought-complex, or which contradicts it, is however an irrational one, and it 
seems for Skinner perfectly legitimate for the historian to say so. If an action is based on 
an irrational belief in this sense, then, as for Collingwood, although historical 
understanding still requires “seeing things his way”, at the same time the historian can 
hardly prevent himself from thinking ‘that was a bad reason to do that’, or ‘if he wanted 
to achieve this end he would have been better off doing this instead’. But this kind of 
historical assessment might also involve a logical evaluation, such as noting that a 
conclusion does not follow, or that an important question in the inquiry has been 
overlooked; or it might involve saying something like ‘given that our author already 
thought this thing and those things, it really was an oversight to maintain this belief’. If 
the historian of philosophy cannot prevent himself from thinking such things, from 
identifying bad reasoning, unsystematic thinking, and if he has described all the relevant 
features of the philosophical situation as the actor himself saw it so that the reader is 
likely to draw the same conclusions, then it seems unnecessarily supine to withhold those 
kinds of evaluation from historical writing. The historian can therefore justify narratives 
that combine ‘what he thought’ statements with historical statements about ‘why his 
reasoning was bad’. 
So there is in Skinner a kind of rapprochement between historical understanding 
and philosophical thinking. Although he must “try to make the agents who accepted 
                                                 
1 Skinner, Regarding Method, p. 140. See also ‘A reply to my critics’, pp. 243-4 
2 See Skinner, Regarding Method, chs 3 and 7 
3 Skinner, Regarding Method, p. 141 
4 Skinner, ‘A reply to my critics’, p. 239 
5 “Web of belief” is a now popular term thanks to Quine and Ullian, but at least in the relevant ways it is 
used by Skinner I think it is clear that the same idea is outlined by Collingwood as what he calls a “thought-
complex”. See A, p. 55 
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them appear… to be as rational as possible”,1 the historian is not obliged for the sake of 
historical understanding to think a past argument just as ‘rational’ as the author thought 
it. 
But to assess the rationality of a piece of reasoning, or even to assess “what 
counts as politically true or right… in different ideologies and contexts”,2 is obviously to 
go less far than full, proper philosophical thinking, because assessing rationality, or 
whether something counts as true in a qualified way, is not the same as asking whether 
what a philosopher concludes is true. Assessments of rationality are not assessments of 
truth, as Skinner readily acknowledges.3 In assessing rationality the historian might 
understand that the author ‘didn’t have the benefit of knowing this’, and therefore 
declines to condemn him for being irrational. In assessing truth however he must subject 
the author’s claim to the full weight of today’s knowledge. “What is required, if I am to 
know Plato’s philosophy”, Collingwood says in The Idea of History, “is both to re-think it 
in my own mind and also to think other things in the light of which I can judge it”.4 Here 
the fact that an author did not have the benefit of knowing some detail or other might be 
precisely the grounds for his having been wrong. As long as we have reason to think our 
evidences and considerations are better than the past author’s, or are in some sense an 
advance on them, the historian is in a good position to say something like, ‘This was 
Plato’s claim, and it was wrong because what he did not realize was…’ Again, as 
Collingwood indicated, the more sophisticated our appreciation of the situation as the 
agent saw it, the more sophisticated can be our assessment of his philosophical success.5 
But even when he distinguishes it from the ‘rationality question’, Skinner still 
does not dispel the truth question as illegitimate. It is clear, however, that it is not among 
the tasks of historians (as historians): 
 
Take for example one of the cases I have already discussed: Machiavelli’s 
fervently held belief that mercenary armies always jeopardize political liberty. 
Perhaps there is nothing to stop us from asking whether this is true. But the 
effect of doing so will be somewhat analogous to asking whether the king of 
                                                 
1 Skinner, ‘A reply to my critics’, p. 246 
2 See James Tully’s introductory chapter to Meaning & Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics, p. 20. See also 
Taylor, p. 221 
3 Skinner, ‘A reply to my critics’, p. 239 
4 IH, p. 301 
5 And this is additionally, I think, why it is not quite right to say, as Keane has, that ‘contextualism’ 
(necessarily) does not entail any kind of critical attitude to something like politics. Keane attacks “the new 
history” for its uncritical character and its rejection of evaluative thinking. See Keane, p. 212 
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France is bald. The best answer seems to be that the question does not really 
arise. 
I am not of course adopting the position… that we are precluded from 
asking about the truth of such beliefs… I am merely insisting (to revert to my 
example) that our task as historians is to try to recover Machiavelli’s point of 
view; and that, in order to discharge this task, what we need to employ is solely 
the concept of rational acceptability, not that of truth.1 
 
The operative words here are “our task as historians”. Skinner is not limiting his 
discussion to historians of rhetoric, just as Collingwood is not really limiting his to 
historians of philosophical thinking. The apartheid is breached from both sides. I think 
this demonstrates that although Skinner’s rapprochement prescribes the assessment of 
rationality and reasoning, it only permits the assessment of truth – and from his tone it 
seems to be an unenthusiastic permission. His claim is that the historian’s task does not 
“need” – that is, require – asking the truth question. In fact Skinner downgrades the truth 
question precisely because he thinks it is allied to the error of holding ‘true’ and ‘rational’ 
to be identical – which is, he rightly notes, to relativize truth.2 But although Skinner 
might allow the ‘truth question’, what he says is nevertheless an indirect attack on 
Collingwood’s rapprochement. Collingwood’s argument is not that the historian merely may 
ask ‘was he right?’, but that he must ask it. For Skinner conversely, the historian does not 
have to. The two are irreconcilable. Where ‘P’ = the historian’s obligation to ask the truth 
question, Collingwood’s claim is ‘P’, while Skinner’s is ‘not P’. 
 
 
x 
Collingwood’s reasoning 
 
Skinner, then, is reviving the very position Collingwood’s rapprochement is meant 
to attack – which, in ‘Can Historians be Impartial?’, he provocatively calls “the doctrine 
of the historian as eunuch”.3 Interestingly this is also what Collingwood seems to think 
history is in its “pure” state in Religion and Philosophy. 4 The question is, what argument 
                                                 
1 Skinner, ‘A reply to my critics’, pp. 256-7. This sentence was reprinted unchanged in Regarding Method, p. 
53 
2 Skinner, ‘A reply to my critics’, p. 257 
3 ‘Can Historians be Impartial?’, PH, p. 211 
4 Religion and Philosophy is Collingwood’s first book and, as it was written before the 1925/6 period from 
which, as Dussen identified, Collingwood developed his investigation of history as a science, it ought not 
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does Collingwood offer for thinking this “doctrine of historian as eunuch”, which is also 
Skinner’s revived position, to be wrong? 
In An Autobiography Collingwood offers two first-hand accounts of how the 
rapprochement must arise: one, familiar to anyone who has done it, of how teaching 
undergraduates to look for authors’ questions gives way to philosophical problem-
solving;1 and another, again familiar to anyone who has taken part in one, about 
understanding the arguments of others in academic seminars.2 “To think in that way 
about philosophies not your own”, Collingwood adds, “as I have hinted, is to think 
about them historically”.3 
An Autiobiography also contains some theoretical argument to support the point, 
but it is not, I think, convincingly put. “The reader can easily see… for himself”, 
Collingwood says, how this distinction between historical thinking and philosophical 
thinking “broke down in the light of the question ‘how is the so-called philosophical 
issue to be settled?’” But in fact it is not so easy, especially when Collingwood’s example 
suggests that if the historical question can be answered, then the answer to the 
philosophical question must be ‘yes’. I’ll refer to this as the ‘Leibniz passage’ for reasons 
that will soon become clear: 
 
Perhaps we label [Leibniz’s] problem p14. Then comes the question ‘Does Leibniz 
here deal with p14 rightly or wrongly?’ The answer to this is not quite so simple as 
the ‘realists’ think. If Leibniz when he wrote this passage was so confused in his 
mind as to make a complete mess of the job of solving his problem, he was 
bound at the same time to mix up his own tracks so completely that no reader 
could see quite clearly what his problem had been. For one and the same passage 
states his solution and serves as evidence of what the problem was. The fact that 
                                                                                                                                            
to be surprising that it contains some passages in which Collingwood attacks history in the guise of 
“historical positivism” for being the very thing that he would later insist it should not be. See RP, pp. 38-9, 
42-3 
1 A, p. 75 
2 “In another chapter I have explained that, according to my own ‘logic of question and answer’, a 
philosopher’s doctrines are his answers to certain questions he has asked himself, and no one who does not 
understand what the questions are can hope to understand the doctrines. The same logic committed me to 
the view that anyone can understand any philosopher’s doctrines if he can grasp the questions which they 
are intended to answer. Those questions need not be his own; they may belong to a thought-complex very 
different from any that is spontaneously going on in his own mind; but this ought not to prevent him from 
understanding them and judging whether the persons interested in them are answering them rightly or 
wrongly.” A, p. 55 
3 A, p. 58 
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we can identify his problem is proof that he has solved it; for we only know what 
the problem was by arguing back from the solution.1 
 
This seems to imply that if the ‘realist’ distinction between the ‘what did he say?’ 
and the ‘was he right?’ really collapses, it is only because the answer to the second is fixed 
as ‘yes’ when the first can be answered at all. There quickly follows another example 
where the same thing seems to be argued, this time though the example is not 
‘theoretical’ but ‘practical’: 
 
Naval historians think it worth while to argue about Nelson’s tactical plan at 
Trafalgar because he won the battle. It is not worth while arguing about 
Villeneuve’s plan. He did not succeed in carrying it out, and therefore no one 
will ever know what it was. We can only guess. And guessing is not history.2 
 
Collingwood appears to be dispensing with the possibility of a passage of theory 
or action in which the question or problem is obvious to the reader/historian, despite the 
agent’s failure to solve it properly.3 Furthermore, Collingwood then suggests that 
believing oneself to have identified a failed solution to a question is to attribute to an 
author an eternal question “which all philosophers ask themselves sooner or later”. “As a 
matter of fact”, he then says, an historian who did this “is not basing his assertion on 
evidence; he is only trotting out some philosophical question of which the passage 
vaguely reminds him. For me, then, there were not two separate sets of questions to be 
asked, one historical and one philosophical, about a given passage in a given 
philosophical author. There was one set only, historical.”4 
If this is true, then the present study has been largely a waste of time, because my 
evidence that Collingwood is answering the questions I believe him to be answering is 
evidence enough that those solutions are right. If I argued that he was wrong, I would 
probably be guilty of trotting out some philosophical question of which his work vaguely 
reminds me. So it seems, as I’ve said, that the distinction between the two types of 
question only fails because the answer to the ‘philosophical’ question is fixed as ‘yes’ 
where the first can be answered at all. This is the crack that Gadamer opens up for his 
                                                 
1 A, pp. 69-70 
2 A, p. 70 
3 Gadamer also notices this, which is – I think – probably what brings it to Skinner’s attention later. See 
Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 364 
4 A. pp. 71-2 
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attack on Collingwood’s logic of question and answer as a whole. It only works, 
Gadamer says, if one subscribes to an Hegelian assumption about the world-historical 
importance of victors.1 And it is this little critique of Gadamer’s, I think, which is picked 
up later by Quentin Skinner. Here is how Skinner summarises it: 
 
Collingwood’s own misunderstanding derived, I think, from the fact that he 
chose to link his attack on ‘perennial questions’ with an excessively strong thesis 
to the effect that we cannot even ask whether a given philosopher ‘solved the 
problem he set himself’, since we can only see what the problem was for him if 
he did solve it. Thus ‘the fact that we can identify his problem is proof that he 
has solved it; for we can only know what the problem was by arguing back from 
the solution’.2 
 
Skinner is referring to Collingwood’s conclusion to the Leibniz example, which is 
also the page featuring the Villeneuve example. Dussen has noticed this difficulty, and 
includes it as one of the “puzzling aspects” of Collingwood’s logic of question and 
answer. (Unfortunately he declines the opportunity to discuss it.3) Unlike Dussen, I will 
go into this difficulty, because it is, for the reason we’ve just seen, rather important, and 
because I think it’s actually rather easily solved. 
Collingwood has misstated his usual position here by seeming to conflate 
‘solution’ with ‘successful solution’ – that is ‘answer’ with ‘right answer’. But an 
ostensible solution to a problem can be evidence of the problem without the solution 
being ‘successful’. If by ‘solving’ a problem in this passage Collingwood had meant 
merely ‘offering a solution to it’ then the question of rightness or wrongness is still 
available. Accordingly the fact that we ‘understand’ the solution (as a solution) is proof 
that the problem has been ‘solved’, but not proof that it has been solved well or properly. 
We might know that a speaker attempted to convince his audience along a certain line of 
argument despite the fact that we also know that (a) the audience booed him, and that (b) 
the booing was due to an obvious non-sequitur in his argument. Nevertheless we can 
work out the question he was talking about – political, theological or whatever – by using 
                                                 
1 Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp. 364-5 
2 Skinner, ‘A reply to my critics’, p. 65. Here Skinner cites Collingwood’s Autobiography. See A, p. 70 
3 Dussen says “I will not go into these difficulties, however, but confine myself to the relevance of 
Collingwood’s “logic of question and answer” for historical methodology.” (History as a Science, pp. 295-6) 
Actually though, although this is a “puzzling aspect”, it is also relevant to a treatment of Collingwood’s 
methodology of history, because allowing it to stand unexplained and undefended has, as we’ve just seen, 
allowed Collingwood to be dismissed by other authors dealing with similar questions, on the basis of 
something he didn’t really mean. 
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as evidence what he said in answer to it, and we can work out from the circumstances 
what his intentions were: i.e. to convince his audience that this was the answer. But 
Collingwood does not secretly mean this. When he says ‘solved’ he does not really mean 
‘offered a solution’. He has just confused a good argument he makes elsewhere with a 
bad one he makes only here. 
A passage in the chapter ‘Roman Britain’, also in the Autobiography, states the 
correct version of the point, and here Collingwood quite clearly assumes that the 
historian (and in this passage he is talking specifically about the archaeologist) is still able 
to judge whether or not the solution was a good one: 
 
Whenever you find any object you must ask, ‘What was it for?’ and, arising out 
of that question, ‘Was it good or bad for it? i.e. was the purpose embodied in it 
successfully embodied in it, or unsuccessfully?’1 
 
The Leibniz passage is, then, a misstatement. So what is the real argument for 
why the ‘realist’ distinction between the ‘historical’ question and the ‘philosophical’ 
question is to be abolished? I think Collingwood has two arguments in support of the 
rapprochement: a weak one, which we’ve begun to see, and a much better one which we’ll 
come to next. Collingwood’s claim in the first is that the historian cannot describe a 
belief without evoking it,2 and his argument is this: In order to understand a text we must 
understand the problem that it is meant to solve, and once we have grasped the proposed 
solution we catch ourselves already asking ‘Is it right?’3 The second question, as he says 
here, ‘arises’ out of the first. I think this is what he means. It would anyway put the 
Autobiography argument in line with what he says in The Idea of History and An Essay on 
Metaphysics.4 Historical thinking is, he says, ‘critical’, and sometimes ‘criteriological’.5 This 
does not mean ‘critical’ only in the sense of distinguishing between good evidence and 
bad. Collingwood means to say that in re-enacting past thought the historian “forms his 
own judgement of its value [and] corrects whatever errors he can discern in it”. And he 
continues: 
 
                                                 
1 A, p. 128 
2 This wording taken from Hampsher-Monk, p. 111 
3 Dray emphasises this feature of Collingwood’s account of historical thinking several times in History as Re-
enactment. He doesn’t deal with the passage in An Autobiography which seems to contradict it. See A, p. 27 
4 EM, p. 108 
5 EM, p. 108 
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This criticism of the thought whose history he traces is not something 
secondary to tracing the history of it. It is an indispensable condition of the 
historical knowledge itself. Nothing could be a completer error concerning the 
history of thought than to suppose that the historian as such merely ascertains 
‘what so-and-so thought’, leaving it to some one else to decide ‘whether it was 
true’. All thinking is critical thinking; the thought which re-enacts past thoughts, 
therefore, criticizes them in re-enacting them.1 
 
In An Essay on Metaphysics Collingwood writes that the science of mind “must 
describe the self-judging function which is part and parcel of all thinking and try to 
discover the criteria upon which its judgements are based”.2 In practice I think this 
means the ‘scientist’ – and here we can read ‘historian’ – must answer the question ‘Why 
did he think he was right?’ in the sense of the question ‘What reasons did he have for 
thinking he was right?’ This is why, Collingwood says, these sciences of mind were 
“traditionally called normative sciences” – from the Latin norma: “criterion or standard of 
judgement”.3 
What had yet to be decided is whether historical thinking demands philosophical 
thinking because (a) historical questions cannot be answered without philosophical 
thinking being awoken, or (b) historical questions are, when properly historical, 
themselves philosophically evaluative. By ‘evaluative’ here I mean philosophical truth 
questions, not questions about whether it is historically true that the author thought 
something. An example of (a) might be ‘What is Kant’s theory of beauty?’, where this can 
only be answered by way of philosophically evaluative thinking; and an example of (b) 
might be ‘Does Kant adequately show what beauty is?’ Of course Collingwood does not 
need to come down on the side of one of these options: in fact I think he maintains 
both. Because he is attacking the view that historical questions and philosophical 
questions can be separated – that is, that the ‘what did he think?’ and the ‘was he right?’ 
can be separated – he can appeal to either. In itself it is, though, an important question, 
because, in the first place, it goes some way to answering Collingwood’s question of what 
history is for; and, in the second, if Collingwood’s implicit claim is that properly historical 
questions are philosophically evaluative, then this has some very great consequences for 
history indeed. 
                                                 
1 IH, pp. 215-16 
2 EM, p. 108 
3 EM, p. 108 
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So how do we settle this? Skinner says that, as historians, we do not need to ask 
the truth question, while Collingwood says that we “must”. This “must” can be taken in 
two ways. It might mean that the truth question cannot be avoided; or it might mean 
something like if, as an intellectual historian, you don’t ask the truth question, then you 
are not an historian worth the name. In the language of ‘question and answer’, the four 
possible positions are now as follows: 
 
1. Historical questions are complete without evaluative terms. (This is Skinner’s 
position.) 
2. Historical questions are answerable without evaluative thinking. (This is also 
Skinner’s position.) 
3. Historical questions might be possible without evaluative terms, but in being 
answered evaluative thinking is always awoken. (This is Collingwood’s first 
position.) 
4. Historical questions that are not evaluative are incomplete historical questions. 
(This is Collingwood’s second position.) 
 
Now, 1 and 4 are mutually exclusive, because historical questions either can be 
complete without evaluative terms, or they cannot be. For the same reason, 2 and 4 are 
also mutually exclusive; 2 presupposes 1 because a question that is evaluative cannot be 
answered without evaluative thinking. 
The position which Collingwood tries to argue explicitly is position 3. I have 
already said that it is his ‘weaker’ argument. The stronger argument is available by 
recourse to ‘question and answer’, but Collingwood does not argue it as explicitly. As 
promised we’ll come to it shortly. 
First though there is a further complication to this story. In his Essay on 
Metaphysics Collingwood argues that “all metaphysical questions are historical questions, 
and all metaphysical propositions are historical propositions”.1 We might expect him to 
say next that this is why sciences of thought are unavoidably evaluative, or ‘normative’ in 
the current sense (which would accord with position 3, if not also position 4). But what 
he actually says, in the Essay on Metaphysics, is that the word ‘normative’ may prove 
misleading, because… 
 
                                                 
1 EM, p. 49. This does not mean, of course, that all historical questions are metaphysical questions, or that 
all historical propositions are metaphysical propositions. 
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It conveys by its form the suggestion that the standard or criterion to which it 
refers is a criterion belonging to the practitioner of the science thus described, 
and used by him to judge whether the thinking which he studies has been well 
or ill done; as if it were for the logician to decide whether a non-logician’s 
thoughts are true or false and his arguments valid or invalid, and for the student 
of ethics to pass judgement on the actions of other people as having succeeded 
or failed in their purpose. This suggestion is incorrect. The characteristic of 
thought in virtue of which a science of thought is called normative consists not 
in the possibility that one man’s thoughts may be judged successful or 
unsuccessful by another, real though that possibility is; but in the necessity that 
in every act of thought the thinker himself should judge the success of his own 
act. To avoid that misleading suggestion I propose to substitute for the 
traditional epithet ‘normative’ the more accurate term ‘criteriological’.1 
 
This is a statement that lends weight not to position 3 or 4, but actually to 
position 2 – that historical thinking is possible without evaluative thinking. This is 
Skinner’s position, where although rationality can be assessed, truth cannot. Furthermore, 
combining two of the ‘big claims’ of Collingwood’s Essay on Metaphysics – namely, that (1) 
metaphysical questions are historical questions; and that (2) it is a nonsense question to 
ask whether an absolute presupposition is ‘true’ – one concludes that there must be some 
historical questions, such as ‘what are Hobbes’s absolute presuppositions in Leviathan?’ 
which cannot be philosophically evaluative without being ‘nonsense’.2 This lends weight 
to position 1. 
What we have found here in one book are, at best, exceptions and, at worst, 
contradictions of arguments made in other books by the same author. But we have to be 
careful about what we think this shows. What it does not show is that Collingwood does 
not really believe his own rapprochement argument(s). Neither does it show that those 
arguments are wrong. It might also indicate that Collingwood isn’t aware that what he 
says in his Essay on Metaphysics contradicts what he says elsewhere, or it might show that 
although he is aware of it, he doesn’t really care. 
I think Collingwood is probably deliberately ignoring the apparent contradiction 
between both positions 3 and 4, and his ‘position 2’ statement in the Essay on Metaphysics, 
because he does not really think it is a contradiction at all. The Essay on Metaphysics was 
written during Collingwood’s voyage to the Dutch East Indies in late 1938, revised a little 
                                                 
1 EM, p. 109 
2 See EM, pp. 47-8 
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in Java, and revised further during the return voyage in early 1939. It seems unlikely that, 
while writing the passage I’ve just quoted in 1938-9, he would not be aware that he 
seemed to be contradicting what he’d already said in his Essay on Philosophical Method 
(1933) and again more recently in ‘Reality as History’ (1936). Furthermore, he cannot 
have changed his mind on it – at least not for good – because he would restate it that 
very same year in his Autobiography, where he gives it the title rapprochement. So I think 
Collingwood must, or at least should, have been aware that it sounds like a contradiction. 
So why does he not address this? Either one of Collingwood’s arguments is 
wrong – that is, either historical thinking is philosophically evaluative, or it isn’t – or the 
two arguments are proposed answers to different questions and can be reconciled. 
They can in fact be reconciled. The rapprochement appears only when history as a 
discipline is being discussed (or, as in the Essay on Philosophical Method, the history of 
philosophy), and not when ‘historical thinking’ per se, which may arise in other sorts of 
systematic thinking, is being discussed.1 Metaphysical questions actually are historical 
questions, Collingwood says, even though they cannot ask the truth question.2 But because 
they aren’t evaluative, they are not of the normal kind of historical question that 
historians answer. Those kinds of historical investigators are a special sub-class called 
‘metaphysicians’, with special dispensation, if you like. Similarly, logic is a science of 
thought which relies on historical thinking, but questions of logic are apparently not 
evaluative.3 Here we have exceptions, then, to the claim that all historical questions are 
‘was it true?’ questions, and also to the argument that all historical thinking causes ‘Was it 
true?’ questions to ‘arise’. There are actually two senses of ‘historical question’: there are 
those, such as metaphysical questions, which either are not necessarily or cannot be 
philosophically evaluative – which are the ‘historical’ questions that lie at the foundation 
of all the sciences of human affairs; and then there are the historical questions that 
historians deal with – the questions at the root of the kind of history discussed in An 
Autobiography, The Idea of History, and The Principles of History – and these are the historical 
questions that must be evaluative.4 
                                                 
1 Although he often speaks as if history is the only science of thought, he actually doesn’t think that it is. 
“Plenty of other people beside the psychologists have been studying thought, and studying it in an orderly 
and systematic way, for a long time”, he writes in the Essay on Metaphysics, before naming “metaphysicians, 
logicians, and others whom I will not enumerate”. EM, p. 104 
2 EM, pp. 52, 47-8 
3 EM, p. 109 
4 In order to sustain this against Collingwood’s own real-life separation of the question ‘What is Aristotle 
saying and what does he mean by it?’ from “the further question ‘Is it true?’”, one only has to point out 
that this separation is reported as occurring before the First World War, and as a lecturing technique. See 
A, p. 27 
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My inquiry here concerns the historical questions that historians and historians of 
ideas deal with, and although there is further inquiry to be made about how history 
underpins the other sciences of human affairs, I propose to park that inquiry here and 
return to our real concern, which is the history of ideas – taking with us the continuing 
preliminary conclusion that either (4) the kind of historical questions which pertain to 
this history of ideas as a discipline must be evaluative; or (3) the only way in which 
historical questions are answered is one in which philosophically evaluative thinking is 
awoken. 
Skinner deals his blow to both positions in the same passage: “our task as 
historians”, he says, “is to try to recover Machiavelli’s point of view; and… in order to 
discharge this task, what we need to employ is solely the concept of rational acceptability, 
not that of truth”.1 The words “what we need to employ is solely” confirms, I think, that 
Skinner’s position is both 1 and 2, rather than only 1. Whether the reader takes Skinner’s 
position that this is now philosophy, or Collingwood’s that it is still history, I am not 
content to leave him with a contradiction like this between two figures of the field who 
want to occupy the same space. Who is right? 
The odds seem to be stacked in Collingwood’s favour, and for two reasons 
corresponding to his two possible positions. In order to find that Collingwood is right, 
we would only have to decide either that historical questions must be evaluative, or 
(failing that) that although historical questions themselves don’t have to be evaluative, the 
re-enactment of reasoning inevitably awakens some kind of evaluative thinking. The 
second demonstration is rather easier, I think, than the first. Intellectual historians can 
describe their authors as ‘attacking’, ‘defending’, ‘trying to show’, ‘using a specific kind of 
language’, and so on with or without following those authors’ reasoning. But every time 
they describe authors as ‘failing’, ‘showing’, ‘proving’, ‘disproving’ and so on, they reveal 
not only that they are following their authors’ thinking, but also that they are alert to the 
rightness2 of the evidence and considerations being offered to substantiate truth claims. 
Whether the historian’s question demanded it explicitly or not, such an historian has 
‘watching’ for truth. Of course an historian can deliberately keep that philosophical 
alertness and its language out of his narrative, and many historians have, do, and perhaps 
always will. But this does not prove that he had succeeded in avoiding philosophical 
                                                 
1 Skinner, ‘A reply to my critics’, pp. 256-7. This sentence was reprinted unchanged in Regarding Method, p. 
53. 
2 By ‘rightness’ I mean to refer to what Collingwood says (A, pp. 37-8), which is as distinct from ‘true’ as 
Skinner’s use of ‘rational’, but may also be used to refer to the ‘correct’ answer. 
 - 196 -
thinking in the process of searching for his historical answer. It might equally show only 
that he might have wanted to hide it from his readers. 
I have said that I think what Collingwood means is that once the historian has 
grasped the proposed solution he catches himself already asking ‘Is it right?’ It is this that 
underpins the third position outlined above – that historical questions might be possible 
without evaluative terms, but in being answered evaluative thinking is always awoken. 
If this were Collingwood’s position, he would be wrong. It seems perfectly 
possible at times to follow another’s reasoning without reflecting on the truth of it, 
particularly where the rightness of the answer is of no concern. As in those familiar one-
way conversations with people explaining their intended solutions to problems on their 
minds, you can find yourself thinking little more than ‘well that’s his plan’. It would be 
simply dogmatic to reply that, because I can maintain my neutrality in this way, and take 
no interest in whether the plan is the right one, that it is proof that I haven’t understood 
my friend’s intended solution in relation to its problem. The same is often – perhaps 
even usually – true of other people’s conference papers. It is, then, untrue that all cases 
of following other people’s reasoning and solutions to questions awakens philosophically 
evaluative thinking. We follow it when there is something at stake for us – when we are 
‘interested’. But when we are not, we follow the reasoning more passively. 
In the case of pursuing an answer to an historical question, that ‘interest’ is more 
assured. So perhaps the first demonstration – i.e. that complete historical questions 
themselves must be evaluative – is easier. But actually that demonstration is even more 
difficult, because the questions to which so many historians’ narratives are intended as 
the answers are not themselves inherently evaluative questions. Historians of ideas might 
pursue answers to their questions, and be highly ‘interested’ in their subjects’ reasoning, 
without commenting on, or even caring about, whether what their subjects thought and 
said was true. If these sorts of questions are incomplete as historical questions, what kind 
of questions are they? And, if they are still valid questions in their own right, if they are 
answerable, and if they provide knowledge as a result, then what kind of knowledge is 
that if not ‘historical’? 
It might be rather less difficult to demonstrate that intellectual history sometimes 
answers evaluative questions. Those questions are, though, often implicit. If an 
intellectual historian says that an author ‘shows’ something, he might well be implying his 
own agreement, which in turn means that he thinks the question, whatever it was, has 
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been correctly answered. But this shows not that evaluative questions are unavoidable, 
but merely that some do not even try to avoid them. 
I think we have to conclude preliminarily that Collingwood’s argument is 
inconclusive. His claim that the historian “must” ask ‘Was he right?’ in conjunction with 
a properly historical question cannot be a logical “must”, whatever Collingwood thinks. 
It is not a logical necessity because it is not necessitated by any of the characteristic terms 
of historical questions that we have so far encountered. 
However – and this is a big ‘however’ – it might make sense if what Collingwood 
has in mind is the practical service historians “must” provide for their societies, or 
something about what it is that motivates historical questions in the first place. The ‘Was 
he right?’ question might then be a further necessary feature of historical questions, 
because of where the historical question arises. This is a loose end I’ll pick up in the next 
chapter, because it concerns what the history of ideas is for, but I’ll hint at the answer 
here so as to close the rapprochement question for now. 
The discovery that Collingwood’s rapprochement between history and philosophy is 
inconclusive on its own account reveals that either his argument fails, or it must 
presuppose something we are not yet getting. What I have decided it presupposes is 
another rapprochement Collingwood has in mind; namely, that between ‘theory and 
practice’ – which is of course the title of the Autobiography’s closing chapter. Collingwood 
does not say that the relationship between these two aspects of his rapprochement is one of 
presupposition, and that final chapter covers diverse topics. But logically the rapprochement 
between theory and practice must be presupposed by the rapprochement between history 
and philosophy, and for this reason: The truth question is necessitated not by the form 
that historical questions take, but by the practical, social, and lived experience out of 
which historical questions should arise. Collingwood answers his question, in ‘Can 
Historians be Impartial?’, in the negative: historians cannot be impartial, he says.1 His 
argument as he puts it, though, fails because he (again) habitually states what counts as 
historical knowledge, as opposed to what is “only a form of pigeon-hole ready to receive 
historical knowledge”. In order to succeed, Collingwood ought to have pointed out that 
the reason historians cannot be impartial is that they should not investigate historical 
questions that don’t matter to anyone, where there is no dispute over ‘rightness’ that 
needs to be settled. The answer to an enduringly important question of how the history 
                                                 
1 See ‘Can Historians be Impartial’, PH, pp. 209-18 
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of political thought is to be done, then, is to be sought for in social and political 
philosophy itself. 
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Part VI 
 
Theory and Practice: What the History of Ideas is For 
 
 
 
i. A survey of the site 
ii. What history is not for 
iii. Self-knowledge through the science of human affairs 
iv. Self-knowledge by rethinking and situational insight 
v. Transition from practice to theory 
vi. History and freedom 
vii. History and duty 
viii. Transition from freedom to civilization and progress 
ix. History and civilization: in theory 
x. History and civilization: in practice 
xi. Progress 
 
 
 
 
“It would be a more disastrous mistake in the science of mind to forget that 
thought it always practical than to forget that it is sometimes theoretical.” 
– The New Leviathan, 1. 68 
 
 
 
i 
A survey of the site 
 
The prologue to Speculum Mentis opens with the declaration that “All thought 
exists for the sake of action”. “If thought were the mere discovery of interesting facts”, 
Collingwood adds, “its indulgence, in a world full of desperate evils… would be the act 
of a traitor”. The New Leviathan, twenty years later, contains a similar statement: “real 
thinking… always starts from practice and returns to practice; for it is based on ‘interest’ 
in the thing thought about; that is, on a practical concern with it”.1 
But for what kind of action, for what kind of practical concern, does scientific 
historical thinking exist? According to Quentin Skinner, “the past has been studied for a 
myriad of changing reasons, and… any attempt to summarise them will almost inevitably 
degenerate into just such a string of clichés”.2 It is my intention to explain here the ways 
                                                 
1 NL, 18.13 
2 Skinner Regarding Method, p. 25 
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in which Collingwood manages to avoid these ‘clichés’ and offer some good suggestions 
to one of his 1926 questions: “What are we doing it [history] for? in other words, how 
does this study fit into our general view of the aims and purposes of human life?”1 
The value of history is discussed in An Autobiography, The Idea of History, and The 
New Leviathan. In the Autobiography it is dealt with in more than one of the chapters in 
roughly the final third of the book. Although only chapter eight carries the title ‘The 
Need for a Philosophy of History’, chapters nine and ten – ‘The Foundations of the 
Future’, and ‘History as the Self-Knowledge of Mind’ respectively – obviously continue 
the discussion. They do so, though, in much more extramural terms. After a short 
interlude in chapter eleven, in which Collingwood recalls his work on Roman Britain 
firmly in terms of his logic of question and answer, he returns to the practical purpose of 
history in chapter twelve, ‘Theory and Practice’. In the Autobiography, then, it is in 
chapters nine, ten and twelve that Collingwood makes his most focused statements about 
the purposes of history. 
In The Idea of History the question of the purpose of history survives as one of the 
four set out in the introduction.2 The ensuing text is most useful, though, for 
Collingwood’s arguments about what history is not for. In what follows I’ve dealt with 
these arguments first. 
From Collingwood’s preface to the ostensibly ‘practical’, real-world-concerning 
New Leviathan, the reader would expect the question to be broached there too. 
Collingwood recalls thinking out “the fundamental ideas of the present book” in 1919, 
including especially “the problems of history which bore on my subject”.3 But it is not 
especially clear from the text of The New Leviathan what exactly those problems were. 
Prima facie, history, or “historical consciousness”, only really features in relation to what 
Collingwood calls the ‘historical plain method’, which has already been discussed (III:v), 
and in relation to what he says about man’s consciousness of duty.4 
Collingwood’s main arguments about the purpose of history are spread across 
these three texts. He does not, I think, quite succeed in the arguments he considered the 
most important. His priority is really the claim that history provides self-knowledge. 
After our brief review of Collingwood’s attacks on the false purposes of history (ii), we’ll 
deal with the self-knowledge arguments, of which there are three strategies (iii & iv). 
                                                 
1 L26, IH, p. 359 
2 IH, pp. 7-10 
3 NL, p. lxi 
4 See NL, 18.5-91 
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Collingwood’s contention is not, I think, demonstrated very satisfactorily in any of them 
– though this has not prevented it from becoming a celebrated claim. Similarly his 
attempt to demonstrate the relationship between history and freedom (vi) – one of the 
main arguments in The Idea of History’s ‘Epilegomena’ – is incomplete. There are also 
problems with his equation between history and the concept of duty (vii), presented in 
The New Leviathan and elsewhere.1 
Once these arguments have been cleared I’ll argue that it is only in view of the 
relationship between history and “practical reason” – the practical reason upon which, as 
explained in The New Leviathan, progress and civilization depend – that Collingwood 
ultimately provides his best answers to the question of how history fits into “our general 
view of the aims and purposes of human life”.2 It is also this relationship between theory 
and practice which solves the question left over at the end of the last part of this study: 
namely, why historians must also ask ‘Was he right?’ 
. 
 
ii 
What history is not for 
 
In The Idea of History Collingwood discusses what history is not for – though, 
again, to today’s historians of ideas, little of what he says in those attacks will be new. 
Historians of ideas now tend to presuppose, for example, that their discipline is not for 
making predictions.3 History is also not for telling us how to act – the ‘pragmatic theory 
of history’ which Collingwood attacks in his 1926 lectures. And I am sure that today’s 
historians of ideas do not think that the purpose of their discipline is that it tells us how 
to think. 
The only reason to discuss these attacks is that they follow the pattern of 
Collingwood’s argument strategy that I’ve already tried to point out. As he formulates 
                                                 
1 ‘Elsewhere’ means his 1940 Lectures on Moral Philosophy. The most relevant part for our purposes has 
been published in EPP under the title ‘Duty’ (EPP, pp. 150-9) 
2 L26, IH, p. 359 
3 See IH, p. 220. A further objection that Collingwood deals with in ‘Human Nature and Human History’ 
leads Collingwood into an argument that might not be shared by today’s historians as people – viz. that 
historical knowledge is not the only way in which mind can be known – but which, in their historical 
practice, is anyway irrelevant to them. In other words, although they might think Collingwood wrong to 
claim that there is no difference between what mind is and what mind does, nevertheless they have no 
interest in promoting their discipline to the study of what mind is as distinct from what it does – from, that 
is, ‘things done’. Historians are only interested in minds ‘doing things’, and not in the mind ‘at rest’, or as a 
‘structure’. For that reason I have chosen not to subject this argument of Collingwood’s to much 
discussion here. 
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them in The Idea of History, his attacks on these claims tend to be circumnavigations of 
points that, in view of the starting question principle, can be put more succinctly. By 
‘circumnavigation’ I mean that, in order to make those points, Collingwood again ends 
up discussing history as concerned with a characteristic subject-matter,1 rather than as the 
science that answers questions of a particular character.2 The value of ‘doing’ history 
means the value of investigative history.3 What Collingwood might more easily say, then, is 
that questions of prediction are not historical questions, because they lack one or more 
of the necessary characteristics: they cannot ask ‘what he meant by it’, because the res 
gestae, the things done, have not yet been done at all. Any attempt to reconcile a question 
of prediction with a ‘what he meant’ results in nonsense: ‘Why did the Prime Minister 
order the invasion of Cyprus?’ is a nonsense historical question when the ‘thing done’ is 
actually a thing not yet done. Explaining that properly historical questions cannot be 
questions of prediction is all Collingwood needs to show in order to demonstrate that 
prediction is not what history is ‘for’ – though it may provide material that can be used 
for answering questions of a different kind. ‘Is the Prime Minister going to order the 
invasion of Cyprus?’ is a predictive question, and answering it might well demand 
breaking it down into smaller questions and considerations, some of which will be 
historical. 
The same circumnavigation of the main point is evident in Collingwood’s attack 
in his 1926 Lectures upon the ‘pragmatic theory of history’, according to which history 
tells us what to do. This theory, Collingwood says, is “out of date. No one preaches it 
now, for people generally recognise that it assumes a finality about the results of 
historical research which they do not possess”.4 What Collingwood means by “finality” is 
the idea that history “determines” past facts and that, on that basis, “it can tell you what 
to do in the present”.5 He has to concede, though, that history does in fact have pragmatic 
value. We don’t have to assume that all cases of influenza repeat themselves precisely to 
know that our knowledge of how to treat influenza is derived from past experience; and 
                                                 
1 i.e. the position we’ve also seen him attacking Hegel, Voltaire, and the ‘theorists of the Geisteswissenschaften 
for holding. See IH, p. 434-5, and PH, p.179 
2 IH, pp. 220-1. See also IH, pp. 239-40 
3 This is why the following discussion takes no account of what David Boucher has identified as the 
common conception of the history of philosophy among British idealists. I have no reason to doubt any of 
what Boucher says in his description of Collingwood’s understanding of the history of political thought as 
a “triadic” understanding. The conception of ‘history’ that he is describing, though, is that of a succession 
of philosophers and their ideas, rather than that of ‘history’ as the process of the historian investigating 
that succession and those ideas. See Social and Political Thought, pp. 71-80 
4 See L26, IH, p. 397. This has not stopped Stein Helgeby from arguing that, for Collingwood, the value of 
history is that it shows us what we must do. See Helgeby, ‘Action, Duty and Self-Knowledge’, p. 104 
5 L26, IH, p. 397 
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“a soldier or statesman who knew nothing of the history of war or politics would be 
quite unfit for his work”.1 But what is important to remember despite this, Collingwood 
argues, is that the pragmatic value of history is not the “essence” of history, because the 
facts it relies upon can never be determined in the way that it assumes. It lacks, he says, 
the “finality” required. 
Alan Donagan criticises Collingwood for being “oblivious to the fact that his 
own analysis of scientific history shows that it too can yield ready-made rules of a kind. 
Historical situations recur,” Donagan says, “just as natural situations do”.2 It seems to me 
too that Collingwood’s argument, as he puts it, is awfully weak – but for different 
reasons to those advanced by Donagan. All Collingwood’s argument means is that, if we 
rely on the certainty of facts to tell us what to do, we cannot use history, where there is 
no such certainty. If certainty is not relevant, though, why should history not tell us what 
to do, precisely for the reason hinted in the examples of medicine, war, and statecraft? 
We might still allow history to offer us lessons, even when those lessons are based on an 
historical fact acknowledged to be provisional. 
To rescue Collingwood’s claim we must again appeal to the character of historical 
questions. When Collingwood says that its pragmatic value is not the “essence”3 of 
history, he appeals to the impossibility in history of ‘determining’ facts in the way the 
‘pragmatic theory’ requires. He would do much better to point out that ‘What should I 
do here?’ is not the essence of an historical question. ‘What should I do?’ is, though, a 
perfectly legitimate question of itself. It is, for Collingwood, what initiates practical 
reason – which is why in the Autobiography and New Leviathan he describes the moral, 
political, and economic characters of the same action as overlapping.4 We perpetually 
face situations that demand action one way or another. We can choose to act 
capriciously, or we can appeal to reason (and reasons). Acting by caprice is essentially 
negating the question by bypassing it. Practical reason, which results from accepting or 
formulating the question, takes one of three ascending, overlapping forms (which need 
not detain us here).5 Whichever form is appealed to, I think Collingwood’s point is that 
the process of thinking by which we deliberate, decide, and ‘resolve’ to act is a process 
that may contain some historical thinking, but should not be carried out entirely by 
                                                 
1 L26, IH, p. 397 
2 Donagan, Later Philosophy, p. 239. Donagan cites IH, pp. 223-4, 265 
3 L26, IH, p. 397 
4 A, pp. 148-9 
5 For a concise summary of Collingwood’s attempts to specify the different forms of rational action, see 
Boucher’s introduction to Essays in Political Philosophy (EPP, pp. 43-51). For Collingwood’s own explanation 
the reader can hardly do better than to survey the essays collected together as Part One (EPP, pp. 58-159). 
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reference to ‘things done’. This would in fact be a dereliction of existential duty, since it 
would be imitation. But what is wrong with it is not only that it would very often lead us 
to take the worse course, but also that it crushes the distinct features of our situations 
and those of others in the past that make those situations unique, by presupposing that 
they are the same situation. That presupposition underlies the recourse to history from 
the question ‘What should I do here?’ By ‘recourse’ I mean the assumption that questions 
initiating practical reason and questions initiating historical thinking are congruent. It is 
because we can expose that presupposition as false that we also know it to be illegitimate 
to decide what to do purely by recourse to historical example. In the world of ‘action’ 
these situations never repeat themselves in all their details, though they might resemble 
each other in certain selected features. This is why, although historical thinking cannot 
determine what we do, it might yield insight that assists our decision-making by eliminating 
enough alternatives that only one action is left available. So when Collingwood says that 
its pragmatic value is not the “essence”1 of history, he ought to appeal not to the 
impossibility of “finality” in history, but instead to the fact that ‘What should I do?’ is not 
the “essence” of an historical question. Donagan is right that even scientific history can 
“yield” ready-made rules of a kind, but the point is that historical questions are not 
themselves quests for discovering rules. 
A note has to be added here to rescue the doctrine of re-enactment. In the world 
of thought, in the world of philosophy, we must be able to re-enact philosophical 
situations in order to understand them. Those situations, then, do ‘repeat themselves’, or 
can be made to – albeit “incapsulated” in the historian’s mind. So is this a difference 
between the outside world of doing things and the inside world of thinking? No. Even 
here, Collingwood could point out, we are free thinkers, and even when situations are 
shared in this sense, history cannot tell us what to do. The historical fact that Karl Marx 
answered our shared question in this particular way does not mean that I am committed 
to giving the same answer, or in the same way – unless political sectarian2 loyalty is more 
important to me than problem-solving. 
So if history cannot tell us what to do, what is its practical value? Let us examine 
Collingwood’s arguments as he presents them. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 L26, IH, p. 397 
2 NL, 16.11 
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iii 
Self-knowledge by a science of human affairs 
 
History, Collingwood thought, could become as important in the twentieth 
century as natural science was from the beginning of the seventeenth century; it could 
become the foundation of a “science of human affairs”. The urgency for advancement in 
the science of human affairs is powerfully illustrated in chapter nine of Collingwood’s 
Autobiography, ‘The Foundations of the Future’: 
 
The [First World] War was an unprecedented triumph for natural science… 
[but] an unprecedented disgrace to the human intellect… The contrast between 
the success of modern European minds in controlling almost any situation in 
which the elements are physical bodies and the forces physical forces, and their 
inability to control situations in which the elements are human beings and the 
forces mental forces, left an indelible mark on the memory of every one who 
was concerned in it… it was a plain fact that the gigantic increase since about 
1600 in his [man’s] power to control Nature had not been accompanied by a 
corresponding increase, or anything like it, in his power to control human 
situations.1 
 
“What was needed,” Collingwood concludes, “was not more goodwill and 
human affection, but more understanding of human affairs and more knowledge of how 
to handle them”.2 
The ‘science of human nature’ (on the model of natural science) had, 
Collingwood says, failed as a science of human affairs. It could not, and cannot, fulfil that 
function.3 “It was precisely because history offered us something altogether different 
from rules”, he writes, “namely insight, that it could offer us the help we needed in 
diagnosing our moral and political problems”.4 He writes, in the same vein in The Idea of 
History, that “the work which was to be done by the science of human nature is actually 
done, and can only be done, by history”.5 
                                                 
1 A, pp. 90-2 
2 A, p. 92 
3 IH, pp. 208-9 
4 A, p. 101 
5 IH, p. 209. For an interesting discussion of how Collingwood expands the scope of the ‘historical plain 
method’ in The New Leviathan, see Boucher, Social and Political Thought, pp. 117-19. 
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Now, if history were simply the science that deals with things done by other 
people, then, given the character of historical questions, there would be good reason to 
agree with Collingwood about the place of ‘historical thinking’ at the foundation of the 
sciences of human affairs as we know them. If history is that which goes from the 
unknown to the known concerning the deliberate acts of other minds, how could a 
science of human affairs possibly proceed without it? It is difficult to imagine what 
would be left of certain disciplines if they attempted to conduct their characteristic 
enquiries without investigating or referring to people’s reasoning. The exceptions among 
‘human sciences’ are, as well as psychology, those that are only interested in humans as 
physical entities, animals, and perhaps as a kind of collective organism – ‘cultures’ in the 
sense in which it is used by bacteriologists. It would still be possible to do ‘human 
geography’: to give descriptions of population densities and the physical conditions 
amongst which people live; it would be possible to describe the preponderances of 
diseases of all kinds; it would be possible to measure infant mortality, as it would be to 
compile statistics and descriptions of anything which is the same regardless of ‘what was 
meant’ by it. But as we move towards anthropology, and as the ideas, beliefs, and 
intentions of those involved play ever more of a role in characterising exactly what it is 
they do, then the more ‘history’ in Collingwood’s sense underpins the study of it. 
Anything relating to social or political activity becomes extremely difficult without that 
which Collingwood calls ‘historical thinking’. 
This is not the place to argue that we should be interested in studying and 
knowing about other people’s purposive actions in general. It seems to me that it is 
obvious that, for whatever practical or impractical reason, we more often than not have 
to understand something about ‘why’ other people do what they do, where ‘why’ 
indicates an ‘historical’ sense, and that we should do this as well as possible. Achieving 
this often requires some investigative effort. We can’t rely on the immediacy of ‘aesthetic’ 
to provide us with the knowledge of whatever it is we seek. No more than I can know 
the ideas embodied in Parmenides by a single reading, or in a “rotten little Roman fort” by 
just looking at it, can I understand the reasoning behind a dervish’s whirl just by 
spectating it, or the complex web of actions and behaviours which we call the European 
Union by doing a tour of its expensive collection of architectural edifices. Bodies like that 
are what they do – they ‘are’ their res gestae – and not the steel and glass houses in which 
they situate themselves. 
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Collingwood’s definition of ‘history’ in this sense is obviously very broad – so 
broad that it makes a lot of other disciplines (partially) dependent on historical inquiry. 
As Collingwood defines ‘history’, then, his claim can hardly be contradicted. 
Collingwood is right: the sciences of human affairs really should be built upon the 
principle (among others) of proceeding from specific unknowns concerning the 
deliberate acts of other minds to correlative specific knowns by using reason and 
evidence. If that is what ‘history’ means, then history really is the right way to answer our 
questions about European civilization.1 
 
 
iv 
Self-knowledge by rethinking and situational insight 
 
But Collingwood is really making a more ambitious claim than this. He is saying 
that history is for self-knowledge.2 The gap that has to be bridged is between the quite 
straightforward claim that ‘history’ is the investigation of things done, and the claim that 
history produces knowledge of the self. 
There are two ways of bridging that gap. The first is that the self is (partly) 
‘mind’, and that knowledge of what mind has done is therefore knowledge of what the 
self has, in a sense, ‘done’ as well. On this account human nature is human history 
because we are our species history.3 Studying our history is thus studying what we are. 
This is what is presupposed when someone says that history offers a science of human 
affairs, that we are all humans, and that therefore history offers us knowledge of 
ourselves. In this sense the self-knowledge offered by the human sciences discussed 
above is rather a mundane one, like the equivalent statement that human biology 
provides self-knowledge. 
A variant which does not appeal to a corporate mind is that the self is ‘man’, and 
that knowledge of what man has done is knowledge of what the self can do. In history, 
though, this explanation invites additional objections that become obvious as soon as 
one tries to think of concrete examples. My study of things done by Oliver Cromwell 
                                                 
1 Boucher, ‘The Place of Education in Civilization’, in David Boucher, James Connelly, & Tariq Modood 
(eds), Philosophy, History and Civilization: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on R. G. Collingwood, pp. 287-8 
2 Boucher, in The Social and Political Thought of R. G. Collingwood, does not comment on the success or failure 
of Collingwood’s argument that history is for self-knowledge. He is quite right, though, to say that, in view 
of this claim, the importance of history to civilization in the education of society “goes without saying”. 
See Boucher, Social and Political Thought, p. 227 
3 See for instance NL, 9.21-22 
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actually tells me nothing about myself. Moreover, even if it were true that in the same 
situation I could and would do the same as Cromwell, the fact is that I will never face 
Cromwell’s situation. The only knowledge of my situation I get from this is that my 
situation is not Cromwell’s. 
A second strategy for bridging the gap is to point out, as Collingwood does in The 
Idea of History, that I can apply historical methods to investigating my own res gestae. 
Historical thinking helps me to answer ‘why’ questions about by own choices, and 
liberates me from reliance on memory.1 The problem with this strategy is that, although 
it is obviously true that in this way I can answer questions about what I have done, it is 
true only trivially that this is self-knowledge. If I find myself wondering one day why I 
did something, I could go back through my correspondence, ask people I’d spoken to at 
the time what kind of things I’d been saying about it, or whatever. And I would construct 
some kind of answer. It is true that this can be done well and badly, scientifically and 
unscientifically – and it seems preferable that it be done scientifically. But ‘self-
knowledge’ in this sense falls short of what Collingwood seems to mean by it. Commonly 
we would describe this as merely going back through records to fill in gaps in our 
memories, and it is surely not more of this that we need to improve our control of 
human situations in order to avert further disasters like the First World War. ‘Know 
thyself’ is an instruction which seems to demand something more. So how does 
Collingwood explain his claim that history fulfils (part of) that demand? 
Chapter ten of the Autobiography is called ‘History as the Self-Knowledge of 
Mind’. It is not a long chapter – only twelve pages and a bit. Yet it takes Collingwood 
seven or eight pages to begin to explain the title’s proposition. (In the meantime he 
mostly discusses the re-enactment and “incapsulation” of thoughts.) When he finally gets 
down to the business of the title, he offers a bright and rare example of his ability to 
explain the knowledge provided by history in terms of historical questions. But it is also a 
very hurried explanation, and the reader will see in a moment why it requires 
disentangling and protracting. Here is what Collingwood says: 
 
Every historical problem ultimately arises out of ‘real’ life. The scissors-and-
paste men think… that first of all people get into the habit of reading books, 
and then the books put questions into their heads. But I am not talking about 
scissors-and-paste history. In the kind of history that I am thinking of, the kind 
                                                 
1 IH, p. 219 
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I have been practising all of my life, historical problems arise out of practical 
problems. We study history in order to see more clearly into the situation in 
which we are called upon to act. Hence the plane on which, ultimately, all 
problems arise is the plane of ‘real’ life: that to which they are referred for their 
solution is history. 
If what the historian knows is past thoughts, and if he knows them by 
re-thinking them himself, it follows that the knowledge he achieves by historical 
inquiry is not knowledge of his situation as opposed to knowledge of himself, it 
is a knowledge of his situation which is at the same time knowledge of himself. 
In re-thinking what somebody else thought, he thinks it himself. In knowing 
that somebody else thought it, he knows that he himself is able to think it. And 
finding out what he is able to do is finding out what kind of a man he is.1 
 
This, Collingwood says, was a train of thought not complete until about 1930, 
and he adds that it answered his problem of how man could construct a science of 
human affairs and obey the oracular precept ‘know thyself’.2 
We’ve already dealt with the science of human affairs. It appears that there are in 
fact two further arguments here about history and self-knowledge. At the end of this 
passage Collingwood says something he also says elsewhere, namely that history shows 
us what we can think, or re-think, and therefore what kind of people we are ourselves. 
The other argument, which I’ll discuss second, is that history gives us knowledge of our 
situations. Situation and self are, it seems, lashed together with the claim that “it is 
knowledge of the situation which is at the same time knowledge of himself”. 
The second part of the explanation given in the passage above is this: “In re-
thinking what somebody else thought, he thinks it himself. In knowing that somebody 
else thought it, he knows that he himself is able to think it. And finding out what he is 
able to do is finding out what kind of a man he is”.3 Now this explanation, it seems to 
me, is a cautious attempt to bridge the gap between knowledge of what man has done 
and knowledge of the self by the ‘variant’ of saying that the self is ‘man’, and that 
knowledge of what man has done is knowledge of what the self can do – though here 
those ‘things done’ are illustrated as things thought, which avoids the objection that ‘I will 
never face Cromwell’s situation’. The unfortunate consequence of putting it this way is 
that the explanation for why history provides self-knowledge is more than a little 
                                                 
1 A, pp. 114-15 
2 A, pp. 115-16 
3 A, pp. 114-15 
 - 210 -
anticlimactic. That the history of ideas might provide man with self-knowledge gives it, it 
seems to me, some potential gravitas. But if we can’t explain that self-knowledge in terms 
more significant than the fact that by following the reasoning of, say, Kant, I find out 
that I am the kind of man who can follow the reasoning of Kant, then the ambition 
initially stated seems not to deliver properly. Cricket scorekeeping provides self-
knowledge in the same way. By doing it I find out that I am the kind of man who can be 
relied upon to preside over an accurate scorecard. Collingwood, I think, saw this as soon 
as he penned this passage. What he says next is intended as a remedy: 
 
If he is able to understand, by rethinking them, the thoughts of a great many 
different kinds of people, it follows that he must be a great many kinds of man. 
He must be, in fact, a microcosm of all the history he can know. Thus his own 
self-knowledge is at the same time his knowledge of the world of human 
affairs.1 
  
This short passage is much more suggestive. However, this train of thought, 
having rapidly accelerated over the course of three sentences, then halts, and gives way to 
a discussion of how the above realization solved his problem concerning the science of 
human affairs, and then to a discussion about his writing, publishing, and health – which 
takes up the remaining three pages of the chapter. The reader is supposed to be left, I 
think, seeing several things at once: first, that learning about what other people have 
thought and done you learn about what man is. The reader is also meant to see that, 
secondly, by learning about what other people have thought – learning, that is, by 
thinking these things yourself – you learn about what you are. And thirdly, you see that 
history is the science for investigating the actions of all people (including yourself), and 
the only science for this. The first two of these points Collingwood thinks he has already 
explained in the first seven pages of chapter ten of the Autobiography. Those pages 
actually deal with re-enactment and the idea of one person’s thoughts “incapsulated” in 
the mind of the re-thinker. In order to see how this provides self-knowledge, the reader 
must, I think, go back to the passage on incapsulation2 and start reading again with the 
later explanation in mind. What becomes clear is that this “incapsulation” in history is 
supposed to provide self-knowledge by overcoming the object/subject distinction. If 
there is no distinction between the known object and the subject, then the subject too is 
                                                 
1 A, p.115 
2 A, p.113 
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known. Again, though, history’s contribution to self-knowledge is explained in terms of 
something the individual does and, thereby, finds himself able to do.1 The language of 
incapsulation by re-thinking – “removing the gap” between object and subject, as 
Browning has put it – only disguises the anti-climax.2 
Perhaps a little more convincing is an explanation in The Idea of History that 
Collingwood plainly thinks is the converse of the same point: that when the historian 
finds certain historical matters unintelligible, “he has discovered a limitation of his own 
mind; he has discovered that there are certain ways in which he is not, or no longer, or 
not yet, able to think”. “It is the historian himself who stands at the bar of judgement”, 
he adds, “and there reveals his own mind in its strength and weakness, its virtues and its 
vices”.3 
It would certainly be a significant self-discovery to find that one was unable to 
think of a certain thing, or unable to think in a certain way. One would in this way find 
oneself to have some kind of thinking handicap, which it is probably useful to be aware 
of. But it is hard to see how you would come to the conclusion that ‘I am unable to think 
this yet/anymore’, rather than concluding that the person whose thought you were 
attempting to follow must have been extremely confused, and that those who say they’ve 
followed him must be as well. 
In the Autobiography, then, Collingwood exploits an ambiguity in his terminology 
of ‘self’ and ‘man’. By saying that history is the science of human affairs, and that the 
value of history is self-knowledge, Collingwood is obviously referring to humankind – 
‘man’ as a corporate being. Yet his explanations appeal to the personal self-knowledge of 
the individual. The same ambiguity is in evidence in the introduction to The Idea of History, 
where Collingwood presents these different senses of ‘man’ almost as grades of self-
knowledge: 
 
My answer is that history is ‘for’ human self-knowledge… Knowing yourself 
means knowing, first, what it is to be a man; secondly, knowing what it is to be 
the kind of man you are; and thirdly, knowing what it is to be the man you are 
and nobody else is. Knowing yourself means knowing what you can do; and 
since nobody knows what he can do until he tries, the only clue to what man 
                                                 
1 There is also a similar explanation of how reliving past thinking contributes to self-knowledge in The Idea 
of History. See IH, p. 174 
2 Browning, Rethinking R. G. Collingwood, p. 74 
3 IH, pp. 218-19 
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can do is what man has done. The value of history, then, is that it teaches us 
what man has done and thus what man is.1 
 
The formulation in ‘Human Nature and Human History’ is more focused and 
clearer. But here, in order to achieve an explanation of what it means to say that history 
provides self-knowledge, Collingwood is forced to use the word ‘knowledge’ in a way 
that applies not only to a process of answering questions, but also to one in which 
information is transferred from one person to another – from a teacher to a student, for 
example.2 What he says is, in essence, that without re-enacting the thoughts of others, no 
individual could take his share in the wealth of knowledge accumulated by mankind.3 
This is self-knowledge, it seems, because the knower now knows that he knows it – 
whatever ‘it’ is. What is clear here is that Collingwood is no longer speaking of 
investigative history. He is only describing re-enactment; and, although scientific history 
presupposes re-enactment, re-enactment does not presuppose history – at least not 
history in the sense we’ve been discussing. Because Collingwood has historical method in 
mind, he is thinking of the self-knowledge of someone engaging in an investigative 
process. Thus the historian who re-enacts Julius Caesar’s,4 or Becket’s5 thinking, knows 
what he is doing. The object of his own mind – his re-enacted thinking – becomes itself 
something known.6 
Let us turn to the other argument. “We study history in order to see more clearly 
into the situation in which we are called upon to act”, Collingwood says, and later he 
adds that “the knowledge he achieves by historical inquiry is not knowledge of his 
situation as opposed to knowledge of himself, it is a knowledge of his situation which is 
at the same time knowledge of himself”.7 
The implications of this statement will please those who prefer individuals 
immersed in contexts, cultures, communities, structures, and so on, and who argue that 
individuals are ‘constituted’ by their environments, and on that basis that you can’t 
understand anything without also knowing its context. But we’re talking about self-
knowledge now, and there is a common-sense difference between the ‘situation’ that a 
                                                 
1 IH, p. 10 
2 IH, p. 218 
3 See IH, pp. 218-19 
4 IH, p. 174 
5 IH, p. 297 
6 IH, p. 292 
7 A, p. 114 
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man is in, and that man himself.1 By the same token, there is a common-sense difference 
between my situation and ‘who I really am’. If there were no common-sense difference 
between these, there would be nothing intuitively wrong with saying that the Polish 
qualified surgeon working in a British railway café is really just a barista; or that the 
American backpacker in Kathmandu has ‘found’ herself during her travels, and what she 
has found is that she is Nepalese. 
The problem with Collingwood’s formulation is that, owing to the word 
‘situation’, the imagery is too spatial. (‘Context’ can be taken in the same way.) 
Collingwood’s real reasoning is, I think, this: ‘Purposive’ action means problem-solving. 
Answering questions about what people have done therefore requires knowing what 
their ‘problems’ were, and those ‘problems’, as far as understanding their actions goes, 
means the features of their situations which they regarded as requiring rectification. 
Historical questions are questions about people’s solutions (and attempted solutions) to 
problem-situations. Historical investigation, then, produces understanding of situations 
in this sense. 
But my earlier objection returns: these are other people’s situations, not mine. 
The only knowledge of my situation I get from an appreciation of one faced by 
Cromwell is this is that my situation is not Cromwell’s situation, and thus knowledge I 
have of Cromwell is not knowledge of myself. This has not stopped Collingwood 
commentators from letting their man off very lightly for his ambitious claim. Marnie 
Hughes-Warrington, for instance, treats the argument as a fait accompli demonstration, and 
allows it to support her own contention that education must be reformed with 
Collingwood’s philosophy of history in mind, such that it enriches knowledge of the 
self.2 
I hope the reader thinks I’ve given Collingwood’s explicit arguments about why 
history provides self-knowledge a fair enough run-through, and that although my 
objections might have been curt, they have not been unfair. I actually think the claim that 
history offers self-knowledge can be rescued, but it requires relating two things that 
Collingwood does not explicitly relate, and probably did not mean to. The most 
significant part of the long passage I quoted earlier was actually one he passed over far 
too quickly, and it was this: “In the kind of history that I am thinking of, the kind I have 
been practising all of my life, historical problems arise out of practical problems. We 
study history in order to see more clearly into the situation in which we are called upon to 
                                                 
1 See NL, 5.33 
2 Hughes-Warrington, pp. 161-3 
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act”. I’ve added the emphasis where Collingwood ought, I think, to have added more of 
an elaboration than he did. As we’ve seen, Collingwood’s equation, between knowledge 
of one’s situation with knowledge of oneself, does not work well, and it suits the 
‘idiographic’ nature of history even less well. But there is an available accommodation if 
the concept of self-knowledge can be stretched to include not only identity conclusions 
‘about’ oneself, but also ‘decision’ conclusions: not deciding that one is, has done, or can 
do such-and-such, but deciding that one shall do such-and-such in response to a problem 
situation. 
 
 
v 
Transition from practice to theory 
 
I surveyed earlier Collingwood’s dismissal of what he calls the ‘pragmatic’ theory 
of history. If you remember, he attacked the pragmatic theory for presuming that the 
facts history provides enjoy “finality”. The pragmatic value of history cannot, he says, be 
its “essence”. Stripped of the bogus argument about the finality of facts, I said that the 
strength of Collingwood’s point is that it shows that the pragmatic theory of history 
conflates historical questions with questions about what to do – questions for practical 
reason. Historical questions are not identical with questions for practical reason. 
The passage above1 remains true to this. Historical questions are not themselves 
questions about what to do. But historical questions can ‘arise’ out of practical questions, 
and be useful for helping to reach decisions of that kind. In fact, Collingwood is saying 
not only that historical questions can arise in this way, but that, at least “in the kind of 
history that I am thinking of, the kind I have been practising all of my life”, historical 
problems do arise out of practical problems.2 History as a science, then, provides specific 
examples of a principle stated in The New Leviathan. This is an important point, so I will 
quote it in full. 
 
Reason is distinguished into theoretical reason and practical reason: i.e. reason for 
‘making up your mind that’ (reason for what logicians call a proposition) and 
reason for making up your mind to’ (reason for what moralists call an intention). 
                                                 
1 A, pp. 114-15 
2 David Boucher has already provided an interesting discussion of this point, of how it relates to the 
rapprochement between theory and practice more widely, and the historical background to it (via Croce) in his 
Social and Political Thought of R. G. Collingwood. See pp. 51-7, especially p. 56 
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We shall see that, of these two, practical reason is the prior: it is the original 
form of reason, theoretical reason being a modification of it; and by the Law of 
Primitive Survivals a practical element is always present in a case of theoretical 
reason.1 
 
The principle that practical problems and practical thinking survive into all 
theoretical problems, and all ‘abstract’ thinking, pertains in Collingwood’s thinking to 
more than just history.2 But history is the subject at hand. Scientific history, I am saying, 
is a form of theoretical reason. The construction of conclusions by historians is a form of 
“making up your mind that”, rather than a form of “making up your mind to”. Now, if 
what Collingwood says here is true, the value or present real-world relevance of doing 
history is assured for as long as historical questions continue to arise out of practical 
questions. A Tribunal in The Hague is trying to answer the historical question of whether 
or not Radovan Karadžić ordered the Srebrenica massacre. This is an example of a 
question that arises out of a practical problem – namely, the practical legal question of 
whether or not a man has committed a terrible crime. Even if it is ‘theoretical’, historical 
knowledge is important or pressing when the questions it answers are important or 
pressing. History has consequences for action when it arises out of questions of action. 
Historical thinking doesn’t need to justify itself to the present, because as long as it is 
considered important that questions like this be posed and that the process of answering 
them proceed properly, historical thinking in the sense in which Collingwood means it is 
assured. Equivalent investigations into the notorious ‘princes in the Tower’ episode are 
no less (and no more) historical, but barring some very surprising developments in the 
British political agenda that investigation remains what Collingwood calls, in accordance 
with popular parlance, “academic”, meaning that it “belong[s] to the world of make-
believe”.3 
The passage I quoted earlier from the Autobiography4 also indicates the solution to 
a problem we wrestled with in the last chapter: the problem of Collingwood’s 
rapprochement between asking what someone thought, and asking by necessity whether he 
                                                 
1 NL, 14.3. See also 14.38; 1.66-68. See also L26, IH, pp. 406-7. There is more general discussion, of the 
‘primitive survival’ of practice in theory, in Donagan, Later Philosophy, pp. 87-91. Because the present study 
is limited to history, there is no need to summarise Donagan’s discussion – which can anyway be better 
enjoyed in its original context. 
2 See NL, 14.32–35; 18.13. A very nice passage is at NL, 7.64-7 
3 NL, 2.51. This does not mean that Richard III cannot really have ordered the murder of the princes, or 
that the episode is fictitious. ‘Make-believe’ in Collingwood’s argument means that such questions and 
investigations arise with no present purpose beyond the educational. See NL, 2.5-55 
4 A, pp. 114-15 
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was right. The question of whether this facet of Collingwood’s rapprochement between 
history and philosophy was well-founded turned out to depend on whether or not 
historical questions must be philosophically evaluative. 
On the analytic grounds of what history as a discipline is, what it asks about, and 
what kind of knowledge it produces, there is no reason to think that historical questions 
must in themselves be evaluative. That is to say, the ‘Was he right?’ question is not 
determined by other necessary features of properly historical questions. But 
Collingwood’s argument about the practical value of history depends upon the exclusion 
of “academic” historical questions. In fact he claims, as we’ve seen, not that that kind of 
history ought not to be done, but actually that nobody does it. Prima facie this is untrue. Lots 
of historians are working on historical problems that have no practical consequences. We 
can take Collingwood’s point either of two ways. Either he means that all historians’ 
work is valuable because all historical problems that are being worked on have ‘arisen’ in 
someone’s real life, and are therefore ‘real problems’ with practical consequences; or he is 
simply being dismissive about some historians working on obscure problems, who are, 
like their problems, insignificant enough not to have to make concessions for when one 
says “all”. Either way, it is clear that the rapprochement discussed earlier depends on 
another rapprochement between theory and practice.1 The ‘Was he right?’ question does not 
follow from an analysis of what historical questions are; but it might follow from a 
presupposition about why historical questions are asked. In short, the ‘Was he right?’ 
question is the ‘primitive’ element of practical reason that survives into the theoretical 
reason of scientific history. 
The history of ideas is only practically valuable if its answers contribute to solving 
the practical problems out of which its questions arise. This is what he means, I think, 
when he writes in The Idea of History that history provides for us more than “a mere 
inventory of our intellectual possessions at the present time” by answering the question 
“by what right we enjoy them”.2 The history of political thought is then not only for 
answering questions about what ideas were held by someone, or what arguments were 
dominant during a given period. It is also for establishing whether those ideas were 
right.3 The historian of ideas might then inquire further whether, if those ideas were 
                                                 
1 For a detailed account of the rapprochement between theory and practice in all of Collingwood’s work, see 
Boucher, Social and Political Thought, pp. 51-7. Boucher rightly emphasises this rapprochement between theory 
and practice as one of the “long-term considerations” in the context of which The New Leviathan is to be 
seen. 
2 IH, p. 230 
3 This is also part of what Collingwood argues in ‘Can Historians be Impartial?’ See PH, pp. 209-18 
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wrong, the error was due to inherited superstitions that were allowed somehow to go 
unchallenged. Historical thinking and philosophical thinking therefore ‘throw light’ upon 
each other, in the sense that in history we come to appreciate the legitimacies and 
identify the illegitimacies of the ‘settled’ answers to past questions and problems as we 
have inherited them. The history of political thought is, then, (or should be) ‘critical’ in 
the full sense, and initiated by questions of present importance. 
 
 
vi 
History and freedom 
 
The rapprochement between philosophy and history – at least, the aspect of it I’ve 
dealt with – presupposes a certain kind of relationship between historical and practical 
problems. It is in this way, I think, that the strongest argument can be offered in support 
of Collingwood’s contention that history fits in a certain way into our general view of the 
aims and purposes of human life in general.1 But Collingwood’s own explanations of the 
link between the ‘theoretical reason’ of history and the ‘practical’ aims and purposes of 
human life do not, I think, work well. It is nevertheless worth discussing them, because 
Collingwood puts enough stock in them to refer to them in his last book, The New 
Leviathan – albeit obliquely. Those ‘links’, as I’ve put it, are between history and freedom, 
and history and duty. We’ll take freedom first. 
Collingwood does not make this argument in his Autobiography – at least, not in a 
way that a reader of that book alone would be able to summarise readily. It is found in 
The Idea of History and referred to again in The New Leviathan.2 The material I’m referring 
to specifically is a piece called ‘Freedom’, which was intended as part of book one of The 
Principles of History: chapter three, ‘Nature and Action’. T. M. Knox used this material, 
with a few changes, and published it in 1946 as the shortest section of The Idea of History’s 
‘Epilegomena’, §6. He renamed it ‘History and Freedom’.3 It is partly because 
Collingwood wanted to write The New Leviathan that he broke off work on The Principles of 
History. It is perhaps worth pointing out that this means that when Collingwood wrote 
The New Leviathan in 1940/41, his formulation of the argument contained in ‘History and 
                                                 
1 L26, IH, p. 359 
2 NL, 37.1-14. See also 13.31 
3 The manuscript survives, and was republished in 1999 in its corrected form in The Principles of History and 
other writings in the philosophy of history. See PH, pp. 98-103, especially note 56 
 - 218 -
Freedom’ would have been fresh, or at least clear, in his mind, but it would not be clear 
to his readers until 1946. 
Here, in ‘History and Freedom’, Collingwood foregoes the easy equation of 
knowledge as freedom,1 and attempts to show that “our knowledge that human activity is 
free has been attained only through our discovery of history”.2 His argument refers to the 
historian’s “discovery that the men whose actions he studies” are free in the sense that, 
although they might not have realised it, they were free to cast off the ways of thinking 
they had inherited. Their thinking was, whether they knew it or not, autonomous.3 A 
man who fears to cross the mountains because he believes them to be inhabited by devils 
is suffering from a superstition that he is in fact free to discard, and his doing so would 
only require some ‘high-grade’ thinking. Once the question arises in an explicit form, 
‘Are there in fact devils living in those mountains?’, the traveller has begun to free 
himself from his previous fearful situation. When we conceive of situations according to 
the “sin” of the superstitions we have been taught, we “share in that sin”.4 If a man is “a 
wise man, it is not until he has… done everything in his power to find out what the 
situation is, that he will make even the most trivial plan. And if he neglects the situation, 
the situation will not neglect him. It is not one of those gods that leave an insult 
unpunished”.5 
The historian, realising this, has made “a discovery which every historian makes 
as soon as he arrives at a scientific mastery of his own subject”. He “discovers his own 
freedom: that is, he discovers the autonomous character of historical thought, its power 
to solve its own problems for itself by its own methods”.6 The argument fits with 
something Collingwood says in The New Leviathan: “The act of becoming free cannot be 
done to a man by anything other than himself. Let us call it, then, an act of self-liberation”.7 
                                                 
1 David Boucher has found evidence in Collingwood’s correspondence with Knox that he, like Lachelier 
(Boucher says), “equates freedom with knowledge”. See Boucher’s introduction to EPP, p. 11 
2 IH, p. 315. Emphasis added. Collingwood speculates that it is no coincidence that the ‘free-will 
controversy’ arose in the seventeenth century at “the time when scissors-and-paste history in its simpler 
forms was beginning to dissatisfy people”. (IH, p. 319) One possible interpretation of this has already been 
seen off by Boucher in his introduction to Essays in Political Philosophy (see EPP, pp. 21-2), so I have not 
dealt with it here. The possible interpretation is that, because Collingwood thought it was a great 
achievement of Marx to convert the problems of economics into historical problems (as Collingwood says 
in ‘The Nature and Aims of a Philosophy of History’), he thinks that history leads to freedom in something 
like the way Marx describes also. Boucher also quotes Collingwood’s unpublished 1929 ‘Lectures on 
Philosophy of History’, where he says “the practical consequences of his [Marx’s] teaching have been, 
perhaps, the most important feature in general politics in the last hundred years”. See EPP, pp. 21-2, 29 
3 IH, p. 256 
4 IH, p. 318 
5 IH, p. 316. See however also NL, 13.75 
6 IH, p. 318 
7 NL, 13.21 
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Collingwood’s point is that the historian’s scientific mastery of his subject mirrors 
that of the traveller. The freedom of the scientific historian consists not only in that he 
can ask whatever questions he wants, but also in that the way in which he must go about 
answering them is never fixed by inherited ideas about what he should do. “The freedom 
that there is in history consists in the fact that this compulsion is imposed upon the 
activity of human reason not by anything else, but by itself”,1 he writes. Doing history 
demonstrates to the historian (eventually) the autonomous character of historical 
thought, “its power to solve its own problems for itself by its own methods”,2 because 
the methodological compulsions under which he had previously assumed he laboured in 
his situations as an historian – and laboured in order to solve his problems – are 
gradually removed when he realises that this is not how it has to be done. 
The greatest strength of ‘History and Freedom’ is what it says about the idea of 
freedom. ‘Freedom’ means the self-liberation from certain assumed limits and 
compulsions that fill any human situation. The traveller might have inherited the idea 
that devils live in the mountains from his cultural environment, of course, but this 
impediment that shapes his idea of his situation is really (Collingwood is saying) of his 
own making, if he did but know it.3 
Granted that the historian – with his situation, his problems, and his autonomous 
efforts to solve them – is partly here a specific example of all humans in all situations, 
what we have in ‘History and Freedom’ is a much more sophisticated argument about 
the nature of freedom than was immediately apparent. Day to day we might presuppose 
freedom in the way described in the chapter of The New Leviathan that discusses the 
nature of choice.4 But we also commonly assume our situations to be full of limitations 
and compulsions which are ‘just there’, either by the work of others, the previous 
irreversible actions of ourselves, or just by ‘the nature of things’. We might be aware that 
we are free to act in this qualified situation, but perhaps we don’t initially realise just how 
free. Perhaps we don’t know, that is, that we can emancipate ourselves even from some 
of those qualifications. This kind of knowledge, as distinct from merely being ‘aware’ of 
our freedom, can only be realised systematically, Collingwood says.5 Realizing our 
freedom means systematically deconstructing the compulsions and obstacles which we 
                                                 
1 IH, p. 317 
2 IH, p. 318 
3 IH, p. 317 
4 NL, ch. XIII. See especially 13.16-18 
5 This is what I think Collingwood means in his response (IH, p. 320) to the counter-argument that people 
have always been aware that they are free. 
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are anyway maintaining in our own thinking. It is this ‘autonomous problem-solving’ 
which I wish to emphasize here as underlying what Collingwood says about ‘freedom’, 
because I think he does not adequately give centre stage to the idea himself, and his 
argument connecting history to civilization is weaker for it. 
In The Idea of History, for example, instead of leaving the idea of autonomous 
problem-solving laid bare, this raw nerve of the argument is, in Collingwood’s 
formulation, quickly adorned with the academic points he wants to score from it, which 
are quite historically-specific. This makes his argument more effective to his immediate 
ends, but in view of wider-ranging arguments – such as that we’re looking at here – it 
rather obscures the bigger point. Here, for instance: 
 
It is simultaneously with this discovery of his own freedom as historian that he 
discovers the freedom of man as an historical agent. Historical thought, thought 
about rational activity, is free from the domination of natural science, and 
rational activity is free from the domination of nature.1 
 
Collingwood’s immediate aim – to force the concession that history is 
methodologically independent of the methods and paradigms of natural science – has 
obscured the grounds for this independence: namely, that to be free and fully-fledged, 
historians must, and can only, solve their problems in their own ways. ‘In their own ways’ 
means that historians come to realise that the compulsion they’d previously assumed, of 
agreeing or otherwise ‘consulting’ the history’s authorities and testimonies, was actually 
always theirs to remove. As we’ve seen, historians are now free from the authority of 
sources (the ‘scissors and paste’ history of old), and they are free from the would-be 
authority of methods of thinking that are not peculiarly their own (such as offered by 
‘positivism’). But we now know, Collingwood says, that by actually doing history, 
historians learn the necessity and unavoidability of autonomous problem-solving. 
But Collingwood’s argument, if successful on the side of freedom, actually shows 
not that “our knowledge that human activity is free has been attained only through our 
discovery of history”,2 and even less does it show that it has been attained only through 
our discovery of scientific history. It shows rather that it is the questioning activity in 
general that makes us free and shows us that we are so systematically. History only shows 
us that we are free because autonomous question-answering as Collingwood describes it 
                                                 
1 IH, p. 318 
2 IH, p. 315 
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is as much a presupposition in scientific history as it is in anything scientific. He might 
have added that the more we think historically the more that presupposition is 
reinforced, but the same could be said of any science. History might be one of many 
forms of systematic thought that allows us to practise our freedom, but it is by no means 
the only one. History on this account offers nothing that is peculiar to itself. So although 
history might serve man’s knowledge of his own freedom, it remains undemonstrated 
that it is “only” through studying history that man knows himself to be free. It seems, 
then, that we have to go beyond The Idea of History to find Collingwood’s best argument 
about what history does for us in terms of our freedom. 
 
 
vii 
History and duty 
 
Other relations between history and freedom have been remarked upon before. 
Several commentators have pointed to Collingwood’s argument about the apparent 
connection between history and duty,1 outlined in his 1940 Lectures on Moral 
Philosophy and again in The New Leviathan.2 Collingwood’s account of duty is different 
from Kant’s.3 If freedom consists in the elimination of caprice from practical choices,4 
then the more man’s practical reason eliminates caprice, the freer man is. The scale of 
overlapping forms of practical reason5 are, for Collingwood, utility, right, and duty,6 while 
the corresponding forms of theoretical reason are, varyingly, thinking in terms of means 
to ends (the ‘science’ of utility, or ‘economics’); thinking in terms of conforming to a rule 
(law, modern natural science); and thinking in terms of unique individual situations 
(history).7 The theoretical counterpart is invoked when an agent, reflecting on his own 
actions, asks “Why am I doing this?”8 
                                                 
1 See Browning, Rethinking R. G. Collingwood, pp. 132-3, and Hughes-Warrington, pp. 161-9 (especially p. 
168) 
2 See NL, 18.51-92. The relevant part of the Lectures has been edited into a stand-alone ‘essay’ in EPP, pp. 
150-9. It is discussed by Boucher in The Social and Political Thought of R. G. Collingwood, for example, and by 
Stein Helgeby in Action as History (pp. 101-37). For Boucher’s discussion of Collingwood’s account of duty 
alone, see Social and Political Thought, pp. 105-9. 
3 See NL, 17.62. Thanks to ES for his suggestion that I document the differences. 
4 See NL, 13.2-22 
5 See NL, 14.3 
6 NL, chs XV, XVI, XVII 
7 NL, 18.3 and 15.6; 18.4-45; 18.5-6 
8 NL, 18.1. Duty is consistently associated with history – albeit for reasons which, as Boucher shows, are 
themselves shifting. Initially the association is due to the fact that historical thinking is the world of fact, 
and in historical thinking the universal and the particular are unified in the various ways I’ve already 
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A correct conception of duty is, for Collingwood, the fulfilment of theories of 
practical action. In his 1940 Lectures, he begins his explanation of how this correct 
conception depends upon history by appealing to his audience’s… 
 
experience that there is a form of moral consciousness which does not consist 
in analysing one’s action into means and end, or rule and obedience to rule, or 
in any other way whatever, but is aware of it in its unbroken or unanalysed 
individuality as his own response to a situation in which, as I said, he finds 
himself or places himself… His response to it, similarly, is present to his 
consciousness not as a response of a certain kind relevant to any situation of a 
certain kind or to certain features in this situation, but as this response and no 
other, a response which is an individuum omnimode determinatum to a situation 
which is an individuum omnimode determinatum.1 
 
Collingwood soon adds that he wishes to draw attention to the fact that he has 
been, during the last few minutes, equating duty with “something that is already familiar 
to you in another context”. That “something” is history, and the equation lies in the fact 
that history is knowledge of “a past composed not merely of individual events but of 
individual actions done by human beings in individual situations… Every situation which 
the historian studies is an individual situation; every action is an individual action”.2 
The relationship between history and freedom is, then, that the historical 
consciousness makes duty possible, and duty further eliminates caprice from action. So 
history is necessary for the further elimination of caprice, and thus the extension of 
freedom.3 
Some of Collingwood’s commentators have extended a great deal of sympathy to 
this argument about history and duty. In his conclusion to The Social and Political Thought of 
R. G. Collingwood, David Boucher seems to lament the fact that “the realisation of a 
                                                                                                                                            
explained. In the first place (and this is what Boucher thinks is most important) it is in historical thinking 
that the false dichotomy between mind and its object is overcome. In Collingwood’s Lectures on Moral 
Philosophy of 1940, the relationship is explained a little differently. For our purposes, this later version is 
more pertinent. Later Boucher explains, more clearly than Collingwood perhaps managed, why it is that 
duty is the highest form of practical reason and, as such, absorbs ethics, just as the theoretical counterpart 
of duty, history, absorbs philosophy. Boucher’s account is in Social and Political Thought, p. 94 (the full 
discussion spans pp. 93-108). For the correspondence between history and duty see pp. 82, 90, 94 
1 EPP, p. 154. See also NL, 17.51 
2 EPP, p. 155. See also NL, 28.9 
3 See also Boucher, Social and Political Thought, p. 169. There is more that could be said about how ‘history’ 
liberates social man from caprice. For example, it is difficult to see how, without historical thinking in 
Collingwood’s sense, criminal investigations and decisions about punishment could be carried out in any 
way other than capriciously. 
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historical civilization characterised by duty, rather than by utility, is as remote a possibility 
now as it was in Collingwood’s own day”.1 More recently Marnie Hughes-Warrington has 
treated the argument as another fait accompli. “From the above discussion it should be 
abundantly clear”, she says, “that aesthetic, religious and scientific education presuppose 
historical/philosophical education. History/philosophy takes us to self-knowledge and 
dutiful action via the activities of the a priori historical imagination”.2 
Not all commentators are so generous. In The Later Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood, 
Alan Donagan attacks Collingwood for shortcomings in this same argument. 
Collingwood, Donagan thinks, “confounds historical insight with moral”. “His error”, he 
adds, is “to think that in any concrete situation you are immediately aware that there is 
some concrete action which it is your duty to do”.3 And he continues: 
 
I cannot explain Collingwood’s conviction that he was aware of such duties, 
except as a relic of philosophical idealism… So as far as it rests on direct 
consciousness, I question Collingwood’s theory of duty because my moral 
consciousness does not corroborate his; and so far as it rests on the 
presupposition that an action done from duty must be rational in every concrete 
detail, I question it as flouting common sense.4 
 
Donagan’s attack, then, is aimed at Collingwood’s conception of duty – with 
some additional reference to inconsistencies with his philosophy of mind. I will not enter 
the debate on the ‘duty’ side of Collingwood’s argument. Our interest here is with what it 
says about what history as a science is for, so our interest is in whether Collingwood’s 
argument actually does justice to what he says elsewhere about ‘history as a science’. Here 
there are some additional shortcomings. 
Collingwood does not say merely that the concept of duty is associated in some 
way with the concept, or with one of the concepts, of history. He does not say that the 
‘individual’ nature of duty resembles the ‘individual’ nature of history. And he does not say 
that this sensitivity to particularity on the part of historical understanding “harmonizes” 
with the particularity of focus of moral duty, as Gary Browning says he does.5 
                                                 
1 Boucher, Social and Political Thought, p. 241 
2 Hughes-Warrington, p. 169. See also p. 178 
3 Donagan, Later Philosophy, p. 243 
4 Donagan, Later Philosophy, pp. 243, 245 
5 Browning, Rethinking R. G. Collingwood, p. 133 
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Collingwood actually says that he is “equating”1 duty with history; he says that “the 
consciousness of duty is thus identical with the historical consciousness”.2 And he warns 
that “until these obsolescent tendencies in historical thinking have become wholly 
obsolete” – and by these he means analysing past actions “either by the utilitarian 
analysis or by the regularian analysis” – until then, “we shall not have a fully developed 
consciousness of duty”.3 Collingwood claims, then, that historical consciousness and 
consciousness of duty are “identical”, and that history is a prerequisite of a fully 
developed consciousness of duty. He is not saying merely that history “reinforces” duty.4 
Duty, he is saying, presupposes history. 
But history also presupposes duty, because dutiful action is suddenly, in The New 
Leviathan, the proper subject-matter of history: 
 
To think historically is to explore a world consisting of things other than myself, 
each of them and individual or unique agent, in an individual or unique 
situation, doing an individual or unique action which he has to do because, 
charactered and circumstanced as he is, he can do no other.5 
 
As an account of the ‘value’ of history, Collingwood’s argument is inadequate, 
and for this reason: The sense of ‘history’ which he appeals to and identifies with duty is 
not the same highest form of ‘history’ that we have been examining. It is not history as a 
science. History corresponds to duty, he says, because of correspondence with the 
subject-matter of history, which is – to use the technical language – ‘idiographic’, rather 
than ‘nomothetic’.6 This relation of history to the concept of duty, and thereby to 
Collingwood’s moral philosophy in general, reveals that, for Collingwood, the highest 
form of practical reason presupposes only the concept of concrete uniqueness (or unique 
concreteness). This is quite different from claiming that duty requires investigative 
history. Duty on this account is equally well-served by scissors-and-paste history. To 
think historically “is to explore a world consisting of things other than myself, each of 
them and individual or unique agent, in an individual or unique situation, doing an 
individual or unique action”,7 Collingwood says; but it is precisely the practical 
                                                 
1 EPP, p.155 
2 EPP, p. 157 
3 EPP, pp. 157-8 
4 Browning, Rethinking R. G. Collingwood, p. 136 
5 NL, 18.52. See also Boucher’s introduction to EPP, p. 42 
6 IH, p. 166 
7 NL, 18.52. See also Boucher’s introduction to EPP, p. 42 
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importance of how that ‘exploration’ is carried out that has not been accounted for. He 
has merely appealed to a formal concept presupposed by his account of duty that mirrors 
one of the ‘habitual’, ‘arbitrary’1 concepts of a lower form of history. Because Stein 
Helgeby deals, in Action and History, with precisely this lower form, where history is its 
own subject-matter, he finds much in the argument about history and duty to agree with. 
Although he has some reservations about Collingwood’s theory of duty, Helgeby 
certainly doesn’t think the argument inadequate to Collingwood’s philosophy of history.2 
But it is inadequate, since it does no justice to ‘history as a science’. Helgeby’s book is 
anyway not about history as a science, so he has no obligation to comment upon it.3 
What, then, is the social function of investigative history? We could attempt to 
provide an answer by elaborating on the overlap between the conception of history that 
Collingwood appeals to in his discussion of duty, and the conception of history as a 
science. I’ve already explained what that overlap is in itself, but here’s how it works in 
relation to the correspondence between history and duty: Investigative history (history as 
a science) is the only way to answer the kind of questions that typically arise about things 
done by unique agents other than oneself in situations uniquely their own: questions in 
which the specific unknown is some specific ‘constellation’ of ideas that we can call 
somebody’s reasoning. If this is what is meant by a ‘why?’ question, scientific history is 
the only way of answering that question properly. 
Now, two hesitations should arise. The first is that unique actions in unique 
situations can actually fail to raise any historical questions at all. Historical questions 
might arise which we consider unimportant, and which we ignore; or questions of 
another kind might arise – a psychological question, for instance. More familiarly, just 
because I recognise that the deed of a man whom I observe was done out of duty, it does 
not mean that I commit a category error in putting to him the ‘logically effected’4 
question ‘Can I offer you a drink?’, rather than an historical question inquiring about his 
reasoning. This hesitation is easily soothed by noting that nowhere does Collingwood say 
that practical reason necessitates its theoretical counterpart. Dutiful acts do not demand 
historical thinking. But when we do ask ‘Why did I do that?’ – as some people always will 
– we  need the question-and-answer logic of history to provide answers. 
                                                 
1 IH, p. 213 
2 See Helgeby, Action as History, pp. 136-7 
3 He considers it merely “epistemology”. See Helgeby, Action as History, pp. 51 and 58 
4 EM, p. 27 
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The second hesitation is, I think, more of a problem for Collingwood’s claim. 
Actually duty and investigative history are not identical, and neither are they prerequisites 
of each other. We can have a concept of duty, and know what our duty in a given 
situation is, without posing a single historical question. And for recognising uniqueness 
as a characteristic of human reality, a lower form of history will suffice just as well. 
Collingwood does not even use ‘historical thinking’ for the kind of reasoning used to 
decide on acts of duty. Deciding between “x, y and z as claimants for the title of my 
present duty” is, he says, a matter for one’s ‘consideration’.1 Historical thinking is not 
‘consideration’ per se. It might, of course, occur as part of that consideration process. But 
it might not; so recognising one’s duty, or doing one’s duty, does not presuppose 
scientific history. 
By the same token, historical questions do not presuppose dutiful actions. But 
Collingwood seems to argue in The New Leviathan that they do – though he doesn’t say 
this anywhere else. Here is the passage again: 
 
To think historically is to explore a world consisting of things other than myself, 
each of them and individual or unique agent, in an individual or unique 
situation, doing an individual or unique action which he has to do because, 
charactered and circumstanced as he is, he can do no other.2 
 
Let’s use Collingwood’s own language to follow his reasoning. In a utilitarian 
action, x is the means and y is the end. The historian inquiring into x (by asking ‘Why did 
I do that?’ or ‘Why did he do that?’) takes y as his specific unknown. If he is a scientific 
historian he uses evidence to offer a conclusion about what the thought-content was of 
the agent’s y. If he is presupposing that the act was of a utilitarian nature, then y stands 
for the ‘specific unknown end’. If he presupposes that the act was regularian the content 
of y is a specific unknown rule. The historian’s question might be, in other words, ‘what 
rule did he think he was following?’ The specific unknown is still y. And it is again still y 
in acts of duty. But in acts of duty there is, Collingwood says, a “one-one relation” 
between x and y.3 He means to say that where acts of utility and rule-following have 
features which are not determined by the end or the rule (capricious elements), in duty 
nothing is left to caprice. To this Collingwood adds that, therefore, 
                                                 
1 NL, 17.81 
2 NL, 18.52. See also Boucher’s introduction to EPP, p. 42 
3 NL, 17.53 
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dutiful action, among these three kinds of rational action, is the only one… 
whose explanations really explain; the only one whose answer to the question: 
‘Why did I do that action?’ (namely, ‘because it was my duty’) answers precisely 
that question and not one more or less like it.1 
 
He seems, then, to be saying that the thought content of y will be not an end or a 
rule, but the action itself classed as a duty. y is the specific unknown duty, which has a 
one-one relation to x, the specific known deed. 
We are not interested here in any shortcomings in Collingwood’s account of 
duty. Such alleged shortcomings have anyway been dealt with by others. Our interest is 
his philosophy of history. The passage just quoted shows, I think, that here Collingwood 
has confused theoretical reasoning regarding non-dutiful acts with theoretical reasoning 
that ultimately fails to ‘satisfy’ its question – that is, fails to correlate. He uses the same 
language in his argument about history and duty, as we’ve seen, to dismiss historical 
explanations of the French Revolution which would also explain other revolutions of a 
similar kind.2 The conflation, though, must be avoided, because actually scientific history 
in Collingwood’s sense is in no way inappropriate to understanding utilitarian or 
regularian actions. It might be true that understanding dutiful acts requires the historian 
to have a concept of duty, but an historian is not less scientific just because he never 
investigates that kind of act. In other words, historians can legitimately conclude that the 
reasoning behind a deed was that doing x would secure y, or that x was done in order to 
follow rule y. What Collingwood should say, if history is a science, is that only theoretical 
reasoning that offers an answer correlative to its historical question offers historical 
knowledge. What he actually says in The New Leviathan3 is that only theoretical reasoning 
about dutiful acts is historical thinking. He thereby makes the value of history, as it is 
presented in The New Leviathan, dependent on his account of duty. If, as Donagan 
contends, Collingwood’s account of duty is wrong, then history is a science which deals 
with a kind of act whose existence is doubtful. 
Here, then, the equation of history with duty has begun to erode history as a 
science. And this ‘erosion’ pertains not only to ‘Why did he do that?’ questions, but also 
to ‘Was he right?’ questions. If historians get into the habit of saying ‘he did it because it 
                                                 
1 NL, 17.55 
2 Compare ‘Goodness, Rightness and Utility’ in NL, pp. 476-7, with ‘Reality as History’, in PH, pp. 180-1. 
3 NL, 18.52 
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was his duty’, and they accept that it was his duty, the answer to the evaluative question 
seems presupposed to be ‘he was right to do it’. It cannot, by Collingwood’s definition, 
be wrong to do one’s duty, since duties are what one ‘owes’ – they are what one ‘ought’ 
to do.1 It seems that by attempting to equate duty with history, Collingwood is inviting 
an implication much worse than what has been called the ‘what-why paradox’. He is 
getting close to saying that once the historian knows why someone did something, he 
also knows why it was right. 
The way out of the difficulties I’ve explained is either (a) to deny that the forms 
of ‘history’ which Collingwood discusses actually overlap at all, or (b) to concede that 
Collingwood has either made an error here in his account of ‘history’, or he is only 
talking about a lower form of ‘history’. The first strategy would operate by not only 
cleanly separating what Collingwood says about subject-matter from what he says about 
‘question and answer’, but also by insisting that a complete philosophy of the subject-
matter of history is possible and demonstrable without the advantage of ‘retrospect’ from 
a higher form. According to this, Collingwood would be using The New Leviathan to 
narrow even further the subject-matter of history to dutiful actions. But this move invites 
chaos, since it divorces historical subject-matter from historical questions, and historical 
facts from historical thinking. All of those misinterpretations of Collingwood’s doctrines 
about history that can only arise without that ‘retrospect’ are resurrected. The subject-
matter of history is again asserted arbitrarily, except now the arbitrariness is compounded 
by the exclusion of utilitarian and regularian actions from history. Re-enactment is again 
arbitrarily insisted upon; the distinctness of sciences appears again to be based on their 
distinct objects – which Collingwood anyway still denies; and only someone prepared to 
assent to Collingwood’s philosophy of mind, to his dialectical method in general, and 
now also (unlike Donagan) to his account of duty, can find much agreement in what 
Collingwood says about history. I’ve tried to show in this study that agreement can be 
found on Collingwood’s most embattled contentions without presupposing his 
philosophy of mind or the so-called dialectical method at all. All one needs to agree with 
is that history, when done properly, poses certain kinds of question and seeks to answer 
them systematically using evidence. To deny the overlap of the forms of history I’ve 
described would be not only to assert that the concept of ‘history’ defies a pattern of 
overlapping concepts in Collingwood’s thinking that he is perfectly explicit about, and 
which has already been observed in certain other concepts by commentators from 
                                                 
1 NL, 17.15 
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Boucher and Mink and beyond – but it would also be to dismiss a legitimately available 
line of defence for those contentions. 
The second is, I think, the best option. We have to conclude that Collingwood 
has contrived rather clumsily this argument about the equation and co-presupposition of 
history and duty, and that in doing so he does no justice to his own philosophy of 
history, let alone to the points he can make about what scientific history offers 
civilization. It is not clumsily presented, of course: nothing Collingwood says is. But it is 
clumsy in view of the accidental damage it does. We should concede that instead of 
saying that the consciousness of duty is identical with the historical consciousness,1 
Collingwood ought to have said that both rest on the kind of thinking that can, when 
needed, dispense with utility and rules and think in terms of uniqueness without 
rendering the object of thought arbitrary. In the present study, we have already seen 
Collingwood making this point anyway. The argument for uniqueness by allusion to 
dutiful action adds nothing to it. In conclusion, this argument does not demonstrate that 
the practical function of history is to underpin duty and further man’s freedom by that 
route. All it demonstrates is that the kind of reason that can answer ‘why’ questions 
about acts of duty is simply a kind of reason that has a place for the concept of 
uniqueness. 
 
 
viii 
Transition from freedom to civilization and progress 
 
Collingwood’s opening question regarding history in the 1926 Lectures is “What 
are we doing it for? in other words, how does this study fit into our general view of the 
aims and purposes of human life?” In order to get to the best answers he offers in later 
work to this question, we should modify that question slightly, and we should modify it 
in such a way that what we’ve already heard about the highest form of history, history as 
a science, remains properly the focus. Our question is, then, ‘How does history as a 
science – investigative history – fit into our general view of the aims and purposes of 
human life?’ 
I propose now a certain direction. We should abandon the contention that it is 
only through history that man knows himself to be free, or can realise his freedom 
                                                 
1 NL, 18.52-18.7. See also EPP, p. 157 
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through dutiful acts. We don’t leave empty handed, though. Following Collingwood’s 
argument in ‘History and Freedom’ we can still accept that it is only through 
autonomous problem-solving that man knows himself to be free, and that history is a 
form of problem-solving that is autonomous from other forms. Our interest since the 
close of part two has been in history specifically, so this argument – which in fact 
concerns the questioning activity in general – shouldn’t detain us here. 
Instead we should take seriously further arguments about history specifically, 
starting with the function of history within civilization as outlined in The New Leviathan 
and other essays in political philosophy. After that we’ll move on to Collingwood’s 
argument that historical thinking creates progress. My reasons for thinking this the right 
course at this juncture are as follows. 
Firstly, abandoning the argument about history and freedom as it is offered in 
The Idea of History means opening up the social and political function of history for ‘man’ 
rather than for individual ‘men’. Collingwood is quite clear that freedom is something 
that pertains only, and reducibly, to individuals.1 By leaving behind the direct relationship 
between doing history and realizing one’s own freedom, then, we can pursue his 
arguments about the importance of history to human life, rather than to a human life – 
which means that what is at stake is why we should protect history, rather than why I 
should take an interest in it. 
In fact freedom in Collingwood’s thinking is not only a given presupposition of 
social activity. Individual freedom is also something that civilization produces – through 
education.2 In this sense freedom is an aim of politics, not just a presupposition of 
choice. Civilization and progress, then, do not only presuppose freedom, they also foster 
it. All the same I propose to discuss civilization and progress on their own terms, rather 
than as means to a kind of freedom which is more implicit in Collingwood’s political 
arguments than explicit. This is, I think, more in line with the first opening question of 
Collingwood’s 1926 Lectures which I began the present study by quoting. Progress and 
civilization can be “aims and purposes of human life” in their own right, and are not only 
valuable as means to freedom. 
                                                 
1 See NL, 13.18-27 
2 NL, 37.1. Boucher has explained how this puts Collingwood more in line with continental liberals, and 
his account of Collingwood’s liberalism puts more historical perspective in the frame that I can here. See 
Boucher, Social and Political Thought, pp. 141-66. See particularly the ten or so pages from p. 145. Boucher 
also provides a detailed discussion of the relations between Collingwood’s liberalism and that of the (other) 
British and Italian idealists. See approximately pp. 147-54, and the comparison with Ruggiero’s account of 
freedom on p. 144. Gary Browning has recently gone to some length to demonstrate the resonance 
between civilization and freedom in Collingwood’s thinking and that in Hegel’s. See particularly Rethinking 
R. G. Collingwood, pp. 125-39 
 - 231 -
And finally, as well as opening up to the present inquiry what Collingwood 
thought was at stake beyond one’s own freedom for the maintenance of scientific 
history, it brings us into areas already discussed in sophisticated Collingwood 
scholarship.1 
 
 
ix 
History and civilization: in theory 
 
There has already been some strong work done on other aspects of the 
relationship between history and civilization in Collingwood’s thought. Of particular 
interest is a 1995 volume of essays on Collingwood, Philosophy, History and Civilization, 
particularly David Boucher’s contribution, ‘The Place of Education in Civilization’. It is 
an insightful and not uncritical treatment of Collingwood’s thought on the subject, and I 
discuss it here only with the intention of showing the reader what has already been 
covered that we needn’t rehearse, and what he has left open for the present inquiry.2 
Boucher refers to the importance of handing down practical scientific knowledge 
from generation to generation3 – which might be fairly summarised as the technical 
importance of the ‘content’ of inherited knowledge. In The New Leviathan Collingwood 
presents an argument – and it is a very convincing one – that civilization regarding man’s 
exploitation of his natural environment depends on a certain level of civility in his social 
environment.4 Civility, in short, is required for the transfer of knowledge. But 
Collingwood does not call that transfer of knowledge ‘history’ – even though it is 
obviously based on knowledge of the past successes of individuals getting what they 
needed from their surroundings. And if he did call it ‘history’, it would not be scientific 
                                                 
1 Boucher notes, however, that many commentators have “chosen to ignore the very close theoretical 
connections” between mind, society, and civilization in Collingwood’s social and political philosophy. (See 
Boucher, Social and Political Thought, pp. 195-6) Here we have only indirectly to touch on Collingwood’s 
philosophy of mind. As I’ve already argued in Part IV, although Collingwood’s arguments about historical 
method draw on his philosophy of mind, they are not dependent upon it. Our interest here is in the role of 
history in civilization. 
2 Taking many of her cues from Boucher’s work, Marnie Hughes-Warrington has provided a really valuable 
study of the relevance of Collingwood’s philosophy to education. See Hughes-Warrington, particularly pp. 
9-46, 155-202. Her focus is really on what schools should teach, how they should be organised, and what 
they should take as their aims. The importance of education to civilization is taken for granted – as is only 
appropriate given the aim of her study. 
3 Boucher, ‘The Place of Education in Civilization’, pp. 282-3, 286-7 
4 See NL, 36.25; 36.46-52 
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history. At best it would be the transference and sharing of today’s historical conclusions. 
That is why Collingwood actually calls it “an ancestral, prehistoric civility”.1 
Boucher also refers to the fact that education should also, for Collingwood, 
concern itself with “inducing habits of orderly and systematic thinking”,2 and with 
encouraging people to attain the highest form of rationality by being able to ask and 
think through ‘Why did I do that?’ – in the way the practical reason of duty is supposed 
to be associated, as we already know, with the theoretical reason of history. I’ve already 
explained why, although both ‘systematic thinking’ and ‘concrete uniqueness’ are 
involved in historical thinking, the function of history as a science cannot be satisfactorily 
explained by reference to those concepts in general. And Boucher also discusses very 
efficiently Collingwood’s series of contentions that metaphysics is an historical science, 
that without metaphysics there is no science, and that without science there is no 
civilization. (We return to this below.) But the most relevant part of Boucher’s article for 
our purposes is that in which he discusses the importance of “these so-called historical 
sciences”, which are “at once descriptive and critical”.3 He refers to passages in An 
Autobiography and The New Leviathan in which Collingwood claims that the purpose of the 
history of scientific, economic, and particularly of moral and political thinking are meant 
to improve your own practice – they are for the sake of acting better.4 Boucher’s 
investigation does not require him to go further into this.5 He is, after all, attempting to 
display in full range the nuances of Collingwood’s thinking not only regarding history 
and civilization, but history as part of education in general and civilization – so he is wise 
not to get diverted. In short, Boucher has left open the question of the role for 
civilization of history as a form of inquiry specifically. How, then, does investigative 
history serve better action? 
As we saw in ‘Transition from practice to theory’, historical investigations serve 
action when they arise out of questions of action. It probably needs little demonstration 
that, where important historical questions arise out of pressing questions of what to do, it 
is presupposed that answering that question correctly rather than falsely is desirable for 
the sake of deciding upon the best course of action. Here is an example: If I am 
approaching the deadline for making an important financial decision, and my financial 
                                                 
1 NL, 36.52 
2 EM, p. 134. See Boucher, ‘The Place of Education in Civilization’, p. 283 
3 Boucher, ‘The Place of Education in Civilization’, pp. 287, 289-90 
4 Boucher, ‘The Place of Education in Civilization’, pp. 289-90 
5 At the close of the essay Boucher returns to the subject of Collingwood’s “historical or criteriological 
sciences” and points out to his reader Collingwood’s implicit emphasis of “the importance of people like 
himself in the civilizing process”. Boucher, ‘The Place of Education in Civilization’, p. 295 
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advisor is unavailable for a conversation, I might instead go back through my 
correspondence with him to find out what options he had given me, what considerations 
he had made regarding each, and what course of action he had recommended. That is an 
historical investigation. My question is ‘What did my advisor suggest as the answer to this 
(largely unchanged) financial situation?’ (‘What was he ‘driving at’ in these letters and 
emails?) It is an historical investigation arising out of a practical problem. By seeking an 
answer, I am already presupposing that my decision will be better if I answer my 
historical question properly. If I didn’t presuppose that, I would not take the time to 
investigate it. Collingwood’s contention, then – that historical knowledge helps us to act 
better – is not really in need of demonstration. When historical problems arise out of 
practical problems, it is already presupposed that the right ‘historical’ answer facilitates a 
better practical solution. If it is not presupposed, the historical question does not arise in 
the first place. If it does arise, but answering it would not help, it is a question of no 
importance. The ‘knowledge’ that would be its answer would be utterly useless – or, as 
Collingwood puts it, “academic”.1 
How, then, do historical questions that do arise serve the “aim of human life” that 
we call ‘civilization’? That depends on what we mean by ‘civilization’. Collingwood 
discusses ‘civilization’ in several chapters of the Essay on Metaphysics2 where he argues that, 
if metaphysics is historical investigation aimed at explicating the absolute presuppositions 
made in certain lines of reasoning, and civilization depends on metaphysics in this sense, 
then civilization depends on historical thinking. I will not waste the reader’s time by 
rehearsing an argument he can find elsewhere, both in the original form and in ample 
commentary.3 I will instead point out that the arguments about historical science in the 
Essay on Metaphysics explain the importance of history only in so far as it is required for 
answering metaphysical questions. Although all metaphysical questions are historical 
questions, not all historical questions are metaphysical questions. I’ve already said that, 
on Collingwood’s account, metaphysicians are a special class of historians with special 
dispensation against having to ask ‘Was he right?’ Collingwood’s arguments about the 
purpose of metaphysics explains the dependence of orderly thinking on explicating 
presuppositions, but does not explain the purpose of answering historical questions that 
are not metaphysical. 
                                                 
1 NL, 2.5-51; 2.55. See also 26.22 
2 See EM, pp. 103, and particularly 133-42 (i.e. ch. XIII, ‘The Propaganda of Irrationalism’) 
3 EM, pp. 34-48. See also Boucher, ‘The Place of Education in Civilization’, pp. 288-9 
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The meaning of ‘civilization’ is laid out in a more focused and systematic way in 
Part III of The New Leviathan – and there is nothing about metaphysics in The New 
Leviathan. Collingwood explains that, properly speaking, civilization is the process that 
occurs in a community of becoming civil, (rather than the state resulting from that 
process).1 And it is an asymptotic process: though it is never complete, under civilization 
the community resembles ever more an ideal of civility.2 Because it can never achieve its 
ideal, civilization is a “permanent enterprise”.3 Relating ‘civilly’ consists in ‘respecting’ 
people – that is, treating them as beings with free will, rather than relating to them by 
force.4 ‘Civilization’ therefore “indicates abstention from the use of force”, and although 
“a degree of force is inevitable in human life”, nevertheless “being civilized means 
cutting it down, and becoming more civilized means cutting it down still further”.5 In this 
process, individuals within a community relate increasingly civilly to other individuals 
within that community, and also ever better to members of other communities. And it is 
this that is of direct interest to us here: whether – and, if so, how – investigative history is 
useful, or even necessary, to the process of improving relations between man and man by 
extending civility; i.e. to the process of civilization. 
Collingwood explains that “the process whereby a community becomes civilized 
is the process whereby its members become free agents: agents possessing and exercising 
free will. To have free will implies being conscious of freedom”.6 We have already 
examined Collingwood’s argument in ‘History and Freedom’ about how it is only 
through the discovery of history that man has become conscious of his freedom. I said 
that, although that argument holds strong cards in the suit of freedom, it is empty-
handed in that of ‘history as a science’ specifically. We therefore abandoned that 
argument as it is presented in The Idea of History. 
Now this is what I think Collingwood really thinks freedom consists in: truly 
autonomous problem-solving. This is the freedom implied by the having of free will in 
                                                 
1 NL, 34.36. See also 34.22 
2 By this Collingwood means that the process of civilization is “if the process of civilizing is at work”, he 
says, “the civil elements in the life of the community are gradually predominating and the barbarous 
elements are being gradually prevailed over, though the community’s condition never becomes one of pure 
civility and the barbarous elements never vanish”. NL, 34.55 
3 NL, 21.92 
4 Medhat Khattar has already provided an interesting discussion of how civility in certain social 
circumstances means ‘toleration’. See Medhat Khattar, ‘Toleration, Civility, and ‘Absolute Presuppositions’, 
Collingwood and British Idealism Studies, vol. 6, nos 1-2 (2010), pp. 113-35. As this is not the only kind of 
civility to which historical thinking is necessary, I have maintained a more loyal sense of civility in general. 
5 NL, 39.11; 39.15 
6 NL, 37.1-2 
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The New Leviathan. “This consciousness of freedom is self-respect”, he says.1 I respect 
myself, then, not because I am free from the instructions of others at all times, but 
because I can and do solve my own problems in my own ways.2 I respect myself because 
I know I don’t allow my emotions to get the better of my intellect. I respect myself 
because I prefer to find out systematically the real nature of the situation I am in, rather 
than to be satisfied with the illusions and narratives my “sectarian” thinking3 maintains or 
(worse) creates in (or as) that situation. Equally, I respect another when he is such an 
autonomous problem-solver; but I cannot respect him (i.e. recognise his free will) when 
he wallows in his problems, lets situations and emotions get the better of him, or even 
creates more for himself. 
I’ve already explained that, although Collingwood’s argument about autonomous 
problem-solving is a good one, he fails to demonstrate that history is the only form of 
problem-solving that delivers it. The New Leviathan, I think, offers a different function for 
history in relation to freedom that Collingwood does not take advantage of. That 
function concerns the recognition that others are free as well. 
For Collingwood, it is recognizing the freedom of others with whom one stands 
in social relations that makes society, social activity, and civility possible.4 Civility is the 
demeanour of a self-respecting man towards one whom he respects. Without it there 
might only be servility – the demeanour of a man lacking self-respect towards one whom 
he fears.5 Civility, then, presupposes the recognition of others as free agents. But 
Collingwood explains how we come to view others as free as follows: Self-respect, he 
says, recognizing one’s own freedom, is “inseparably bound up” with the respect for 
others.6 “No man has any idea of himself as a free agent, without an idea of free agents 
other than himself and of social relations between them”.7 
Collingwood’s argument appeals to the principle that ideas about the self are 
attended by correlative ideas about others. Whether or not the reader finds this principle 
convincing – and today’s specialists in Asperger syndrome might offer a catalogue of 
qualifications and exceptions – he will probably observe also that here Collingwood has 
missed an opportunity for further demonstrating the reliance of civilization upon history. 
It is not (or not only) in recognising one’s own freedom that history plays a necessary 
                                                 
1 NL, 37.12, 13.31 
2 This may, of course, be inconsistent in practice. See NL, 21.8 
3 NL, 16.11 
4 NL, 19.57; 20.2-23; 20.61; 20.72; 20.9; 21.6 
5 NL, 37.11-17. This is, of course, a major departure from Hobbes. 
6 NL, 37.13; 37.16. See also 21.19; 21.76 
7 NL, 21.19 
 - 236 -
role, but also in recognising freedom, or certain degrees of freedom, in others. By 
choosing to ‘bind the two inseparably’ Collingwood elects not to open up the crack 
between self and other which would actually suit his previous arguments about history 
rather nicely. He turns the opportunity down partly because he wants to get on with the 
business in hand in those chapters, dealing with ‘society as joint will’ and ‘civilization as 
education’. But he turns it down mostly because he thinks he’s already demonstrated two 
things: first the connexion between history and freedom, as we’ve already seen; and 
second the interdependence of ‘self’ and ‘other’.1 In other passages in The New Leviathan, 
the freedom of others is not ‘given’ in this way: Collingwood discusses “those who, 
having reached mental maturity, are capable of free action”, for example, and “those who 
are not”.2 And in chapter thirty seven: ‘Civilization as Education’, for example, children 
have to be made free. Other people are not always recognised as free just because we 
recognise our own freedom. We might, of course, recognise everyone’s potential freedom. 
But as the only available discipline for investigating the free actions of others, 
history serves not only to show that others think freely, but also to facilitate and regulate 
investigations of how autonomous and how capricious their reasoning is. By ‘regulated’ I 
mean controlled by the normal ‘rules’ of reasoned demonstration with evidence. In a 
political community, understanding the actions and reasoning of each other, let alone 
those of the authorities set up in our name, is of no small importance. It is necessary to 
the practice of joint will3 – so the form of theoretical reasoning that assists the answering 
of practical problems of that kind is of no small importance either. “Joining with these 
others” on terms of civility, rather than on terms of force or fear, therefore presupposes 
the recognition of them as to some degree autonomous, and a readiness to follow their 
reasoning. Only then can a community become a society, and go about its business of 
solving its common situational problems autonomously and civilly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 NL, 21.19 
2 NL, 25.42 
3 See NL, 37.18 
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x 
History and civilization: in practice 
 
That, then, is historical thinking and civilization in theory. Now we’ll turn to 
practice. Collingwood’s project of writing and publishing The New Leviathan, it is generally 
assumed, is what he is referring to in the closing passage of his Autobiography. “I know 
that Fascism means the end of clear thinking and the triumph of irrationalism”, he says. 
“I know that all my life I have been engaged unawares in a political struggle, fighting 
against these things in the dark. Henceforth I shall fight in the daylight.”1 Thus ends the 
Autobiography. Three years later, The New Leviathan emerges. 
But because The New Leviathan is a device for the netting of very big fish, it has to 
trawl, for the most part, at a depth far removed from the everyday lives of men. It does 
not skim the surface of recent political history with the same fine mesh which, in the 
Autobiography, snares David Lloyd George (“a landmark, second only to the Daily Mail, in 
the corruption of the electorate”2), Ramsay MacDonald (“who seemed to say so much 
and never said anything at all”3) and the “con-man” Stanley Baldwin (“who seldom said 
anything except what an honest man he was and how completely every one could trust 
him”4). Because of this, it is the Autobiography which provides the best specimens of 
everyday ‘historical thinking’ in the currents of political life.5 
Here we can see how Collingwood thinks maintaining the settlement of a 
democratic system of government depends on maintaining certain habits of mind among 
a populace. This is not exclusively Collingwood, of course: Machiavelli’s Discourses are full 
of the same idea. “So long as the majority were well enough informed and public-spirited 
enough for what they had to do, fools and knaves would be outvoted”,6 Collingwood 
explains. The democratic system is not only a form of government: it is also “a school of 
political experience coextensive with the nation”,7 in which, “so long as the individual 
voters did their political duty by keeping themselves adequately informed on public 
questions… there was little danger that their representatives would be insufficiently 
informed… to do their work creditably”.8 
                                                 
1 A, p. 167 
2 A, p. 156 
3 A, p. 162 
4 A, p. 162 
5 See though, NL, 30.4-45, which affords an exception to this rough rule. 
6 A, p. 155 
7 A, p. 153 
8 A, pp. 154-5 
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In order to maintain democratic government, the degree to which the public is 
informed must be maintained and, if possible, improved. The news must be conceived as 
the situation in which the reader, listener, or viewer, finds himself called to act, and not 
as “facts, or fictions, which it might amuse him to read… a mere spectacle for idle 
moments”.1 But informed about what? Informed, of course, about society’s ‘situation’: 
the problems, of various kinds (moral, political, economic, etc.2) that it faces, and the 
good and/or best solutions that are available. Importantly, these are the kind of practical 
problems that give rise to the theoretical problems that demand ‘historical thinking’, and 
in various ways. 
For one thing, there are sometimes/often/always people in a community who 
want to mislead the populace about its collective situation. Historical thinking carries an 
inherent distrust of what it is fed by (would-be) authorities, and the demand for real 
evidence to support claims about human, political situations.3 As in historical work, so in 
political life: when we stick to what the testimonies of ‘authorities’ tell us – when we treat 
them as sources of knowledge – we are easily led astray. The British media and the 
National Government, Collingwood says, misled the British public, either by ignorance 
or by design, about the true nature of the Spanish ‘Revolution’ of 1930-31. This is an 
example of one group of people misrepresenting the collective situation in order to win 
public support for a course of action that is not that of the common good. But a nation 
makes itself very much more difficult to deceive when it demands evidence. As it was in 
the early ’30s… 
 
The electorate was willing to put up with almost anything so long as war was 
averted. But no evidence was produced, either then or later, that it had been. 
No evidence was produced that either or both of the dictators bullied the 
British government into adopting the ‘non-intervention’ policy by threats of 
war. No evidence was produced that the British government would have 
endangered peace… No evidence of these things was produced; and there were 
things which, certainly, no one would have believed at the time, and no one ever 
will believe, without evidence, and conclusive evidence, adduced to prove 
them.4 
 
                                                 
1 A, p. 155 
2 See A, pp. 148-9 
3 A, pp. 159-63 
4 A, p. 162 
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And there are things which, we might add, no one ever should believe without 
evidence to prove them, especially where private gain or appeals to the emotions are 
being offered in place of such evidence.1 
But it is also only by scientific historical thinking that we are able to construct 
properly answers to the question of why these ‘authorities’ want us to believe certain 
things. This brings to light features of the collective situation which have perhaps been 
kept in the dark. “Failing any statement of the ‘National’ government’s policy”, 
Collingwood says, “I found myself obliged to infer their policy from the evidence of their 
actions. This was not difficult. For any one accustomed to interpret evidence, their 
actions admitted only one explanation”.2 
It is in these ways, then, that scientific historical questioning is necessary as a 
certain habit of mind among a populace, which is in turn necessary to the maintenance of 
democratic government – the political modus operandi of civilization.3 It is historical 
thinking by which a voter constructs in his own mind the actual situation in which a 
community finds itself. But it is also by historical thinking that voters can understand 
properly the situations of their own politicians, which are so often misrepresented to 
them. It is historical thinking that must go further, and ask not only what the politician’s 
solution is, but whether or not that was and is a good one. And it is historical thinking 
that enables a voter to see through the claims of a would-be-authority newspaper that, 
for example, a U-turn is proof of weakness or of political humiliation, and to see that it 
might in fact be rather the right solution, carried out by a political virtuoso, in response to 
a political situation that has changed and, in the course of events, become something 
else. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 See A, p. 167 
2 A, p. 163 
3 See NL, chs XXXV-XXXVII, XXVI 
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xi 
History and progress 
 
Civilization is itself an asymptotic process.1 But it also consists of progress within 
what Collingwood calls “channels of development”.2 In our own time, academic 
terminological orthodoxy has turned against ‘civilization’ and ‘progress’, identifying them 
as agents of Western supremacism. It should be obvious from what we’ve just heard why 
such objections to Collingwood’s invocation of ‘civilization’ would probably be 
superficial. The same should be clear from what follows about objections to 
Collingwood’s idea of ‘progress’. 
Collingwood tries to explain why history serves man’s progress in §7 of The Idea of 
History’s ‘Epilegomena’. The section was written, under the title ‘Progress’, as a chapter 
of the second part of Collingwood’s 1936 Oxford lectures on the philosophy of history, 
which he had called ‘Metaphysical Epilegomena’.3 It is worth dwelling on this subject of 
scientific history and progress, at least because it is necessary to reassure today’s reader 
that there is nothing of the ‘Whig interpretation of history’ about what follows. 
By the time he wrote this script ‘Progress’, Collingwood had already been writing 
on the subject of history and progress for nearly ten years (at least), and for all of that 
time the notion of ‘problem and solution’ had been a central component of his 
arguments about it. It occurs in his 1927 essay on ‘The Theory of Historical Cycles’, 
where he says that the only sense in which history can be a progress (“and nothing but a 
progress”) is that it is a succession of problems and solutions.4 He explicitly discounts the 
sense of ‘progress’ according to which any of the phases through which history moves is 
‘better’ or ‘worse’ than any of the others. However, justice is not fully done to the idea – 
“not wholly untrue” – that “throughout history man has been working at the same 
problem, and has been solving it better and better”.5 This point, only really hinted at 
there, receives a more thorough treatment two years later in a 1929 article for The Realist, 
titled simply ‘A Philosophy of Progress’.6 By 1936 (and this is what ends up in The Idea of 
History) Collingwood had relaxed his earlier claim that the “only” sense in which history 
was a progress was that it was a process of problems being solved and leading to new 
                                                 
1 NL, 34.5 
2 NL, 41.7 
3 See IH, pp. xiii-xv 
4 EPH, p. 86 
5 EPH, p. 84. Emphasis added. 
6 In EPH 
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problems. The idea that progress is simply a succession of problems and solutions is, 
Collingwood now adds, “just as true of a dog as of a man”.1 What is specifically 
‘historical’ is when new specific types of “actions or thoughts or situations” come into 
existence, where such novelties are conceived of as improvements. This is what makes a 
succession of problems and solutions a progress in the positive sense. But 
‘improvements’ from whose point of view? The Collingwood of 1929 might have said 
‘from our own’, or ‘from the historian’s’ – before adding, in his mischievous impertinent 
way, something to the effect of ‘who else?’ But now, in the 1936 argument, the position 
has changed in a manner reminiscent of Mill’s appeal to judgements of higher pleasures. 
Improvements are assessed from the point of view of those who know both types.2 
Collingwood’s new example concerns an old and a new method of catching fish. 
This seems conspicuously to be a problem that has been around for millennia. Here we 
should remember part of Collingwood’s argument about why problems are never 
‘eternal’ in their concreteness: 
 
People will speak of a savage as ‘confronted by the eternal problem of obtaining 
food’. But what really confronts him is the problem, quite transitory like all 
things human, of spearing this fish, or digging up this root, or finding 
blackberries in this wood.3 
 
The argument continues that only those who know both methods by actual 
experience can decide whether or not the new is an improvement on the old. And if they 
cannot know the old method by actual experience, they must rely on the “sympathetic 
insight which may take its place for such a purpose”. In order for the change to be an 
improvement, it is not necessary that the old method be thought a bad one, but that the 
new be thought better. “This he can only do”, Collingwood says, “on condition of his 
knowing what the old way of life was like, that is, having historical knowledge of his 
society’s past while he is actually living in the present he is creating: for historical 
knowledge is simply the re-enactment of past experiences in the mind of the present 
thinker”.4 The only one genuine meaning for the question of progress is, he says, this: 
 
                                                 
1 IH, p. 324 
2 IH, pp. 324-7 
3 A, pp. 32-3 
4 IH, p. 326 
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If thought in its first phase, after solving the initial problems of that phase, is 
then, through solving these, brought up against others which defeat it; and if the 
second solves these further problems without losing its hold on the solution of 
the first, so that there is gain without any corresponding loss, then there is 
progress. And there can be progress on no other terms. If there is any loss, the 
problem of setting loss against gain is insoluble.1 
 
Now this seems to be a much more satisfactory sense of progress, at least as a 
definition, and it is very clear how Collingwood thinks ‘history’, or at least ‘historical 
knowledge’, is necessary to it. An additional virtue, which also makes this argument itself 
an exemplary improvement on earlier essays on progress, is that it reconciles the 
apparent contradiction between the facts that (a) our modern solutions can be 
improvements on old ones, even though (b) our problems and purposes are different 
from those of the past. The claim is that present solutions ‘contain’ or ‘retain’ those of 
the past. One of the errors made in our own time in arguments about the history of ideas 
is the assumption that authors’ problems across time are either (a) the same, or (b) 
different. Collingwood has reconciled the two by having problems develop not in such a 
way that they are separated, but in such a way that they overlap. 
The cost of this definition of progress is that it limits the range of the concept to 
a particular problem, or set of problems that are somehow interrelated. We can never 
really talk of the general ‘progress’ of our society, or of an age, let alone of humanity in 
general. Instead we can only aim at the progress of specific ‘lines’ of problem-solving – 
or, in Collingwood’s words, “channels of development”.2 The natural sciences are the 
archetypical example of a line of questioning that exhibits progress.3 But as long as there 
are problems arising and solutions being established in succession, there can be progress 
in any discipline: and this means in history and in philosophy.4 (Where there is no real 
process of successive problem-solving, there can be no progress – though there can be 
development.5) 
This narrowing to ‘channels’ of problem-solving is not itself a great cost, since it 
is still not terribly limiting on what we can say about the processes among us. Our 
politics as a whole are ‘progressive’ when (and only when) solutions are being found to 
                                                 
1 IH, p. 329 
2 NL, 41.7 
3 See IH, p. 332 
4 See NL, 21.94 
5 Collingwood’s example is art. But he also says there is no progress in comfort, happiness, or satisfaction. 
IH, p. 330 
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the political problems that are newly arisen among us, without any corresponding loss of 
our hold over the problems that were previously ‘solved’. 
But this qualification of ‘no corresponding loss’ means that it can almost never 
be said that ‘our politics’ are in a state of progress. We are constantly losing our hold on 
previously ‘solved’ problems. The eruption of war between nations previously at peace is 
proof that the settlement that maintained that peace has slipped, albeit under new 
pressures. And the relaxation of the legal and social incentives that previously held 
marriages together, although intended as solutions to attendant moral evils that follow 
the marriage ideal when rigidly applied (not least of which is the problem of a kind of 
domestic oppression that affects women more than it does men), have meant a 
corresponding loss in our society’s ability to discipline and educate children in a stable 
and controlled way.1 A truly progressive move would be a new arrangement that 
reconciled and satisfied new requirements and maintained the solution to old ones. But, 
as Collingwood says, “If there is any loss, the problem of setting loss against gain is 
insoluble”.2 
So what is Collingwood’s concluding point about how history creates this 
progress in political reality? The answer is to be found on the last two pages of The Idea of 
History. Einsteinian physics is an improvement on Newton only because it ‘retains’ the 
solutions found by Newton. What follows that short discussion is, again, an example of 
progress in politics (which is more appropriate here anyway), and finally the closing 
words of Collingwood’s classic posthumous work: 
 
Progress, in those cases (common or rare) when it happens, happens only in 
one way: by the retention in the mind, at one phase, of what was achieved in the 
preceding phase. The two phases are related not merely by way of succession, 
but by way of continuity, and continuity of a particular kind… If we want to 
abolish capitalism or war, and in doing so not only to destroy them but to bring 
into existence something better, we must begin by understanding them: seeing 
what the problems are which our economic or international system succeeds in 
solving, and how the solution of these is related to the other problems which it 
fails to solve. This understanding of the system we set out to supersede is a 
thing which we must retain throughout the work of superseding it, as a 
knowledge of the past conditioning our creation of the future. It may be 
                                                 
1 My examples are drawn from IH, p. 331, though the elaborations are my own. 
2 IH, p. 329 
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impossible to do this; our hatred of the thing we are destroying may prevent us 
from understanding it, and we may love it so much that we cannot destroy it 
unless we are blinded by such hatred. But if that is so, there will once more, as 
so often in the past, be change but no progress; we shall have lost our hold on 
one group of problems in our anxiety to solve the next. And we ought by now 
to realize that no kindly law of nature will save us from the fruits of our own 
ignorance.1 
 
This “retention in the mind… of what was achieved in the preceding phase”, this 
“understanding” of the problems of the past and especially of the solutions still in place 
among us to hold them down, is, of course, a product of history. If progress is to be 
achieved and maintained, it is necessary that those engaged at the ‘mining end’ of any 
channel of inquiry understand the settlements of that line’s past. Indeed, as Ian 
Winchester has again argued in a recent article for Collingwood and British Idealism Studies, 
this is why advances in physics presuppose knowledge of the history of physics2 – or, at 
least, some knowledge of the recent history of physics. 
In his Autobiography Collingwood describes his own attitude towards politics as 
“what in England is called democratic and on the Continent liberal”.3 Here we see that 
this ‘liberalism’ retains the achievements of Burke’s classical conservatism. Proceed by all 
means with improvements and reforms to the political system that supports us, he is 
saying, but beware of destroying at the same time that of which you don’t understand the 
function.4 
In philosophy there might be more room for recklessness, and the risks of aiming 
at a wholesale overhaul of ‘the system’ significantly lower – at least in terms of body-
counts and so on. But if politics is political thought, losing our grip on the solutions of 
the past that we have since built upon means not investigating our history on our own 
terms, but allowing those old problems of politics, in Burke’s imagery, to blow 
                                                 
1 IH, pp. 333-4 
2 See Ian Winchester, ‘Physics and History’, Collingwood and British Idealism Studies, vol. 14, no. 1 (2008), pp. 
17-35 
3 A, p. 153 
4 There are further expressions of the general principle of conservatism (though it is very general) in NL, 
particularly at 36.33-34, where Collingwood writes: “in this kind of science improving on what is handed 
down to us is far less important than conserving it; a fact which it is well to remember. The proportion 
between the two things has been much misunderstood in the last century or two when for accidental and 
temporary reasons Europeans have attached too much importance to invention and too little to 
conservation.” 
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themselves open beneath our feet.1 Collingwood identified the initial tremors of this kind 
of slippage in the lead-up to the Second World War, which is why the course of action he 
took was a public reinforcement of ‘Hobbesian’ foundations in an updated and accessible 
form, in The New Leviathan.2 
Now, the reader might already have noticed that this whole argument about 
history and progress appeals to a form of history according to which ‘history’ means 
historical knowledge. When he says ‘history’ here Collingwood is not talking about 
history as a science, at least not explicitly. This time, however, the overlap is fairly 
obvious and, furthermore, the connexion to progress, unlike the connexion to duty, 
strengthens his argument about scientific history. 
If Collingwood is guilty of misstatement it is only because the idea of ‘retention 
in the mind’ seems to equate historical knowledge with memory. Importantly, history as a 
science is not the “retention in the mind… of what was achieved in the preceding 
phase”:3 it is the investigation of it, the reconstruction of it. The overlap of historical 
knowledge with ‘history as a science’ consists in the fact that scientific knowledge is 
created by systematic investigation: it is not created by being remembered. If progress 
were reliant only on memory, we could only improve on what we could remember; we 
could only retain the achievements of the past according to, at worst, our own memories 
and the stories we’d been told and, at best, a form of history which is stuck at the level of 
‘scissors and paste’. It is because we can investigate history that we can come to 
understand the ‘solution’ nature of much of what survives among us in a systematic, 
evidenced way – rather, we might add, than by keeping it as an article of conservative 
political faith or dogma. 
Collingwood offers an account of doing precisely this himself in An 
Autobiography. He recounts how he “began to reconsider in in detail all the familiar topics 
and problems of moral philosophy… on the principles which by now were controlling all 
my work”.4 One of these principles, he says, is that every topic and problem has its 
history and is “unintelligible without some knowledge of that history”. Now, prima facie 
the principle is untrue. Someone coming to moral philosophy with a principle of reading 
nothing written before 1980 could not only make a great deal of sense of most 
                                                 
1 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France [1790] L. G. Mitchell (ed.) (Oxford University Press, 
1999), p. 58 
2 See, though, Boucher’s clarification of the relationship between “the two Leviathans” in Social and Political 
Thought, pp. 63-109 
3 IH, pp. 333-4 
4 A, p. 148 
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contemporary debates in that field, but could actually be a valuable contributor to some 
of them as well. Collingwood’s claim is easily salvageable by pointing out either that even 
a book published earlier this year is ‘history’, or that ‘history’ includes the function of 
ascribing to any moral philosopher a question he is understood to be answering. But that 
is changing the terms of the claim such that it is trivially true. 
The real value of investigating the history of a problem is not that it makes the 
problem’s present form ‘intelligible’, but that it ensures that today’s contributions are 
progressive, that they build on achievements hitherto secured, rather than that they 
relapse into errors that have already been made and exploded. Collingwood reappraised 
the history of moral philosophy not purely because he wanted to understand it better, 
but because he wanted to make sure that, by contributing to it himself, he was offering 
good solutions to new problems without weakening moral philosophy’s hold over old 
ones.1 This is, of course, why historians of philosophy have to ask whether a past 
solution is right or wrong. They have to ask whether So-and-so was right, because their 
historical inquiry into what So-and-so thought – what his reasoning was – is driven by a 
presupposed need to find out whether a certain question has already been answered 
adequately; or, if not, what considerations have already been offered along the right lines. 
The conclusion that follows from all of this is, then, that scientific history of philosophy 
is for the progress of philosophy itself; and the history of political thought is for the 
progress of political thinking. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 This is what produces what Boucher calls the “idealist conception of the history of philosophy”. See 
Boucher, Social and Political Thought, p. 93 
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Part VII 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
i 
Summary 
 
It is time to sum up what has been said and to say something about what it 
means for us. 
We’ve seen that history can be a ‘science’ – a science in the ‘Baconian’ sense that 
sound historical questions can be posed and systematically answered by being broken 
down into series of sub-questions and answered by recourse to evidence. Because all 
history is the history of thought – and because the vital characteristics of starting 
questions in history are the same as those in the apparent sub-discipline, the history of 
ideas – the ‘rules’ of scientific history are the same as those for the history of ideas. 
But we’ve also seen that Collingwood does not consistently speak of history in 
this way. In fact he also uses ‘history’ to refer to assertions of unique, concrete facts, and 
instances of ‘becoming’. These ‘forms’ of history are not simply different sub-topics of 
his writings on history. Generally they are chronologically and thematically mixed in his 
work. But they are not separate: the three forms of history – though other readers might 
identify more – lend themselves, by the way Collingwood employs them in his 
discussions, to precisely the sort of ‘scale of forms’ that he thinks characterises all 
philosophical concepts. He does not say this explicitly, and I have not claimed that 
although he didn’t say it he really meant it. I have meant only to demonstrate that what 
are apparently competing, or at least separate, ‘categories’ within the idea of history, are 
actually reconcilable such that the highest form – history as a science – gives reason to 
what are otherwise defects of arbitrariness in lower forms. 
The lower forms of history are absorbed into the highest form by Collingwood’s 
Law of Primitive Survivals. But that highest form, ‘history as a science’, is not itself a 
lower form of some other science, because its specific type of question is special to it, so 
that such questions cannot be satisfied by answers that do not correlate to them. 
The specialness of those questions consists of several conditions which I have 
explained as ‘characteristics’ of their typical ‘specific unknown’. They are not discussed as 
such by Collingwood. He has phrased his arguments about history as a science 
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differently, such that his claims and arguments have appeared to some readers as in 
various ways defective. But I have argued that by making them more explicitly into terms 
of what historical questions (in Collingwood’s own phrase) “expect”, Collingwood’s 
contentions are reasonable and, as far as his account of investigative history goes, 
workable. 
It is because we have approached ‘question and answer’ in history in this way that 
we have seen that the doctrine of re-enactment has been taken routinely to be much 
more complex than it really is. Some commentators have tried to make sense of it by 
appealing to Collingwood’s philosophy of mind and language. But, imported into history, 
Collingwood’s philosophy of mind only functions as support for certain presuppositions 
of historical questions, and those can anyway be presupposed on other grounds. 
Appealing to Collingwood’s claims in philosophy of mind as if they are his hidden 
supporting arguments for the doctrine of re-enactment only alienates readers who can 
see further defects in his philosophy of mind and language. Actually re-enactment is 
necessary to historical knowledge simply because no properly historical question can be 
satisfied without it. And this, we have seen, is what answers the criticisms that survive 
other commentators’ attempts to defend the doctrine of re-enactment. 
What Collingwood has illuminated, whether he intended to or not, is something 
more about what kind of thing we are trying to find out when we ask historical questions 
that really are ‘historical’, and what counts as an answer. The claim that re-enactment is 
not necessary for historical knowledge can only be maintained if this feature of 
Collingwood’s delineation of what historical questions pursue is also overturned. 
Denying that historical knowledge is about re-enacted thoughts looks easy and tenable; 
but it seems less so when it is demonstrated that it also means denying something that 
Collingwood is implicitly endorsing as a characteristic of all historical questions – 
common to all historical questions, but exclusive to the questions of history: namely, 
what somebody ‘meant’ by something, in the sense of what his ‘reasoning’ was. 
We’ve seen, furthermore, that historical questions are not those that are aimed at 
the discovery of rules. They aim at following certain concrete trains of reasoning, not 
‘rules’ of reasoning or, necessarily, common patterns of reasoning. 
It is also because we have approached scientific history in this way that we have 
been able to make sense of certain aspects of Collingwood’s arguments that have 
troubled commentators. Collingwood’s claim that once the historian knows ‘what 
happened’ he already knows ‘why it happened’ – the so-called ‘what-why paradox’ – only 
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makes sense where the ‘what’ and the ‘why’ signify identical specific unknowns – which, 
in order to be properly historical ‘whats’ and properly historical ‘whys’, they must be. 
Meanwhile, the dispute over whether the past is, for Collingwood, ‘real’ or merely 
‘constructed’ has been dissolved by showing that it is both. It is a presupposition of 
scientific historians that what they are aiming at is the truth, but the knowledge they 
produce through their investigations is not ‘apprehension’ of, or ‘compresence’ with, the 
event or act of thinking itself, but rather the conclusion they have constructed. Scientific 
knowledge consists in the warranted assertion of conclusions. 
We’ve also examined Collingwood’s arguments about what history is for. His 
claims that it is only through history that we have knowledge that human activity is free 
fails where it refers to scientific history and to knowledge of one’s own freedom. But 
some accommodation may be made with the claim that it is only through scientific 
history that we can make reliable judgements of the freedom of others. Similarly, his 
argument that history provides ‘self-knowledge’ fails to deliver where self-knowledge 
means facts about ourselves and our capacities. He succeeds in showing that, if ‘history’ 
denotes all systematic investigations of other people’s reasoning, then certain sciences of 
human affairs require it; and he can succeed further if ‘self-knowledge’ is stretched to 
include conclusions in practical reason: deciding to rather than only deciding that – where, 
that is, ‘know thyself’ includes ‘know what thou shalt’. Collingwood’s equation of history 
with duty – explained in his 1940 Lectures on Moral Philosophy and in The New 
Leviathan, and admired by some commentators – appeals only to a concept of history 
asserted as the ‘essence’ of history in a lower form of ‘history’. As applied to history as a 
science, it actually militates against what Collingwood means elsewhere by ‘history’. 
Finally I think we’ve seen that returning our methodological debates to such 
foundational ‘Baconian’ principles, we are able (as Collingwood puts it) to dispose of a 
good deal of “clap-trap”.1 Debates over the definitive senses of terms like ‘explanation’, 
‘cause’, ‘meaning’, ‘understanding’, ‘significance’ and so on, are to be dissolved by 
referring them to what they mean in concrete instances of historians investigating the 
kind of questions which, as historians, they really try to answer. Where conceptual 
analysis of those terms is conceived as ‘methodology’, method (it should be remembered) 
is a consequence of question. Where ‘methodology’ is conceived as the establishment of 
principles governing how such questions should be answered, method (again) is a 
consequence of question. Nothing more specific can really be said about how to answer 
                                                 
1 A, p. 32 
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questions scientifically beyond that one should use evidence and reason. Something is 
evidence when it is used as evidence – evidence for something particular, helping to 
answer a particular question. And evidence relates properly to a conclusion when it 
satisfies the court of other historians that the conclusion has been demonstrated. 
Attempts to be more specific than that really only invite objections and exceptions. 
 
 
ii 
History of political thought as education 
 
I began by describing the history of ideas as a subject for undergraduate study 
and this, I think, is where the arguments of Collingwood’s that we’ve seen so far are best 
put to use, especially those concerning scissors-and-paste history, evidence, and the 
general but vital prescription to ask historical questions – and, better, to ask those historical 
questions that arise out of the (political) philosophical questions that are, for whatever 
reason, most in need of being answered properly. 
For Collingwood, as we’ve seen, the purpose of the history of political thought is 
the progressive advancement of political thinking. We should investigate the works of 
the past with the aim of seeing, as precisely as we can, what their problems were, what 
their reasoning was in terms of the solutions they offered and, importantly, whether they 
were right. We should ask whether they solved their problems adequately and – if not – 
where they went wrong. Collingwood’s philosophy of history is not only for investigators 
with ‘historian’ in their job title. It is not for a social class, but for a way of thinking 
common to many areas of inquiry, and accessible to all independent-thinking people.1 
Philosophers must be historians of philosophy; political theorists must be historians of 
political thought; and the same goes for any “channel of development”2 that can progress 
– any, that is, in which old problems solved lead to new problems opened, and so on. 
But not only must historical thinking in disciplines be maintained by those in the 
disciplines themselves. It must also be passed on by the generation that knows how to do 
it, to a generation that so far doesn’t but takes an interest in what their seniors are doing.3 
We’re straying into pedagogical territory here, but why not? The history of ideas is a 
discipline of both research and teaching, and those who do it professionally are usually – 
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3 See NL, 37. 43–44 
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rightly – employed in both capacities. The ‘methodology’ of the history of ideas should 
concern not only the methods by which these professionals do their research, but also 
those by which they do their teaching, since it is there that the basics of the discipline are 
transferred to new initiates. Collingwood himself discusses, after all, the ‘rules of thumb’ 
that he used in his teaching at Oxford, right in the middle of a discussion concerning his 
practical research work as an historian and archaeologist.1 And I’ve already said that 
many of his conclusions – if not the arguments that support them – are actually 
presupposed by working historians, though undergraduates may have to be taught to 
presuppose them. 
Marnie Hughes-Warrington has already provided a deep study of the relevance of 
Collingwood’s ideas to education in general, and especially to the teaching of history, in 
her 2003 book, How Good an Historian Shall I Be? I don’t want to replicate what she has 
already shown. But fortunately she does not discuss the logic of question and answer 
anywhere in the book. This is partly because her focus is on the historical imagination, 
and not the logic of inquiry, so she does not need to discuss ‘question and answer’. That, 
though, is where we can add to her discussion about Collingwood and the teaching of 
the history of political thought. 
Very few historians of ideas, no matter how well they know his work, have as 
much of Collingwood’s personal experience to draw on as they have of their own. From 
my own I can say this about the importance of Collingwood’s logic of question and 
answer to the teaching of history of political thought at present: 
Firstly, the scissors-and-paste problem still seems highly prevalent among history 
of political thought undergraduates, and probably also among those on courses which 
familiarise students with old philosophy in general. At worst, scissors-and-paste history in 
the student work I’ve seen takes the form of a summary of the whole book, sometimes 
with biographical and quasi-psychological material included. In its most sophisticated 
form you might get a short inventory of commentators’ views on a particular point or 
other, with the attendant implication that because they have been published for saying it, 
these authorities must have a point – and the point is then, in Collingwood’s word, 
‘fixed’. Where two authorities contradict each other you might get a statement that one 
view is ‘preferred’ – especially where what is being assessed is an account of human 
nature. But more often than not the contradiction is not commented on. 
                                                 
1 See also IH, pp. 7-8 
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There are two guilty parties here, where the survival of ‘scissors and paste’ is 
concerned. The first is a paradigm picked up by students, I think probably before the 
stage of higher education, that the task in academic work is to provide only ‘facts’, and to 
keep your own private thoughts out of it. Thus you describe what an author says, but 
don’t offer a view on whether or not what he says is correct. The reasoning is that where 
the former is ‘objective’, the latter is merely ‘subjective’. The former, as long as the facts 
are correct, gets academically rewarded – the reasoning goes – while the latter causes 
your work to haemorrhage marks. It is much safer, then, to reproduce material from 
trustworthy sources – namely, from the published work of authorities. 
The other guilty party is the teachers. We’ve seen that the question-and-answer 
logic of historical questions cancels the distinction between past and present – or, at 
least, renders it unimportant from the point of view of history. Collingwood’s 
prescription, that the past be seen as an element of the present, is very seldom realized, 
because most historians think of the past as a ‘foreign country’. Historians of ideas are 
particularly prone to this today, because they are more aware than ever that in these 
foreign countries foreign languages are spoken. Lectures and tutorials in the history of 
political thought take on more of a ‘language class’ tone than they did in Collingwood’s 
day. Indeed part of Collingwood’s complaint, in An Autobiography, is that historians of 
philosophy were completely ignorant of the inherent differences in the meanings of 
ostensibly identical words through time. But today, since the ‘linguistic turn’, historians 
are perfectly aware of the hazard of terminological faux amis. But it is perhaps not 
unrelated to the reason why their answers to the question of what those pasts can be for 
are commonly quite thin. If the past, with its foreign languages that must be learned, is a 
foreign country, then the purpose of this time-tourism seems to be merely that it 
broadens your mind with a temporary diet of exotic cuisines. You can never go there, of 
course, but then again you don’t have to intend to move to Saudi Arabia for a course in 
Middle-Eastern Studies to be good for the broadening of your global-historical outlook. 
Contemporary political issues are, it is true, thrown into perspective when you’re 
suddenly exposed to the minutes of fierce debates in the past concerning the 
fundamental nature and origin of authority, property, freedom, or custom. In contrast, 
current affairs begin to appear quite parochial. 
Although this is undoubtedly a case of the broadening of minds, the effects of 
the ‘foreign country’ idea in the history of political thought at undergraduate level are 
also very limiting. The idea that the past is a foreign country perpetuates a common 
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assumption among students that they are being tested on how many ‘doctrines’ they can 
remember. The notion of deciding whether long-dead philosophers were right about 
something, or whether they were instead responsible for sowing the seeds of some 
monstrous blunder from which we still suffer, strikes them as an exercise that somehow 
breaks the rules. Indeed, as we’ve seen in the cases of Hans-Georg Gadamer and 
Quentin Skinner, some eminent figures in the field are telling them that it does almost 
break the rules of being a good historian. Student essays, I’ve found, for the most part 
reflect this. They tend to be overly descriptive, and betray an assumption that, apart from 
what it means for their degree result, it no longer matters whether Hobbes, Locke or 
whoever was right or wrong. 
But because of the cancelling of the past/present distinction, Collingwood shows 
us why someone who thinks past mistakes in argument unimportant is someone who 
thinks present mistakes unimportant. If investigating past philosophy is important it is 
because there are things we want to know about our social present which cannot or 
should not be answered without doing so. This is not only about surveying the history of 
a problem in order to avoid repeating exploded errors, so that your own contributions 
can be genuine advancements – as Collingwood describes himself as doing with the 
history of moral philosophy in his Autobiography.1 Investigating other people’s reasoning 
concerns not only what is still being said, but also what is no longer being contested. Its 
proper ‘subject-matter’ is equally what is now simply assumed. The only way to answer 
evaluative questions about ‘cultural assumptions’ inherited from past reasoning is the 
historical way. What I am saying is that what historians of ideas deal in are equally the last 
explicit forms of what has often been settled and has survived into the present as implicit 
assumption, or what Burke calls ‘prejudice’. In this light, the history of political thought 
appears as the authentic ‘critical theory’ of cultural assumptions concerning politics. I say 
‘authentic’ because it does not, unlike other fields using the name ‘critical theory’, 
presuppose a cultural-ideological level of bourgeois conspiracy last explicated properly by 
Antonio Gramsci; and I say ‘authentic’ because properly scientific history of political 
thought accepts the required rigours of historical evidence – and of any other kind of 
evidence. The history of ideas, when properly pursued, offers us a way of doing properly 
what ‘critical theorists’ of all kinds have claimed to be doing more recently and more 
noisily: exposing what really lies below the surfaces of the ideas and assumptions we use 
in our practical reasoning. The ideas which historians of ideas expose, examine and, if 
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they are doing it properly, blow wide open again with full-blooded philosophical 
assessment, do not belong to a cut-off world of the past: they are there in our own time 
to be, like Oliver Cromwell, dug up and subjected to new rounds of torture. 
It seems to me that, if Collingwood is right about the importance of rooting 
historical inquiry in the pressing concerns of the present, historians of political thought 
can legitimately identify not only the sources of the ideas we’ve inherited, but also ask by 
what right we retain those inheritances. If certain political thinkers of today seem to 
presuppose, for example, Locke’s account (by ‘historical plain method’) of the origin of 
private property, then historians of ideas should not be afraid to decide, with the full 
force of their reasoning, whether Locke was right. What is required, as Collingwood says, 
is both to re-think Locke’s reasoning in my own mind, “and also to think other things in 
light of which I can judge it”.1 And this, I think, is how Collingwood would have us 
educate newcomers to the field. We should let them join in with what we’re already 
doing: show them what we’re trying to find out, why we’re trying to find it out, and 
demonstrate to them the infinite means we have of proving that so-and-so proposed this 
answer, whatever it is, to this question. And we should not stop there. We should also 
show them the further means we have of deciding whether this author was right – and, if 
he wasn’t, why he wasn’t. 
That is the pedagogical task, ultimately, and it is obvious that it involves the 
teacher spreading habits of autonomous historical thinking. The solution to ‘scissors and 
paste’ is for teachers to insist that material not be collected according to a topic or a 
‘point’, but that the mass of material written on any given subject in the history of ideas 
be ‘navigated’ according to some principle decided upon before a single word has been 
written, and that that principle be the specific question the essay is supposed to answer – 
a question built upon a specific unknown that satisfies all the conditions we’ve already 
examined. 
It will be said in reply to this that undergraduates are given questions to answer in 
every assignment; that they always get questions, but some of them ignore them. This is 
not true: they are not always given complete historical questions. What are disguised as 
questions are sometimes little more than invitations to say something about a vaguely-
specified area of a work, an argument, or whatever. Sometimes the prefabricated 
questions we provide for students even end with a one-word instruction: “Discuss”. 
                                                 
1 IH, p. 301 
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If no professional historian of ideas would consider basing one of his own 
articles on such a poorly-conceived question, why should he get his initiates into the 
habit of making do with one? The best work, I have found, is always offered by those 
students who have ‘narrowed’ the question initially set down to something more easily 
satisfied within their word limit – whether deliberately as a means of managing their 
material, or quite coincidentally. Answers must be correlative to their questions, after all. 
Once they have done so, it is very easy for students to know where in the primary text to 
look for their evidence, and to see whether something written by another commentator is 
of any significance to their inquiry or not. This is how professionals operate. But by 
giving students inadequate questions without the attendant advice to make them more 
specific according to what they see as the most pressing questions, teachers are 
effectively withholding from students the principle of navigation that prevents their own 
work from collapsing into scissors-and-paste history. 
Undergraduate essays in the history of political thought sometimes show that the 
student has made some mistake or other about the reasoning of the author being studied. 
We should be quick to forgive this, in general, because oftener still their essays evince 
little attempt to follow his reasoning at all. Instead students, as if by instinct, pick up on 
an author’s conclusions which then, cut away from the inquiries that originally led to 
them, are treated as stand-alone propositions which can be evaluated on the terms of a 
critique of a manifesto in this year’s election. It is an unconscious habit of students, 
particularly in the history of political thought I think, to treat past philosophers’ 
conclusions as their ‘policies’. 
The marker, who knows that this is not what the discipline demands, will 
characterise this as something like an insufficient ‘engagement’ with the author’s 
argument. But what it means at root is a failure to re-enact the author’s reasoning. For 
Collingwood, as we’ve heard, this is the absence of ‘historical’ thinking. In its guise of 
‘engaging with the argument’, re-enactment is widely acknowledged in the history of 
political thought as a requisite of doing the thing properly, and a prerequisite of 
criticising past arguments appropriately. This shows that, even when as professional 
historians they are attacking the possibility of re-enacting past thoughts in print, as 
teachers they are probably trying to foment it in the seminar room. This is why they 
should be doing with their students exactly what Collingwood said: you tell them that 
what they have read for that week was our author’s answer, and then ask them to tell you 
the question.  
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There is a moral here about asking students to explain why an author thought 
what he thought. ‘Why’ questions are ambiguous: they demand ‘explanations’, and we 
have seen that the idea of an explanation is ambiguous too. Giving students an 
instruction to provide an ‘historical’ explanation does not help particularly, since it invites 
the notion that thoughts are products of their contexts, and Hobbes said such-and-such 
because there was a Civil War on. 
Instead we ought to be better at explaining what kind of a ‘why’ historians of 
ideas pursue. Here’s an example: I might ask my students to write an essay about why 
John Locke said private property was legitimate. I would, though, be inviting all sorts of 
explanations that would by-pass Locke’s arguments altogether: ‘Locke was acting as a 
mouthpiece of the Whig Shaftesbury’; ‘Locke was trying to justify capitalism’; ‘Locke was 
a slave-trader’. All of these might be true, but that was not what I was trying to get them 
to do – and the fact that these facts about Locke came from a reliable source will 
contribute to their sense of injustice at getting a low mark. A better formulation would 
be, ‘What reasons does Locke give for thinking private property legitimate?’ This, I think, 
gets students re-enacting thoughts; this is what gets them following the details of an 
argument, and this is what ‘raises the stakes’ in making sure that, given intervenient 
changes in terminology, the author really does mean what he seems to mean by saying 
something. Collingwood helps to explain, I think, why good historical thinking is 
incubated, and the future of systematic history of political thought is secured, but 
ensuring the adequacy and the real-world importance of our historical questions. 
 
 
iii 
Is Collingwood right about ‘historical questions?’ 
 
I’ve said that, Collingwood’s arguments having been reordered to reflect his 
principle of question and answer, the best defences of his most contentious arguments in 
philosophy of history are to be mounted by pointing to what is demanded by a class of 
questions that are ‘historical’. Historical questions pursue what people ‘meant’ by doing 
things; they cannot be aimed at general rules or laws; they seek processes and not states; 
and, where historical knowledge is to have any relevance to the aims of human life in 
general, historical questions ask whether people’s actions were right. 
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It follows that we ought to ask whether Collingwood’s philosophy of scientific 
history is right, and it’s turned out that the only way to do this is to ask whether his 
conception of historical questions is right. This does not put us back to the beginning, 
because we’ve identified along the way strategies for attacking Collingwood that fail, and 
strategies for defending him that make sense of his claims. I should remind the reader, 
though, that Collingwood does not present this as his ‘theory of historical questions’. It is 
not Collingwood that is being put to the torture. It is the strongest versions of his claims, 
strengthened with his most fundamental principle of systematic thinking. 
How can we assess this sketch of historical questions? Not, I think, by giving 
praise or blame to anything which “relates to human actions, and human concerns, on a 
simple view of the object, as it stands stripped of every relation, in all the nakedness and 
solitude of metaphysical abstraction”1 – but rather by viewing this account of ‘historical 
questions’ in relation to concrete instances of their arising: that is, in relation to the kinds 
of question that really arise in the work of professional historians, and the ‘answer’ 
narratives that are meant to presuppose them either explicitly or implicitly. 
We instantly see that there are some very significant consequences of this 
account of historical questions. There are abundant ostensibly historical questions that 
do not presuppose meaning. History teachers in schools ask their students, ‘When was 
the Battle of Trafalgar?’ or, ‘How did the Great Fire of London begin?’ And these are 
commonly thought to be historical questions. Collingwood’s answer should, I think, be 
that these are only quasi-historical questions – or, at best, they are incomplete as 
historical questions. Certainly they resemble historical questions in being ‘about the past’. 
But questions of date are really only chronological questions. Chronological questions 
might ‘arise’ in an historical inquiry, but where they stand alone they can only really be 
useful for providing ‘general knowledge’ details for filling in our “innate” idea of the past. 
Similarly there are non-chronological questions that seem to be historical. At every 
moment over the last six decades there have been professional historians attempting to 
establish the true number of Jews killed in the holocaust. That is a question of numbers, 
and is apparently disconnected from the ‘historical’ question (in the sense I’ve been 
explaining) of what the German officials of the era were trying to do. We already know 
all too well what they were trying to do. The point is, if these systematic researchers are 
not historians, what are they? 
                                                 
1 Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, pp. 7-8 
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Some commentators have spoken of Collingwood having a ‘narrow’ conception 
of history and a ‘broad’ one.1 In short, it follows from the conception of historical 
questions we’ve seen that not all of what we commonly call history is history, and a lot of 
what we don’t think of as history in fact is – or is based on it. The ‘broadness’ refers to 
all the other subject-matter and types of investigation that, according to Collingwood, are 
drawn into ‘historical thinking’ or made to depend upon it. The ‘narrowness’, meanwhile, 
refers to the fact that much of what we ordinarily call ‘history’ is not, according to 
Collingwood, real history. Chronology; descriptions of past states of affairs (however 
accurate); the method of ‘scissors and paste’; past natural events, and so on, are excluded 
from ‘history’, it seems. Actually, though, we’ve seen that they are not excluded from 
history – though Collingwood says very often ‘that is not history’. Rather, they may serve 
as components of scientific history by taking up proper places within the systematic 
investigations of scientific historians. It is simply that they are not adequate descriptions 
of ‘history’ in its highest form. 
I’ve said that Collingwood’s philosophy of history is at times framed so as to 
support with reasons what had previously been “habitually” and/or “arbitrarily” 
described as the subject-matter of history.2 The question that haunts my explanation is 
whether, by resolving this arbitrariness by recourse to what historical questions demand, 
it has not been resolved at all, but rather merely transferred to the ‘question’ side. My 
answer is that arbitrariness is not something that can survive the transfer from answer to 
question in the way that a number value can be passed inverted from one side to the 
other of a mathematical equation. Where questions of ‘what I should be investigating’ are 
transformed into statements of ‘what I want to investigate’, the arbitrary concentration 
upon a subject-matter becomes the deliberate concentration upon a question. The above 
account of historical questions derived from Collingwood’s arguments about historical 
thinking collects certain general characteristics of a kind of question that really is asked 
by people for real reasons and calls them ‘historical’. Those questions are shown to be 
internally coherent – in the sense that the characteristics and presuppositions of their 
‘specific unknowns’ are not mutually contradictory – and, when aimed at truth, 
sometimes of present real-world importance. Nowhere does Collingwood say that people 
may not pose and answer systematically questions that fail one or more of these 
conditions. It follows from his logic of question and answer that such other questions are 
simply not what he means by ‘history’. 
                                                 
1 See also IH, pp. 6-7 
2 IH, pp. 212-13 
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